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ABSTRACT 
THE EFFECTS OF EDUCATION ON HEALTH AND FERTILITY IN GHANA 
AMA A. AHENE-CODJOE     PHD IN ECONOMICS 
THE UNIVERSITY OF NOTTINGHAM, UK    2012 
 
Using the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) conducted in 1987/88 and 
1998/99, this thesis examines two thematic areas of non-monetary returns to 
education in Ghana. One of the primary aims is to find the differences in the effects 
of education over the decade (1987/88Ȃ1998/99), using standard and non-
standard econometric analysis. In addition, the later survey year serves as a 
robustness check on the first. 
 
The first theme examines health status; measured as illness and its duration, as 
well as the use of anthropometric indicators. The study finds that parental ǯǤ
Further verification of this outcome using an instrumental variable (2SLS) 
approach that assumes possible endogeneity of parental education supports the 
results relating to maternal education in both survey years. In contrast, paternal ǯǢ
statistically significant in GLSS 1. These outcomes, although perverse are not 
uncommon in developing countries, and may be the result of systematic reporting 
bias. ǯ
between the two survey years. For example, we find that illness and its duration 
increase with personal education in GLSS 1, but the converse is true in GLSS 4, 
ceteris paribus. The mixed results of this study imply that the relationship 
between education and health status varies across health measures, and probably 
over time. Hence caution should be exercised before broad conclusions are drawn 
and policies made regarding these two vital socioeconomic indicators (education 
and health).  
The last theme analyses fertility in both structural and reduced form functions. 
The structural function involves a two-stage process. The first stage estimates the 
effect of education on three proximate determinants of fertility - the duration of 
breastfeeding, contraceptive use and age at cohabitation. The second stage 
subsequently models the fertility function by estimating three measures: the 
probability of having at least one birth; the unconditional number of births; and 
the number of births conditional on one having occurred, using the predicted 
values of the proximate determinants as inputs similar to the conventional 
production function. The reduced form fertility model estimates the impact of ǯǤȋ ?Ȍ
education increases the use of contraception, delays age at cohabitation and 
shortens the duration of breastfeeding, as anticipated; (2) contraception and age 
at cohabitation subsequently tend to reduce the overall number of live births, 
though we observe an ambiguous outcome regarding breastfeeding; (3) 
education, in a fuller and direct way, also shows a strong negative association with 
fertility in both surveys; and finally (4) fertility appears to have declined over the 
period studied. We also find a structural shift in respect of the influence of ǯ-primary to primary level on fertility, ceteris 
paribus. 
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis estimates the non-wage returns to education in two thematic areas 
using two household surveys in Ghana. The analysis focuses on the relevance of 
education to health and fertility. These are two important variables that affect the 
pattern of economic growth and development of any country, most of all, a 
developing one. Ghana, one of the African countries to expand its educational 
sector in the early sixties because of the expected gains to be derived (Hinchliffe, 
1971) and currently implementing a policy of Free Compulsory Basic Education 
(FCUBE), makes a good choice for this study. As the thesis explores in subsequent 
chapters, education has the potential to improve the general welfare of societies 
through for example, improvement in health and reduction of fertility levels. 
These work together to increase national income, growth and development as 
well as reduce poverty. Considering its role in economic development, education 
could arguably be the most vital investment countries in Africa need to leapfrog 
into the heights of development. 
The first thematic area in the study is health, where an estimate of non-monetary 
returns to education is analysed. This explores the relationship between 
education and health status in the entire country for adults and children. The 
measurement of health is reported illness by individuals in a household. A special 
emphasis is given to maternal education since mothers are the primary source of 
childcare in a household.  
The other thematic area of the thesis ǯǡ
measured as number of children ever born to the woman. Both structural and 
reduced forms are examined in the fertility analysis to draw insights into how 
 2 
 
education affects fertility through the proximate determinants of fertility as well 
as its reduced form effects. The proximate determinants used in the structural 
model are contraception, duration of breastfeeding and age at cohabitation. Two 
periods of the survey data, which are a decade apart, are used in the estimation of 
the models. The second survey serves as a robustness check on the first and where 
relevant, notable changes in policy related variables as well as their implications 
are brought to attention. The sections below present the general issues of 
education in the thematic areas, an overview of Ghana, and a brief explanation of 
the organisation of the thesis. 
 3 
 
1.1. GENERAL ISSUES 
A surge of interest in education, productivity and human development in general 
has been witnessed over the past few decades through many studies on the topic. 
The belief that education plays a considerable role in improving the welfare of the 
populace is undoubtedly the crux of this interest. Both macro and micro-economic 
analyses in published and unpublished literature indicate the importance of ǯ (see Shultz, 2003; Gueye and Gauci, 2003; 
Glewwe, 2002, 1991; Appiah and McMahon, 2002; Teal, 2001; Appleton, 2001; 
Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999; Appleton and Balihuta, 1996; World Bank, 
1986; Lockheed, Jamison and Lau, 1980; and Hinchliffe, 1971). New growth 
theorists have also emphasised the effective role of education in accelerating and 
sustaining growth (see Romer, 1990, 1986; Lucas, 1988) and the returns benefit 
not only individuals but also society in general. Early proponents of the theory 
argued that investment in physical capital alone is not adequate for growth; equal 
if not more investment in human capital is also required. Therefore education 
became one of the core developmental goals of most developing countries, and 
Ghana is no exception. Hinchliffe (1971) for instance notes that due to the 
increased belief in education as the means to growth, both finance and trained 
manpower were channelled in increased quantities into the educational sector of 
many countries, even to the detriment of other sectors. 
For low-income countries especially, investment in education is desired for the 
additional purpose of reducing poverty through increased efficiency and 
productivity. Poverty is a significant feature in most developing countries, but for 
Africa, it has almost become ǯǤabout 
sub-Saharan-Africa (SSA) is written without a reference to poverty. This has led to 
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an increasing quest among leaders of nations and international institutions to find 
techniques to reduce poverty drastically, if not eradicate it all together. Poverty 
reduction is one of the most challenging goals of developing countries. Thus, 
analysing education in any developing country needs no further justification. 
Studies on returns on education provide assurance and advice to these low-
income countries on plausible channels to improve productivity and therefore 
growth. Some of the studies include the World Bank (1986), Glewwe (1991; 
2002), Appleton (2001), and Gueye and Gauci (2003), which give support to 
education as a way to increase incomes, promote growth and aid poverty 
eradication. However, the economic returns estimated for Africa are sometimes 
found to be relatively small, and also as in most developing countries it increases 
economic inequalities, especially at higher levels of education (Shultz, 2003). 
Education moves labour from farm to non-farm activities (especially giving access 
to wage employment), which although increasing household incomes (Jolliffe, 
1998, 2004; Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 1999; and Appleton, 2001), also creates 
inequalities because gains from non-farm activities are unevenly distributed 
(Canagarajah et al., 2001).  
This is not the case for non-wage returns, most of which are shown to be 
favourable. In the past few decades, research focus has been geared towards the 
assessment of some of the underlying social or external returns on education that 
are important to the development of low-income countries. Most findings indicate 
that education improves health status and reduces fertility (Lawson, 2004; 
Appleton, 1996). It also ǯ
uncertain productivity and employer learning (Strobl, 2004) as well as increase 
farm productivity in relation to both internal and external returns (Appleton and 
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Balihuta, 1996; and Weir and Knight, 2000). Appiah and McMahon (2002) 
analysed the comprehensive net effects of education in Africa, and they found that 
education goes beyond increasing incomes and growth to improving infant 
survival, longevity, strengthening civic institution and democratisation, increasing 
political stability, lowering fertility and population growth rates as well as 
contributing to sustainable environment. Female education particularly plays role 
in these social developments. Summers (1994) show how increases in female ǤǡǲǥǤǡǯ
highest return investment available to the developing worldǤǳȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
succinctly summarises the benefits of female education, and to paraphrase, thus: 
female education is the single most effective way to encourage a shift to smaller, 
healthier, and better educated families with an enormous subsequent impact on 
population growth and sustainable development. She explains that education ǯearnings capacity; increases the opportunity cost of their time 
and bargaining positions in families and society which results in fewer offspring 
who consequently would have better education and healthier livelihood. 
Because of this and other many important benefits to education several 
international institutions have adopted measures of health and education as the 
fundamental non-monetary indicators of development. The Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) represent an example of such a measure. Under the 
MDGs Ȃ using a baseline of 1990 Ȃ world leaders set targets for developing 
countries to be achieved by 2015. More than half of the goals are related to 
education and health in addition to the fundamental focus of poverty reduction. 
This includes the reduction of malnutrition, under-five mortality, infant mortality, 
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maternal mortality and HIV/AIDS among others. In addition, country-specific 
development targets such as those in the Ghana Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS 
I, 2003-5) include health and education as challenges to its basic goal of reducing 
poverty. The emphasis placed on these two stems from the generally accepted 
view that education positively affects the general efficiency of labour as well as 
makes the implementation of new technologies possible. On the other hand, health ǯ
labour supply that increases income and expenditure, which eventually leads to 
development. Also, higher survival rates of children lead to lower fertility by ǲǳǤ
results in lower fertility.  
Indeed fertility plays a crucial role in economic development since high 
population growth rates unmatched by economic growth increases poverty. One 
of the effective ways noted of promoting development, is curbing fertility rates; 
and education plays a significant role. There are however, positive and negative 
impacts of education in general and of female education on fertility in particular. 
Thus the net effect on population growth rates could be positive or negative, or 
even insignificant depending on the strength of the channel through which 
education works (Bongaarts et al., 1984; and Appiah and McMahon, 2002). First of 
all educated adults are able to obtain knowledge about health and nutrition for 
both themselves and their offspring, which reduces mortality and increases life 
expectancy. Although educated women have a higher tendency to breastfeed, 
which improves the survival rates of children, they also tend to breastfeed for 
shorter periods as well as shorten post-partum abstinence. Unaccompanied by 
effective contraceptive use, the possible consequence is increased population size. 
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Conversely, female education may lower fertility by increasing contraceptive use 
as well as participation in wage employment, which raises the opportunity cost of ǯǤ	nement of marriage and 
later family formation (Martin, 1995). Indeed Westoff et al., (1994) cited in Martin 
(1995), show that even when sexual activities precedes marriage, education leads 
to the postponement of first birth, which is likely to have a lowering effect on final 
family size. As Jain (1981) explains, female school enrolment alone without a 
simultaneous change in other factors such as increased opportunities in paid 
labour force could also influence fertility behaviour, especially by increasing age at 
marriage.  
Sub-Saharan Africa is noted to have experienced some of the negative effects of 
education on fertility. Nevertheless, for the majority of the countries, the 
percentage of the female population with education beyond the primary level is 
not high enough to warrant a substantial fall in fertility in the continent. Bongaarts 
et al., (1984) suggested fertility in SSA would fall after literacy levels of women of 
reproductive age reaches above 70 percent, for the effects of increased 
contraceptive use and delayed age at first union to outweigh the effect of shorter 
breastfeeding and post-partum abstinence. A more recent simulation by Appiah 
and McMahon (2002) also show that net population growth rate is still increasing 
in SSA but would stabilise around 2035 AD; and begin to fall when most female 
education reaches beyond the ninth grade1. This is when the negative effects of 
education (through behaviours including enrolment in school that delays age at 
reproduction debut; increase use of contraception; higher opportunities and 
wages in the labour force and hence participation) on fertility would outpace the 
                                                        
1
 The average for most of the poor countries in Africa is third grade. 
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positive effects. However, for some countries like Zimbabwe, Kenya and 
Botswana, the fertility transition has begun. 
Despite the many studies done in the area, there is room for more. This thesis 
adds to the existing knowledge by analysing two sets of data, which are a decade 
apart to roughly capture socioeconomic dynamics as well as the influence of 
education. Through the interaction of health, fertility and education, the 
development of human resources of a country is also enhanced. The wheels of 
social and economic development are consequently set into motion. Thus, the 
importance of the thematic areas in this thesis and their subsequent effects on 
socioeconomic development cannot be over-emphasised. The chapter on health 
answers questions like: does education determine morbidity and its duration in 
households? Which kinds of people are more likely to fall ill and if they do, for how 
long? Does education matter in the development of children in relation to height 
and weight? Is there any underlying gender discrimination in any of the above 
situations? And what other policy relevant variables affect illness, duration, 
height-for-age and weight-for-height, as well as their implications in the country? 
The chapter on fertility also examines whether education influences fertility by 
estimating a reduced form as well as a structural model. The former estimates the 
overall impact of education on fertility while the latter examines its influence 
through particular channels such as contraceptive use, breastfeeding duration and 
age at cohabitation. Questions as to whether fertility has changed over the period 
understudy as well as whether education contributes to the change are answered. 
This thesis uses various econometric methods in the estimation of the two 
thematic areas with control for endogeneity for variables with valid instruments. 
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Whilst Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is employed in estimating most models, 
Probit, Tobit and duration models are also used where necessary. 
This thesis focuses on non-wage returns to education in Ghana because many 
economic returns have been analysed by other studies. These include Glewwe 
(1999) who estimated private rate of return to education using the second round 
(1988/89) of Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS), Jolliffe who in a series of 
studies in 1998, 1999 and 2004 estimated farm and non-farm earnings also used 
the second round and Teal (2001) who used all the four rounds of the GLSS to 
estimate earnings in relation to education. Also studies of the non-wage returns to 
education in Ghana, especially with the GLSS are few and most are quite dated. 
Thus possible changes over the years are not uncovered. This thesis adds to the 
knowledge in the field by focusing on some of the social outcomes as well as non-
wage returns to education. It also has the novelty of estimating changes over the 
period of a decade. 
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1.2. THE CONTEXT 
This section gives the general background information of the country under-study. 
The main focus is on the socioeconomic variables to be analysed in subsequent 
chapters. This also highlights changes, especially over the period being assessed in 
the thesis.  
 
1.2.1 Ghana 
In 1957 Ghana won her independence from British colonial rule and at the time 
emerged as a beacon of hope on a continent blighted by slavery, colonial rule and 
poverty. The first half of her 54 years existence as an independent country was 
characterised by political instability mainly as the result ǯ±ǡ
the first of which occurred in 1966. The consequence of this instability was 
generally a poor economic performance. Table 1.1 gives some of the major socio-
economic indicators on Ghana from 1984 to 2010. Located along the west coast of 
Africa, independent Ghana is today a low-income country with a per capita income 
just over $700. The period between 1972 and 1983 represented a decade of 
economic downturn. Aryeetey and Harrigan (2000) have described this decade as 
nothing short of an unmitigated economic disaster.  
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Table 1.1: Socioeconomic Indicators of Ghana, 1984 Ȃ 2010   
General 1984 2000 2005 200
8 
2010 
Population (mill.) 12.3 18.9 21.3 23.6 25.0 
(2011) 
Urban (%) 32 43.8  48 48 
Population Growth Rate 2.6 2.4 2.2 2.1 2.1 (2009) 
Percentage of people in 
poverty 
 39.5  
(1998/99
) 
28.5   
GDP per capita (US $) 334 (1985) 247 476 712 753* 
GDP Growth (%) 8.6 3.7 5.9 8.4 6.6* 
Agriculture      
Contribution to GDP (%) 52.5 (1985) 39.6 39.5 37.7 35.6* 
Education      
Primary Net Enrolment Ratio      
Total 53.6 (1991) 62.9 65.1 76.5 75.9 
(2009) 
Female 50.4 (1991) 62 64.9 77 76.2 
(2009) 
Secondary Net Enrolment 
Ratio 
     
Total  33.8 39.2 47.4 46.1(2009
) 
Female  31.2 36.7 45.3 44.1 
(2009) 
Adult Literacy (%) 32.5 
(1987/88) 
49.8 56.2 65.8 66.6 
(2009) 
Health      
Infant Mortality Rate  
(per 1000 live births) 





Life Expectancy (Years):      
Male 50.3 55.4  58 63 
Female 53.8 59.6  59 65 
Population per Doctor 
 
 1:20,036  
(2001) 
1:17,929 1:13,683  
(2007) 
Fertility      





Source: Ghana Statistical Service; UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Global Education Database; 
Population Reference Bureau (PRB); African Development Indicators. 
- Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is based on the old series estimates. Source: News Brief, New Series 
of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Estimates, (2010). Ghana Statistical Service, Statistical 




Real GDP per capita, real export earnings, domestic saving and investment all 
declined dramatically. The economic and social infrastructure was near collapse, 
the majority of economic transactions took place in parallel markets, and there 
was a massive haemorrhage of human capital to neighbouring countries. The 
crisis in the Ghanaian economy, which started from the early 1970s and persisted 
until the mid-1980s resulted in a gradual migration of professionals and other 
skilled individuals to neighbouring countries as well as countries in Europe, North 
America, the Middle East and other countries on the African continent. This loss of Ǯǯ
impacts especially in the health and education sectors. Van Hear (1998) for 
example estimates that approximately 14,000 teachers left Ghana between 1975 
and 1981, of which 3,000 were university graduates (Rado, 1986). Initially most of 
them settled in Nigeria although others found themselves in Liberia, Gambia, 
Libya, Botswana, Europe and North America (Anarfi et al., 2003). As Awumbila et 
al., (2008) affirm, Ghana in the 1970s lost many of teachers to Nigeria and in the 
1980s also lost health professionals to developed economies such as UK and the 
USA (Anarfi, 1982; Nuro, 2000). Although accurate numbers are hard to come by, 
Akurang-Parry (2002) reports that estimates by the Ghana Medical Association 
for 2000 show that more than 600 Ghanaian doctors trained locally worked in the 
state of New York. Dovlo (2003) also reports that 61 percent of the output of one 
medical school in Ghana had left the country between 1986 and 1995. The 
migration of people was not restricted only to skilled professionals. Other non-
skilled individuals faced with difficult domestic economic challenges also joined 
the exodus.  
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Real economic activity however began to improve from 1984 a year after the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) commenced. Growth of real GDP averaged 
5 percent between 1984 and 2000, and since 2001 real GDP growth has averaged 
nearly 7 Ǥǯ
ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ?ǡ
is now less than 40 percent. Nonetheless, it still represents the largest sector of 
national output. Its significance to the economy is therefore unquestionable. 
About 60 percent of the economically active population either engages directly or 
indirectly (agriculture-related activities) in agriculture. It is also a major source of 
foreign exchange especially the cocoa sub-sector that contributed about 39.2 and 
74.0 percent to total foreign and agricultural earnings respectively. Despite its ǯ
ǡ
proportion of poor households in the country (ISSER, 2005). 
According to the Ghana Statistical Service (GSS) and Population Reference Bureau ȋȌǡǯas at mid-2011 is approximately 25 million with 
an estimated growth rate of 2.1 percent. Close to half the population currently live 
in urban areas, increasing from 32.0 percent in 1984. This reflects increased rural-
urban migration, which consequently strains the ability of the state to provide 
social services such as education, health care, water and sanitation. There are 10 
administrative regions in the country whose living standards are partly 













Regions in the north (Upper East, Upper West and Northern Region) are the 
poorest in economic terms. Apart from them being farther from the capital Accra, 
which is at the south and on the coast, they have a dry savannah climate; hence 
produce few crops most of the seasons. Therefore people from the north often 
migrate to the south, especially to the neighbouring forest regions with lush 
vegetation for seasonal crops. Related to the regions are ethnicity and religion. 
The Akans are the largest ethnic group in Ghana, constituting about 53 percent of 
the population and are located in the middle, central, eastern and western part of 
the country. Other major ethnic groups are Ga-Adangbes, Ewes and Guans located 
in the south and north-eastern of Ghana respectively, and Mole-Dagbon, Grusi and 
Mande-Busanga are located north. Major religious practices in Ghana include 
Christianity, Islam, Traditional African and no religion. Christianity is mainly 
practiced in the south, Islam in the north and Traditional African in the northeast 
and northern regions. 
Like many developing countries, Ghana has integrated the MDGs with its national 
goals outlined in the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) part II, 2006-
9. The current GLSS 5 report indicates that the percentage of people who are poor 
has decreased to 28.5, suggesting that the MDG target of 26 percent by 2015 is 
likely to be met. This success however does not extend to the other targets. 
Education and health for instance are far from meeting the targets. Although 
Ghana launched a policy of free compulsory basic education in the mid-90s, net 
primary enrolment ratio has only increased from 53.6 to 75.9 percent in 2009 
(UNESCO, 2011). Calculating from 2005 net enrolment of 65.1 percent, the World 
Development Indicator (WDI, World Bank cited on UNESCO (2008) website) 
shows that Ghana would need to increase primary enrolment by 5.1 percent to 
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achieve the universal primary education target in 2015. Although this rate is 
better than some countries in West Africa like Nigeria and Burkina Faso who need 
increases of 5.27 and 9.52 percent respectively to achieve the goal, it is bigger 
than its nearest neighbour, Togo, and Senegal who require 2.87 and 4.11 percent 
rises respectively. Other countries needing smaller percentage increases to 
achieving universal primary education include Kenya (3.13%), Tanzania (0.87%) 
and India (1.37%). 
Secondary education enrolment is far lower than primary with less than half 
(46.1% in 2009) secondary school-aged students in school. However, it compares 
favourably with Kenya (49.6% in 2009) and has higher rates than Nigeria (25.8% 
in 2007), Senegal (20.8% in 2006) and Zimbabwe (37.2% in 2006). The gap ǯ
also closing in Ghana. Similar to the other education indicators, adult literacy has 
improved over the years to 66.6 percent in 2009, but is still low compared to ǯ ? ?Ǥ ?ǡǯ ? ?Ǥ ?ǡǯ ? ?Ǥ ?Ǥ 
ǯǲǳ
emanates from the framework of the MDGs in the GPRS II. The Annual Report of 
the Ghana Health Service (GHS, 2007) propounds the theme as one of the main 
pathways to the ultimate middle-income status by 2015. However, the health 
targets are far from being achieved. The health status of the country is poor and 
deteriorating. Morbidity increased by about 40 percent between GLSS 1 and 4 and 
about a third of the child population is stunted. The disease burden is dominated 
by communicable diseases, almost all of which are preventable. Malaria, the 
leading cause of morbidity and mortality in Ghana (Annual Report, 2007, GHS), 
can easily be prevented by clearing stagnant water bodies and nearby bushes as 
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well as by providing easy access to treated mosquito nets. Due to limited action on 
prevention, malaria constitute ? ? ?ǯover 
18% of deaths reported at health facilities (ibid). Children under five years old and 
pregnant women are the most affected. Other common diseases include acute 
respiratory infection, diarrhoea, ulcers, anaemia and pregnancy related 
complications. The report also indicated that HIV/AIDS reached the pandemic 
state at a prevalence rate of 3.4% in 2006. Other indicators of health such as the 
infant mortality ratio, under-five mortality ratio and maternal mortality ratio are 
worsening.  
Government figures differ slightly from the Ghana Demographic Health Survey 
(GDHS) but basically show the same trend of the health indicators. Infant and 
under-five mortality ratios from 1988 to 2008 could be described as U-shaped. 
The rates declined from the 80s to the 90s, then increased thereafter. The figures 
from government health statistics show that infant mortality ratio decreased from 
77 per thousand live births in 1988 to 57 per thousand live births in 1998. Then it 
began to increase to 64 per thousand in 2003 and 71 per thousand live births 
(2008). The increase in infant mortality between 2003 and 2007 is mainly 
attributed to the increase in neo-natal mortality (MOH, 2008). Similarly, under-
five mortality declined from 155 per thousand births in 1988 to 108 per thousand 
births in 1998 but then started increasing to around 111 per thousand live births 
in 2006. Maternal mortality has also increased to 230 per 100,000 live births 
(2007) from 205 per 100,000 live births in 2003. These health indicators are high 
relative to international standards. However within West Africa, Ghana has better ǯǡǡ	 with 
regard to under-five mortality rates. The State of tǯ
 18 
 
(2008) ranks2 Ghana number 32 amongst 194 developing countries. Of the ten 
West African countries included, Ghana rates better than all except Cape Verde, 
Togo and Senegal.  
The Millennium development targets for Ghana to achieve include reducing 
under-five mortality to 40 per 1000 births, underweight in children to 14.7 
percent, maternal mortality by three-quarters and to stop the spread of HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases. With falling poverty levels, Ghana is projected to be on 
its way to achieving the coveted poverty reduction goal of cutting the proportion 
of people living on one dollar a day by half by 2015. Indeed by assuming a linear 
projection of the decline in poverty from 52% (1992) to 40% (1999), the 
proportion of the population living below the poverty and extreme poverty lines 
will be around 9.3 and 4.0 percents respectively by 20153 (ISSER, 2005). This 
proportion far exceeds the 2015 MDG targets of 26 and 19 percents for the upper 
and extreme poverty lines respectively. However, such anticipated declines 
cannot be observed with respect to the other MDGs such as malnutrition using the 
same projections. Although the proportion of children underweight declined from 
27.0% (1992) to 23.3% (2003), the millennium target of 14% is not expected to 
be achieved by 2015, instead a higher value of 21% is projected (ibid). The other 
targets in the MDGs, namely, child mortality, maternal health, eradicating malaria 
and HIV/AIDS as well as universal basic education are also far from being 
achieved. 
                                                        
2
 Countries with lower under-five mortality rates are ranked higher 
3
 The assumption of a downward slope was based on the past 17 years experience rate of decline of 
poverty in the country. 
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Life expectancy on the other hand is improving, perhaps in part because of a 
decreased patient to doctor ratio from about 20 thousand to 13.7 thousand to one 
doctor in 2000 and 2007 respectively as well as increased percentage of adult 
literacy. Education, as already elaborated on in the section above, sensitises health 
awareness and paves the way for increased access to the limited healthcare 
available. Also related to increased literacy as well as urbanisation is fallen 
fertility rates. Fertility rates declined from 6.4 in 1988 to 4.4 percent in 1998, and 
it has remained that after a decade. Some researchers doubt fertility would fall 
below 4.0 in Ghana, at least not in the near future.  Agyei-Mensah (2005) for 
example suggests that unless fertility decline drastically in rural areas especially, 
as well as a more drastic societal transformation occurs, the transition would stall 
for sometime. He explained that although having six children is seen as a burden 
in recent times, couples are nonetheless anxious and insecure if they have less 
than four children. Thus the projection by the UN (2004) that Ghana would reach 
fertility replacement level by 2045-2050 is uncertain (ibid).      
 
1.2.2 The Education System 
The education system in Ghana from 1957 to 1986/1987 covered elementary or 
basic school, secondary and university education. The elementary takes 10 years 
to complete and a pass of Middle-School Leaving Examination (MSLE) qualifies 
one to enter formal employment at the lower ranks for clerical duties. It is made 
up of 6 years primary, which is officially free and compulsory (now or before), and 
4 years of middle school. Secondary education consisted of grammar schools, 
teacher training colleges, nursing and technical and vocational institutions. 
Secondary grammar school takes 5 years for an Ordinary Level and a further 2 
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years for the Advanced Level Certificate. Entry requires a pass from the Common 
Entrance Examination (CEE), which is taken at primary 6 or any year at the 
middle school. Teacher training colleges take either middle school leavers for a 
four-year or fifth and sixth form students from secondary grammar schools for a 
three and two-year certificate course respectively. Nursing and 
technical/vocational institutions like teacher training colleges take students from 
either middle or secondary grammar schools at several levels.  
The university education was primarily at the University of Ghana, University of 
Science and Technology and the University of Cape Coast. Duration is usually 3 
years4. Historically taking the mainstream education, that is, via the middle and 
secondary grammar system for instance gave 6-4-5-2-3 years of education. 
Students who avoided middle5 school and entered secondary grammar straight 
from primary school had 6-5-2-3 years instead, but were still credited with the 4 
years of middle school because their education level is likely to be equal to that of 
a student in M3 or 4 (Basic Information, GLSS 1 and 2, 1987/88). 
After the educational reforms in 1986/87, the system changed from 13Ȃ17 years 
pre-tertiary schooling to 12 years. Basic education became 6 years primary and 3 
years junior secondary school. Secondary education changed to 3 years senior 
secondary, which could be grammar, technical or vocational, and university 
undergraduate degrees changed to 4 years. Thus, the educational system now is 6-
3-3-4. The training schools mentioned earlier still operate alongside this new 
system, with some (including polytechnics) upgraded to tertiary levels. There are 
                                                        
4
 An additional year is taken by students pursuing a teaching degree. This is mainly at the University of 
Cape Coast, which was built for that purpose. 
5
 These are usually students from private schools. 
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also private universities specialising in various courses as well as institutes of 
journalism and professional studies. 
 
1.2.3 Data 
This thesis draws on data from a comprehensive household survey programme, 
the Ghana Living Standards Survey (GLSS) carried out by the Ghana Statistical 
Service (GSS). GLSS is a nationwide survey devised to give standards of living 
information on a continuous basis to the government, for a more effective welfare 
policy formulation for the country. There are currently five rounds6 completed: 
GLSS 1 in 1987/88, GLSS 2 in 1988/89, GLSS 3 in 1991/92, GLSS 4 in 1998/99 and 
GLSS 5 in 2005/06. The data are collected over a period of 12 months at the 
individual, household and community levels. Information on individuals includes 
demographic characteristics, education, health, employment and time use, and 
migration. At the household level, data on income, expenditure, housing, 
household enterprises and assets are collected whilst provision of public services 
(education and health), communication, transportation, food and commodity 
prices, main demographic, religious, economic and social characteristics are the 
focus of the community level data. 
In addition to this common coverage in all the data sets, each round focuses and 
gives extra information on particular topics that may not be in the others. For 
instance GLSS 1 and 2 have anthropometric information whilst the rest do not; 
and GLSS 2 alone has data on cognitive skills tests7. In fact the first two surveys 
                                                        
6





were designed with a rotating panel sequence in mind, where half of the sample in 
the first is retained for re-interview in the second, with the other half replaced. 
GLSS 3 differed from the first two by giving more detailed information on income, 
consumption and expenditure of households at disaggregated levels. The 
 ? ?ǯ-farm household 
enterprises respectively. New sections, on tourism, migration and remittances, are 
also included in GLSS 5.  
Apart from the extra data or emphasis of each round of the surveys, they also 
cover different sampling sizes Ȃ they increase with each subsequent round. 
However only the first and fourth rounds, which this thesis uses, are discussed8 
for brevity. GLSS 1 covered 176 enumeration areas (EAs), about 63 percent of 
which are rural and a total of 3,136 households with 15,492 individuals. The 
corresponding figures for GLSS 4 are 300, 65 percent, 5,998 and 25,855. Although 
a multi-staged stratified sampling procedure was used in selecting enumeration 
areas (EAs) and households for all rounds, some of them are self-weighting whilst 
others are not. For example, GLSS 1 is self-weighting (proportional allocation)9 
but not GLSS 4. Therefore sample weights provided with the GLSS 4 data are 
applied where the econometric method employed under sub-sections of thematic 
areas allows. This may present some limitations in the comparison of the two 
surveys as done in all the chapters of this thesis. Also, due to lack of data on some 
                                                        
8
 Actual achieved sample are given.  
9
 &KRVHQKRXVHKROGVKDGHTXDOSUREDELOLW\RIEHLQJVHOHFWHGDQGJURXSHGLQWR³ZRUNORDGV´RI
households each whilst considering the three main ecological zones (coastal, forest and savannah) as 
well as rural, urban and semi-urban location. This is done in order to form the same proportion in the 
sample as in the national population. Upon the selection of EAs, 200 workloads were assigned to 
them such that areas with higher than average increases in sampling size had a greater than one 
chance of being selected. Therefore each enumeration was assigned zero, one, two or sometimes 
three workloads of 16 households. Each group of 16, 32, or 48 households within a sampling or 
enumeration area is referred to as a cluster in the data sets. (Source: Basic Information, GLSS 1 & 2, 
Poverty and Human Resources Division, The World Bank, 1993).  
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topics in one or the other of these two data sets as well as differences in the 
measurement of some variables10, a strict comparison sometimes could not be 
made.  However the results obtained still give some important insights into the 
general trend on topics covered over the years in the country and for some level of 
comparison to be made, which may be useful for policy.    
The GLSS 1 and 4 datasets are used in this study because they were the first and 
last rounds at the beginning of the thesis; and with a span of a decade between 
them, it is anticipated that potential trends in the socioeconomic variables could 
be observed. Also some of the information required for analysis, such as the 
anthropometric measures, is available in only GLSS 1; besides GLSS 1 and 2 are 
quite similar, as is GLSS 3 and 4. Thus with slight dissimilarities coupled with 
maximum information between the GLSS 1 and 4 datasets, the opportunity to use 
one (especially the later) for robustness checks exists. 
                                                        
10
 Details are given in main text under the various chapters. 
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1.3. ORGANISATION OF THESIS     
The two thematic areas are analysed in two substantive chapters. Additional two 
chapters Ȃ on introduction and conclusions Ȃ are included to make up the whole 
thesis. Chapter 1 has provided an overview of the research questions, motivation 
and context of the thesis. Chapter 2 covers the analysis of health outcomes, which 
includes the incidence of illness and its duration, as well as anthropometric 
measures. These are divided into sub-sections in the chapter, and under each the 
relevant literature, methodology and econometric specification are presented, as 
well as discussions of econometric results. Models of fertility, both structural and 
reduced form, are estimated in chapter 3. The analyses comprise proximate 
(contraceptives, breastfeeding and age at cohabitation) and socioeconomic 
determinants with the literature, methodology, econometric specifications and 
estimations examined under each sub-topic to give easier reference. Finally 






Chapter 2: EDUCATION AND HEALTH STATUS 
This chapter examines the relationship between education and health status using 
household survey data from two periods. The analysis of is conducted separately 
for children and adults using variety of health measures to explore the different 
effects of education on each. The main reason for this is that children in 
households do not make decisions concerning their health; other household 
members with responsibility roles for the household such as their parents or 
household head make these decisions on their behalf. Hence the characteristics, 
education in this case, of these members is important and thus used in the 
analyses.  
Additionally data on one of the health indicators (the anthropometrics) is 
available for only children, which makes the separation of children and adults in 
the analysis more appropriate. Although maternal education is more often than ǯȋ
ǡ ? ? ? ?
Doyle et al., 2007), other studies also find the education of both parents influential 
(Thomas et al., 1990; 1991) and sometimes that of the father instead of the 
mother (Appleton, 1991; Lavy et al., 1996) as influential. Consequently in our ǡǯǡ
for adults in this study.  
The health status measures considered for adults are the incidence of illness and 
the duration of illness, with the main research question being whether own Ǥǯ
sample is the asǯǤǯ
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or removes own education effects. The empirical literature does not give a 
consistent outcome. For instance Behrman and Wolfe (1987) find own education ǯǢ
but Joshi (1994) finds a contrary outcome in Nepal. 
With regard to children, anthropometric measures (height-for-age and weight-for-
height) are examined in addition to the health measures, incidence of illness and 
its duration. The main question asked is whether parental education favourably 
influences these health outcomes of children. The variety of health indicators 
analysed provides an opportunity to observe whether parental education has 
consistent effects on different dimensions of health outcomes. They can also act as 
sensitivity checks for each other, although the health outcomes are not strictly 
comparable. This is because morbidity is self-reported and therefore subjective; 
largely influenced by the socioeconomic characteristics of households and errors 
(most likely recall). However, anthropometric measures, albeit also subject to 
some errors11, are the more objective of the two. The comparison is on whether 
education is found to be beneficial in all the measures.  
In order to assess the full effect of education without the carry-on effect of other 
socioeconomic or policy indicators highly correlated with it, some of the latter 
including income and location are controlled in the empirical model. For example, 
education and income are positively correlated, hence omitting income from the 
specification will cause an upward bias of estimates, as education will not only 
show its own effect but also reflect the effect of income. Therefore with the aim of 
analysing the impact of education without the indirect influence of income, an 
                                                        
11
 Measurement errors due to inaccurate alignment of children on measuring boards or recorded figures, 
oIILFLDOVPLJKWIRUJHWWRUHFDOLEUDWHVFDOHVQRWWRPHQWLRQYDULDWLRQLQIRULQVWDQFHDFKLOG¶VZHLJKWRYHU
the course of a day or across days (Strauss and Thomas, 1998)  
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alternative specification holding household expenditure (used in accordance with 
the permanent income hypothesis) constant is conducted. These control variables 
are also briefly discussed later in the study for possible direct influence and policy 
relevance.  
Regarding expenditure, one of the interests is to find whether its inclusion 
removes the significance of education, as education might be reflecting its effect 
on expenditure, or they complement each other. Controlling location also 
distinguishes quality and availability of facilities between rural and urban 
communities as well as regional differences. Further analysis is also made by ǯ
urban sub-samples with the aim of observing possible differences in the 
educational returns on health in these areas. There is also the added benefit to 
control additional variables observed at community levels in rural areas only.  
Introducing these controls into the model does not only imply that estimates of 
education would be indicating a more direct influence but it is also likely to reduce 
the potential bias of education due to correlation with unobserved variables in the 
error term. This bias, which could be as a result of endogeneity, might occur 
because there exists multiple connections between education and health, as well 
as other socioeconomic variables. The fundamental argument here is that 
education affects health, and health affect education; and there are common 
factors such as genetic endowment, social background or time preference that 
simultaneously affect both education and health, which contribute to the 
correlation between them. In order to avoid reverse causality as well as a possible 
correlation with the error term due to an omitted or unobserved variable, 
instrumental variable (IV) approach is required in the estimation of the model. 
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This could then result in a possible identification of a causal link between 
education and health. However the outcome is achievable if valid instrumental 
variables, that is: (1) variables that correlate with education but not health; (2) 
uncorrelated with the error term, which involves unobserved variables or 
measurement errors; and (3) not required to be included in the estimating the 
model as explanatory variables; could be found.  
In this chapter, we attempted the use of the instrumental variable procedure in a 
two-stage least-squares (2SLS) approach but achieved few successes with a pass 
at the validity test. However, various statistical indicators, which are discussed in 
details under the methodology section, suggest the instruments are weak. 
Therefore proof of the causality effect of education on health is performed under ȋǯȌǤ
the remaining sections, and indeed those under the fertility theme in the next 
chapter are estimated with education presumed as exogenous. This approach has 
been used in similar studies such as those by Thomas et al., (1990; 1991), 
Appleton (1991), Alderman and Garcia (1994), Glewwe and Desai (1999), Jalan 
and Ravallion (2003), Cooper et al., (2006). Consequently, where possible, 
relevant and available control variables are included in the model specifications to 
minimise the influence of unobserved factors or omitted variable bias. 
The ensuing estimates of education in this thesis might then be indicative of 
association rather than causal relationship with the dependent outcomes due to 
the potential problem of endogeneity. This is a primary limitation of the study. 
However, the source of bias could be regarded as less serious in the analyses of ǡǯǡ
about education inputs would have occurred early in the lifecycle (Currie and 
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Madrian, 1999). The discussion of estimates in this study might sometimes appear 
to be caǲǳǡ
borne in mind that the relationship is most likely not causal. 
Ȁǯ
health has usually been found beneficial. However, studies on developing 
countries frequently use health indicators such as child mortality and 
anthropometric measures (see Appendix AȂ1). This restricts health information to 
only a sub-section of the household (children) with the health knowledge of the 
remaining members thus neglected. Many detailed studies have also been 
conducted on the anthropometric indicators on Ghana (see Lavy et al., 1996; 
Asenso-Okyere et al., 1997; Glewwe and Desai, 1999; and Blunch, 2004). However, 
very few have been conducted on the prevalence of illness and its duration. It is 
valuable for the purposes of policy making to explore several other dimensions of 
health, for consistency of evidence found regarding the relationship between 
education as well as other socioeconomic variables and health status. Further, 
there is limited research on adult health, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
where the subject appears to have been neglected. In the case of Ghana for 
example, there is none, except for Schultz and Tansel (1993; 1997) who estimated 
the ǯ-stage regression to a final analysis of a 
wage function as well as labour supply and annual earnings. This study therefore 
contributes to research in the area by filling this gap. 
This study also adds to the body of research in the area by examining the 
sensitivity of results using two survey data from the same source but a decade 
apart; two rounds of the national household surveys conducted in 1987/88 (GLSS 
1) and 1998/99 (GLSS 4) are used in this study. This is contrary to existing studies 
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on the subject of health, which used only one of the rounds of the living standards 
surveys (and there are five rounds on Ghana now), or the demographic and health 
surveys datasets or personal data collection in some particular regions. The 
concurrent use of the data sets allows for a comparison analysis over the decade, 
to the extent that the data permits, and also serves as a robustness test. The 
novelty in this approach is to better comprehend the assessment of health status 




2.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Evidence on the influence of education and other socio-economic determinants of 
health is discussed in this section. The focus of this literature review is mainly but 
not exclusively restricted to studies on Africa. The aim is to collate current 
research on the topic to help validate and add to existing deliberations on the 
relationship between education and health in the region. A summary of some of 
the literature reviewed is presented in Appendix AȂ1. 
Of the many factors that influence health outcomes, education has been identified 
as one of the most prominent. Grossman (1972) in his seminal work outlined the 
important role of education in improving the efficiency of health production by 
individuals and households. His theory is built around the assumption that 
individuals initially have a stock of health that depreciates over time, but could be 
forestalled by investing in the health capital. This investment in health is part of 
an overall household production function and would vary based on household 
decisions. This therefore shows that the level of health is not exogenous but 
dependent on the resources allocated to its production. He showed that one of 
such resources is education. There is extensive empirical research that confirms 
the importance of education on health outcomes. Some of which are discussed 
here but a lot more could be found in Ware (1984), Behrman and Deolalikar 
(1988), Hobcraft (1993), Currie (2000) and Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006) for 
both developing and developed countries.  
The studies on health outcomes in developing countries are largely skewed 
towards children. Many concentrate on health indicators such as 
survival/mortality and anthropometric indicators with few attempts at estimating 
morbidity (Blunch, 2004). Sensitivity analysis is usually the reason for most 
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studies that include morbidity, for example, to check if their findings on the main 
health indicators are robust.  However, there are a handful of notable studies 
whose primary objective is morbidity. Two of these are Appleton (1991) and 
Lawson (2004) who do not only examine children but also adults in four African Ǥǯ
concerning the immediate physical well being of a person. Wolfe and Behrman 
(1984) and Behrman and Wolfe (1987) have also undertaken a significant number 
of studies on adults but mainly on women (mothers) in Nicaragua. 
The effects of education on morbidity are mixed, at least for adults and as yet 
inconclusive in Africa and for other developing countries. However for children, 
the relationship is commonly noted as positive, where in this case education is 
rather parental education. Appleton (1991) analysed socioeconomic health 
determinǡǯǯ
household living standard surveys. He analysed children and adults separately, 
and also gives attention to gender and residence for each country. He finds that 
education is significant ǯ
consistent pattern. In Kenya, where health status is measured as number of 
diseases suffered, women with primary level education are observed as likely to 
report more ailments, whilst those with secondary level education tend to report 
less, compared to no education. On the other hand, men with secondary level 
education are noted as having higher tendencies of reporting ailments. In rural ǯǡǯ does not have any effects on the incidence of 
illness, but rather the education of the senior male and female reduces and raises ǯǤ 
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In the same study, he finds maternal education to be positively associated with ǯalmost all the countries where education was statistically 
significant. In some of these countries, paternal education was found to be 
significant and that also suggested a positive association. This gives the general 
impression that parental education makes children more prone to illness, but the 
study argues that this may be the result of parents spending less time with their 
wards due to formal employment. Moreover, educated mothers are less likely to 
breastfeed for the medically required duration therefore increasing the risk of ill 
health in children. It is also plausible that the positive correlation between 
parental education and illness could be reflecting systematic reporting bias. 
Nonetheless, the study finds parental education reduces the duration ǯ
illness in these countries. 
Similar results on education and morbidity are also noted in a study on Uganda.  
Lawson (2004) who estimated the effects of education, wealth and other 
socioeconomic variables on health finds a positive relationship between parental 
education and morbidity amongst children (school-aged and pre-school). 
Meanwhile amongst adults, only personal secondary education is found as 
significant in influencing the tendency to fall ill and shows the expected negative 
sign. Thus on the whole, the effect of education on health status of children and 
adults is varied.  
In another study in a rural district in Uganda, Katahoire et al., (2004) find 
evidence on education that suggests that ǯǯs incidence of morbidity, defined as fever, cough with fever and diarrhoea. 
They speculate that their results may be due to the existing poor socioeconomic 
environment such as poverty, food shortage, insufficient government health 
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services, poor sanitation and unprotected water sources that is likely to cause 
sickness and malnutrition for children of both educated and uneducated mothers. 
Nonetheless, those with some education increase ǯ
survival by taking advantage of the available preventive health services12. 
Blunch (2004) also modelled child health production in Ghana using literacy and 
numeracy skills of mothers. He used the GLSS 4 dataset to estimate the effects of 
maternal skills on illness and other intermediate and final health outcomes. Like 
some of the results already discussed, maternal education gives mixed evidence Ǥǯǯ
whilst the ability to write English increases it. Also, adult literacy course 
participation (where health knowledge skills are also instructed) raises the ǯǤHowever, one of the formal schooling categories is 
found significant.   
These ambiguous results on morbidity are not only found in sub-Saharan Africa 
but also in other developing countries like Nicaragua (see Wolfe and Behrman, 
1984; Behrman and Wolfe, 1987). In these studies, the latent variable approach is 
used ǯǯealth. The analysis also examines the effect of education on three main 
household health factors (nutrition, medical usage and water and sanitation), and 
how they consequently affect health status. For women, the latent health status is 
determined by ǲdays too ill to workǳ, parasitic, medically preventable and 
therapeutically treatable diseases. Their findings indicate that literate women are 
less likely to report parasitic and medically preventable diseases. However, their 
                                                        
12
 7KH\ILQGHGXFDWHGPRWKHUVDUHPRUHOLNHO\WRFRPSOHWHFKLOG¶VLPPXQLVDWLRQ7KXVFhildren could be 
protected from diseases like tetanus and measles that have vaccines.   
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being literate does not have any statistically significant influence on days of illness 
and therapeutically treatable diseases. They also ǯis 
directly influential on their own health status when the above health indicators 
are put together. On the other hand, ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯǯȋ
duration) in rural India, as expected.  
Unlike the findings in most developing countries, those on developed countries 
mostly provide beneficial evidence of education influencing health. One of such is 
the study by Cooper et al. (2006) of 13 European countries using a household 
panel data from 1994 Ȃ 2002. They used duration analysis and accounted for 
unobserved individual heterogeneity by correcting for frailty using the inverse 
Gaussian distribution. With the duration of good health (where a relapse to bad 
health occurs when one suffers a physical and mental health problems, illnesses 
and disabilities) as the health measure, they observe that education has positive 
effect in ten of the thirteen countries namely Germany, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, Austria and Finland. Education is however not found 
statistically significant in the remaining three: Denmark, the Netherlands and 
Belgium. Doyle et al. (2007) also finds parental education reduces ill health in 
children in England, with or without the control of income. However when 
instrumental variables are used to estimate the effects of education, only maternal 
education retains its influence. They thus conclude that maternal education is ǯǡǤ 
A drawback to the studies in SSA so far is that none appears to have checked the 
robustness of the results using instrumental variables approach, considering the 
possible endogeneity of education. This raises the question of whether the 
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problem of endogeneity is the cause of the mixed evidence on education and 
morbidity observed in SSA and other developing countries? This is probably not 
the case, as very few studies in SSA that attempted to solve the problem of 
endogeneity do not give very reassuring evidence. In some cases, education is 
found influential only through indirect means (Glewwe, 1998) and might not 
always be significant (Blunch, 2005). The health measures used in these cases 
however are height-for-age and mortality; none has been done on estimates of 
morbidity13.  
The use of reduced form estimation by Glewwe (1998) finds that ǯ
schooling raises the height-for-age of children aged 5 and below in Morocco when 
schooling is assumed exogenous. However the relationship is weakened, both in 
magnitude and significance, with fixed effects estimations. Further estimations of 
the same models, where maternal education is treated as endogenous found the 
relationship statistically insignificant. The instrumental variables used in this case 
are the educational levels of both parents as well as the number of married sisters 
of the mother. But the study finds an informatiǯǯǤtermed health knowledge14, 
which is acquired outside school but made possible or improved by schooling 
through literacy and numeracy skills. Female schooling thus becomes important in 
the long run. 
Following a similar procedure using the GLSS 4, Blunch (2005) finds a negative 
association between formal maternal schooling and child mortality in Ghana. The 





number of married sisters of mother and her husband, number of radios and television in household 
and the availability of local newspapers.  
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instrumental variable approach is however only significant in rural areas where 
adult literacy course participation15 as well as literacy and numeracy skills reduce 
child mortality substantially relative to the OLS. Using IVs (interactions between 
maternal birth cohort and region of birth) for the educational variables did not 
find education statistically significant in determining ǯ
areas or indeed the full sample. However they enhanced the influence of literacy 
course participation and sometimes, formal schooling on the intermediate health 
measures (postnatal care and vaccinations) examined.  
Due to the difficulties (not to mention the cumbersome estimation process) of the 
instrumental variable approach, with few satisfactory results with using data from 
SSA, most studies directly control variables that are correlated with education and 
may also affect health in reduced form estimations. Some of the unobserved 
factors too are controlled using parental family background or endowment (see 
Behrman and Wolfe, 1987; and Joshi, 1994). Although these procedures improved 
the specification models on health, the results are not always consistent and thus 
inconclusive with regard to morbidity16; but frequently beneficial with the other 
health measures such as height, weight and mortality. 
For example, Desai and Alva (1998) upon analysing 22 developing countries using 
demographic health surveys conclude that maternal education improves child 
health as measured by infant mortality, height-for-age and immunisation. (The 
study however cautions that maternal education may be acting as proxy for socio-
economic effects. This is because its magnitude decreased in two (infant mortality 
                                                        
15
 This is also where some of the direct health knowledge on family planning, immunisation, safe 
motherhood and child care, and safe drinking water are acquired. And rural areas are noted for higher 
participations, where formal schooling is also low.  
16
 The earlier studies cited controlled some of these variables and still found the mixed results. 
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and height-for-age) of the three health outcomes with the introduction of access to ǯion and community fixed 
effects). They find persistent negative relationship between maternal education 
and the probability of infant mortality. Infants of mothers with primary education 
are less likely to die relative to infants of mothers with no education whilst the 
least likely infants to die are those of mothers with secondary education, ceteris 
paribus. The relationship is found significant in 11 countries for maternal primary 
education, 15 countries for secondary education, and jointly significant in 14 
countries. Height-for-age and the immunisation status of children are also 
positively linked to maternal education in their study. 
Similarly, Frost et al. (2005) using the Bolivian demographic health survey assents 
to the positive link between maternal ǯ-for-age. Like 
Desai and Alva (1998), the magnitude of the impact decreases with the inclusion 
of other socio-economic determinants. 
Further evidence of the positive relationship of education, not only of mother but 
also fatherǯǡǯ
(Thomas et al., 1990; 1991), rural Nepal (Joshi, 1994) and Uganda (Lawson, 2004) ǯǡ
(Lavy et al., 1996) on only height at 
higher levels of education. Alderman and Garcia (1994) also found that maternal ǯǯ
significant. Their findings ǯal. Glewwe 
(1998) noted similar results in Morocco. However, there are certain estimations 
that show ǯ education. 
Lavy et al., (1996) provide evidence for such an outcome in their analysis of 
weight-for-height in Ghana.  
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An earlier study by Behrman and Wolfe (1987) in Nicaragua explains that the ǯǯǯǤ
with the ǯchildhood endowment (hǯschooling, urban 
childhood, mother and father present during her childhood and number of ȌǯǤǡȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯ for the ǯǤ 
Despite a reasonable number of studies showing favourable effects of maternal ǯǡ
weaker links and even statistically insignificant relationships. In Ghana for 
example, Lavy et al., (1996) observed a rather weak relationship between 
maternal education and child survival. They however found nutritional status of 
the mother to be one of the very influential factors and suggest that improving the 
health of mothers rather than their education would increase the survival rates of 
children. The weak and sometimes insignificant relations of maternal education 
also emerge in other studies on Ghana using data from GLSS 1 or GLSS 2. One such 
study of Asenso-Okyere et al., (1997), ǯ
literacy influential in improving the height and weight of children respectively. It 
is however not clear why they used different educational measures for height and 
weight in their study. Glewwe anȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯǯ, ǯ
scores (the only amongst the cognitive tests scores) seem significant in increasing ǯ-for-height. They thus speculatively conclude that skills 
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(mathematics) and not innate abilities (Raven's test score) improve child's health 
(weight-for-height). 
It is worth mentioning that almost all the studies reviewed took account of income 
or related variables that capture household wealth. This is with the view that 
education is highly correlated with income and a disaggregated effect of each is 
desired more than one carrying the effect of the other. Also more often than not, it 
is income or the household wealth that is treated as an endogenous variable. This 
is probably because of the availability of instruments for household wealth in 
most of the household surveys used. Despite solving this econometric problem, 
the effect of income holding education constant also shows mixed but fewer 
perverse results on health. Wolfe and Behrman (1984) argue that the sometimes-
perverse effects of income (and education) on health result from a possibility of 
altered consumption patterns due to taste changes associated with more 
resources (or schooling).  
Appleton (1991) for instance finds that predicted consumption income per capita 
reduces the probability of an individual falling ill amongst adults in urban Cote ǯǡǤ that 
livestock per capita and land per capita reduce the duration of child illness in 
Kenya but a reverse effect is found in Tanzania with regard to land per capita. 
Glewwe and Desai (1999) on the contrary find land is not statistically significant 
in determining child's health in Ghana. Mackinnon (1995) that finds real 
expenditure improves the health of children (weight-for-height) in Uganda, which 
is also confirmed in a different study (Lawson, 2004) of the same country. Lawson 
(2004) notes that a raise in income significantly lower the probability of sickness 
for male adults and female school aged children. Studies that also show favourable 
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effects of income on health status include Alderman and Garcia (1994), Glewwe 
(1998), Jalan and Ravallion (2003) and Haddad et al., (2003). 
In sum, the effects of education mainly seem influential and improve health in SSA 
depending on the indicator of health understudy. For anthropometric measures 
and mortality, which is mainly for children, education of the mother (and 
sometimes father) becomes very valuable. With regard to morbidity, the outcome 
appears to be more deteriorating for children with educated mothers; but the 
children benefit by experiencing shortened duration of illness (Appleton, 1991). 
However, the results for adults are mixed and very few have been estimated 
indeed, not to mention over a set period of time. Further, none of the studies 
attempted to use the instrumental variable approach in the estimation of 
education on morbidity. These are some of the gaps that needs filling in SSA and 





This section draws on theory to examine the relationship between education and ǯǤbers are 
separated into children and adults. The models to be estimated are therefore 
specified to analyse the effects of parental education on ǯ, and 
personal education on adultsǯ health. Description of the data and estimation 
strategies are subsequently discussed.  
2.2.1 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework of health production is based on the theory of 
household production that has health as one of its arguments in maximising 
utility. This study adopts Pitt (1993) model, which assumes household maximises 
utility thus: 
Ui = Ui (Hi, Fi, Ci, Liǡ ?i) ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥȋ ?Ȍ 
where Hi is the health production function, Fi is food which is consumed for 
reasons other than nutrients, Ci is all other commodities consumed, Li is labour 
supply and  ?i is leisure. He explained that the health of household members as 
well as the consumption of food, other commodities and leisure increases their 
utility whilst labour may have decreasing effects on utility due to its detrimental 
work efforts on health. The utility is subject to a set of constraints including health 
production, time and income. 
The health production unlike other household productions is biomedical where 
each individual is born with a degree of healthiness that depreciates over time. 
The health produced could either be final health outcomes such as morbidity and 
its duration, anthropometrics, mortality or intermediate health demands 
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including usage of medical services for either treatment or prevention of ill-health, 
for example, immunisation, pre- and post-natal care. The production function 
however ǯ-market 
goods including health inputs. It thus involves costs, resource availability, tastes 
and random and non-random environmental factors (Pitt, 1993).  Health is 
therefore modelled as a function of nutrients from foods, non-food health inputs, 
time and labour conditional on the education, socio-demographic characteristics, 
such as age and gender, and innate healthiness. The health production function is 
thus: 
Hi = Hi (Ni, Zi, Ti, Li, v; Ei, Ai, Gi, µi, ei)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥȋ ?Ȍ 
where Hi is the health of individual i in the household, Ni is nutrients from food 
consumption and Zi represents all non-food health inputs. The non-food health 
inputs includes the availability and individual consumptions of amenities, such as 
immunisations or other medical services/treatment; household public goods, such 
as water, sanitation and housing qualities. Ti is the time household members 
assign to health related activities including food preparation, housekeeping and 
childcare, whereas Li constitutes labour supply and v is regional specific health 
attributes, such as rainfall, drought and the existence of rivers with its links to 
parasitic and communicable diseases. Nutrients from food, health inputs like 
medical services, time and labour are under the control of individuals with 
parents or adult members of households making the decisions for children. These 
aforementioned choice variables may depend on education (Ei), age (Ai) and 
gender (Gi,).  The health production of people also varies with their own innate 
health endowment (µi), which may be unobserved, and measurement error (ei). 
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The second constraint is time; where household members invest their total time 
(Ti) in work where wages are earned (Wi), health and care related activities in 
household ( ? i), farm production and processing in farming households (Qi) and 
leisure ( ?i). The total time constraint thus become: 
Ti = Wi +  ? i + Qi +  ?i ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥȋ ?Ȍ 
The third constraint, wage, is also affected by health through productivity. 
Therefore where market rewards health related productivity differentials, wage 
(Wi) becomes a function of health, and intensity of effort required in chosen 
occupation (labour). Wage also varies with education, age, gender, ability and 
community characteristics that affect labour demand. Thus: 
Wi = Wi (Hi, Li; Ei, Ai, Gi, Ic, ai, eiȌǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤȋ ?Ȍ 
where Hi, Li, Ei, Ai, Gi and ei are as previously defined; Ic represents community 
characteristics like infrastructure and culture and ai captures unobserved 
characteristics such as ability.  
The final constraint is household budget based on their incomes, which is the 
household total income (Yhh) made up of earned [Wi(Ei).Li] and unearned income 
(Ki). The earned income involves wage acquired as a result of labour supplied in a 
given time period. The unearned income is from remittances.  
Yhh = Wi(Ei).Li + KiǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤȋ5) 
Household spending is also restricted since people cannot spend more on 
commodities and health inputs than their total income, giving an expenditure 
equation such as: 
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Yhh = Ph.Hi + Pc.CiǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤȋ6) 
where Ph is prices of health inputs including food and non-food and Pc is prices of 
all other commodities. The income equation thus becomes: 
Wi(Ei).Li + Ki = Ph.Hi + Pc.CiǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤȋ ?Ȍ 
Maximising the household utility subject to its constraints yields a generic health 
production thus: 
Hi* = hi* (Ni, Zi, Ti, Wi(Ei).Li, Ki, Ei, Ai, Gi, Ic, v, µi, ei)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤȋ ?Ȍ 
However, the health inputs (Ni, Zi, Ti) are choice variables, which have either cost 
in money and/or time. Thus, substituting the price of the choice variables as well 
as generalising community characteristics (Ic) to rural/urban residence (Ri), and 
inserting into equation 8 gives a reduced form demand function: 
Hi* = hi*(Pf, Pnf, Wi(Ei).Li, Ki, Ei, Ai, Gi, Ri, v, µi, ei)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤȋ9) 
where Pf is price of food, Pnf is price of non-food health inputs which does not only 
cover the direct price but also the opportunity cost of acquiring such inputs. 
It should however be noted that equation 9 could also be used to estimate the food 
and non-food health inputs because households simultaneously choose these 
variables; quantity or accessibility of which is dependent upon their income and 
time, which is also influenced by education. These choices also depend on the 
characteristics of the household, the health endowments of its members and 
community that are outside the control of the household. Such characteristics 
include the initial asset of the household, parental background including 
schooling, family values and individual intelligence, community socio-economic 
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and health infrastructure. In effect the exogenous determiǯ
choice variables are same for both health outcomes and inputs.  
A drawback of the framework is that it captures only one-period of the ǯǡ
which is probably correlated with past health status or activities. Thus investment 
in health is unobserved. Despite this shortcoming of the model, some information 
is gathered on how individual and family health is determined. One of such 
important information is individual or parental education, which is also of policy 
relevance in a developing country with relatively few health infrastructures.  It is 
noted in the conceptual framework that education influences many of the 
arguments in the health function as well as common factors that may influence 
both education and these arguments. This presents econometric problems of 
endogeneity and simultaneity in the empirical estimations of the model, which are 
discussed in the next section.  
 
2.2.2 Empirical Specification, Estimation Strategies and Data  ?ǯffected by the 
prices of food and non-food health inputs, education and income, age, gender and 
community characteristics as well as the innate healthiness. However, not all of 
these factors are available in the data used for this study. For instance the price of 
food and some non-food health inputs (like medicines) are collected only at the 
community levels in rural areas. Other non-food health inputs such as household 
public goods are not collated by their prices but by their availability in 
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households. This section therefore explains the specification, data and 
econometric strategies used in our analysis of the effects of education on health.  
First of all, we adapt equation 9 to model a health function with education as its 
main determinant controlling for age, gender, rural residence, and regional 
characteristics. This is done with the assumption that the influence of variables, 
such as income, and of non-food health inputs, such as the availability of 
household public goods and medical treatment are all captured through 
education, which tends to increase their acquisition or usage. Thus the model to 
be estimated is:  
Hi* = hi*(Ei, Ai, Gi, Ri, v, øi)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤ(10) 
In order not to neglect the available price data, which apart from having direct 
effect on health could also act as control on education, a model for only rural areas 
is specified as: 
Hi* = hi*(Ei, Pf, Pnf, Wi, Ai, Gi, v, øi)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤ(10') 
A model for only urban areas is also estimated using the same model as equation 
(10) but without (Ri). Apart from the community level data that is available for 
only the rural sub-samples, separating the estimation models into rural and urban 
also presents an opportunity to observe whether education relates to health 
differently in the two areas. This is because the availability and quality of 
infrastructure is different (better in urban than rural areas). Besides, rural 
communities are more attached to their traditional/cultural values, and may have 
different outlook on health that could be captured in the sub-sample estimates.  
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For both equations 10 and 10', clearly the observed variables are education (Ei), 
prices (Pf, Pnf, Wi)17, age (Ai) and gender (Gi), rural residence (Ri) and regional 
characteristics (v) represented by dummies for region of residence. The 
unobserved variables (øi) are innate healthiness (µi) of members in the household, 
measurement errors (ei) from education and health, and others such as ability and 
quality of education to mention a few. These unobserved variables are also 
influential because in the empirical analysis, they might under- or over-estimate 
the effects of the variables of interest. Also, their control (or lack of it) partly 
determines whether the relationship estimated is causal or just correlation, which 
brings to fore the problem of endogeneity in the model specified above.  
Indeed only few of the variables estimated could be termed as exogenous in the 
strictest sense and they include age and gender as well as prices of goods and 
services at community levels. Education on the other hand is endogenous because 
of the reverse causality of health on education as well as possible common factors 
such as ability, motivation or even inherent interest in the outcome, genetics or 
social background that affect both health and education. The heterogeneous 
effects of education also makes investigating its causal effects challenging since it 
is likely to be rather associational. Instrumental variables are usually used to 
correct for the problem of endogeneity. However, the search for valid instruments, 
that is, variables that are highly correlated with the endogenous variables but not 
the error term as well as proved not to belong to the main estimated equation is 
difficult to achieve. Instruments found for this study failed the validity test for 
some sub-samples and in others, indicated as weak instruments (details are 
                                                        
17
 Pf  is price of food: maize;  Pnf  is price of non-food: medicine and distance to the nearest clinic; Wi is 
wage: agricultural wage rates for men, ratio of women to men and ratio of child to men. Agricultural 
wage rates are included here because they are fixed, and to a large extent do not vary with education. 
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discussed under the results section). Following such an outcome and also to have 
comparable estimates, both the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Two-Stage 
Least Squares (2SLS) are estimated. However, only the results of samples that 
passed the over-identification test are presented, for the latter. 
From the conceptual framework, it is also observed that in addition to having a 
direct effect on health, education also has indirect effects through income (Yhh). In 
order to isolate the effect of income that is likely to be picked up by education, 
variants of the health model outlined in equations 10 and 10' are specified to 
include household expenditure. Thus equations 10 and 10' become: 
Hi* = hi*(Ei, Xhh, Ai, Gi, Ri, v, øi)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤ(11) 
Hi* = hi*(Ei, Xhh, Pf, Pnf, Wi, Ai, Gi, v, øi)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤ(11') 
Wherefore equations 10 and 10' could be described (and known from now in this 
chapter) as variant 1 (where education is estimated) and equations 11 and 11' 
may be referred to as variant 2 (estimates education conditioning on household 
expenditure (Xhh)), for the full (as well as urban) and rural sub-samples 
respectively. These different estimations are also performed because the 
education coefficient in variant 1 may overestimate the overall effect of education 
as a result of an upward bias due to a positive correlation between education and 
expenditure. Variant 2 reduces such a bias. Household expenditure is used in the 
equations instead of earned income because income fluctuates more in the 
farming and business sectors of the economy; and they are the major employers in 
the country. Besides, current income is subject to more measurement error, which 
maybe due to deliberate under-reporting whilst expenditure on the other hand 
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may capture long-term income effects. Economic theory also suggests households 
try to smooth expenditure over the life cycle.  
Similar to education, expenditure does not only have a direct effect on health, but 
also there exists a reverse causality of health on expenditure. Whereas 
expenditure or wealth may increase the ability of individuals to invest more in 
health, a better health also enables individuals to work and therefore earn more. 
Again, there may be some common unobserved factors such as ability and innate 
healthiness (øi) that influence health and expenditure, as well as education when 
all are considered in the same equation. In view of such inter-correlations 
amongst education, health and expenditure, as well as the unobserved factors that 
simultaneously affect all, there arises a need for instrumental variables to solve 
the likely econometric problem of endogeneity that may arise. Expenditure is 
therefore treated as an endogenous variable in variant 2, and identifying variables 
are substituted for it. Unlike education, IVs for expenditure are relatively easier to 
find and those used are explained in the section where explanatory variables are 
described. 
Additional versions of equations 11 and 11' are also estimated where instead of 
expenditure, ȋǮǯȌis used in the 
estimation. This version is described as variant 3, and unearned income is 
assumed exogenous18 to be compared with instrumented expenditure. An 
advantage of the use of unearned income is that the occurrence of ill health is not 
anticipated to terminate its flow or acquisition unlike expenditure.  
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Another variable of interest especially for a developing country is household 
public goods: availability of water and sanitation in the households. These form 
part of the health inputs in the conceptual framework outlined in the previous 
section. Including water and sanitation in the model is somewhat important 
because they act as control variables in estimating the effects of education, with or 
without expenditure. They also have direct impact on health because most 
communicable diseases could be prevented with increased availability of safe 
drinking water and human waste disposal. Subramanian (1995) for instance notes 
that most morbidity and mortality in Ghana result from poor environment and 
sanitation conditions that are largely preventable. Mustard (1990) cited in Joshi 
(1994) also indicates that maternal education is of limited effectiveness in 
protecting children where extensive sources of infection are present. Therefore it 
seems relevant to separate their effects from income and education by adding 
them in the reduced form health model. Besides it is imperative to know, for the 
sake of policy, the independent effects of these household public goods since its 
supply is not universal. Even in some higher income communities, frequent water 
interruptions and fewer/no toilet facilities in neighbouring communities could 
spread communicable diseases across areas with none of these problems. 
Therefore variants 1, 2 and 3 of the reduced form model described above are also 
estimated controlling for the availability of water and sanitation in clusters. 
However, these are choice variables and ǯ to acquire them 
might be based on income and education. These health inputs are also 
simultaneously determined with health production and therefore make them 
endogenous. However there are no instruments or their prices in the data to solve 
for this problem. Indeed several studies that control for household public goods 
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including Appleton (1991), Lawson (2004) and Blunch (2005) do not treat them 
as endogenous because the living standards survey data do not contain 
information to be used as instruments. In order to overcome this and somewhat 
avoid the potential endogeneity problem, community averages (calculated as 
cluster mean value of households y exclusive of household yi) of these variables 
are used. 
Health [Hi*(Ȉ)] is multi-dimensional in measure, which in this study represents 
outcomes like self-reported illness and its duration, as well as the 
anthropometrics (height-for-age and weight-for-height). For this study, all these 
measurements are estimated using the econometric specification (variants 1, 2 
and 3) described above. For morbidity and its duration, the analysis is divided into 
two; children (household members below the age of 16 years) and adults 
(household members who are 16 years of age and above), whilst the 
anthropometrics are estimated for only children. The Ghana Living Standard 
Surveys (GLSS), Rounds 1 and 4 are the data used in this study. Both data sets 
have a section on health where all household members are asked about their 
health condition in a given period of time prior to the survey: this is four weeks in 
GLSS 1 and two weeks in GLSS 4. Details of variables used are discussed below. 
 
2.2.2.1   Dependent Variables 
Morbidity 
The incidence of illness, the first health outcome estimated in this study, is 
observed at the individual level in the data. The question asked is whether the 
respondent has suffered any illness or injury in the above-specified period before 
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the survey. The reported illness in the questionnaire is non-clinical, that is not 
backed by any medical confirmation. It is entirely based on the response of the 
individual or heads of households for their families. The GLSS 1 questionnaire 
gave examples of illness as cold, cough, diarrhoea and injury due to accident. 
Indeed these are not exhaustive but cover some of the common early symptoms of 
prevalent diseases in the country including malaria, HIV/AIDS, respiratory and 
chest infections. It is however still possible that other illnesses with unrelated 
symptoms as referenced in the questionnaire as well as those unknown, concealed 
and/or respondents presume as shameful enough to be disclosed would be lost. 
This could lead to the underestimation of ill health and hence a potential 
drawback of this study. 
The incidence of illness may also suffer from measurement problems due to the 
nature of response. The problem could arise as a result of re-call periods and 
subjectivity influenced by socioeconomic status. With regard to re-call periods, 
self-reported information on illness or injury may be subject to positive or 
negative bias due to inaccuracies as a result of memory decay as well as under-
reporting where respondents might be answering on behalf of others (Mock et al., 
1999). A study on injuries in Ghana notes that the rate of decline of re-call is 
influenced by its severity. Mock et al., (1999) finds injuries involving less than 7 
days of disability show 86 percent estimated rates of decline from one month to a 
12 month re-call period; whereas injuries resulting in more than 30 days of 
disability show minimal decline. They concluded that longer re-call periods 
significantly under-estimate the injury rate compared to shorter ones. They thus 
suggested that shorter re-calls of 1 Ȃ 3 months should be used when overall non-
fatal injury incidence rate is calculated. The re-call period of both surveys used in 
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this study is within the suggested period but the indicator includes both illness 
and injuries, with the latter constituting a lesser proportion of response of the 
two. Thus, the bias as a result of re-call errors may not be as negligible as 
observed in the injury studies. 
Reported illness is subjective because they maybe interpreted differently by 
individuals based on their education, income and age (Pitt, 1993) or may reflect 
sensitivity rather than illness itself (Appleton, 1991). Systematic reporting bias 
may also occur due to information the individual already has, most probably as a 
result of prior use of medical care (Strauss and Thomas, 1998). Hence conditional 
on a level of health status, those likely to report better health are those with less 
exposure to the health system (ibid). Therefore given that low-income households 
are less likely to seek health care, especially in a country where health care ǲǳǡǤ
Linked to income, in the use of medical facilities and therefore increased 
probability of reported ill health, is education and region of residence. As educated 
people and urban residents have increased accessibility and/or availability of 
health facilities, they tend to have more information on their health status and 
therefore more likely to report illness. This subjectivity of self-reported illness 
could lead to a spurious relationship with education and income; and this has 
been noted in studies such as Appleton (1991) and Lawson (2004), especially 
regarding children.     
Despite the subjective nature of morbidity and measurement problems, it still 
seems a relevant subject for research because it is informative and gives useful 
indication on health in the absence of an objective or clinically verified measure. 
Strauss and Thomas (2008) for instance suggest that self-assessments of health 
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and health behaviours do not only provide important insights into the distribution 
of health and the characteristics associated, but also reflect intrinsic health. It has 
also been noted that self-reported health is positively correlated with clinically 
confirmed diseases (Fayers and Sprangers, 2002 cited in Groot and van den Brink, 
2006). In addition, not all the determinants of health status may be highly related 
to the measurement error of self-reported illness. Some household public goods, 
community variables and prices could independently determine the incidence of 
illness of an individual too. Finally, only morbidity as a health measure is available 
in most household surveys, which also contains information on children and 
adults as well as gender.  
The incidence of illness is estimated using a binary probit model due to the 
dichotomous response to the question on health status. The specified equations in 
variants 1, 2 and 3 are therefore estimated as a probit function thus: 
Prob(p=1) = probit hill*(Ȉ)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥ.(12) 
where p ǲ ?ǳǤ
estimated for the full sample as well as the urban and rural sub-samples as 
outlined in the specification section. 
The Duration of Illness 
This is the number of days an individual suffers illness or injury preconditioned 
on illness in the requested period prior to the survey. As noted in the conceptual 
framework, the same variables essentially determine both illness and its duration. 
Two econometric problems are however immediately noted in the estimation of 
this health outcome: censoring and sample selectivity bias. The duration of illness 
is both left- and right-censored. Left-censored because only days ill, four and two 
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weeks before the survey in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively, are reported. Thus illnesses 
that have lasted over four and two weeks are reported as 28 and 14 days 
respectively. The data is also right-censored because the most recent illness 
within the requested time period may continue after the survey but there is no 
information regarding this in the data. The problem of sample selection also arises 
because the duration of illness is observed on people who only reported sick. 
One of the solutions to the econometric problem here is to use a Tobit model. Only 
the left-censor could however be controlled because whether an individual was 
still ill after the period was not reported. The Tobit model translates the specified 
equations with arguments as described with variants 1, 2, and 3 into: 
hi*= tobit hdur*(Ȉ)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤȋ ? ?) 
where hi* is the latent variable, the duration of illness, observed only when Hi(dur)* 
is greater than zero, and zero otherwise. A disadvantage of the Tobit model is the 
assumption that the same probability mechanism generates both the probability 
of illness and its duration. To allow for the possibility of separate mechanisms, a 
two-part model with a binary probit that models prob (duration > 0) with a 
subsequent linear regression modelling E (duration | duration > 0) with an 
identifying instrument for selectivity is required. However exclusive restricting 
variables are not found in the data, without which the interpretation of selectivity 
bias must be treated with caution due to a bivariate normality assumption 
resulting from lack of identifying instruments (Cameron and Trivedi, 2010). 






The anthropometric measures are based on long-term (height-for-age) and short-
term (weight-for-height) health indicators. Compared with a standardised 
international height and weight given age and gender, the height and weight of 
children, especially of age five and below are calculated to indicate their health 
status. Although regarded as the more objective measure of health status, the 
anthropometric indictors are typically collected for only young children. This 
analysis is therefore conducted for only the children sub-samples. 
In this study, the anthropometric measures are not only estimated as additional 
health indicators but also used as robustness check on illness. Even though they 
cannot be compared, in the strictest sense, they could be used to give credence to 
the overall effects of education (and also expenditure, due to systematic reporting 
bias). It also helps in building a general consensus on the overall health status of 
children in the country as the anthropometrics and morbidity show different 
aspects of health. In a wayǡǲ-ǳ
when compared with illness amongst children; and they are also somewhat Ǥ	ǡǯ
development and possibly future health. Case and Deaton (2006) suggest much of 
the variation in adult height is set by age 4, therefore deficiencies in growth up to 
that age cannot be made up later.  
In order to have another dimension of health status analysed for a more 
comprehensive outlook of health in the country, the height-for-age and weight-
for-height are estimated using OLS with the models outlined in variant 1, 2 and 3. 
An additional variable, ǯ, is however included in these equations 
because it is believed to be indicative of the health endowment that is 
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subsequently transferred to children. Cǯthus expected 
to reduce the ǯbias resulting from unobserved health endowment of the 
children. However most importantly, it removes physical variation in height that 
is not health related. The equations estimated here are therefore slightly changed 
to: 
 Hi* = h(haz)*(Ei, MHi, Ai, Gi, Ri, v, øi)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤȋ ? ?) 
Hi* = h(whz)*(Ei, MHi, Ai, Gi, Ri, v, øi)ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤȋ ?4') 
where MHi ǯ, h(haz) is height-for-age z-scores and h(whz) is weight-
for-height z-scores. All the other variables remain as previously defined. The 
estimations are conducted for children with complete observations for all the 
anthropometric measurǯǤǡ
analysis may include but not necessarily be the same set in the estimations of 
reported illness. The sample is also divided into two: pre-school (0 Ȃ 5 years) and 
school-aged (6 Ȃ 15 years) children. However, for the school-aged sample, weight Ȃfor- height z-scores (WHZ) is observed only for children between ages 6 Ȃ 10 
years inclusive due to the inability of the software to calculate WHZ for ages 







2.2.2.2   Explanatory Variables 
Education (Ei):  
The measure of education is number of completed years of schooling and used in 
this analysis in categorical terms as No education; Primary; Middle & JSS; and 
Secondary and above. Education is differently represented in the children and 
adult sub-sampǤǯ-sample and ǯǤǯ
estimated controlling for parental education as well as personal. This is in a bid to 
capture some of the unobserved component of personal education, which is 
correlated with childhood family background or endowment (Behrman and Wolfe, 
1987; 1989). This could also mitigate omitted variable bias.  
As the theory suggests education is generally expected to improve the health of 
individuals and their families, and therefore expected to result in lower likelihood 
to report illness. Education ensures better health status in several ways including 
better choice of health inputs, increased productivity through increased use of 
information on health services and healthy behaviours. It is also likely to increase 
wealth with a consequent increase in spending on good health related activities 
(Becker, 2007). Education also influences the health of individuals by determining 
many decisions that appear to affect quality of life, which includes choice of 
occupation, ability to select healthy diets and avoid unhealthy habits as well as 
efficient use of medical care.  
Education however, upon increasing access to job opportunities, thus increasing 
the opportunity cost of time, could also worsen health status. This is especially the 
case with educated mothers (in employment) who tend to have less time to spend 
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at home to care for their children, tend to breastfeed for shorter periods, thus ǯ
immunological diseases amongst others.  
As already mentioned, estimates of education might be subject to a potential 
endogeneity bias. However instruments are found for the chiǯ. 
The instruments used ǯfor maternal 
education are the interactions between maternal birth cohort and maternal region 
of birth. This is adopted from Blunch (2005) who explained that maternal birth 
cohorts and region of birth are closer, in time and space, to the relevant time 
period for school attendance and skills acquisition than are school supply and 
quality variables of the current time period. Also time and region of birth are 
likely to explain school supply and quality through differential effects for different 
cohorts and regions following changes in economic and political conditions in 
Ghana at the time relevant for school attendance and skills acquisition (ibid).  
Although the same could be said for paternal education, the restriction test for 
identification rejected the instruments as valid. Therefore paternal mother and ǯ
region of birth interactions as instruments in this study. However as mentioned 
earlier, these instruments are not found valid in some of the sub-samples 
estimated. Due to such unsatisfying outcomes after several laborious estimation 
processes, subsequent models are estimated without instruments for education 
(as is common in many studies including Appleton, 1991; Hobcraft, 1993; Glewwe, 




Household expenditure (Xhh) 
Household expenditure is already imputed19 and available in the survey data. This 
comprises expenditure on food, non-food items, water, garbage disposal, 
electricity, schooling, employee benefits, imputed rent, and durable goods and 
services. It is included in the econometric estimations as expenditure per capita 
and its quadratic. Expenditure, like education is expected to improve health status. 
Therefore in our case, it is expected to reduce the propensity to fall ill; as 
increased expenditure would ensure greater access to the required nutrients and 
other inputs for a healthy lifestyle. Also, in a situation that illness is unavoidable, 
expenditure is expected to reduce its duration. On the other hand, expenditure 
may result in a reduction in the time for childcare, especially with regard to 
women who work outside the house for increased earnings, and this may be ǯǤ 
As with the education variable, there is the likely endogeneity of expenditure, 
hence the need for its substitution with instrumental variables. The instrumental 
variables for expenditure per capita are relatively less difficult to find for all the 
estimations in this study, unlike education. They include the employment of 
household head, value of land per capita, durable goods per capita, business assets 
per capita and room per capita. All the assets are included with their quadratics 
except for the number of rooms in a household. Their over-identifying restrictions 
are reported and discussed in the estimated results sub-section. 
 
 
                                                        
19




The price of food (Pf), non-food (Pnf) and agricultural wage rates (Wi) are available 
at the community level covering only rural areas. Since there could be more than 
one community in a cluster, average cluster prices are used. The prices of food and 
non-food are exogenous. Agricultural wage rates are also included in the model as 
exogenous because unlike formal wage that is dependent on education and health, 
they are fixed in rural areas.  They only differ by age and gender. To some extent, 
education and age are expected to capture wage effects in urban centres in 
addition to their direct influence in the health outcomes (Appleton, 1991). 
The price of food partially represents nutrients in-take of household members. 
This is because it is only one of the factors that influence the production of 
nutrients and likely to underestimate its effects on health outcomes. Other factors 
include storage and preparation of food, which may change the nutrients of food 
(Behrman and Deolalikar, 1988). Increased food prices negatively impacts on in-
take and thus nutrients and health. Nutrients in developing countries positively 
affect the health outcomes of individuals and are estimated as one of the 
important determinants of health (ibid). Controlling for the regional attributes (v) 
of households reduces the bias of the effects of various prices of food since 
different types of foods are cultivated and thus consumed in different regions of 
the country.  
The price of non-food is captured as health inputs: price of medicine20 and 
distance to the nearest clinic. Similar to the price of food, increased price of 
medicine reduces its demand to ward off the incidence of illness when early signs 
                                                        
20
 This is the average price of aspirin, paracetamol and nivaquine (an anti-malarial drug) 
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are noted, thus worsening health status and possibly its duration. Distance to the 
nearest clinic is also used as a proxy for the price of non-food health input since it 
serves as the opportunity cost of time to health services. Thus the further health 
facilities are from communities, the less accessible they become and therefore less 
likely to be used for preventative care amongst others. This is assumed to be 
independent, that is, the allocation of clinics is not influenced by the prevalence of 
diseases in the area, politics or migration (to access better health services).  
The agricultural wage rates constitute the total amount of money received as a 
result of weeding. These are separated into men, women and children. In the 
estimations however, alongside the menǯ wage rate, the ratios of women to men 
and child to menǯ wages are also used. This is to measure the relative effect of ǯ, given their ǯ on the estimated 
health outcomes. Besides, the actual wages are highly correlated and it is expected 
that the use of proportions could reduce problems of multicolinearity. Increased ǯd income and therefore Ǥǯ
wage rates may have the same effect as the men; but could also be detrimental to ǯǤe primary 
carers of children, the reduction in time committed to child or home care such as 
breastfeeding, hygiene and food may negatively affect health status. Children who 
work are also more likely to have worse health status although they contribute to 
a rise in the household income. They are also more likely to expend more 
nutrients than they consume, as well as be exposed to hazardous conditions at 




Household public goods 
This is measured as the availability of water and sanitation in households. This Ǥǡȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǲǳ
of the household public goods. This is where the external effect of non-availability 
of water and toilet in households is used; calculated as the proportion of ǲǳ (that is, use water from 
rivers, lakes and rainwater) or toilet or both in the cluster. It is anticipated that an 
increase in the proportion of neighbours with unprotected water and sanitation 
would increase the probability of illness and its duration in households, all things 
held constant. 
Age (Ai) and gender (Gi) 
Age and gender are controlled because health production basically varies 
accordingly, even if individuals belong to the same household and utilise the same 
health inputs. In the case of age, we note that infants or pre-schoolers easily fall ill 
due to their less developed immune systems. They are also more prone to 
bacterial infection with increased mobility and a change in diets from breast-milk 
to infant formulars and solid food. Improved health starts to be observed after 
their second to third birthdays in the case of reported illness, two and four years 
in the case of wasting and stunting respectively (see results on the 
anthropometrics in this study). The full effect of age may also depend on gender 
and residence.  
Gender is controlled because women at some phase, experience several health 
challenges due to pregnancy or menopause. It has been observed in the literature 
that at younger ages, females have better health than males; this increases to a 
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certain age and then the reverse is observed. At very old ages however, females 
are found to be healthier again than men. In addition, the distribution of health 
inputs may not be uniform in households and thus females may be more prone to 
illness due to lesser health inputs; some cultures (not only in Ghana) perceive 
females to be of less economic importance to the family because they leave home 
as result of marriage. On the other hand, males maybe given more food or allowed 
more access to health with the limited resources available to the household 
because of their perceived higher productivity returns to health.  
ǯ 
ǯitive relationship with health status as 
well as the height-for-age of her children. This is because some of their genetic 
health endowments could be attributed to the health status of the mother.  
Regional attributes (v) and Rural residence (Ri) 
Regional attributes are controlled using dummies representing the administrative 
regions of the country. An additional representation is rural, a categorical term 
indicating rural residence, is also controlled. Ethnicity, which is somewhat linked 
to the regions, is also controlled to cover the influence of cultural differences on 
health outcomes and inputs. This is also a categorical term with a dummy equal 
one representing the non-Akan ethnic group and zero otherwise. The default 




2.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Variables Used 
Tables 2.1-2.3 show the means and standard deviations of covariates used in the 
estimations of all the samples (children, adults, pre-school and school-aged) as 
well as by residence at the time of the two surveys understudy. This comprises 
2.1: children in GLSS 1 & 4; 2.2: adults in GLSS 1 & 4; and 2.3: the anthropometric 
measures for pre-school and school-aged children (GLSS 1 only). Table 2.4 shows 
the summary statistics of the community variables used whilst tables 2.5-2.7 
present cross-tabulations of the dependent variables (illness, duration and the 
anthropometrics) and education as well as other pertinent variables. These tables 
are discussed concurrently where relevant. The tables also have sub-divisions 
relating to age (children, adults, pre-school and school-aged) and the various 
dependent variables. This section as in all the subsequent ones first discusses 
children in GLSS 1 then 4, and then goes on to discuss adults in the same order.  
In the first survey year, about a third of the children are reported ill in the four-
week period prior to the survey. And pre-schoolers have a higher percentage of 
reported illness than school-aged children. Surprisingly, slightly more children are 
reported ill in urban than rural areas. However, the urban children experience 
shorter duration of illness relative to their rural counterparts. The average 
duration of illness for the whole sample is about six and a half days with about a 
day shorter for urban than rural. Further, about a third of pre-schoolers are 
stunted (height-for-age z-scores of less than -2) and 6.4 percent are wasted 
(weight-for-height z-scores of less than -2). These statistics are similar to the 
findings of Alderman (1990) and Asenso-Okyere et. al. (1997) using the same 
data. The corresponding figures for school-aged children are 26.8 and 6.0 percent. 
The cross-tabulations also show that boys generally have poorer health status 
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than girls and the only instant that the reverse is true is amongst school-aged ǯight-for-height. For the rest of the indicators, the statistics suggest 
boys experience higher reported illness, longer duration of illness and are more 
stunted in both pre- and school-aged children relative to girls. Boys are also 
thinner for their height compared to girls amongst pre-schoolers. 
In GLSS 4, about a quarter of the children are reported ill in the two-week period 
before the survey. Unfortunately a comparison between GLSS 1 and 4 cannot be 
made due to the difference in reference periods, however GLSS 4 makes a good 
source for a robustness check on GLSS 1. For example, unlike GLSS 1, rural 
children show higher reported illness than urban children and roughly have the 
same duration of illness (about 5 days). But similar to GLSS 1 boys show higher 
percentage of reported illness and slightly longer duration than girls, especially in 
rural areas. This raises a question of whether there is an element of discrimination 
whereby boys are more favoured so receive more attention, and would quickly be 
noted when they fall ill or they are actually less healthier than girls. Other 
suggestions made in the literature are that since boys feed more, they are weaned 
or given complementary foods earlier than girls. This thus exposes the boys to 
disease causing bacteria, which make them fall ill and worsen their health status, 
more than girls.   
More so, the higher percentage report of illness amongst pre-schoolers relative to 
school-aged children in GLSS 4 is consistent with GLSS 1. Pre-school children fall 
ill more often because of the processes of weaning from breastfeeding to solid 
foods. They also get exposed to new bacteria because they become more mobile 
by crawling and learning to walk. Due to low immunity at this stage, contacts with 
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contaminated household objects probably causes pre-schoolers to fall ill relatively 
easier than their older counterparts.    
Reported illness amongst adults in GLSS 1 is particularly high: about forty percent 
with an average duration of 8 days. In GLSS 4, adults who reported ill are about 30 
percent with an average duration of about 6 days. In both surveys, women are 
noted as having reported more illness than men. A plausible explanation to this 
observation is that women are more prone to gynaecological complications, 
especially pregnancies and menopause, as they get older. Illness is also reportedly 
high amongst pensioners. Thus the general trend from both the adults and ǯ-tabulation in relation to age suggests that incidence of illness 
drops from a relatively higher level from pre-school to school-aged, and then 
begins to rise again from young adults to pensioners in both surveys. 
In relation to education, maternal levels are lower than paternal especially at 
higher education levels. Nevertheless, table 2.1 shows some overall increase in 
education over the decade ȋǯȌ. This is quite common in 
developing countries where males are encouraged to go to school compared to 
females. As with most surveys on self-assessed illness in developing countries, 
educated mothers in GLSS 1 reported more illness (Table 2.5) of their children but 
shorter duration of these illnesses (Table 2.6) than their uneducated counterparts. 
Pre-schoolers of educated mothers are less stunted and wasted; and this is less so 
in urban than rural areas. Similarly, school-aged children of post-primary 
educated mothers are less stunted (except in rural areas); but contrary to 
expectation, more wasted.   
The positive relationship between maternal education and height as well as 
weight would suggest that the positive relationship between education and the 
 69 
 
incidence of reported illness is possibly due to systematic reporting bias, 
especially for pre-school children. Several reasons could be linked to the positive 
association between self-assessed illness and maternal education. This includes 
illusory perception of ill health of an objectively healthier child; possibility of 
actual illness due to a general exposure to some seasonal diseases that could not 
be effectively prevented by both educated and uneducated mothers but the 
former may give it more attention or consider it worth mentioning compared to 
the latter; educated mothers may be more likely to have attended clinical 
procedures with children to have been properly diagnosed and therefore have 
superior knowledge of the health status of their children, which suggests they ǯ
uneducated counterparts. Finally, due to the higher opportunity cost of time (of 
formal labour market participants), children of educated mothers are often left in 
the care of young uneducated house helps, which in effect means increased risk of 
exposure and contracting diseases as a result of the carers, in most cases, being 
young themselves.  
Regarding school-aged children, reported illness, stunting in rural areas as well as 
wasting, in many cases, show ǯǡ
in an uneven sequence. There is no apparent explanation to this, except to imply 
that maternal education does not seem to influence the health status of these 
children.  
The positive association between maternal education and reported illness is also 
observed amongst the same age group in GLSS 4, with children of primary 
educated mothers showing the highest reported illness. Interestingly, unlike GLSS 
1 the perverse pattern is not observed amongst urban children. These children are 
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relatively less likely to be reported as ill the higher the level of education of their 
mothers. However, the overall illness duration is slightly longer amongst children 
of educated mothers in GLSS 4. It initially increases from the uneducated to 
primary education, and then falls thereafter (but not lower than the duration of 
children of uneducated mothers suffer). 
In ǯǡadults in GLSS 1 tend to report less illness as 
own education rises beyond post-primary in urban areas. However in the full and 
rural sub-samples, individuals with primary education report more illness, and 
those with middle/JSS show relatively close percentages as those with none. Yet in 
GLSS 4, reported illness is negatively related with own education right from the 
primary school level upwards. With regard to the duration of adult illness, both 
surveys tend to indicate shorter periods as the levels of education increases 
compared to no education. This seems to suggest the educated manage to take 
better care of themselves than their young children. On the other hand, they might 
be indicating more attention and thus sensitivity to their childrenǯ than 
their own health; hencǯ.   
Differentials in reported illness in relation to expenditure quartile show similar 
perverse correlation as education amongst children. However in this case, only 
stunting contradicts this pattern for both pre-school and school-aged children. 
High expenditure negatively correlates with stunting as expected. This is probably 
because households are able to afford better health inputs including food, and 
better environment. Wasting amongst the children however worsens as 
household expenditure increases. This is very much at odds with expectations and 
contradicts the expenditure quartile trend with stunting (see also Asenso-Okyere 
et. al., 1997). The rural and urban expenditure quartiles show no difference in the 
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pattern of the relationship compared to the overall sample. Unlike this study and 
Asenso-Okyere et. al., (1997) that observe higher wasting amongst the rich 
households, Alderman (1990) finds no pattern whatsoever within the expenditure 
deciles using the same data. However as in Alderman (1990), we find that 
households at the highest levels appear to have children with very acute 
malnutrition. 
Reported illness and expenditure pattern amongst children in GLSS 4 is also not 
different from GLSS 1. They are positively correlated, and the same relationship is 
observed in relation to Ǥǯ
sample also shows positive correlation of the duration of illness and expenditure 
in GLSS 1, but in GLSS 4 the relationship is Ǯǯ- shape. The 
duration of illness at the higher quartiles however is still longer than the lowest in 
GLSS 4. This finding appears to support the argument in the literature that, 
households with higher income often seek treatment and are therefore more 
likely to know their health status, which has probably been diagnosed by a 
medical system beforehand (Strauss and Thomas, 1998; 2008). The wealthy 
would also most likely continue treatment till declared fit by medical officers, 
which might translate into increased duration of illness. This could explain the 
finding, which suggests that relatively poor appear healthier than the rich, when 
indeed this might actually be the opposite; because the relatively poor are 
unaware of their status until they are properly diagnosed. 
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics of  ǯǡ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?Ƭ ? ?  ?Ȁ ? ? 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4      
 Full  Urban  Rural  Full  Urban  Rural  
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Illness 0.342 0.47 0.362 0.48 0.329 0.47 0.239 0.43 0.216 0.41 0.250 0.43 
Number of days ill 6.574 5.94 6.105 5.47 6.888 6.22 5.211 3.42 5.214 3.40 5.210 3.43 
Mother's Primary 0.102 0.3 0.097 0.3 0.105 0.31 0.158 0.36 0.171 0.38 0.148 0.35 
Mother's Middle 0.295 0.46 0.354 0.48 0.26 0.44 0.237 0.43 0.336 0.47 0.2 0.4 
Mother's Sec & above 0.031 0.17 0.069 0.25 0.008 0.09 0.047 0.21 0.1 0.3 0.02 0.14 
Father's Primary 0.058 0.23 0.037 0.19 0.071 0.26 0.108 0.31 0.107 0.31 0.098 0.3 
Father's Middle 0.433 0.5 0.464 0.5 0.414 0.49 0.392 0.49 0.415 0.49 0.4 0.49 
Father's Sec & above 0.114 0.32 0.169 0.37 0.08 0.27 0.163 0.37 0.259 0.44 0.103 0.3 
Log of expenditure per capita 10.587 0.62 10.782 0.58 10.470 0.61 13.487 0.66 13.838 0.62 13.334 0.62 
Log of unearned income per capita 5.230 3.53 6.323 3.37 4.567 3.45 6.205 5.05 6.794 5.31 5.947 4.90 
Age (years) 6.971 4.51 7.234 4.52 6.81 4.49 7.604 4.43 8.063 4.41 7.491 4.43 
Female 0.492 0.5 0.498 0.5 0.489 0.5 0.495 0.5 0.508 0.5 0.491 0.5 
Non-Akan 0.525 0.5 0.565 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.535 0.5 0.487 0.5 0.518 0.5 
Water and sanitation 0.576 0.43 0.211 0.316 0.797 0.33 0.452 0.43 0.200 0.33 0.563 0.42 
Rural 0.622 0.48     0.696 0.46     
Western Region 0.114 0.32 0.092 0.29 0.128 0.33 0.122 0.33 0.082 0.27 0.132 0.34 
Central Region 0.083 0.28 0.077 0.27 0.087 0.28 0.097 0.3 0.106 0.31 0.118 0.32 
Eastern Region 0.144 0.35 0.107 0.31 0.167 0.37 0.117 0.32 0.08 0.27 0.142 0.35 
Volta Region 0.091 0.29 0.058 0.23 0.111 0.31 0.125 0.33 0.112 0.31 0.148 0.36 
Ashanti Region 0.191 0.39 0.159 0.37 0.21 0.41 0.158 0.36 0.194 0.4 0.166 0.37 
Brong-Ahafo Region 0.119 0.32 0.105 0.31 0.128 0.33 0.093 0.29 0.065 0.25 0.086 0.28 
Upper West Region 0.014 0.12   0.022 0.15 0.03 0.17 0.012 0.11 0.03 0.17 
Northern Region 0.093 0.29 0.082 0.27 0.099 0.3 0.107 0.31 0.058 0.23 0.087 0.28 
Upper East Region 0.019 0.14 0.01 0.1 0.025 0.16 0.048 0.21 0.016 0.12 0.068 0.25 
Observation no. 6378  2410  3968  11660  3547  8113  
*Note for all the summary tables:  
(1) Ȃ Mean of number of days ill is conditional upon the incidence of illness; (2) Ȃ Water and sanitation is measured as proportion of 'neighbours' in cluster with no water & toilet; (3) Ȃ Mean 
of Log of expenditure and unearned income, as well as age are also controlled with their quadratics but not reported in table for brevity. 
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of Variables Used for ǯǡ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?Ƭ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ? 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4      
 All  Urban  Rural  All  Urban  Rural  
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Illness 0.404 0.49 0.411 0.49 0.399 0.49 0.279 0.45 0.250 0.43 0.296 0.46 
Number of days ill 8.298 7.02 8.007 7.04 8.505 6.99 6.389 4.06 6.170 3.97 6.493 4.10 
Primary 0.098 0.30 0.086 0.28 0.106 0.31 0.147 0.35 0.141 0.35 0.151 0.36 
Middle 0.372 0.48 0.436 0.50 0.327 0.47 0.320 0.47 0.382 0.49 0.284 0.45 
Sec & Higher 0.086 0.28 0.143 0.35 0.047 0.21 0.119 0.32 0.208 0.41 0.068 0.25 
Mother's Primary 0.019 0.14 0.025 0.16 0.015 0.12 0.062 0.24 0.085 0.28 0.049 0.22 
Mother's Middle 0.039 0.19 0.064 0.24 0.022 0.15 0.091 0.29 0.149 0.36 0.059 0.23 
Mother's Sec & above 0.005 0.07 0.011 0.11 0.001 0.03 0.023 0.15 0.050 0.22 0.008 0.09 
Father's Primary 0.025 0.16 0.024 0.15 0.026 0.16 0.058 0.23 0.070 0.26 0.051 0.22 
Father's Middle 0.139 0.35 0.191 0.39 0.104 0.30 0.198 0.40 0.260 0.44 0.162 0.37 
Father's Sec & above 0.037 0.19 0.064 0.24 0.018 0.13 0.086 0.28 0.145 0.35 0.053 0.22 
Log of expenditure per capita 10.787 0.70 11.006 0.67 10.635 0.68 13.700 0.73 14.047 0.68 13.505 0.68 
Log of unearned income per capita 5.362 3.65 6.470 3.46 4.598 3.58 6.450 5.24 6.884 5.56 6.206 5.04 
Age (years) 35.621 16.36 34.794 15.45 36.191 16.94 37.111 16.73 35.797 16.31 37.865 16.92 
Female 0.528 0.50 0.523 0.50 0.532 0.50 0.539 0.50 0.544 0.50 0.536 0.50 
Non-Akan 0.546 0.50 0.566 0.50 0.532 0.50 0.521 0.50 0.493 0.50 0.536 0.50 
Water and sanitation 0.544 0.44 0.194 0.30 0.785 0.34 0.407 0.42 0.165 0.30 0.543 0.42 
Rural 0.592 0.49     0.635 0.48     
Western Region 0.105 0.31 0.085 0.28 0.118 0.32 0.114 0.32 0.075 0.26 0.136 0.34 
Central Region 0.085 0.28 0.069 0.25 0.096 0.29 0.087 0.28 0.070 0.26 0.096 0.29 
Eastern Region 0.144 0.35 0.107 0.31 0.169 0.38 0.119 0.32 0.077 0.27 0.143 0.35 
Volta Region 0.092 0.29 0.054 0.23 0.118 0.32 0.127 0.33 0.077 0.27 0.157 0.36 
Ashanti Region 0.168 0.37 0.153 0.36 0.177 0.38 0.166 0.37 0.189 0.39 0.154 0.36 
Brong-Ahafo Region 0.11 0.31 0.091 0.29 0.122 0.33 0.084 0.28 0.071 0.26 0.092 0.29 
Upper West Region 0.016 0.13   0.027 0.16 0.034 0.18 0.032 0.18 0.036 0.19 
Northern Region 0.093 0.29 0.073 0.26 0.107 0.31 0.090 0.29 0.052 0.22 0.112 0.32 
Upper East Region 0.025 0.16 0.012 0.11 0.035 0.18 0.044 0.21 0.014 0.12 0.062 0.24 
Observation no. 6519  2659  3860  13547  4873  8674  
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Table 2.3: Summary Statistics of Variables Used for the Anthropometric Measures Estimations, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
 Pre-school School-Aged 
GLSS 1 only All  Urban  Rural  All  Urban  Rural  
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Illness 0.422 0.49 0.440 0.50 0.412 0.49 0.319 0.47 0.374 0.48 0.283 0.45 
HAZ -1.149 1.57 -0.893 1.48 -1.286 1.60 -1.190 1.33 -0.914 1.24 -1.369 1.36 
WHZ -0.552 1.02 -0.461 1.00 -0.601 1.03 -0.655 0.89 -0.643 0.88 -0.662 0.90 
Mother's Primary 0.129 0.34 0.118 0.32 0.135 0.34 0.095 0.29 0.111 0.31 0.084 0.28 
Mother's Middle 0.344 0.48 0.436 0.5 0.294 0.46 0.243 0.43 0.314 0.46 0.198 0.4 
Mother's Sec & above 0.035 0.18 0.086 0.28 0.007 0.08 0.034 0.18 0.072 0.26 0.01 0.1 
Father's Primary 0.062 0.24 0.042 0.2 0.073 0.26 0.063 0.24 0.032 0.18 0.083 0.28 
Father's Middle 0.475 0.5 0.523 0.5 0.449 0.5 0.382 0.49 0.457 0.5 0.334 0.47 
Father's Sec & above 0.117 0.32 0.176 0.38 0.086 0.28 0.114 0.32 0.165 0.37 0.081 0.27 
Log of expenditure per capita 10.604 0.60 10.817 0.54 10.490 0.60 10.593 0.64 10.843 0.60 10.431 0.62 
Log of unearned income per capita 5.225 3.56 6.583 3.29 4.497 3.49 5.071 3.60 6.216 3.58 4.332 3.42 
6-11months 0.099 0.3 0.107 0.31 0.095 0.29       
12-23months 0.154 0.36 0.141 0.35 0.161 0.37       
24-35months 0.202 0.4 0.209 0.41 0.198 0.4       
36-47months 0.171 0.38 0.188 0.39 0.162 0.37       
48-60months 0.289 0.45 0.269 0.44 0.3 0.46       
Age (years)       9.828 2.85 10.037 2.89 9.693 2.81 
Mother's Height 157.817 6.87 158.49 8.22 157.456 6 157.677 6.74 158.185 7.09 157.349 6.48 
Rural 0.651 0.48     0.608 0.49     
Female 0.507 0.5 0.487 0.5 0.517 0.5 0.477 0.5 0.495 0.5 0.465 0.5 
Non-Akan 0.525 0.5 0.538 0.5 0.518 0.5 0.53 0.5 0.555 0.5 0.513 0.5 
Water and sanitation 0.593 0.43 0.202 0.30 0.803 0.33 0.555 0.43 0.198 0.30 0.785 0.33 
Observation no. 2168  757  1411  2207  866  1341  
obs. (Whz) for school-aged       1268  465  803  
*Note: Mean of regional dummies is similar to those of table 2.1; they are not reported here for brevity.  
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Table 2.4: Summary Statistics of Community Variables Used in Estimations, 1987/88 & 1998/99 
Community variables Children    Adults    
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  GLSS 1  GLSS 4  
 mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd 
Price of Maize (kg) 2.853 1.89 5.759 3.29 2.897 1.86 5.972 3.17 
Price of Anti-malarial pill 1.159 0.51 3.301 1.56 1.151 0.52 3.432 1.48 
Dummy for missing price 0.085 0.28 0.16 0.37 0.092 0.29 0.133 0.34 
Dist. to the nearest clinic 13.075 12.98 12.483 46.02 12.182 12.58 10.037 43.83 ǯǤage 5.247 0.9 8.094 1.58 5.27 0.82 7.839 2.07 ǯage 0.55 0.45 0.604 0.41 0.565 0.45 0.577 0.43 
Ratio of child wage 0.583 0.4 0.451 0.41 0.588 0.39 0.416 0.43 
Observation no. 3968  8113  3860  8674  
 GLSS 1 only 
 Pre-school School-aged     
 mean sd mean sd     
Price of Maize (kg) 2.916 1.86 2.82 1.89     
Price of Anti-malarial pill 1.178 0.5 1.146 0.52     
Dummy for missing price 0.086 0.28 0.087 0.28     
Dist. to the nearest clinic 13.648 13.63 13.433 12.79     ǯǤage 5.258 0.89 5.257 0.86     
Ratio of women wage 0.546 0.46 0.536 0.45     
Ratio of child wage 0.577 0.4 0.581 0.39     
Observation no. 1411  1341      
For school-aged (WHZ)   803      
*Note: Community variables are controlled in rural samplesǯǤ
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Table 2.5: Cross-Tabulations of Health Status (Illness) and Key Socio-Economic Variables, 1987/88 & 1998/99 
 Children (%) Adults (%) 
ILLNESS GLSS 1   GLSS 4 Weighted  GLSS 1   GLSS 4 Weighted  
 Full Urban Rural Full Full Urban Rural Full Urban Rural Full Full Urban Rural 
Full 34.2 36.2 32.9 24 24.2 21.1 25.6 40.4 41.1 40 27.9 28.2 24.9 30.1 
Boys 35.2 37.6 33.8 24.7 25.3 20.9 27.1 39 38.6 39.2 23.9 24.3 21.5 25.9 
Girls 33.1 34.9 32 23.2 23.1 21.3 24 41.7 43.4 40.6 31.3 31.5 27.7 33.8 
Urban 36.2   21.6 21.1   41.1   25 24.9   
Rural 32.9   25 25.6   40   29.6 30.1   
Age (Years)               
0 Ȃ 5 41 42.3 40.3 36 35.7 34 36.3        
6 Ȃ 15 29.3 32.34 27.3 17.6 18.1 15.5 19.3        
16 - 24        33.6 35.1 32.5 18.6 18.8 18.4 19 
25 - 34        40.1 42.2 38.5 28.2 29.4 26.5 31.1 
35 - 49        42.9 43.6 42.4 28.6 28.6 24 31.1 
50 - 59        44.4 41.2 46.5 31.8 31.9 29.3 33.2 
60 plus        52 52.6 51.8 41.8 42.5 37.8 44.6 
Education               
None 30 30.3 29.8 24 23.8 22.4 24.1 40 42.7 38.7 32.5 32.3 30 33 
Primary 42.5 44.9 41.2 25.3 26.8 21.1 29 46 48.5 44.6 27 28.5 25.5 30.1 
Middle 38.3 40.1 36.8 23.6 24 21.4 25.1 40.6 40.2 40.9 24.4 25.4 24 26.5 
Secondary & Higher 45.7 45.8 45.6 23.7 24 19.7 28.9 36.1 35.9 36.6 21.9 21.2 19.5 24.3 
Expenditure quartile              
Lowest 25.7 29.2 24.7 22.2 23.5 20.8 23.9 34.7 41.3 32.9 24.4 25.7 23 26.1 
Lower middle 33.8 33.2 34.2 23.6 23.6 20.9 24.4 39.1 38.3 39.5 26.4 26.7 24.2 27.5 
Upper middle 36.2 35.6 36.7 24 23.7 18.9 26.3 38.9 37.2 40.2 28.2 28.1 23.9 30.6 
Highest 43.1 43.2 43 27.1 26.5 22.8 32 46.1 44.7 47.8 31.5 30.9 25.9 38.1 
Observation no. 6378 2410 3968 11660 11660 3547 8113 6519 2659 3860 13547 13547 4873 8674 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ Education for children is maternal education; and for adults, it is personal education. (2) Ȃ Proportional sampling weights created by the survey team and supplied with the data 
are applied in GLSS 4. 
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Table 2.6: The Duration of Illness by Key Socio-Economic Variables, 1987/88 & 1998/99 
Children GLSS 1 GLSS 4 
 All  Urban  Rural  All  Urban  Rural  
 Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. 
All 6.57 5.94 6.11 5.47 6.89 6.21 5.21 3.42 5.21 3.4 5.21 3.43 
Boys 6.79 6.12 6.38 5.9 7.09 6.26 5.31 3.54 5.14 3.38 5.36 3.59 
Girls 6.33 5.71 5.81 4.95 6.69 6.15 5.11 3.29 5.28 3.41 5.04 3.24 
Urban 6.11 5.47     5.21 3.4     
Rural 6.89 6.21     5.21 3.43     
Maternal Education            
None 6.99 6.19 6.07 4.95 7.43 6.66 5.06 3.3 4.93 2.99 5.09 3.36 
Primary 6.28 5.69 5.48 5.07 6.75 6.01 5.42 3.47 5.32 3.47 5.45 3.48 
Middle 6.17 5.62 6.41 5.95 5.95 5.31 5.26 3.47 5.2 3.37 5.28 3.51 
Secondary & Higher 5.73 5.71 5.8 6 5.33 4.06 5.29 3.56 5.45 3.75 5.14 3.38 
Expenditure quartile            
Lowest 6.35 5.99 6.22 5.94 6.4 6.01 4.9 3.3 4.81 3.03 4.92 3.34 
Lower middle 6.86 6 6.29 5.26 7.16 6.34 5.3 3.43 5.05 3.09 5.36 3.51 
Upper middle 5.99 5.43 5.55 5.06 6.32 5.67 5.29 3.44 5.36 3.6 5.26 3.37 
Highest 7.08 6.3 6.41 5.73 7.89 6.85 5.41 3.54 5.34 3.52 5.48 3.56 
Observation no. 2176  873  1303  2774  763  2011  
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Table 2.6 contd: The Duration of Illness by Key Socio-Economic Variables, 1987/88 & 1998/99 
Adults GLSS 1 GLSS 4 
 All  Urban  Rural  All  Urban  Rural  
 Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. Duration Std. Dev. 
All 8.3 7.02 8.01 7.04 8.5 6.99 6.39 4.06 6.17 3.97 6.49 4.1 
Men 8.38 6.98 7.98 6.99 8.66 6.97 6.37 4.14 6.05 4.05 6.51 4.17 
Women 8.23 7.05 8.03 7.09 8.37 7.02 6.4 4.02 6.24 3.92 6.48 4.06 
Urban 8.01 7.04     6.17 3.97     
Rural 8.5 6.99     6.49 4.1     
Own Education             
None 9.55 7.74 9.44 7.94 9.6 7.64 6.81 4.21 6.73 4.18 6.83 4.22 
Primary 8.25 6.63 8.38 6.7 8.16 6.6 6.01 3.84 6.3 3.88 5.87 3.82 
Middle 7.05 5.93 7.06 6.16 7.04 5.72 6.12 3.9 5.88 3.79 6.29 3.97 
Secondary & Higher 7.31 6.92 6.93 6.82 8.09 7.11 5.52 3.82 5.51 3.84 5.53 3.82 
Expenditure quartile            
Lowest 7.58 6.02 6.82 5.49 7.84 6.18 6.14 4.04 5.8 3.84 6.2 4.07 
Lower middle 8.27 7.04 8.42 7.38 8.2 6.86 6.78 4.21 6.68 4.16 6.82 4.23 
Upper middle 8.07 7.06 7.36 6.48 8.58 7.41 6.41 4.04 6.16 3.95 6.53 4.08 
Highest 8.79 7.37 8.44 7.44 9.19 7.28 6.26 3.99 6.09 3.94 6.42 4.02 
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Table 2.7: Cross-Tabulations of Health Status (Illness, Stunted & Wasted) and Key Socio-Economic Variables, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
Pre-school Illness   Stunted   Wasted   
 Full Urban Rural Full Urban Rural Full Urban Rural 
Full 42.2 43.99 41.25 29.15 19.68 34.23 6.37 5.28 6.95 
Boys 44.81 47.16 43.47 29.75 21.13 34.65 7.11 6.96 7.2 
Girls 39.67 40.65 39.18 28.57 18.16 33.84 5.64 3.52 6.71 
Urban 43.99   19.68   5.28   
Rural 41.25   34.23   6.95   
Maternal Education         
None 37.17 37.36 37.11 33.24 25.64 35.85 7.68 4.76 8.68 
Primary 49.29 41.57 52.88 31.79 24.72 35.08 6.07 6.74 5.76 
Middle 46.04 49.39 43.37 24.56 16.06 31.33 4.83 5.45 4.34 
Secondary & Higher 49.33 47.69 60 6.67 6.15 10 4 4.62 0 
Expenditure quartile         
Lowest 32.43 36.36 31.58 35.5 25.25 37.72 6.13 5.05 6.36 
Lower middle 42.52 41.28 43.08 30.27 20.35 34.73 5.41 3.49 6.27 
Upper middle 44.81 43.08 46.01 26.3 18.58 31.68 6.49 5.53 7.16 
Highest 50.45 50.21 50.72 23.76 18.03 30.14 7.69 6.44 9.09 
Age (months)          
0 - 5months 24.46 15.38 29.41 5.43 3.08 6.72 2.17 0 3.36 
6-11months 49.77 53.09 47.76 7.91 6.17 8.96 7.91 11.11 5.97 
12-23months 55.99 58.88 54.63 28.44 28.04 28.63 14.37 15.89 13.66 
24-35months 48.86 48.1 49.29 33.11 24.05 38.21 6.39 3.8 7.86 
36-47months 39.19 38.03 39.91 40.81 29.58 47.81 4.86 3.52 5.7 
48-60months 34.61 42.65 30.73 34.13 15.69 43.03 3.67 1.47 4.73 
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Table 2.7 contd.: Cross-Tabulations of Health Status (Illness, Stunted & Wasted) and Key Socio-Economic Variables, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
School-Aged Illness   Stunted   Wasted   
 Full Urban Rural Full Urban Rural Full Urban Rural 
Full 31.85 37.41 28.26 26.82 17.55 32.81 5.99 5.59 6.23 
Boys 32.24 37.99 28.73 32.06 20.82 38.91 5.41 4.8 5.75 
Girls 31.43 36.83 27.72 21.08 14.22 25.8 6.86 6.7 6.96 
Urban 37.41   17.55   5.59   
Rural 28.26   32.81   6.23   
Maternal Education         
None 28.79 33.72 26.53 27.71 20.18 31.16 4.46 4.55 4.43 
Primary 39.71 48.96 31.86 28.71 17.71 38.05 10 7.02 12.33 
Middle 34.45 36.03 32.83 25.88 15.81 36.23 7.74 6.49 8.79 
Secondary & Higher 48 51.61 30.77 12 6.45 38.46 7.5 5.88 16.67 
Expenditure quartile         
Lowest 21.51 30.63 19.36 29.95 23.42 31.49 5.59 4.76 5.78 
Lower middle 29.93 29.72 30.05 28.4 17.92 34.31 6.36 4.42 7.3 
Upper middle 34.98 36.84 33.33 30.21 21.43 38 5.07 6.41 3.91 
Highest 43.22 46.57 38.46 16.95 11.19 25.13 7.29 6.02 8.77 
Observation no. 2207 866 1341 2207 866 1341 1268 465 803 
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2.3. ECONOMETRIC RESULTS 
This section presents the results of the various models estimated. The ǯ
tables first show estimated results of the impact of education in the various 
specification models described in the methodology section. These are variants 1, 
2, and 3, which presents estimates of only education, education conditional on 
expenditure and education controlling unearned income respectively. The version 
of education conditioning on expenditure is estimated using a two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) with instruments for expenditure and its quadratic21. The external 
effects of household public goods are also controlled as separate versions of each 
of the above-mentioned variants. These are the results presented in text in an 
abridged form (for the sake of brevity) with the discussions. The entire results can 
however be found in appendix AȂ2 to AȂ11. The estimates of the controlled 
variables are then presented in different tables, and are briefly discussed. Other 
variables also controlled in all versions of the estimations but not presented for 
the sake of brevity are region of residence, ethnicity and a dummy for missing 
price in the rural sub-sample. 
Also all the estimated results are presented as full samples, urban and rural sub-
samples for each survey year. The rural sub-samples have additional variables 
that are observed at community levels in rural areas only. The full samples are 
however the main focus points of the discussions. The residence sub-samples are 
referred to where relevant differences or interesting results are observed. A 
pooled sample result of both GLSS 1 and 4 is also presented with a dummy, which 
                                                        
21
 Instrumental variables are also used for education where valid instruments are found; but this will be 
mentioned under sections where the procedure is used. Details of the instrumental variables are also 
GLVFXVVHGXQGHUVXFKVHFWLRQVDQGUHVXOWV¶WDEOHVRIWKHILUVW-stage regressions are presented in the 
appendix A.  
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equals one representing the former survey year and zero otherwise. Results on 
children and adults are presented separately, with that of children examined first 
followed by adults. Generally, the primary focus is on GLSS 1, and then results 
from GLSS 4 are considered to examine the robustness of the first.  
 
2.3.1 Morbidity: Reduced Form Estimates 
I: Children 
The impact of parental education ǯ 
Table 2.8 presents the estimates of parental education in GLSS 1, GLSS 4 and the 
pooled sample of both survey years. These results are the marginal effects after 
probit. The results in GLSS 1 and 4 are not consistent. The first survey year 
indicates a perverse relationship whilst the later suggests no influence at all. In 
GLSS 1, the results suggest that parental education positively influence ǯ
reported illness (variant 1). All the levels of motherǯs education show they are 
more likely to report illness relative to the uneducated mother, ceteris paribus. ǯǯǡis 
only significant after primary education. Whilst only maternal education is found 
significant in urban areas, it is paternal education that influences increased 
reported illness in rural areas. This pattern is also found in Appleton (1991), 
where paternal education sometimes replaces the significant impact of maternal ǡǯǤ 
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Table 2.8: The Impact of Parental Education on The Probability of Child Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled) 
 Full   Urban   Rural   
Sample GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled 
 Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal 
 Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects 
Variant 1: Education          
Mother's Primary 0.07**  0.011 0.026* 0.104**  -0.007 0.025 0.037 0.019 0.027* 
Mother's Middle 0.035* 0.016 0.018* 0.089*** -0.004 0.023 0.011 0.03 0.018 
Mother's Sec & above 0.094* 0.014 0.035 0.169*** 0.011 0.057* 0.126 0.027 0.032 
Father's Primary 0.013 0.028 0.012 -0.03 -0.017 -0.012 0.043 0.041 0.022 
Father's Middle 0.034* -0.006 0.004 -0.021 -0.02 -0.017 0.059** -0.006 0.006 
Father's Sec & above 0.048* 0.021 0.02 -0.049 -0.023 -0.014 0.125*** 0.048 0.045** 
GLSS_1   0.087***   0.135***   -0.02 
Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure 
Mother's Primary 0.066** 0.009 0.027* 0.106** -0.008 0.023 0.044 0.021 0.029* 
Mother's Middle 0.037* 0.008 0.014 0.092*** -0.011 0.019 0.014 0.025 0.013 
Mother's Sec & above 0.086 0.01 0.022 0.184*** 0.001 0.044 0.119 0.029 0.015 
Father's Primary 0.029 0.002 0.003 -0.029 -0.015 -0.022 0.046 0.007 0.014 
Father's Middle 0.051** -0.021* -0.007 -0.018 -0.031 -0.029 0.056* -0.023 -0.002 
Father's Sec & above 0.067* -0.007 0.008 -0.044 -0.022 -0.028 0.127*** -0.001 0.033 
GLSS_1   0.302**   0.304*   0.206 
Variant 3: Education conditioning on unearned income 
Mother's Primary 0.065** 0.008 0.022* 0.101** -0.011 0.022 0.034 0.016 0.024 
Mother's Middle 0.033* 0.013 0.015 0.083** -0.008 0.02 0.012 0.026 0.016 
Mother's Sec & above 0.088* 0.01 0.033 0.152** 0.007 0.052* 0.119 0.019 0.03 
Father's Primary 0.016 0.03 0.012 -0.035 -0.013 -0.01 0.046 0.041 0.02 
Father's Middle 0.028 -0.007 -1.15E-04 -0.027 -0.02 -0.018 0.053** -0.008 0.001 
Father's Sec & above 0.041 0.016 0.017 -0.058 -0.028 -0.016 0.118*** 0.044 0.042* 
GLSS_1   0.086***   0.148***   -0.017 
Observation no. 6378 11660 18038 2410 3547 5957 3968 8113 12081 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ Proportional sampling weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
(2) Ȃ The entire results with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-2, A-3, and A-4. 
(3) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, water and sanitation, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations. 
(4) Ȃ Community variables are controlled in addition to the above for the rural sub-samples. 
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Unlike GLSS 1, parental education is not found significant in determining 
morbidity in GLSS 4. The outcome is parallel to Blunch (2004) with the same data 
(GLSS 4). He finds that maternal formal education does not significantly influence 
reported illness amongst children aged 0 Ȃ 7 years. However, other literary 
indicators controlled for do influence the incidence of illness in the same 
estimation with mixed signs. For instance, he finds English reading and writing 
(this forms part of his maternal literacy measure) negatively and positively 
determine illness respectively; and adult literacy course participation positively 
affects childǯ illness. 
The results of the pooled sample also show a positive relationship between ǯǤ
level of maternal education in the full sample, maternal and paternal secondary 
and above in the urban and rural sub-samples respectively.  The dummy variable ǲ ?ǳ
 ?
increased reported illness of children is 8.7 percentage points higher in GLSS 1 
than GLSS 4, ceteris paribus. The corresponding difference in the urban sub-
sample is 13.5 percentage points. The survey dummy in the rural sub-sample is 
not statistically significant, but this is because of the control of the community 
variables. Without these controls, reported illness amongst children in GLSS 1 is 
estimated as being 6.8 percentage points higher than in GLSS 4 (results not 
presented). This could be implying that the percentage of reported illness may 
actually be noticed as unchanged between the years, when community variables 
are also controlled in the full and urban sub-samples. But this can only remain a 
conjecture since lack of community data in urban areas makes verification 
impossible.  
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Meanwhile, the supposedly reduced probability of reported illness over the years 
of these surveys might be suggestive of improved information on healthy lifestyles 
through the advancement of the media, increased access and use of health 
facilities as well as services such as taking immunisation activities to communities 
for maximum coverage. However, these improved services are most likely to be 
prevalent in urban relative to rural areas.    
The impact of parental education ǯ conditioning on household wealth 
Household wealth is first represented by expenditure, which is included in the 
model as an endogenous variable (variant 2), and secondly by unearned income as 
an exogenous variable (variant 3)22. ǯ
reported illness changed marginally with the control of expenditure per capita in 
the model. In GLSS 1, maternal secondary school and above became statistically 
insignificant. In GLSS 4, paternal middle/JSS changed from having no influence, 
just as other levels of parental education, to lowering the probability of reported 
illness. This is arguably a weak and random relationship since it is the only 
indicator amongst six that is statistically significant and at the 10 percent level.  
Similar to expenditure per capita, the impact ǯs 
reported illness changed slightly in magnitude and significance (especially the 
urban sub-sample) with the control of unearned income per capita. All the 
categories in the full samples as well as the rural sub-sample remained fairly same 
and show positive association ǯ reported illness. 
Similarly, the parental education categories in GLSS 4 are unaffected. However, the 
paternal education categories in GLSS 1 are not as stable as maternal. Paternal 
                                                        
22
 Both variables are controlled in their per capita forms as well as their quadratics. 
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post-primary became insignificant in the full sample, whilst that of the rural sub-
sample did not change.  
The evidence from the estimated outcomes indicate that parental education ǯǤǡ
significance, does not dramatically change with the inclusion of household wealth, 
or the proportion of neighbours with poor household public goods (estimates 
without can be found in appendix A-2 to A-4). Although the estimated relationship ǯlness seem perverse, they are consistent with 
the descriptive statistics for maternal education and also what is usually found in 
the literature on self-reported morbidity especially in developing countries (see 
Appleton, 1991 and Lawson, 2004). Several reasons have been attributed to the 
possibility of such a relationship occurring. This includes correlation between 
education and some of the unobserved variables in the error term like innate 
health, ability and taste, or to a common factor that is correlated with both 
education and health; and lifestyle choices such as early termination of 
breastfeeding, either due to modern practices of bottle-feeding or participation in 
formal employment, which may have adverse consequences on children. These 
lifestyles might be influenced by education, which increases the opportunity cost ǯǤ In order to rule out the possibility 
of education being endogenous and therefore affecting the direction on illness, the 
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2.3.2 Morbidity: Conditional Estimates  
As outlined in the conceptual framework, education is likely to be endogenous 
because it is simultaneously determined with health, or maybe correlated with 
omitted variables or measurement errors, or a combination of all three. In order 
to examine this and therefore verify whether the previous findings are causal or 
just associational, instrumental variables are substituted for education in a two-
stage regression model.  As already discussed interaction between maternal birth 
cohorts and region of birth are used as instrumental variables for maternal 
education. We anticipate that this could influence the levels of education because 
of the variation in the quality and supply of schools over time and space in the 
country. However, this is not identified for paternal education hence paternal 
parents years of education is used as instruments in their case. The first-stage 
regressions, reported in the appendix A, are estimated as: 
 Ei = ß1 +ß2Zi + ß3Xi + ei ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤǤȋ ? ?) 
Where Ei is the endogenous variables (ǯ
mother and father), Zi is a vector of the instrumental variables (the interaction 
between mateǡǯ, as well 
as the value of land and durable goods with their quadratics when expenditure 
per capita and its square are also controlled in the model as endogenous); Xi 
represents a vector of all the control variables, which have already been discussed 
under the reduced form model; and ei is the error term. Estimates of the control 
variables are not presented in the results table for brevity. 
The second stage is estimated as: 
Hiillness =  ?1 +  ?2Êi +  ?3Xi  ?Ɏi ǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǥǤȋ16) 
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Where Hiillness ǯǡÊi is a vector of predicted levels of 
education of the ǯɎi is the error term. Instrumental probit is 
used in estimating the model because of the categorical nature of the dependent 
variable of equation 16. 
Appendix AȂ5 shows the results of the first stage regression. The P-values of the F-
statistics reported in the last rows indicate the instruments jointly predict 
parental education in both GLSS 1 and 4, at the 1 percent level of statistical 
significance. However, most of the F-statistics are less than 10, which may be an 
indication of the instruments not being strong predictors (see Stock, Wright and 
Yogo, 2002). They also point out that an adjusted R-squared of about 0.25 of the 
first-stage regression is an indication of weak instruments. According to them, 
strong instruments should have the adjusted R-squared of the first-stage 
regression to be nearly 1. The over-identification test on the other hand indicates 
that the instruments are valid, which suggests they have all passed the exclusion 
restriction test. That is, the instruments are not correlated with the error term and 
could also be excluded from the model. The over-identification test statistics are 
reported with the results tables.  
Table 2.9  ?ǯ
education as endogenous. Several differences are immediately noted. In GLSS 1, 
firstly, the magnitude of parental education changed massively from that of the 
OLS model. Secondly, although the signs remained same for maternal education 
where significant, those of paternal education changed. Thirdly, only maternal 
primary education is found significant at the 1 percent level. Finally, whereas 
previously in the OLS model, none of the educational outcomes in GLSS 4 was 
found ǯ
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reported illness, this time maternal primary is found statistically significant. These 
results therefore somewhat concur with the previous model as well as others 
(Appleton, 1991 and Lawson, 2004) that show that maternal education (primary 
levels in this case) have higher probability of reporting illness relative to those 
with no education. This also confirms what was observed in the descriptives; and 
that the relationship is not only associational but also most possibly causative. 
The change in magnitudes is however very big; and thus caution must be 
exercised in drawing strong conclusions from these results. For example in GLSS 
1, the likelihood of increased reported illness changed from 6.8 (OLS) to 65.7 
(2SLS) percentage points, ceteris paribus. The corresponding 2SLS estimate for 
GLSS 4 is 54.3 percentage points. Paternal primary education however lowers the ǯ ? ?Ǥ9 percentage points in GLSS 1. 
The result in GLSS 4 is not significant. Estimates of the pooled sample of both GLSS  ? ?ǯ more in GLSS 1 than 4, all else held 
constant. 
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Table 2.9: Probability of Child Illness Ȃ Treating Parental Education as Endogenous (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled); with and without conditioning on Expenditure 
2SLS/IV Full   Urban Rural   
Sample GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled 
 Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal 
 Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects 
Variant 1: Education 
Mother's Primary 0.657*** 0.543*** 0.568*** 0.712***    
Mother's Middle -0.022 -0.043 0.164 0.049    
Mother's Sec & above 0.061 0.068 -0.025 0.441    
Father's Primary -0.269* -0.109 -0.183* -0.34***    
Father's Middle -0.022 -0.049 -0.106 -0.092    
Father's Sec & above 0.088 0.064 -0.015 -0.186    
GLSS_1   0.094***     
Observation no. 6378 11660 18038 2410    









(34)    
P-value 0.0998 0.3388 0.3677 0.4387    
Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure 
Mother's Primary 0.614*** 0.572*** 0.501*** 0.655*** 0.395* 0.128 0.291 
Mother's Middle -0.018 -0.02 0.13 0.02 0.045 0.008 0.205 
Mother's Sec & above 0.276 0.047 0.255 0.701*** -0.012 0.355 -0.245** 
Father's Primary -0.294*** -0.121 -0.226*** -0.343*** -0.154 -0.035 -0.157 
Father's Middle -0.032 -0.088 -0.065 -0.103 -0.05 0.007 -0.146 
Father's Sec & above 0.092 0.047 -0.108 -0.276* 0.091 0.035 0.107 
GLSS_1   0.189    0.108 
Observation no. 6378 11660 18038 2410 3968 8113 12081 
















P-value 0.1085 0.421 0.1781 0.3668 0.3668 0.0525 0.2144 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ The entire results with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-6. 
(2) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, water and sanitation, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations. 
(3) Ȃ Community variables are controlled in addition to the above for the rural sub-samples, except for GLSS 1 in this table. 
(4) Ȃ The empty cells imply IVs of those sub-samples did not pass the over-identification test; hence not reported. 
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The estimates of the urban sub-sample in GLSS 1, like the full sample, also show ǯthe reverse with 
paternal primary education. The rural sub-sample in GLSS 1 as well as the rural 
and urban sub-samples in GLSS 4 are not presented because the instruments did 
not pass the over-identification test.  
The results on parental education also did not alter from the discussion above 
upon conditioning on expenditure23, except for a negligible decrease in magnitude 
in GLSS 1 and an increase in GLSS 4 (the full samples). The urban sub-sample ȋ
 ?Ȍǯ reported illness with 
maternal secondary and above relative to no education. This is in addition to the 
positive outcome with maternal primary education. Similarly, paternal secondary 
and higher gained some statistical significance and has the same negative 
relationship with reported illness as that of primary. The rural24 sub-sample also 
indicates that only maternal primary level of education is statistically significant, 
and supports the positive relations with ǯ
women with no education.  
Parental education of the rural sub-sample of GLSS 4 however appears not to have ǯǤǡ
 ?
4 of the rural sub-samples gives a different outcome to what has so far been 
observed with the 2SLS model. Here it appears mothers with secondary and above ǯǡǤ 
                                                        
23
 This model estimates with instrumental variables for both parental education and expenditure per capita 
and its quadratics. 
24
 Community variables are not controlled in GLSS 1 because the instruments do not pass the over-
identification test when they are. The rural sub-sample in GLSS 4 however controls for the community 
variables. 
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Generally, the models estimated with parental education as an endogenous 
variable in the two survey periods also show mixed but consistent variation in the 
educational outcomes compared to the models with exogenous education 
variables. For example, the sign on maternal education when significant is not 
different whether education is endogenous or not. In this case, maternal primary ǯǤ
is even re-enforced in GLSS 4 where hitherto was not significant. However, 
paternal primary education changed from a positive (exogenous) to a negative ȋȌǯed illness in GLSS 1 whilst the 
outcome in GLSS 4 remained unaltered (not significant) in either scenario.  
The 2SLS somewhat confirms the positive relationship usually found to exist 
between maternaǯǡ
individual survey periods. Thus endogeneity is most likely not the cause of the 
positive relationship in this study. It is possible that the higher opportunity cost of 
time of educated mothers, which results in less time directly spent with their 
children, contributes to the higher incidence of illness amongst these children. Or 
possibly, increased sensitivity and awareness of disease symptoms (because 
educated mothers are more informed and also more likely to seek medical ȌǯǤ 
Since the pattern of parental education and reported illness did not change often 
in sign, and some of the sub-samples could not be reported due to lack of valid 
instrumental variables, we resort to estimating the subsequent models with 
education included as an exogenous variable25. In order to reduce the potential 
                                                        
25
 Indeed this is done for all remaining models in the other health outcomes (duration of illness and the 
anthropometric measures). 
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correlation between education and unobserved variables, additional control 
variables (parental education ǯȌincluded in the 
models26. However models conditioning on expenditure are estimated using the 
instrumental variable approach since expenditure, with available information for 
instrumental variables, is controlled as endogenous; similar to many of the studies 
on Africa including Appleton (1991), Lavy et al., (1996), Benefo and Schultz 
(1996) and Lawson (2004). 
 
II: Adults 
The impact of own education on self-reported illness 
Table 2.10 gives the estimated results of the impact of own education on self-
reported illness in GLSS 1, 4 and the pooled sample of both. Education amongst 
adults is similar to those of the children. For instance, own primary and 
middle/JSS level of education are positively related to reported illness in GLSS 1, 
all else held constant, whereas in GLSS 4 education does not appear to matter. 
However, the outcome in GLSS 4 is different, when water and sanitation is not 
controlled (appendix A-8).  
                                                        
26
 7KLVLVDOVRH[SHULPHQWHGZLWKWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VVDPSOHVE\FRQWUROOLQJthe education of grandparents, but 
the outcome does not show any dramatic differences; hence not reported.   
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Table 2.10: The Impact of Own Education on The Probability of Adult Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled) 
 Full   Urban   Rural   
Sample GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled 
 Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal 
 Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects 
Variant 1: Education 
Primary 0.082*** 0.023 0.024* 0.098* 0.004 0.009 0.07* 0.033 0.032 
Middle 0.039* -0.002 0.003 0.02 -0.009 -0.007 0.058* -0.004 0.003 
Sec. & above -0.003 -0.03 -0.021 -0.019 -0.041 -0.033 0.013 -0.028 -0.011 
GLSS_1   0.133***   0.171***   0.008 
Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure 
Primary 0.08*** 0.013 0.022 0.106* -0.02 0.004 0.065* 0.019 0.026 
Middle 0.035 -0.03* -4.70E-04 0.03 -0.022 -0.012 0.045 -0.033* -0.008 
Sec. & above -0.008 -0.129*** -0.024 0.008 -0.051* -0.04* -0.005 -0.082** -0.022 
GLSS_1   0.249*   0.282**   0.48*** 
Variant 3: Education conditioning on unearned income 
Primary 0.078*** 0.021 0.021 0.095* 0.003 0.007 0.067* 1.42 0.028 
Middle 0.031 -0.006 -0.001 0.015 -0.013 -0.009 0.051* -0.48 -0.002 
Sec. & above -0.016 -0.037* -0.027* -0.028 -0.049* -0.039* 0.001 -1.4 -0.018 
GLSS_1   0.139***   0.183***   0.024 
Observation  6519 13547 20066 2659 4873 7532 3860 8674 12534 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ Proportional sampling weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
(2) Ȃ The entire results with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-7, A-8, and A-9. 
(3) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, water and sanitation, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations. 
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Secondary and above level of education is found significant at the 10 percent level, 
and it shows adults with such level of education tend to have lower probability of 
self-reported illness compared to none, ceteris paribus. This probably depicts the 
circumstance whereby the prevalence of diseased environment countermands the 
influence of education. The dummy variable representing time of survey suggests 
reported illness is higher in GLSS 1 than 4, ceteris paribus. This is possibly due to 
the improvement and use of health services, and more so with improved spread of 
information on available services as well as health education through the media. 
The impact of own education on self-reported illness conditioning on household 
wealth 
In relation to the impact of own education of the adults, upon controlling for 
expenditure per capita, only personal primary education is found significant 
amongst adults in GLSS 1, compared to personal primary and middle/JSS when 
expenditure is not controlled. However, the direction of impact is same in both 
models, that is, primary education is positively related to the probability of self-
reported illness, ceteris paribus. The converse is true in GLSS 4, where adults with 
post-primary education tend to report illness less frequently. Similarly, post-
primary, and secondary and above levels are found significant in rural and urban 
areas respectively, which hitherto were insignificant. This outcome suggests 
expenditure per capita might be complementary to education rather than a 
substitute. The two are therefore essential in the production of health, as 
explained by Cutler and Lleras-Muney (2006) that education allows individuals to 
know about a particular health input and income allows them to purchase it. Self-
reported illness is also observed as being higher in the earlier relative to the later 
year in the full sample as well as the urban and rural sub-samples. 
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ǯunearned income is quite 
similar to when household wealth is not controlled. For example, only middle/JSS 
lost its weak statistical significance in GLSS 1 (full sample). The outcomes in the 
rural and urban sub-samples did not change. Own primary education (urban) as 
well as primary and middle/JSS levels remain significant and positively affect self-
reported illness. In GLSS 4 however, the results changed and show rather similar 
results as those with the control of expenditure. Secondary and above level of 
education is observed as having lowering tendencies towards self-reported illness 
in the full and urban sub-sample, ceteris paribus.  
The inconsistency of outcomes between the two survey years makes conclusion of 
personal education on self-reported illness a bit dicey, especially when 
expenditure is controlled. This is where education is noted as having increased 
tendencies in GLSS 1, but a reduced probability to report illness in GLSS 4. A 
plausible conclusion is thus, with heightened awareness of illness as a result of 
education, adults with lower levels at the first survey year had a higher propensity 
to report illness. However this changed in the later survey year, probably because 
relatively more people are educated and/or exposed to environments 
(widespread media and other modern health related activities) that promote 
healthier lifestyles. It is also possible that due to the shorter re-call period of the 
later year, these adults are more able to separate actual illness from maybe 
serious tiredness, and so report less illness. This is however mostly true for people 
with secondary education and above in the later year. These conclusions are 
mainly based on conjecture, since there is not enough information to categorically 
test them.   
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The impact of personal education on self-reported illness controlling the parental 
education of adults 
For a robustness check on the outcomes earlier discussed, the parental education 
of adults is controlled to reduce some of the unobserved effects through family 
background, and the results are presented in Table 2.11. Incorporating parental 
education did not change the direction of impact of personal education in both 
survey years, even with the control of unearned income as well as expenditure. In 
GLSS 1, own primary education is still positively related with self-reported illness, 
middle/JSS education lost its significance in the full sample but the outcomes in 
urban and rural sub-samples remained same. Also in GLSS 4, own secondary and 
above education remained stable and negatively correlated with self-reported 
illness. The pooled sample, where significant supports this negative relationship, 
indicating that education at higher levels is associated with less reported illness, 
especially in urban areas. Self-reported illness is generally noted as being higher 
in GLSS 1 compared to GLSS 4, ceteris paribus.   
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Table 2.11: The Impact of Own Education on The Probability of Adult Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled)Ǣǯ 
 Full   Urban   Rural   
Sample GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled 
 Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal 
 Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects 
Variant 1: Education  
Primary 0.076** 0.018 0.021 0.082* 0.006 0.005 0.069* 0.024 0.029* 
Middle 0.03 -0.007 0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.008 0.058* -0.009 0.001 
Sec. & above -0.018 -0.038* -0.025 -0.054 -0.041 -0.038* 0.009 -0.035 -0.014 
GLSS_1   0.135***   0.175***   0.009 
Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure 
Primary 0.074** 0.011 0.02 0.088* -0.02 0.001 0.064* 0.015 0.024 
Middle 0.025 -0.027* -0.002 0.006 -0.02 -0.013 0.046 -0.034* -0.01 
Sec. & above -0.023 -0.122*** -0.028 -0.031 -0.05* -0.043* -0.009 -0.081** -0.023 
GLSS_1   0.246*   0.286**   0.482*** 
Variant 3: Education conditioning on unearned income 
Primary 0.073** 0.017 0.019 0.08* 0.006 0.003 0.066* 0.021 0.026 
Middle 0.024 -0.01 -0.003 -0.004 -0.011 -0.01 0.051* -0.013 -0.004 
Sec. & above -0.029 -0.044* -0.029* -0.059 -0.047 -0.042* -0.001 -0.042 -0.019 
GLSS_1   0.14***   0.186***   0.075*** 
Observation  6519 13547 20066 2659 4873 7532 3860 8674 12534 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ Proportional sampling weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
(2) Ȃ The entire results (including those of parental education) with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-10, A-11, and A-12. 
(3) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, water and sanitation, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations. 
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Where parental education is controlled, estimates show mixed results and often 
fall in line with the direction of own education of the adults in each survey year 
(Appendix tables A-10 to 11). However, significant categories of parental 
education are few and often weak, with the dominant category being parental 
primary education. The association is however stronger in urban areas, even with 
the control of expenditure or unearned income; but there appears to be no ǯlness in rural areas. Paternal primary is 
however mostly not significant and when it is, the relationship is also found weak 
with mixed outcomes, especially in the urban and rural sub-samples in GLSS 1.  
In GLSS 4, maternal primary lowers the probability of ǯreported illness in 
urban areas whilst paternal primary increases the probability in the full and rural 
samples. Statistically significant parental education categories in GLSS 4 are even 
fewer than GLSS 1, and except for maternal primary in urban areas, are weak too. 
The pooled sample of both surveys gives less convincing evidence of the influence 
of parental education of adults on their illness. The relevant information however 
acquired from this analysis is that controlling parental education of adults does ǯ-reported illness. 
This is parallel to the findings of Joshi (1994) but contradicts those of Behrman 
and Wolfe (1987) in Nicaragua27 ǯ a ǯǤǯǯǤ 
 
                                                        
27
 (YHQWKRXJKWKHLUIRFXVZDVRQPRWKHU¶VHGXFDWLRQDQGFKLOG¶VKHDOWKDSDUDOOHOFRPSDULVRQVFRXOGVWLOO
be made with their analysis. Indeed, estLPDWLRQRIWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VVDPSOHFRQWUROOLQJIRUJUDQGSDUHQWV¶
LQDGGLWLRQWRSDUHQWV¶HGXFDWLRQVKRZHGDVLPLODURXWFRPHXQUHSRUWHGDVWKHDGXOWV¶ 
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2.3.2.1  Morbidity: Control Variables 
This section briefly discusses some of the socioeconomic variables controlled in 
the estimation of the models (variant 2). Variant 3 is only referred to in relation to 
unearned income. Consistent with the earlier pattern of discussions, each variable 
is first discussed for children, and then followed by adults.  
The impact of household wealth on reported illness 
Household wealth is controlled initially as household expenditure per capita 
(endogenous: variant 2) and then as household unearned income per capita 
(exogenous: variant 3). This is basically conducted to use one as a sensitivity 
check on the other; unearned income is however discussed first.  
1: Unearned income per capita 
Table 2.12 shows the estimates of household unearned income per capita of the ǯǤThe results reflect the pattern of education earlier 
discussed in this study. It shows an initial positive correlation with ǯ
reported illness, which turns to negative at the quadratics in GLSS 1. They show a 
joint significance at 5 percent level, suggesting unearned income does not increase 
reported illness for all households28. For instance, increased unearned income at ǯǡ
paribus. 
                                                        
28
 In order to capture the non-linear impact of unearned income, and also expenditure in the next sub-
section, the turning point of each sub-sample is first calculated, then the recorded figures of these 
household wealth in the data are sorted by ascending order so that the lowest is the poorest and the 
highest is the richest household in the sample (In the case of expenditure). Regarding unearned 
income, it would be those who receive no unearned income (the lowest) to the highest recipients of 
unearned income. Then locating the turning point in the sample (as well as inter-quartile ranges), the 
proportion of households found before this point (or after) is calculated to get the varying impact of the 
household wealth. See appendix C for some few illustrations of the Impact of household wealth on 
health status. 
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Table 2.12: The Impact of Unearned Income on The Probability of Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and 
Pooled) ; Treating Unearned Income as Exogenous. 
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Sample Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Children 
Full       
Log of unearned income pc 0.015 2.49*   -0.007 -1.4 0.009 3.05**  
Log of unearned income pc2  -0.001 -1.46 0.001 1.88 -4.56E-04 -1.57 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 13.9  8.6  40.07  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.001  0.0136  0.0000  
Urban       
Log of unearned income pc 0.003 0.31 -0.012 -1.5 -0.003 -0.6 
Log of unearned income pc2  4.23E-04 0.42 0.001 1.67 0.001 1.34 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 5.0  3.44  9.84  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0822  0.1789  0.0073  
Rural       
Log of unearned income pc 0.019 2.33*   -0.005 -0.85 0.012 3.01**  
Log of unearned income pc2  -0.002 -1.78 0.001 1.29 -0.001 -1.87 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ] 6.4  5.79  28.27  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0407  0.0554  0.0000  
Adults 
Full       
Log of unearned income pc 0.007 3.82*** -0.008 -1.66 0.005 1.75 
Log of unearned income pc2    0.001 2.45*   2.33E-05 0.09 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ]   19.79  53.6  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)    0.0001  0.0000  
Urban       
Log of unearned income pc 0.005 1.7 -0.019 -2.65**  -0.002 -0.39 
Log of unearned income pc2    0.002 2.86**  0.001 1.25 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ]   9.01  14.2  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)    0.011  0.0008  
Rural       
Log of unearned income pc 0.007 2.85**  -0.003 -0.48 0.003 0.82 
Log of unearned income pc2    0.001 1.3 2.45E-04 0.67 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ]   16.27  36.3  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)    0.0003  0.0000  
Notes: (1) Ȃ ǲǳǲ ?ǳ 
(2) Ȃ These are estimates that also controlled for ǲǳǢ
this control are not reported for brevity. 
 
Calculating the turning point and assessing it based on the unearned income 
figures in the data show that only about a third of the sampled households found 
at higher levels (after the turning point) in the full sample experience the lowering 
impact of unearned income. This pattern is also true for the rural sub-sample but 
with a higher percentage (approximately 58 percent) of its sampled households 
experǯǡ
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ceteris paribus. However unearned income appears to be statistically insignificant ǯǤ 
In contrast to the earlier survey year, unearned income in GLSS 4 indicates an 
initial negative relationship with the probability of ǯreported illness, which 
then changes to a positive one at the quadratics. The turning point is much earlier 
and about 61 percent of households found after this point are observed as having 
a higher probability of reporting illness. Actually, these are all the households who 
received unearned income in GLSS 4. The rural and urban sub-samplesǯ
however support no such evidence of the influence of unearned income. Evidence 
from the pooled sample supports the outcome in GLSS 1 for the full and rural sub-
samples. The pooled urban sub-sample however indicates an initial decrease in 
reported illness as unearned income increases. These are mainly households with 
no unearned income; but about 63 percent of the sampled households who also 
receive unearned income show increased tendencies of reported illness, ceteris 
paribus. It does appear that increased unearned income in households tends to be 
more beneficial to rural compared with urban children, all else held constant.    
Iǯ unearned income is controlled in linear terms in GLSS 1 
because the quadratics had the same signs and was not significant (unless jointly 
tested). Similar to the childrenǯǡ
the probability of self-reported illness of adults. But in this case, the increase is for 
all income groups, especially in rural areas. A percentage increase in household 
unearned income has the probability of increasing reported illness by 0.7 percent 
amongst adults in GLSS 1, ceteris paribus. The GLSS 4 estimates give a contrary Ǥǯǡ
lowers the probability of self-reported illness but increases at the quadratics. 
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Approximately 61 percent of households are observed after the turning point, and 
these are also the only recipients of unearned income in the sample. Thus 
implying that increased unearned income also tends to increase self-reported 
illness of adults in GLSS 4, ceteris paribus. The pooled sample estimates somewhat 
support this positive relationship, which give an overall implication that for the 
majority of residents in the country (except for children in rural areas), 
households who receive increased unearned income are also more likely to report 
illness, all else held constant. 
A possible reason for such an outcome is that unearned income might be 
simultaneously determined with illness (for example, unearned income is 
received because of already existing ailments, although it was presumed under the 
specification section of this study that it was not the case) or correlated an 
unobserved factor. Any of these reasons may render unearned income potentially 
endogenous, hence the need to estimate these models again with expenditure as 
endogenous for robustness test.  
 
 
2: Expenditure per capita 
An instrumental variable approach is used in the estimations of all the models 
estimating the effects of education conditioning on expenditure per capita29. 
Various combinations of the instrumental variables are used since the same set 
does not pass the over-identification test for the different sub-samples of the 
survey data. The instrumental variables include the value of land and durable 
                                                        
29
 The results discussed here are the estimates acquired when education is assumed exogenous. With 
the exception of the rural sub-sample of children in GLSS 4, none of the samples indicated that 
H[SHQGLWXUHSHUFDSLWDLQIOXHQFHVFKLOG¶VUHSRUWHGLOOQHVVZKHQHGXFDWLRQLVDOVRLQVWUXPHQWHG)RU
these rural children, expenditure per capita initially increases the tendency of them being reported as 
ill and then begins to lower at the quadratics, ceteris paribus. 
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goods, and in some cases the employment of head of household, room per capita 
and whether the household owns a radio. The instruments are found to be jointly 
significant in determining expenditure per capita, and the over-identification test 
also shows they are valid. The over-identification test statistics are reported with 
the estimates in table 2.13. Those of the joint F-test statistics are however 
reported with the first-stage regression and presented in appendix tables A-13 
and A-14 for children and adults respectively. 
Expenditure per capita, from the theoretical perspectives, is presumed to improve 
health status because it enables increased access to health inputs. However, the 
empirical findings show mixed effects of expenditure and its related indicators. 
Whilst studies such as Alderman and Garcia (1994) on rural Pakistan, Glewwe 
(1998) on Morocco and Haddad et al., (2003) show favourable effects, others such 
as Appleton (1991) finds seemingly perverse effects in Tanzania and Glewwe and 
Desai (1999) find it not significant in Ghana using GLSS 2. From the descriptives of 
this study, it could be observed that reported illness increases with expenditure in 
both survey years. This perverse pattern is further observed in some of the 
econometric results but generally, the results are mixed. 
Expenditure per capita is not found significant amongst children in GLSS 1 and 
seems to have perverse effects in GLSS 4 at a joint significance level of 10 percent. 
Expenditure per capita at the mean (log of expenditure of 13.5) has positive effect 
on reported illness by about 4 percentage points, ceteris paribus. This is just 
below the turning point (approximately log of expenditure of 14.0), and thereafter 
expenditure begins to have negative effects. About 76.5 percent of the sampled 
households are below this turning point and they are low to middle level 
expenditure households. Thus, high earners (households found after the turning 
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point) probably getting the necessary and adequate health inputs, which might 
tend to improve their childrenǯ are observed as less likely to be 
reported ill. However, when the proportion of neighbours with poor water and 
sanitation is also controlled, majority of households (about 91 percent) including 
some of the high expenditurǯ, ceteris 
paribus. ǯǯ
quadratics. This also mirrors the pattern observed with unearned income per 
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Table 2.13: The Impact of Expenditure on The Probability of Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and 
Pooled); Treating Expenditure as Endogenous.  
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Sample Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Children 
Full       
Log of expenditure pc -1.698 -1.3 0.978 1.17 0.465 2.16*   
Log of expenditure pc2 0.077 1.28 -0.034 -1.12 -0.016 -2.09*   
Joint F-statistics [chi2(2) ] 2.19  8.05  5.48  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.3343  0.0178  0.0646  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 1.924 (3)  4.433 (3)  9.763 (5)  
P-value 0.5884  0.2184  0.0822  
Urban       
Log of expenditure pc 0.825 0.34 -0.86 -0.56 0.373 0.99 
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.038 -0.36 0.032 0.58 -0.013 -0.95 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(2) ] 0.52  2.81  1.26  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.7712  0.2459  0.5335  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 0.136 (2)  3.693 (3)  2.435 (2)  
P-value 0.9344  0.2966  0.296  
Rural       
Log of expenditure pc -3.436 -1.46 2.228 1.54 0.406 1.07 
Log of expenditure pc2 0.166 1.47 -0.081 -1.52 -0.014 -0.99 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 2.34  4.99  3.4  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.3109  0.0826  0.1827  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 3.363 (3)  1.446 (3)  1.77 (2)  
P-value 0.339  0.6949  0.4126  
Adults       
Full       
Log of expenditure pc 0.56 0.4 -6.815 -2.68** 0.325 1.15 
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.025 -0.4 0.255 2.71**  -0.012 -1.16 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 0.21  12.47  1.4  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.9019  0.002  0.4977  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 8.66 (5)  4.713 (3)  1.497 (2)  
P-value 0.1234  0.194  0.4732  
Urban       
Log of expenditure pc 0.131 0.04 -1.464 -1.15 0.349 1.27 
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.009 -0.06 0.052 1.16 -0.013 -1.27 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 2.84  2.14  1.61  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.2421  0.3435  0.4463  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 1.333 (5)  1.353 (3)  3.247 (3)  
P-value 0.9315  0.7165  0.3551  
Rural       
Log of expenditure pc 0.671 0.47 -3.242 -1.16 1.227 3.80*** 
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.026 -0.39 0.126 1.22 -0.044 -3.64*** 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 6.65  15.42  26.76  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0359  0.0004  0  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 9.811 (5)  5.267 (2)  0.414 (1)  
P-value 0.0808  0.0718  0.5199  
Note: (1) Ȃ  ǲǳǲ ?ǳpita squared 
(2) Ȃ ǲǳǢ
this control are not reported for brevity.
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ǯǡexpenditure per capita ǯ
do not always indicate statistical significance. But when it does, like education, has 
different signs in GLSS 1 and 4. Interestingly, the trend in expenditure and 
education is similar in each survey year; for example if education show a positive 
(negative) tendency in GLSS 1 (GLSS 4) to report illness, expenditure per capita is 
also likely to show the same association in the same year. In GLSS 1, only the rural 
sub-sample shows some significant effects on self-reported illness. The 
relationship is rather relatively weak and suggests an increased tendency of adults 
to report illness till the highest expenditure level, after which decreasing effects 
are observed. At the mean expenditure level (log of expenditure 10.6), which is 
observed around middle expenditure households, the probability of reported 
illness increases by 13 percentage points, ceteris paribus. The turning point is 
occurs at log of expenditure 12.9 (higher expenditure households); after which the 
probability of reported illness begins to decrease. However, the decreasing impact 
at the quadratics is negligible because it represents a very small percentage of 
households. The majority of households, about 99.8 percent, are estimated as 
having high probabilities of self-reporting illness in the rural areas.  
In GLSS 4, only the full and rural sub- samples show expenditure per capita as 
significant in influencing self-reported illness of adults. They suggest the expected 
negative relationship, but this is only at the lower levels of expenditure, that is, 
amongst adults in poor households. They constitute a third of the households 
sampled and indicate that self-reported illness decreases as expenditure levels 
increase. Meanwhile households with middle to high level expenditure tend to do 
the reverse. This is more so in rural areas where the estimated turning point is 
much earlier on the expenditure ladder (lowest) and about 83.5 percent of adults 
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from the lower to higher expenditure households tend to report increased illness 
as expenditure increases, ceteris paribus.  
The overall picture of expenditure per capita and reported illness appears to be 
geared more towards a positive linkage, since the majority of the households 
sampled tend to report more illness with expenditure increase (also observed with 
unearned income). The positive relationship observed might also not be due to the 
potential endogeneity of household wealth since both cases of unearned income 
(exogenous) and expenditure (endogenous) gave fairly similar results. The mixed 
results in this study however concur with others in the literature, and show that 
household wealth affects the health status of different members as well as sections 
of society differently. Wolfe and Behrman (1984) also explain the positive or not 
significant outcome of income (and education) ǲ
that altered consumption patterns due to taste changes associated with more 
schooling and more resources may offset the positive impact on health of greater 
productivity and more household resources. Tǲǣ
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The impact of other control and community variables on reported illness 
Table 2.14 presents the remaining control variables of the model variant 2, which 
also includes poor water and sanitation. The others are age and gender, rural 
residence in the case of the full and urban sub-samples, and in addition, 
community variables for the rural sub-samples.  
ȋǲǳȌ 
These estimates are marginally different (negligible) from those that do not 
control poor water and sanitation (not reported for brevity). Meanwhile it could be 
observed that where significant, increased proportion of poor water and sanitation 
in a cluster tends to increase reported illness of both children and adults, ceteris 
paribus. This is as anticipated because prevalence of poor and diseased 
environments could override the beneficial influence of education and wealth to 
cause detrimental effects on health status. 
The outcomes in the urban sub-samples estimated are however not statistically 
significant. This might be due to other variables that countermand the presumed 
detrimental effects. These possibly include the availability or easier access and use 
of health protective equipments such as mosquito-insecticide nets to prevent 
malaria, which is one of the main causes of ailments in the country; acquisition and 
safer handling of water even if it is piped-borne because of frequent interruptions 
and storage; and better access to information on public health to avoid contracting 
contaminable diseases.  
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Rural communities appear to be more at disadvantaged positions since poor water 
and sanitation are mostly found statistically significant in these areas. This 
probably suggests that improved water and sanitation, in spite of education and 
wealth, is critical to health production particularly in rural areas. One reason being 
that of the sample estimated, only 20 percent of urban dwellers have neighbours 
with poor water and sanitation in the two survey years, whilst in rural areas, about 
80 percent in GLSS 1 and 56 percent in GLSS 4 have neighbours with poor water 
and sanitation. In such circumstances the perception that education or wealth 
serves as proxies for these environmental factors may not be well founded, 
especially in developing countries. Although both are correlated with better 
housing conditions the empirical evidence demonstrates that clean water and 
sanitation also directly improve health (see Lavy et al., 199630; and Lawson, 2004). 
Therefore policy makers should endeavour to make accessibility to these goods in 













                                                        
30
 They used the same data and a similar indicator, which to some extent controls the likely endogeneity of 
household public goods to estimate child survival. They find child survival is positively related to good 
quality water and sanitation. 
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Table 2.14: The Impact of Other Control and Community Variables on The Probability of 
Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled) 
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
 Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
CHILDREN       
Full       
Age (years) -0.032 -6.20*** -0.042 -12.94*** -0.037 -13.67*** 
Age squared (years) 0.001 4.05*** 0.002 7.07*** 0.001 7.70*** 
Female -0.026 -2.11*   -0.015 -1.95 -0.02 -2.97**  
Rural -0.033 -1.64 0.014 1.3 -0.001 -0.09 
Water & sanitation 0.036 1.66 0.041 3.39*** 0.044 4.26*** 
Urban       
Age (years) -0.02 -2.39*   -0.045 -7.96*** -0.036 -7.45*** 
Age squared (years) 0.001 1.5 0.002 4.57*** 0.001 4.26*** 
Female -0.019 -0.96 0.001 0.09 -0.009 -0.78 
Water & sanitation -0.128 -1.88 0.011 0.38 0.009 0.36 
Rural       
Age (years) -0.037 -5.83*** -0.042 -10.60*** -0.039 -11.62*** 
Age squared (years) 0.002 3.87*** 0.002 5.78*** 0.001 6.50*** 
Female -0.03 -1.9 -0.023 -2.38*  -0.025 -3.02**  
Water & sanitation 0.082 2.83**  0.052 3.54*** 0.059 4.78*** 
Community variables       
Price of Maize (kg) -0.005 -0.83 -0.002 -0.94 -0.003 -1.37 
Price of Anti-malarial pill -0.04 -1.6 -0.02 -2.42*  -0.013 -1.88 
Dist. to the nearest clinic 0.002 2.20*   1.11E-04 1.02 2.35E-04 2.18*   
Male Agric. Wage -0.038 -3.82*** -0.01 -2.44*  -0.01 -3.12**  
Ratio of female Wage -0.016 -0.64 0.06 3.92*** 0.032 2.76**  
Ratio of child Wage 0.043 1.57 0.003 0.24 0.012 0.76 
ADULTS       
Full       
Age (years) 0.007 3.97*** 0.004 3.59*** 0.006 6.58*** 
Age squared (years) -3.21E-05 -1.62 -1.05E-05 -0.82 -2.30E-05 -2.33*   
Female 0.03 2.25*   0.075 7.80*** 0.056 7.80*** 
Rural -0.017 -0.85 0.057 3.39*** 0.002 0.2 
Water & sanitation 0.061 2.71**  0.049 3.44*** 0.05 4.35*** 
Urban       
Age (years) 0.006 1.89 0.003 1.82 0.003 2.18*   
Age squared (years) -2.60E-05 -0.75 2.30E-07 0.01 -7.58E-07 -0.05 
Female 0.039 1.87 0.062 4.74*** 0.057 5.11*** 
Water & sanitation -0.013 -0.15 -0.032 -1.17 0.002 0.07 
Rural       
Age (years) 0.009 3.74*** 0.006 4.43*** 0.007 6.38*** 
Age squared (years) -4.21E-05 -1.69 -2.87E-05 -1.91 -3.39E-05 -2.74**  
Female 0.031 1.67 0.076 6.29*** 0.058 6.28*** 
Water & sanitation 0.049 1.7 0.089 5.47*** 0.08 6.31*** 
Community variables       
Price of Maize (kg) 0.009 1.42 0.001 0.23 0.002 0.72 
Price of Anti-malarial pill -0.047 -1.8 -0.026 -2.92**  -0.014 -2.02*   
Dist. to the nearest clinic 0.003 3.47*** -4.54E-05 -0.45 1.02E-04 1.12 
Male Agric. Wage -0.04 -3.44*** -0.009 -2.16*   -0.017 -5.72*** 
Ratio of female Wage -0.031 -1.32 0.071 4.45*** 0.039 3.23**  
Ratio of child Wage 0.032 1.16 -0.003 -0.17 -0.024 -1.59 
*Note: Water and sanitation is measured as proportion of 'neighbours' in cluster with no water & toilet 
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Age and gender, and location 
The probability of the incidence of illness generally varies with the age of children. 
The effect is however non-linear whereby reported illness falls to about 16 and 10 
and half years of age in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively, and then rises thereafter. The ǯ
both surveys till over a century old31. This outcome is consistent with Appleton ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǯǤ  
With regard to gender, the results show girls are less likely to be reported as ill 
compared to boys in both survey years, which also concurs with the descriptive 
statistics. This might not exactly be indicative of gender discrimination. Although it 
is possible that because of the boisterous nature of boys, they might be quickly 
noted as ill when they become lethargic. It is also possible that the boys may 
actually be less healthy than girls for no obvious reasons; but hardly would be due 
to gender discrimination because unlike Asia, there has rarely been evidence of 
such in relation to childcare in SSA. At adulthood, women show higher probability 
of reporting illness as opposed to men, ceteris paribus. This may be due to 
problems related to reproduction and menopause.  
Current residence, represented by a dummy indicating rural, is observed as 
 ?ǯǤ
rural dwellers are 5.7 percentage points more likely to report illness relative to 
their counterparts in urban areas, all else held constant. This is as anticipated 
because not only does settlements in rural/urban communities differ as a result of 
socioeconomic determinants, but also accessibility to facilities that may generally 
                                                        
31
 Which is very rare in a developing country, and therefore suggests that there is no respite from illness 
with regard to age as one reaches adulthood. 
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promote health is different in rural and urban areas. This is one of the reasons for 
the disaggregation of specified models into rural and urban sub-samples. The other 
is the opportunity to include some relevant variables that are only observed at 
community levels in rural areas. 
Community variables 
Of the community variables controlled, the results show that the price of anti-
malarial treatment drugs is negatively related to reported illness. This is however 
 ?ȋǯȌǤ
results is contrary to expectation, since an increase in the cost of an health input is 
presumed to reduce its demand and therefore worsen health status, which in this 
case is an increase in reported illness. This contradicts Lawson (2004) who finds 
higher antibiotic price increase morbidity levels in female adults and school-aged 
boys in Uganda. However another price of health input, distance to the nearest 
clinic, shows the expected outcome. For instance, a kilometre increase in distance 
to the nearest clinic increases reported illness in rural areas by about 0.2 
(children) and 0.3 (adults) percentage points in GLSS 132, ceteris paribus. This 
indicates how lack of easy access to medical facilities impedes health. Ill health 
probably prevails because of lack of preventative health care programmes in 




                                                        
32
 'LVWDQFHWRWKHQHDUHVWFOLQLFLVDOVRIRXQGSRVLWLYHDQGVWDWLVWLFDOO\VLJQLILFDQWLQWKHFKLOGUHQ¶VVDPSOHLQ
GLSS 4 as well as the pooled samples of children and adults, when expenditure and poor water and 
sanitation are not controlled. 
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Increase in mǯ the probability of reported 
illness of both children and adults, all else held constant. For children, this suggests ǯǡ other members (especially children) are less likely 
to work to support household income, and therefore less likely to fall ill. For adults, 
it means they could reduce working periods and enjoy more leisure that could 
improve their health. The outcome may also be suggesting affordability of health 
inputs in households including nutrition that consequently improves health.  
ǯnt in GLSS 1, 
but it increases reported illness in GLSS 4. The pooled samples of children and 
adults also support the positive relationship, which implies that an increase in the ǯǯs. 
This outcome is not unexpected since as primary carers in most households, less 
time or attention given to members, especially children due to an increased 
opportunity cost of time could be detrimental to the health production of all 
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2.3.3 Duration of Illness: Reduced Form Estimates 
The duration of illness is recorded for respondents who only reported they were ill 
within the reference period in both surveys: 28 days in GLSS 1 and 14 days in GLSS 
4. As mentioned in section 2.2.2.1, this presents an econometric problem of 
censoring and truncation, and therefore the use of Tobit in the econometric 
estimations. The upper limit is set according to the end of the reference period of 
each survey year and the lower limit is zero (mainly representing respondents 
who did not suffer any illness or injury within the reference periods). This gives 
the overall sample size of each sub-group estimated as equal to that of the 
incidence of illness estimated in the previous sub-section. It can be observed from 
figure 2.1 that the highest duration frequency in the various sub-samples is zero. 
For instance, of the 6378 (GLSS 1) and 11660 (GLSS 4) children observed, about 
65.9 and 76.2 percent respectively were not reported as ill, hence the high 
proportion of zero days ill. The analogous figures for adults are 59.6 and 72.2 
percent. It is thus fairly possible that with the dominance of zeros in the observed 
sample sizes, the estimated results would be similar to those of the incidence of 
illness. 
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Fig. 2.1 
 
Upon an onset of illness, days ill could be mostly observed around the initial few 
days, with slight intermittent peaks, which then taper off to the end of the 
reference period. The distribution is highest on day three for children (6.4% in 
GLSS 1 and 4.7% in GLSS 4) and day 7 for adults (8.7% in GLSS 1 and 5.1% in GLSS 
4). A distinguishing feature of the distribution however is that the intermittent 
peaks, apart from day three, are points of memorable day-counts (7, 14, 21 and 28 
days) of weekly basis. ǯȋǲǳȌǤ
however neither ascertained as true reflections nor solved using a more 
econometrically appropriate semi-parametric discrete choice duration model due 
to lack of information in the datasets. 
Similar to the incidence of illness, estimates are presented separately for children 
and adults, and are discussed accordingly. Also, the models are estimated with the 
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primary focus on parental education for children and personal education for 
adults. Personal characteristics, such as age and gender, rural location, and the 
community variables discussed in the methodology are also controlled in the 
estimations. In order to reduce potential endogeneity or omitted variable bias that 
might occur due to a likely correlation between education and some unobserved 
variable in the error term, additional control variables are included but not 
reported for brevity. These are ethnicity, region of residence, and a dummy 
representing missing commodity prices.  
Further, as in the case of incidence of reported illness, estimations are conducted 
according to the specified model described under the conceptual framework 
section. The model is in three vaǡǲ ?ǳǡǲ ?ǳǲ ?ǳ
capita as an exogenous variable. These three model variants are also estimated 
controlling for the Ǯǯ in 
cluster as well as parental education of adults ȋǯȌǤ
re-estimations are performed for robustness test and also to further reduce the 
bias as a result of unobserved variables.  
Finally, all the estimations in GLSS 4 are performed using weights created by the 
survey team, with the exception of the instrumental Tobit estimates (the Stata 
econometric software does not allow the use of probability sampling weights with 
this procedure). The estimates of education are presented in text with the 
discussions in an abridged form for the sake of brevity. The entire results can 
however be found in appendix AȂ15 to AȂ20. The estimates of the controlled 
variables are also presented in different tables, and briefly discussed. 
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I: Children 
The impact of parental education ǯ 
 ?Ǥ ? ?ǯ
illness for GLSS 1, 4 and the pooled sample of both surveys. The results are not 
consistent with the expectation outlined in the conceptual framework, but they are 
not unusual. By working through a higher tendency to seek information, education 
is expected to create or improve healthy environments for individuals and 
households through higher exposure and accessibility to health related facilities, 
increase the tendency to use these facilities, efficient use of medical care, taking 
prescribed medicines more regularly, and adopting better nutritional habits. Thus 
children with educated parents are expected to experience shorter duration of 
illness in the event that they fall ill. However, similar to the incidence of illness, 
duration of illness could also be subject to personal sensitivities and perhaps the 
socioeconomic environment.  
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Table 2.15: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Parental Education on the Duration of Child Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled) 
 Full   Urban   Rural   
Sample GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Variant 1: Education 
Mother's Primary 0.204 0.083 0.1 0.323 -0.085 0.067 0.063 0.145 0.125 
Mother's Middle 0.12 0.04 0.039 0.453*** -0.124 0.082 -0.057 0.115 0.023 
Mother's Sec & above 0.333 0.003 0.12 0.713** -0.002 0.24 0.438 -0.03 0.098 
Father's Primary -0.024 0.179 0.047 -0.307 -0.122 -0.098 0.134 0.256 0.109 
Father's Middle 0.14 -0.075 -0.019 -0.155 -0.14 -0.109 0.261* -0.088 -0.018 
Father's Sec & above 0.204 0.168 0.119 -0.275 -0.104 -0.046 0.539** 0.299 0.235* 
GLSS_1   0.541***   0.762***   -0.04 
Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure 
Mother's Primary 0.18 0.061 0.101 0.348 -0.086 0.064 0.108 0.144 0.117 
Mother's Middle 0.136 -0.02 0.027 0.473*** -0.176 0.077 0.001 0.085 0.007 
Mother's Sec & above 0.322 -0.01 0.079 0.796** -0.055 0.223 0.546 0.061 0.033 
Father's Primary 0.083 0.028 0.024 -0.266 -0.061 -0.117 0.23 0.055 0.101 
Father's Middle 0.256* -0.169* -0.047 -0.097 -0.185 -0.131 0.283* -0.189* -0.027 
Father's Sec & above 0.331* -0.005 0.085 -0.189 -0.021 -0.061 0.63** 0.001 0.204 
GLSS_1   1.012   0.915   0.16 
Variant 3: Education conditioning on unearned income 
Mother's Primary 0.183 0.056 0.078 0.311 -0.114 0.044 0.049 0.121 0.104 
Mother's Middle 0.115 0.012 0.021 0.433** -0.153 0.063 -0.047 0.091 0.009 
Mother's Sec & above 0.333 -0.029 0.106 0.667** -0.033 0.211 0.424 -0.073 0.086 
Father's Primary -0.009 0.192 0.048 -0.32 -0.093 -0.086 0.145 0.256 0.102 
Father's Middle 0.114 -0.08 -0.04 -0.173 -0.138 -0.12 0.233* -0.101 -0.048 
Father's Sec & above 0.173 0.137 0.104 -0.301 -0.15 -0.063 0.499** 0.278 0.219* 
GLSS_1   0.535***   0.84***   -0.024 
Observation no. 6378 11660 18038 2410 3547 5957 3968 8113 12081 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ Proportional sampling weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4, except for variant 2. 
(2) Ȃ These estimates are not marginal effects; the entire results with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-15, A-16, and A-17. 
(3) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, water and sanitation, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations. 
(4) Ȃ Community variables are controlled in addition to the above for the rural sub-samples. 
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However, this study finds that children of educated mothers, especially post-
primary education, seem to have longer duration of reported illness in urban 
areas (GLSS 1). Paternal post-primary education also appears to be positively 
associated with longer duratioǯǢ
however observed in rural areas. Although this relationship appears perverse, it is 
possible that educated parents (who are also more likely to seek treatment for 
their sick children) might not consider ǯ
until informed otherwise by a medical practitioner. Hence children of uneducated 
parents may not be healthier than educated ones, as the results seem to indicate.  
In GLSS 4, none of the parental education categories seem to determine the 
duration of ǯǤse findings are quite similar to the analysis of 
reported illness in the previous section. The pooled samples also do not suggest 
any significant influence of parental education on this health indicator, except 
paternal secondary and above in rural areas. However, the dummy representing 
the GLSS 1 survey period is significant in only the full and urban sub-samples, 
which seems to suggest that the duration of illness is relatively longer in GLSS 1 
compared to GLSS 4, ceteris paribus.  
Conditioning on household wealth however gives different results depending on 
whether it is exogenous unearned income per capita or an endogenous 
expenditure per capita. The parental education estimates do not dramatically 
change upon conditioning on unearned income per capita and its quadratic in the 
model. There are fairly negligible reductions in magnitudes of categories found 
significant in GLSS 1, but the outcome in GLSS 4 remains same.  
The estimates of parental education however change upon conditioning on 
expenditure per capita and its quadratic. In the full sample of GLSS 1 for instance, 
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post-primary paternal education becomes statistically significant; but like the 
rural sub-sample, it appears positively related to the duration of ǯillness. 
There are also some perceptible changes in GLSS 4, where paternal middle 
education level is found significant in reducing the duration of ǯillness 
compared to none, especially in rural areas. This relationship is however quite 
weak, and cannot be directly compared with the outcome of the previous model 
without expenditure because sampling weights are not used in this estimation33. 
 
II: Adults 
The impact of personal education ǯ 
The resulǯ ?Ǥ ? ?
indicate that own primary education of adults in GLSS 1 tends to be positively 
related with the duration of illness compared to none, ceteris paribus. These 
results concur with those of Schultz and Tansel (1993) who used a combination of 
GLSS 1 and 2, and a different specification for a first-stage estimation of education 
on adultǯ duration of illness, which was subsequently used in estimating 
morbidity effects on wage rates in Ghana. Our results are also similar to those for 
children in respect of reported illness.   
In contrast, the results in GLSS 4 suggest that persons with secondary education 
and above report shorter (about 7.8%)34 duration of illness relative to those with 
                                                        
33
 The software does not allow for probability sampling weights with instrumental tobit estimations. When 
estimations are conducted without the control of expenditure per capita and sampling weights for 
GLSS 4, paternal education iVDOVRIRXQGVLJQLILFDQWLQUHGXFLQJWKHGXUDWLRQRIFKLOGUHQ¶VLOOQHVV7KLV
then implies that the control of expenditure per capita per se does not change the initial results on 
parental education.   
34
 This is the marginal effects after tobit (unconditional expected value). 
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no education, ceteris paribus. The corresponding figures for adults living in urban 
and rural areas are 8.6 and 8.4 percent respectively. The reason however behind 
the discrepancy in outcomes (direction of impact) between GLSS 1 and 4 is not 
very clear. It is likely that the difference in re-call periods may be a contributory 
factor, but this could not be verified. The pooled sample however supports the 
outcome in GLSS 4, especially in urban areas; and the survey dummy indicator 
being significant suggests longer duration of illness in GLSS 1 than 4, ceteris 
paribus.  
The control of unearned income (variant 3) slightly reduces the magnitude and 
strength of the results in mostly GLSS 1, but is generally fairly stable. Moreover, 
conditioning on expenditure (variant 2) seems to complement the impact of ǯǤ
 ?ǡ
education, which lost its statistical significance in the rural sub-sample; but those 
in GLSS 4 increased in magnitude and strength of impact. For example, the 
estimate of persons with secondary and above level of education is about three 
times that observed when expenditure is not controlled; and the outcome is 
significant at the 1 percent level. Thus adults with secondary education and above 
experience comparatively shorter duration of illness conditioning on expenditure 
than not. This type of dramatic change is not observed in the urban sub-sample. 
However, the rural sub-sample shows similar changes; and in both the full and 
rural sub-samples, persons with middle/JSS level of education are also observed 
as experiencing shorter duration of illness relative to those with no education, 
ceteris paribus.  
The parental education levels of these adults are also controlled as a sensitivity 
analysis to the earlier outcomes (see appendix tables A-21 to 23). The results did 
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not change in signs although the magnitudes of the coefficients as well as 
significance reduced slightly. Nonetheless, when unearned income is also 
controlled, personal secondary education and above in the urban sub-sample of 
GLSS 1 becomes significant and negatively influences the duration of illness. Of the 
parental education itself, only primary levels are significant in GLSS 1 and they 
tend to increase the duration of illness in adults in the full and urban sub-samples.  
In GLSS 4 however, only the urban sub-sample shows maternal primary education 
aǯǤ
education the direction of the link with illness duration is different in the two 
surveys; each mirroring that of the personal education of the adults, which is 
similar to the pattern observed in the estimation of reported illness. Considering 
this and the observation that the control of parental education does not change 
the outcome on personal education of adults, the remaining discussions focus on 
estimates without these controls.
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Table 2.16: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Own Education on the Duration of Adult Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled) 
 Full   Urban   Rural   
Sample GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled GLSS 1 GLSS 4 Pooled 
 Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. Coef. 
Variant 1: Education 
Primary 0.386*** 0.059 0.103 0.517** 0.075 0.096 0.294* 0.051 0.103 
Middle 0.114 -0.018 -0.03 0.062 -0.058 -0.071 0.163 -0.019 -0.032 
Sec. & above -0.095 -0.315** -0.214** -0.158 -0.37* -0.27* -0.006 -0.329* -0.154 
GLSS_1   0.81***   1.033***   0.116 
Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure 
Primary 0.384*** 0.035 0.1 0.546** -0.091 0.071 0.274 0.027 0.163 
Middle 0.108 -0.2* -0.03 0.096 -0.159 -0.096 0.111 -0.205* -0.027 
Sec. & above -0.1 -0.944*** -0.195* -0.018 -0.406* -0.3* -0.062 -0.599*** -0.484** 
GLSS_1   0.936   1.579**   -3.293 
Variant 3: Education conditioning on unearned income 
Primary 0.369** 0.048 0.088 0.502** 0.07 0.085 0.283* 0.032 0.085 
Middle 0.077 -0.042 -0.053 0.032 -0.094 -0.088 0.126 -0.043 -0.059 
Sec. & above -0.158 -0.37** -0.248** -0.219 -0.434** -0.306** -0.061 -0.384* -0.193 
GLSS_1   0.855***   1.109***   0.205 
Observation  6519 13547 20066 2659 4873 7532 3860 8674 12534 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ Proportional sampling weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4, except for variant 2. 
(2) Ȃ These estimates are not marginal effects; the entire results with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-18, A-19, and A-20. 
(3) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, water and sanitation, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations. 
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2.3.3.1 The Duration of Illness: Control Variables 
The impact of household wealth on the duration of self-reported illness 
The impacts of household wealth are mixed, and mostly non-significant, especially ǯǤ
however not uncommon. Appleton (1991) for instance finds predicted 
consumption per capita, and livestock per capita as well as land per capita not ǯ
respectively; but finds that land per capita increases illness duration in Tanzania. 
In this study too, it generally appears that the majority of households who receive 
unearned income or has higher expenditure experience longer duration of illness, 
as also observed in relation to reported illness. 
1: Unearned income per capita (exogenous) 
Table 2.17 presents the results of both children and adults of the two survey 
years. With regard to children, the duration of illness initially increases with 
unearned income in GLSS 1 and then changes at the quadratics, where shorter 
durations are observed. Approximately 51 percent of households from the lowest 
(received no unearned income) to lower middle level of unearned income are 
estimated as having children who experience lengthened duration of illness 
whereas the converse is the case for children in households that received higher 
unearned income, ceteris paribus. These outcomes are however significant in only 
the full and rural sub-samples. In contrast, in GLSS 4 unearned income is found 
significant in only the full and urban sub-samples, indicating that children in 
households that did not receive any unearned income experience shortened 
duration of illness whilst those who did (about 61 percent) experience lengthened 
duration. 
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In relation to adults, the association between unearned income and the duration 
of illness is observed as positive for all the households in GLSS 1, especially in the 
rural sub-sample. On the other hand, adults in GLSS 4 who received no unearned 
income, like their children, experience shortened duration, whilst those who 
received unearned, experience longer duration of illness, ceteris paribus. The 
outcomes in the pooled samples concur with what is observed in GLSS 1, for the 
full and rural sub-samples; but that of the urban sub-sample seems to support the 
findings from GLSS 4. 
Table 2.17: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Unearned Income on the Duration of Illness, (GLSS 
1 & 4, and Pooled) 
Sample GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  
Children Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Full       
Log of unearned income pc 0.098 3.04** -0.05 -1.46 0.054 2.77** 
Log of unearned income pc2  -0.008 -2.21* 0.006 1.96 -0.002 -1.31 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ] 6.77  3.56  18.94  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0012  0.0296  0.0000  
Urban       
Log of unearned income pc 0.024 0.48 -0.09 -1.69 -0.022 -0.64 
Log of unearned income pc2  -3.25E-05 -0.01 0.009 2.20* 0.004 1.31 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ] 1.07  4.57  4.26  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.3419  0.0125  0.0141  
Rural       
Log of unearned income pc 0.12 2.57*   -0.028 -0.52 0.075 2.97**  
Log of unearned income pc2  -0.012 -2.12*   0.004 0.84 -0.004 -1.8 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ] 3.95  1.61  14.32  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0194  0.2029  0.0000  
Adults       
Full       
Log of unearned income pc 0.017 0.59 -0.055 -1.43 0.019 1.11 
Log of unearned income pc2  0.002 0.55 0.007 2.09* 0.001 0.62 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ] 6.23  7.45  23.59  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.002  0.0007  0.0000  
Urban       
Log of unearned income pc -0.033 -0.73 -0.135 -1.99* -0.017 -0.59 
Log of unearned income pc2  0.006 1.27 0.012 2.32* 0.004 1.42 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ] 1.9  4.72  6.77  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.1491  0.0109  0.0012  
Rural       
Log of unearned income pc 0.003 0.08 -0.024 -0.5 0.007 0.33 
Log of unearned income pc2  0.004 0.77 0.005 1.09 0.002 1.09 
Joint F-statistics [chi2(  2) ] 4.01  4.68  16.15  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0182  0.0104  0.0000  
Notes: (1) Ȃ ǲǳǲ ?ǳ 
(2) Ȃ ǲǳater and sanitation; the version without 
this control are not reported for brevity.
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2: Expenditure per capita (endogenous) 
The first stage regression is very similar to that of reported illness presented in 
appendix A-13 and A-14, hence not reported for brevity. The instruments are also 
found significant in determining expenditure per capita and its quadratic at the 1 
percent level. They all pass the over-identification test, which is reported with the 
results in table 2.18 for both children and adults. Expenditure per capita and its 
quadratic are found statistically significant in only the rural sub-sample of children 
in GLSS 1, the full and rural sub-samples of adults in GLSS 4 as well as the rural 
sub-sample of the pooled.  
In GLSS 1, children found in poorer households (lowest to lower middle on the 
expenditure ladder that has been divided into four quartiles in ascending order), 
are observed as having shorter duration of illness, ceteris paribus. However, 
children in the relatively well-resourced households, constituting about two-thirds 
of the sampled households, experience longer duration of illness. 
A similar pattern is observed amongst adults in GLSS 4, especially in rural areas, as 
well as the pooled sample. These show an initial reduction in the duration of illness 
of adults as expenditure per capita increases (mostly in poorer households). In 
rural areas for example, this represents households found in the lowest quarter of 
the expenditure group. Thus the majority of households, mainly middle to upper 
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Table 2.18: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Expenditure on the Duration of Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, 
and Pooled) 
Sample GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  
Children Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Full       
Log of expenditure pc -9.69 -1.37 1.896 0.33 0.93 0.69 
Log of expenditure pc2 0.435 1.34 -0.061 -0.29 -0.032 -0.64 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 3.49  4.8  0.84  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.1747  0.0905  0.6555  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 2.422 (3)  4.342 (3)  7.47 (3)  
P-value 0.4895  0.2269  0.0583  
Urban       
Log of expenditure pc -0.465 -0.04 -10.382 -0.91 0.741 0.32 
Log of expenditure pc2 0.008 0.01 0.377 0.92 -0.028 -0.34 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 1.32  1.33  0.15  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.5163  0.5147  0.9289  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 0.098 (2)  4.099 (3)  2.471 (2)  
P-value 0.952  0.2509  0.2906  
Rural       
Log of expenditure pc -40.378 -2.19*  7.379 0.78 -0.859 -0.37 
Log of expenditure pc2 1.935 2.19*  -0.264 -0.76 0.04 0.45 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 4.8  3.61  2.41  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0906  0.1648  0.2997  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 0.952 (2)  1.68 (3)  1.187 (2)  
P-value 0.6213  0.6415  0.5523  
Adults       
Log of expenditure pc 1.045 0.15 -41.185 -2.57* 0.889 0.55 
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.047 -0.15 1.537 2.60** -0.035 -0.6 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 0.03  10.06  1.35  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.9864  0.0065  0.5097  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 9.143 (5)  5.007 (3)  3.12 (2)  
P-value 0.1035  0.1713  0.2101  
Urban       
Log of expenditure pc 3.774 0.24 -10.804 -1.22 2.037 1.27 
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.185 -0.27 0.385 1.23 -0.074 -1.29 
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 4.09  1.84  1.69  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.1294  0.3987  0.4303  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 0.561 (2)  1.582 (3)  4.734 (3)  
P-value 0.7556  0.6636  0.1924  
Rural       
Log of expenditure pc 0.95 0.13 -20.117 -1.19 -23.916 -2.33*   
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.02 -0.06 0.778 1.25 0.95 2.38*   
Joint F-statistics [chi2( 2) ] 5.82  13.72  17.33  
Joint Sig. (Prob. > chi2)  0.0545  0.001  0.0002  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 6.274 (3)  4.252 (2)  0.208 (1)  
P-value 0.099  0.1193  0.648  
Notes: (1) Ȃ ǲǳǲ ?ǳ 
(2) Ȃ ǲǳǢ
this control are not reported for brevity. 
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ǲǳȋȌ
on the duration of illness 
The high proportion of ǲneighboursǳ with poor water and sanitation in a cluster 
does not only have unfavourable effects on the incidence of illness, but also 
increases illness duration of all household members (table 2.19). This is 
particularly prevalent in rural areas, which has also been noted by Jalan and 
Ravallion (2003) who find that access to piped water shortens childǯ
illness as a result of diarrhoea in rural India. However, in our study, the urban sub-
samples in both surveys do not appear to be influenced by the condition of 
household public goods in the community. But as already explained under the 
incidence of illness, there may be other facilities available in these areas that 
alleviate or override the deteriorating effects of poor water and sanitation in these 
communities.  
Age and gender 
Age negatively affects the duration of illness amongst children initially, gets to a 
maximum, and then increases thereafter. The turning point is significantly earlier 
in the first (11 years) than the later (15 years) survey year. The effect of age on the 
duration of illness amongst adults is contrary to what is observed in the case of 
children. The duration of illness generally rises with age in both years, which is 
similar to the findings of Appleton (1991). 
With regard to gender, where significant, the estimates suggest shorter duration of 
illness for girls relative to boys in both surveys. This is largely observed in rural 
areas, unlike the urban sub-samples, which are not significantly different from 
zero. There are no apparent reasons to explain why girls seem healthier than boys, 
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all else held constant. Meanwhile amongst adults the duration of illness does not 
differ by gender in GLSS 1, but in GLSS 4 women are associated with the tendency 
of reporting longer duration, ceteris paribus. The pooled samples of both children 
and adults support their statistically significant outcomes; and generally suggest 
that females are healthier when young but become worse off as they get to 
adulthood.  
Current residence 
Contrary to expectations, and what is observed in the descriptive statistics, the 
duration of illness is significantly shorter amongst rural than urban children in 
GLSS 1. However, the outcome does not significantly differ from zero in GLSS 4, 
which is not surprising because the descriptives for this survey year do not show 
variation between rural and urban childrǯduration of illness. Amongst adults 
however, rural dwellers tend to have longer duration of illness compared to their 
urban counterparts, ceteris paribus. 
Community variables 
The effects of the community variables on the duration of illness in rural areas are 
mixed and some of them are not consistent with the conceptual framework. For 
example, an increase in the price of anti-malarial treatment drugs rather shortens 
the duration of illness of children (GLSS 1) and adults (GLSS 4) instead of 
lengthened duration, due to the anticipated fall in demand. However, this may not 
actually be a perverse outcome because upon the incidence of illness, patients may 
not have any option but to purchase the medicines. Those who still cannot afford 
the cost could get it on credit.  
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Distance to the nearest clinic however increases the duration of illness in children 
and adults, as expected. This is found significant in the pooled sample of children, 
and the adult sample of GLSS 1. The positive correlation is probably due to the 
opportunity cost of time (parents in the case of children), whereby longer distance 
to clinics may discourage treatments or follow-ups if they do seek the initial 
treatment. It is also possible that the discomfort and burden of long distance 
travels to clinics could worsen and prolong the duration of illness.  
ǡǯ
children and adults. There seems to be a reduction in the duration of illness 
amongst household members with ǯǡ
paribus. On the other hand aǯ
wage rates has adverse impact on the duration of illness. In GLSS 4 and the pooled 
samples where it is significant, both children and adults experience longer 
duration of illness ǯ. This 
is probably due to the increased opportunity cost of time for woman, with the 
result that less time is available for childcare as well as for the entire household, in 
respect of health production. Aǯ
wage rates is found significant in the pooled sample of adults. This is probably a 
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Table 2.19: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Other Control and Community Variables on the 
Duration of Illness, (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled) 
Sample GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  
CHILDREN Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Full       
Age (years) -0.218 -7.87*** -0.293 -13.29*** -0.257 -15.13*** 
Age squared (years) 0.01 5.40*** 0.01 7.18*** 0.01 8.74*** 
Female -0.152 -2.27* -0.099 -1.82 -0.124 -2.96** 
Rural -0.246 -2.26* 0.042 0.57 -0.059 -1 
Water & sanitation 0.369 3.12** 0.302 3.67*** 0.316 4.88*** 
Urban       
Age (years) -0.166 -3.87*** -0.316 -7.52*** -0.24 -8.19*** 
Age squared (years) 0.008 2.86** 0.011 4.09*** 0.009 4.88*** 
Female -0.108 -1.07 0.039 0.38 -0.046 -0.65 
Water & sanitation -0.448 -1.3 -0.105 -0.5 -0.01 -0.07 
Rural       
Age (years) -0.244 -6.37*** -0.295 -11.33*** -0.269 -12.91*** 
Age squared (years) 0.011 4.21*** 0.011 6.24*** 0.01 7.34*** 
Female -0.188 -1.99*   -0.149 -2.35*   -0.156 -3.05**  
Water & sanitation 0.637 3.54*** 0.403 4.14*** 0.434 5.66*** 
Community variables       
Price of Maize (kg) 0.019 0.53 -0.013 -0.83 -0.014 -1.04 
Price of Anti-malarial pill -0.405 -2.63**  -0.107 -1.92 -0.082 -1.9 
Dist. to the nearest clinic 0.005 1.19 0.001 1.61 0.002 2.54*   
Male Agric. Wage -0.221 -3.70*** -0.055 -2.16*   -0.065 -3.26**  
Ratio of female Wage -0.038 -0.25 0.462 4.56*** 0.278 3.87*** 
Ratio of child Wage 0.294 1.73 -0.046 -0.47 0.147 1.44 
ADULTS       
Full       
Age (years) 0.036 4.10*** 0.032 4.10*** 0.038 7.18*** 
Age squared (years) -1.15E-04 -1.21 -8.05E-05 -1.01 -1.31E-04 -2.34* 
Female 0.109 1.65 0.466 7.53*** 0.294 7.07*** 
Rural -0.131 -1.35 0.355 3.24** -3.01E-04 -0.01 
Water & sanitation 0.368 3.32*** 0.293 3.29** 0.265 4.03*** 
Urban       
Age (years) 0.03 2.01* 0.023 1.94 0.022 2.43* 
Age squared (years) -8.63E-05 -0.53 6.15E-06 0.05 4.77E-06 0.05 
Female 0.158 1.58 0.428 4.57*** 0.325 4.83*** 
Water & sanitation 0.024 0.06 -0.222 -1.15 0.024 0.17 
Rural       
Age (years) 0.041 3.70*** 0.047 5.90*** 0.04 5.06*** 
Age squared (years) -1.51E-04 -1.25 -2.32E-04 -2.73**  -1.70E-04 -2.06*   
Female 0.107 1.16 0.401 6.00*** 0.254 4.00*** 
Water & sanitation 0.354 2.49*   0.533 5.55*** 0.632 5.86*** 
Community variables       
Price of Maize (kg) 0.037 1.12 0.003 0.21 -0.02 -1.16 
Price of Anti-malarial pill -0.231 -1.76 -0.118 -2.34*   -0.291 -3.40*** 
Dist. to the nearest clinic 0.013 3.11**  -0.001 -1.22 -0.001 -0.81 
Male Agric. Wage -0.125 -2.38*   -0.09 -4.55*** -0.068 -3.04**  
Ratio of female Wage -0.132 -1.12 0.5 5.29*** 0.495 4.41*** 
Ratio of child Wage 0.23 1.65 -0.088 -0.97 0.785 2.46*   
  133 
2.3.4 Anthropometric Measures: Reduced Form Estimates 
Estimations are performed for children with complete observations for all the ǯǤ
two, pre-school (0 Ȃ 5 years) and school-aged (6 Ȃ 15 years)35 children. The 
former is discussed first followed by the latter in different sub-sections. Similar to 
the previously discussed health indicators the anthropometrics are sub-divided 
into full, urban and rural sub-samples and estimated as three variants of the 
model specified under the conceptual framework.  
The main focus of the discussion is the relationship between parental education 
and height-for-age as well as weight-for-height. The morbidity results are 
reported along side for easy reference. It must be noted however that these three 
health indicators are not exactly comparable because some are more recently 
observed than others. For example, height-for-age is a long-term measurement of 
health that is basically linked to chronic malnutrition whilst weight-for-height is 
acute malnutrition, which is short-term. Further, reported illness is four weeks 
prior to the survey (GLSS 1). We also note that repeated illness could lead to 
wasting in children on one hand, and malnutrition generally could lead to 
increased susceptibility to diseases (Tomkins and Watson, 1989 cited in Asenso-
Okyere et. al. 1997).  Thus to a large extent, they may be correlated and examining 
them concurrently could be beneficial in drawing a general consensus on health 
status.  
 
                                                        
35
 However weight-for-height for school-aged is only between 6 ± 10 years, which is a limitation placed by 
the software used: it could not calculate WHZ for age 10 years and above.  
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I: Pre Ȃ School Children 
The impact of parental education on pre-ǯ-for-age and weight-for-
height  
Table 2.20 presents estimates of parental education on reported illness, height, 
and weight for pre-schoolers in GLSS 1. It can be observed that all else held 
constant, maternal secondary and above tend to increase the height and weight of 
pre-schoolers (full sample). From the rural/urban demarcation, it appears 
maternal post-primary education is more influential in raising their height in 
urban whereas only maternal secondary and above improve their weight in rural 
areas. For instance in urban areas maternal middle and maternal secondary and 
above raise pre-school height by 0.54 and 0.85 standard deviations respectively, 
whilst in rural areas maternal secondary and above raise their weight by 0.83 
standard deviations compared to mothers with no education, ceteris paribus.  
Paternal education on the other hand does not seem to have any significant 
relationship with pre-ǯǤǡpaternal post-
primary education is associated with increased reported illness, especially in rural 
areas. Maternal middle education also appears to increase reported illness 
amongst urban pre-schoolers. Thus apart from the single perverse outcome on 
height in rural areas, maternal education seems to favourably influence the 
anthropometric measures of health. 
The association of parental education and the anthropometric health measures 
changed marginally upon conditioning on unearned income as exogenous 
household wealth in the full sample. First, the positive relationship with weight 
lost its statistical significance, and secondly, the size of the coefficients previously 
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found significant reduced, albeit slightly. This suggests that a small part of 
parental education may be working through household unearned income. With 
the exception of maternal middle edǯthe rural 
sub-sample, the results of maternal education on height and weight are consistent 
with the findings of Wolfe and Behrman (1987) in Nicaragua and Thomas et al. 
(1990 & 1991) in Brazil.  
In order to rule out a possible endogeneity bias of household wealth as a result of 
likely correlation with the error term, a 2-stage least square model is also 
employed in estimating the health indicators, with expenditure per capita as 
household wealth. Conditional on expenditure, maternal education lost its 
statistically significant association with height and weight of pre-schoolers in the 
full sample; but that of the urban sub-sample remained same. The outcome 
observed in the full sample is not uncommon, but there are also findings that 
contradict it. Indeed, studies including Alderman (1990) using GLSS 1 and Glewwe 
and Desai (1999) using GLSS 2 find similar results. However Lavy et al. (1996), 
who also used GLSS 1 but with a different anthropometric sample specification36, 
find a contrary result with height. They find that maternal education significantly ǯht at higher education levels; only the urban sub-sample of 
this study yields such results. Regarding weight, all the above-mentioned studies 
including Lavy et al. (1996) obtain similar results to that in this study. Joshi 
(1994) also finds that whilst height rises consistently by levels of schooling, no 
such evidence is observed with weight amongst children in rural Nepal.  
ǯ estimates for education conditioning on expenditure per capita rather 
show paternal, instead of maternal, education as significant in determining pre-
                                                        
36
 Their estimation sample is divided into children under 3 years and 3 years and older. 
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ǯ. A positive relationship is observed with height at higher levels 
of paternal education, but there seems to be no significant association with 
weight. The former relationship is also noted by Lavy et al., (1996), but not the 
latter. They found that ǯht. 
In conclusion, we note that all else held constant, parental education, albeit not 
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Table 2.20: The Effects of Parental Education on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of Pre-School Children, 1987/88 
(GLSS 1) 
Pre-School Variant 1: Education 
Variant 2: Education conditioning 
on Expenditure per capita 
Variant 3: Education conditioning 
on Unearned income 
 Illness Haz Whz Illness Haz Whz Illness Haz Whz 
 Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal 
Full Sample: Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects 
Mother's Primary 0.049 -0.038 0.003 0.049 -0.057 0.02 0.04 -0.037 0.00036 
Mother's Middle 0.026 0.048 0.005 0.026 0.07 -0.017 0.021 0.039 -0.006 
Mother's Sec & above 0.044 0.493** 0.299* 0.029 0.357 0.206 0.039 0.448** 0.25 
Father's Primary 0.071 -0.064 -0.016 0.079 0.142 -0.1 0.075 -0.066 -0.017 
Father's Middle 0.081** 0.044 0.009 0.09* 0.288* -0.101 0.07* 0.04 -0.002 
Father's Sec & above 0.15*** 0.157 0.09 0.157** 0.36* -0.02 0.138** 0.152 0.078 
Observation no. 2168         
Urban sub-sample:         
Mother's Primary -0.002 0.199 0.028 -0.012 0.037 -0.13 -0.006 0.183 0.022 
Mother's Middle 0.112* 0.535*** -0.021 0.113* 0.476** 0.007 0.102 0.494*** -0.035 
Mother's Sec & above 0.13 0.849*** 0.249 0.141 0.717* 0.441 0.122 0.806*** 0.217 
Father's Primary -0.131 -0.181 -0.037 -0.144 -0.331 -0.268 -0.134 -0.19 -0.043 
Father's Middle -0.053 -0.092 0.084 -0.086 -0.528 -0.434 -0.06 -0.116 0.072 
Father's Sec & above -0.05 -0.094 0.074 -0.084 -0.587 -0.48 -0.062 -0.134 0.058 
Observation no. 757         
Rural sub-sample:         
Mother's Primary 0.06 -0.159 0.019 0.068 -0.186 0.103 0.054 -0.145 0.016 
Mother's Middle -0.006 -0.212* -0.009 0.0000943 -0.173 0.048 -0.008 -0.215* -0.016 
Mother's Sec & above 0.147 0.192 0.829* 0.142 0.468 0.678 0.123 0.201 0.773* 
Father's Primary 0.133* -0.102 0.019 0.133* 0.001 -0.006 0.137* -0.109 0.024 
Father's Middle 0.118** 0.109 -0.036 0.116** 0.208 -0.094 0.107** 0.129 -0.049 
Father's Sec & above 0.266*** 0.276 0.165 0.26*** 0.368* 0.067 0.257*** 0.298 0.157 
Observation no. 1411         
*Notes: (1) ȂThese estimations are performed for only GLSS 1, due to lack of data in GLSS 4; (2) Ȃ The entire results with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-24a and A-24b; 
(3) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations; (4) Ȃ Community variables are controlled in addition to the above for the rural sub-samples. 
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II: School Ȃ Aged Children 
Unlike the pre-schoolers parental education appears not to have any significant 
correlation with the height and weight of school-aged children, at least in the full 
sample (table 2.21). In the urban sub-sample however, maternal secondary and 
above is noted as positively related to their height. Thus school-aged children, 
whose mothers have high levels of schooling, show 0.44 standard deviations of 
increased height compared to similar children whose mothers are uneducated, 
ceteris paribus. In contrast, the impact of parental education in rural areas seems 
perverse. All else held constant, maternal primary and middle as well as paternal 
middle level education are found to be negatively correlated with school-aged ǯheight.  
Controlling unearned income does not cause any dramatic changes on the impact 
of parental education. It only seems to have weakened the statistical significance 
of maternal secondary and above level of education on height in the urban sub-
sample. Otherwise, all other results remained unchanged. Conditioning on 
expenditure per capita on the other hand leads to the loss of statistical 
significance of maternal education in relation to height in urban areas. This might 
be suggesting that the influence of maternal secondary and above level of 
education could partially be working through household wealth.  
Fǯǯǡ-sample in ǯǤ 
ǡǯcation is found significant in the 
urban sub-sample, which is also perversely related to the weight of the school-
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aged children. These findings are contrary to expectation (except for maternal 
secondary and above relationship with height in variants 1 and 3), and indeed 
puzzling. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, there are no studies that use 
the same data and sample demarcation, to compare our findings with. This is 










                                                        
37
 The height and weight of pre-schoolers give better reflection of nutrition and health relative to school-
aged children. At an older age (that is school-aged and above), it is the genetics of parents that are 
most likely to determine the physical attributes of these children rather than nutrition (Case and 
Deaton, 2006). 
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Table 2.21: The Effects of Parental Education on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of School-Aged Children, 1987/88 
(GLSS 1) 
School-Aged Variant 1: Education 
Variant 2: Education conditioning on 
Expenditure per capita 
Variant 3: Education conditioning on 
Unearned income per capita 
 Illness Haz Whz Illness Haz Whz Illness Haz Whz 
 Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal 
Full Sample: Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects Effects 
Mother's Primary 0.077* -0.079 -0.032 0.079 0.032 0.09 0.076* -0.077 -0.026 
Mother's Middle 0.025 -0.106 -0.064 0.024 -0.118 -0.086 0.028 -0.126 -0.083 
Mother's Sec & above 0.119 0.23 0.043 0.099 0 -0.108 0.127 0.133 -0.075 
Father's Primary 0.019 -0.053 -0.093 0.021 -0.142 -0.222 0.02 -0.052 -0.093 
Father's Middle -0.008 -0.125 -0.026 -0.008 -0.286** -0.18 -0.013 -0.123 -0.018 
Father's Sec & above 0.004 0.086 0.016 0.001 -0.137 -0.171 -0.002 0.095 0.025 
Observation no. 2207 2207 1268       
Urban sub-sample:          
Mother's Primary 0.156** 0.171 0.009 0.146* 0.131 0.061 0.156** 0.169 0.01 
Mother's Middle 0.043 0.134 -0.073 0.039 0.067 -0.188 0.041 0.122 -0.088 
Mother's Sec & above 0.246** 0.443** -0.002 0.27** 0.214 -0.211 0.238** 0.376* -0.111 
Father's Primary 0.19 -0.23 -0.224 0.162 -0.382 -0.768* 0.187 -0.249 -0.253 
Father's Middle 0.013 -0.029 0.011 -0.027 -0.208 -0.185 0.012 -0.04 0.006 
Father's Sec & above -0.089 0.14 0.108 -0.128* -0.118 -0.183 -0.091 0.128 0.1 
Observation no. 866 866 465       
Rural sub-sample:          
Mother's Primary 0.004 -0.252* -0.05 0.026 -0.105 0.049 0.002 -0.251* -0.042 
Mother's Middle 0.038 -0.288** -0.108 0.05 -0.311** -0.116 0.044 -0.306** -0.132 
Mother's Sec & above 0.019 -0.09 -0.117 -0.049 -0.31 -0.351 0.035 -0.158 -0.189 
Father's Primary -0.009 -0.014 -0.096 -0.013 -0.108 -0.169 -0.011 0.001 -0.08 
Father's Middle -0.04 -0.209* -0.03 -0.066 -0.328** -0.115 -0.047 -0.202* -0.017 
Father's Sec & above 0.082 0.045 -0.002 0.041 -0.132 -0.135 0.068 0.07 0.025 
Observation no. 1341 1341 803 1341 1341 803 1341 1341 803 
*Notes: (1) ȂThese estimations are performed for only GLSS 1, due to lack of data in GLSS 4; (2) Ȃ The entire results with t-ratio are presented in Appendix tables A-25a and A-25b; 
(3) Ȃ Age and its quadratic, gender, rural residence, ethnicity, and regional dummies are controlled in all the estimations; (4) Ȃ Community variables are controlled in addition to the above for the rural sub-samples. 
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2.3.4.1  Anthropometric Measures: Control Variables 
The impact of household wealth on pre-school and school-ǯ-for-
age and weight-for-height  
1: Unearned income per capita (exogenous) 
Table 2.22 presents the results of unearned income per capita estimates on both 
pre-school and school-ǯǤUnearned income appears to 
have no influence on either the height or weight of pre-schoolers. It is only found 
significant in influencing reported illness in the full sample. The evidence, using 
the quadratics, also indicates an initial rise and then a fall in its impact on 
reported illness. However, in relation to school-aged children, estimated unearned 
income appears to reduce the height and weight of the children initially and then 
begins to increase after the quadratics. In both health measures, the reduction is 
observed in about a third of the sampled households that are found at the lower 
end of the income ladder. These are people who do not get any unearned income 
(lowest) and those that receive marginal unearned income.  
The turning point however is below the average unearned income and majority of 
the households sampled are above this point. The school-aged children of these 
households achieve increased height and weight with increased unearned income. 
In the rural-urban demarcation however, unearned income appears insignificant 
in determining the height of these children. But in relation to weight, about 77 
percent of the children found in the upper to middle level unearned income 
achieve increased weight in urban areas, ceteris paribus. The analogous figure for 
rural areas is 59 percent. It thus suggests that unearned income is more 
favourable in determining the anthropometric health measures of school-aged 
children when more is received in households. 
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Table 2.22: The Effects of Unearned Income on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-
scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of Pre-School and School-Aged Children, 1987/88 
(GLSS 1)  
Pre-School Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Log of unearned income pc 0.021 1.96* -0.04 -1.31 -0.029 -1.33 
Log of unearned income pc2 -0.001 -1.1 0.005 1.51 0.004 1.72 
Joint F-statistics 9.13  1.21  1.96  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.0104  0.2989  0.1411  
Urban       
Log of unearned income pc 0.021 1.08 0.056 1.17 -0.015 -0.38 
Log of unearned income pc2 -0.001 -0.56 -0.002 -0.45 0.002 0.62 
Joint F-statistics 2.69  2.44  0.4  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.2612  0.0882  0.6704  
Rural       
Log of unearned income pc 0.011 0.78 -0.071 -1.69 -0.028 -1.01 
Log of unearned income pc2 -4.06E-04 -0.24 0.007 1.43 0.004 1.39 
Joint F-statistics 3.41  1.61  1.49  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.1822  0.2  0.2252  
       
School-Aged Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
 Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Full       
Log of unearned income pc 0.017 1.72 -0.076 -2.78** -0.083 -3.49*** 
Log of unearned income pc2 -0.001 -1.37 0.009 2.95** 0.01 3.63*** 
Joint F-statistics 3.66  4.36  6.59  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.1606  0.0129  0.0014  
Urban       
Log of unearned income pc -0.008 -0.51 -0.068 -1.75 -0.082 -2.32*   
Log of unearned income pc2 0.001 0.55 0.007 1.87 0.009 2.56*   
Joint F-statistics 0.3  1.75  3.29  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.8613  0.1738  0.0381  
Rural       
Log of unearned income pc 0.028 1.99* -0.076 -1.93 -0.101 -2.89**  
Log of unearned income pc2 -0.003 -1.76 0.009 2.06* 0.012 2.96**  
Joint F-statistics 4.2  2.13  4.39  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.1224  0.1195  0.0127  
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2: Expenditure per capita (endogenous) 
Conditioning on expenditure per capita also shows some significant effects on 
height and weight, but this is mainly observed in the sub-samples of pre-
schoolers, and the full samples of school-aged children (table 2.23). The various 
instrumental variables used include the employment of household head, land, 
durable goods and business assets. The statistical significance of these 
instruments is reported with the first-stage regressions (appendix A-26 and A-27 
for pre-school and school-aged children respectively) but the over-identification 
test statistics are reported with the estimates of expenditure in text. 
Expenditure is only found significant in determining the height of pre-schoolers in 
urban areas, where it appears to initially increase, reaches a turning point at the 
highest level of expenditure, and then begins to fall. This is jointly significant at the 
5 percent level. About 95 percent of the urban households sampled are below this 
highest expenditure level, thus it could be concluded that expenditure increases 
the height of pre-schooled urban children. Most importantly, this observation is in 
spite of the positive influence of maternal post-primary education. The positive 
influence of wealth on height is confirmed in similar studies such as Thomas et al. 
(1990) for Brazil, Alderman and Garcia (1994) for Pakistan, Lavy, et al. (1996) for 
Ghanaian children 3 years and older using same data, Glewwe (1998) for Morocco 
and Lawson (2004) for Uganda.  
In relation to weight, expenditure per capita is also found significant but in only 
the rural sub-sample. However in this case expenditure initially tends to reduce 
the weight of rural children before the increase at the quadratics. The reduction in 
weight is observed amongst low expenditure households, which is also below the 
average expenditure per capita level. Children in households with middle to high 
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expenditure levels experience increased weight with expenditure increase; this is 
observed in nearly 58 percent of the sampled rural households.  
With regard to school-aged children, the estimated outcomes of expenditure 
support the beneficial effect of increased wealth in the majority of households. 
With increases in expenditure, approximately 99.6 and 97.9 percent of the 
sampled households experience increased height and weight respectively, in the 
full sample, ceteris paribus. It however appears that the outcome is mainly true 
for the school-aged children in urban households since expenditure is found non-
significant in the rural sub-sample. Expenditure also appears to be more 
influential in improving the anthropometric health status of children compared to 
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Table 2.23: The Effects of Expenditure per capita on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-
scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of School-Aged Children, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
Pre-School Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Log of expenditure pc -1.435 -0.51 -25.379 -1.55 3.193 0.53 
Log of expenditure pc2 0.067 0.51 1.166 1.5 -0.131 -0.47 
Joint F-statistics chi2(2) 0.26  2.78  2.7  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.8764  0.0625  0.0677  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq)  2.204 (3)     0.638 (3)  0.224 (2)  
P-value 0.5313  0.8878  0.8939  
Urban       
Log of expenditure pc 2.319 0.27 20.447 0.76 38.994 1.49 
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.103 -0.27 -0.876 -0.72 -1.745 -1.47 
Joint F-statistics 0.15  5.43  1.95  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.9282  0.0046  0.1429  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 3.253 (5)  0.218 (2)  5.102 (3)  
P-value 0.661  0.8967  0.1645  
Rural       
Log of expenditure pc -2.513 -0.65 -5.11 -0.43 -28.276 -2.98**  
Log of expenditure pc2 0.121 0.65 0.223 0.39 1.364 3.02**  
Joint F-statistics 0.43  0.49  5.97  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.8064  0.6138  0.0026  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 3.219 (3)     3.323 (3)  6.763 (5)  
P-value 0.3591  0.3445  0.2389  
       
School-Aged Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Log of expenditure pc -0.31 -0.17 5.292 1.01 7.506 1.31 
Log of expenditure pc2 0.016 0.19 -0.211 -0.89 -0.314 -1.22 
Joint F-statistics chi2(2) 0.39  7.98  6.44  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.8238  0.0004  0.0017  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 3.991 (3)  4.923 (2)  3.692 (2)  
P-value 0.2624  0.0853  0.1578  
Urban       
Log of expenditure pc 4.603 1.84 13.325 1.29 20.386 2.05*   
Log of expenditure pc2 -0.204 -1.84 -0.563 -1.23 -0.862 -1.98*   
Joint F-statistics 3.4  4.68  7.51  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.1827  0.0095  0.0006  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 3.808 (3)  5.421 (3)  0.625 (3)  
P-value 0.2829  0.1435  0.8906  
Rural       
Log of expenditure pc -5.337 -0.95 20.556 1.36 9.165 0.97 
Log of expenditure pc2 0.267 0.98 -0.972 -1.33 -0.418 -0.92 
Joint F-statistics 3.7  1.71  2.1  
Joint Sig. (Prob.)  0.1575  0.1807  0.1236  
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 1.655 (3)  2.655 (2)  12.131 (6)  
P-value 0.6469  0.2651  0.0591  
Notes: (1) Ȃ ǲǳ and ǲ ?ǳ 
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The impact of additional control and community variables on the anthropometric 
measures of health 
Age and gender  
Estimates of other control and community variables are given in tables 2.24 and 
2.25 for pre-school and school-aged children respectively. Observations of the 
health indicators analysed suggest that age strongly influences pre-school 
childǯ health.  The descriptives showed that the children generally become 
less healthy as they grow from month zero but more so after the sixth month to 
their first birthday. Reported illness, stunting and wasting all surge upwards after 
this period till their second to third birthdays where they begin to fall and 
stabilise. Glewwe and Desai (1999) find similar pattern using the GLSS 2 data. The 
feeding processes of children could possibly explain this pattern between age and 
health status. The months of poorer health are usually the weaning periods from 
exclusive breastfeeding. Adapting to new food, not to mention the exposure to 
different carers as working mothers return to work, tends to lower the childǯ 
health. In addition, increased child mobility exposes them to all sorts of 
communicable diseases in neighbouring environments. With a default category of 
0 Ȃ 5months, the coefficients on age dummies confirm the descriptive statistics 
above: higher reported illness is predicted for children 6months and above, 
relative to the default. The magnitudes however start to decrease after the second 
birthday. Correspondingly, higher stunting as well as wasting is also observed. 
This continues till the age of 2 years in the case of wasting, and 4 years in the case 
of stunting. The implication is that ǯ
previous malnutrition and disease than weight or current illness.  
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There appears to be no evidence of gender discrimination in relation to height and 
weight of pre-schoolers because the female dummy is not significant. However the 
outcome on reported illness suggests girls are less likely to be reported ill. 
Similarly school-aged girls are estimated as taller than their male counterpart, and 
it is significantly more so in the rural relative to the urban areas, ceteris paribus. 
This supports the outcome that was previously observed with reported illness; 
and plausibly suggests that girls are healthier than boys, ceteris paribus. 
Current residence ǯ 
Also as anticipated and consistent with the descriptives, pre-schoolers in rural 
areas are noted as shorter and thinner than their urban counterparts. School-aged 
children in rural areas are however observed as generally only shorter than their 
urban counterparts. The weight of school-aged children does not seem to matter. ǯǡificant in 
determining the height-for-age z-scores of both pre-school and school-aged 
children. The height of mothers positively determining the height of pre-school 
children for instance concurs with findings of other authors like Lavy, et al (1996) 
and Asenso-Okyere, et al. (1997) using GLSS 1, Glewwe and Desai (1999) using 
GLSS 2 and Glewwe (1998) for Morocco. 
Community variables 
Unfortunately many of the community variables are found to be statistically 
insignificant. It was anticipated that proximity to health facilities might encourage 
better nutritional habit of households and thus improve the production of the 
anthropometric health status. The closeness of a medical facility does not seem to 
have any impact on the anthropometrics but only increases the incidence of 
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reported illness of children as expected. The price of maize is only found 
significant in determining height but the outcome implies that an increase in the 
price of maize increases the height of pre-school children. This seems perverse, as 
increased price could lead to a fall in demand and thereby nutrition; except for 
households that produce maize. In that case, given the same quantity of maize 
produced, household profits would increase and thereby increase the nutritional 
and other health inputs.  
ǯrate is the only community variable found significant in 
the school-aged rural sub-sample of the anthropometric measures. It however 
only determines their weight, which also appears to be consistent with the 
outcome on their reported illness. It indicates that a percentage rise ǯ
agricultural wage rates increase the weight and reduce the incident of illness 
reported of school-aged children by 0.14 standard deviations and 6.6 percentage 
points respectively, ceteris paribus. ǯ
rates also tends to increase the height of pre-schoolers. This probably suggests ǯǡ
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Table 2.24: The Effects of other Control and Community Variables on Health Status (Illness, 
Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of Pre-School Children, 1987/88 
(GLSS 1)  
Pre-school Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal Marginal 
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
6-11months 0.272 5.51*** -0.743 -6.09*** -1.131 -11.01*** 
12-23months 0.331 7.55*** -1.412 -11.18*** -1.206 -11.86*** 
24-35months 0.267 5.96*** -1.523 -12.80*** -0.862 -9.39*** 
36-47months 0.173 3.64*** -1.874 -15.01*** -0.709 -7.62*** 
48-60months 0.13 2.90** -1.619 -14.18*** -0.775 -8.78*** 
Mother's Height -0.001 -0.74 0.034 5.49*** 0.001 0.23 
Female -0.058 -2.66** 0.007 0.11 0.015 0.36 
Rural 0.006 0.23 -0.226 -3.15** -0.102 -2.14*   
constant   -4.918 -5.02*** 0.169 0.35 
Observation no. 2168  2168  2168  
Urban sub-sample:        
6-11months 0.432 6.37*** -0.73 -3.61*** -1.19 -7.52*** 
12-23months 0.447 6.77*** -1.782 -8.60*** -1.198 -7.40*** 
24-35months 0.385 5.25*** -1.358 -6.79*** -0.706 -5.35*** 
36-47months 0.305 3.83*** -1.837 -9.43*** -0.648 -5.06*** 
48-60months 0.338 4.45*** -1.442 -8.13*** -0.735 -6.03*** 
Mother's Height 0.001 0.35 0.021 3.05** -0.002 -0.68 
Female -0.075 -1.99* 0.176 1.78 0.108 1.53 
constant   -3.029 -2.70** 0.54 0.89 
Observation no. 757  757  757  
Rural sub-sample:        
6-11months 0.188 2.92** -0.762 -5.12*** -1.088 -8.30*** 
12-23months 0.268 4.80*** -1.297 -8.40*** -1.228 -9.51*** 
24-35months 0.214 3.84*** -1.659 -11.58*** -0.947 -7.87*** 
36-47months 0.111 1.9 -1.956 -12.47*** -0.734 -5.89*** 
48-60months 0.029 0.54 -1.763 -12.45*** -0.799 -6.81*** 
Mother's Height -0.004 -1.61 0.047 6.55*** 0.006 1.26 
Female -0.054 -1.97* -0.068 -0.87 -0.016 -0.31 
Community variables      
Price of Maize (kg) -0.003 -0.31 0.098 3.56*** -0.015 -0.82 
Price of Anti-malarial pill -0.038 -0.87 -0.113 -0.96 -0.017 -0.2 
Dist. to the nearest clinic 0.003 2.14* 0.005 1.28 -0.002 -0.87 ǯǤage -0.031 -1.81 0.051 1.2 0.004 0.13 
Ratio ǯage -0.018 -0.46 -0.071 -0.63 0.036 0.48 
Ratio of childǯage 0.009 0.22 0.273 2.12* -0.022 -0.26 
constant   -8.002 -6.82*** -0.691 -0.92 
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Table 2.25: The Effects of other Control and Community Variables on Health Status (Illness, 
Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of School-Aged Children, 1987/88 
(GLSS 1) 
School-aged Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal Marginal 
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Age (years) 0.012 0.44 0.06 0.77 -0.087 -0.53 
Age squared (years) -0.001 -0.37 -0.005 -1.48 0.006 0.63 
Mother's Height 0.001 0.45 0.028 5.63*** -0.006 -1.46 
Female -0.016 -0.78 0.299 5.51*** 0.034 0.62 
Rural -0.03 -1.24 -0.396 -6.14*** -0.106 -1.8 
constant   -5.398 -6.19*** 0.404 0.46 
Observation no. 2207  2207  1268  
Urban sub-sample:        
Age (years) 0.076 1.6 -0.022 -0.18 0.028 0.11 
Age squared (years) -0.003 -1.45 -0.002 -0.28 0 0 
Mother's Height 0.001 0.51 0.012 2.03* -0.001 -0.13 
Female -0.011 -0.33 0.19 2.27* 0.141 1.54 
constant   -2.536 -2.43* -1.055 -0.84 
Observation no. 866  866  465  
Rural sub-sample:        
Age (years) -0.02 -0.56 0.148 1.47 -0.149 -0.7 
Age squared (years) 0.001 0.58 -0.01 -2.02* 0.009 0.71 
Mother's Height 0.001 0.3 0.041 4.47*** -0.009 -1.67 
Female -0.02 -0.81 0.378 5.28*** -0.013 -0.19 
Non-Akan 0.003 0.09 0.225 2.18* 0.042 0.45 
Community variables      
Price of Maize (kg) -0.002 -0.26 -0.019 -0.79 -0.017 -0.76 
Price of Anti-malarial pill -0.072 -1.92 -0.088 -0.81 0.02 0.2 
Dist. to the nearest clinic 0.003 2.75** -0.003 -0.81 -0.001 -0.26 ǯǤage -0.066 -4.20*** -0.029 -0.58 0.142 3.87*** ǯage -0.02 -0.55 -0.025 -0.26 0.07 0.76 
Ratio of childǯage 0.141 3.51*** 0.197 1.73 0.026 0.26 
constant   -8.311 -5.01*** 0.467 0.38 
Observation no. 1341  1341  803  
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2.4. SUMMARY: HEALTH STATUS 
This section summarises the estimated results on education and the various 
health status examined in the study. The relationship between education and 
reported illness and its duration has not been consistent with the health theory so 
far in most of the estimated models. For children especially, parental education 
perversely increases illness and its duration in GLSS 1, and does not appear to 
influence these two indicators in GLSS 438.  Estimates of the pooled sample of both 
GLSS 1 and 4 also give evidence of the positive relationship between parental 
education and the reported illness of children. However those on the duration of 
illness are mostly statistically insignificant. The survey dummy though suggests 
that all else held constant children in GLSS 1 are more often reported as ill and 
also experience longer duration of illness relative to GLSS 4. 
Working on the assumption that the positive association or insignificant outcome 
may be due to endogeneity/simultaneity bias, an instrumental variable approach 
is used to verify the results. This somewhat changed the results but not as 
anticipated, at least with maternal education. In both GLSS 1 and 4, mothers with 
primary level of education are estimated as having increased propensity of ǯ39. This confirms the earlier results in GLSS 1 and probably 
concurs with some suggestions in the literature that educated mothers have 
higher tendencies to seek health care and therefore might have prior diagnoses or 
knowledge to recognise symptoms of diseases, hence the increased report of their 
                                                        
38
 Except when expenditure per capita is controlled; upon which children with fathers of middle/JSS 
education level tend to have less reported illness as well as experience shorter duration of illness. The 
latter is especially experienced in rural areas. However less emphasis is placed on this outcome 
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ǯ illness (see Strauss and Thomas, 1998). It does not necessarily mean that 
the less or un- educated is any healthier. This systematic reporting bias, ǯǡthus gives 
arguably an erroneous view of detrimental effects of education on health in 
developing countries, which might objectively not be the case. 
The anthropometric measures of health believed to be relatively more objective in 
measurements to some extent do not support this view. Although the indicators 
are not actually comparable, their results give evidence that parental education is ǯ. 
At least for pre-schoolers in urban areas, height-for-age tends to increase with ǯ-primary level of education, ceteris paribusǤǯ
post-primary education when expenditure per capita is controlled for, probably ǯǤ	
of these outcomes of height-for-age too, the estimates show a positive association ǯǤthe favourable impact of 
parental education on height-for-age of pre-school children contradicts the 
adverse outcome observed in relation to their reported illness.  
Education also gives mixed results on illness and its duration amongst adults. In 
GLSS 1 adults with primary as well as middle education level tend to self-report 
more illness compared to those with no education, whereas the converse occurs in 
GLSS 4. Adults with personal secondary and above level of education rather less 
frequently tend to self-report illness in this later survey year. A similar pattern is 
also observed with the duration of their illness, where adults in GLSS 1 with 
primary level education report longer whilst those in GLSS 4 with secondary and 
above education relative to none report shorter duration, ceteris paribus.  
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Controlling for the parental education of these adults does not change the 
direction and statistical significance of their own education on either illness or its 
duration. This is somewhat contrary to the hypothesis that the influence of ǯ
background. They might be a contributory factor, but they do not replace the 
impact of own education. Generally, the pooled samples suggest adults with 
personal education at the secondary and above level are less likely to report 
illness but those with primary education do the opposite. The former is however 
more likely to observed in urban areas when household wealth is also controlled 
for. Regarding the duration of illness, only own education at the secondary and 
above level is found statistically significant in the pooled sample and indicates ǯss. Finally the pooled sample estimates, like ǯǡ
 ?
well as longer duration of illness compared to those in GLSS 4, ceteris paribus. 
Generally, the estimated results also revealed no dramatic changes in most of the 
estimated models that also controlled for household wealth, as well as household 
public goods. This gives the impression that education directly impacts on health 
outcomes regardless of its possible indirect influence through expenditure and 
other socioeconomic variables such as the availability of water and sanitation, age 
and gender, as well as residence and ethnicity. In addition, these socioeconomic 
variables also, more often than not, tend to have their own independent influence 
on health outcomes. 
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Chapter 3: EDUCATION AND FERTILITY 
A large and growing body of research provides evidence to suggest the existent of 
a consistent negative relationship between education and fertility (Martin, 1995; 
Benefo and Schultz, 1996; Ainsworth et al., 1996).  This relationship has been 
identified in both developed and developing countries using various types of data. 
For developing countries in particular the proliferation of Demographic and 
Health Surveys (DHS) data as well as the Living Standard Measures Surveys 
(LSMS) by the World Bank has contributed to the surge in research in the area. 
Although the existing literature shows a negative association between education 
and fertility, it has not always been observed as a linear downward-sloped 
relationship. A non-ǲǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǯǡ
presumably because they are the primary carers and in some cases are the heads 
of households. Thus, all else held constant, the decision to demand more or less 
children is influenced by the value of time available to them. Nevertheless, where 
the study involves both men and women, the magnitudes are usually smaller with 
regard ǯǡmes even statistically insignificant (see 
Ainsworth et al., 1996).  
Fertility differentials between educated and uneducated women also differ from 
country to country. The degree of difference could be as high as five children in 
Peru whilst others like Indonesia and Sri-Lanka record differentials of about one 
child or less (Martin, 1995). In SSA however, the differentials between the upper 
and lower educational groups observed in most countries are between two to 
three children (ibid). Despite these variations in the pattern and magnitudes, most 
of the existing literature gives little doubt of the lowering impacts of education on 
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fertility. Whether the relationship is causal or just correlation is still an on-going 
debate with very little empirical support, especially in SSA where data limitation is 
the bane of research. 
Economic theory suggests that not only does education affect fertility but there 
also exists a reverse causality, which means fertility could also influence education 
(or possibly that both are jointly determined). Fertility affects levels of education 
attained when decisions on the latter are based on the former. This usually occurs 
when schooling is cut short because of an unplanned or even in certain societies 
planned pregnancy or birth. This reverse causality and/or simultaneous effect 
mean education may be subject to possible endogeneity bias. However it is argued 
that parents make most decisions on a childǯ, and 
that many children complete the required schooling levels of their countries 
before their reproductive phase begins; hence the feedback from fertility 
decisions is less prominent. Another possible way by which education can be 
endogenous is via omitted or unobserved variablesǡǯ innate 
ability (which assists her to climb up the educational ladder), family norms and 
expectations as well as status in the society, and non-random placement of public 
facilities.  
Very few studies have tested the causal relationship between education and 
fertility in SSA. This is due to lack of the necessary information to be used as 
instrumental variables in the available nationally representative surveys. 
Nonetheless, some of the authors who have performed the instrumental variable 
approach to establish the causality have also found that education causes fertility 
to decrease. An example is Osili and Long (2008) who used the introduction of the ǯ
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increase in education reduces early fertility by a range of 0.26 to 0.48 births40 in 
Nigeria. In this chapter, because we are unable to find appropriate instrumental 
variables, we compensate with available control variables for education in 
estimated models. 
The association between womenǯ
based on the theory of time, available resources and exposure to foreign values 
through the mass media or urbanisation. This is basically related to the demand-
side theory of cost and benefits. Parents benefit from having children because they 
assist in household production if there is one; they are status symbols in 
developing countries; and they become the future financial and social security of 
the parents at old age. But producing children is also costly in terms of physical 
(child services) and opportunity cost (the value of time). Thus, faced with the fixed 
constraints of resources and time, the number of children demanded would 
depend on whether the total benefits of having them exceed costs. For educated 
women, the choice usually tends to be heavier on the demand for fewer children 
because the cost of having them is higher than the benefits. This is because firstly, 
educated women have increased opportunities in the formal labour market and 
thus are more likely to participate in these jobs outside the home with relatively Ǥǯ
hence her opportunity cost. As child upbringing is time-intensive, this 
consequently means increased costs of raising children and therefore less demand 
for them. 
                                                        
40
 Depending on three different specification models, which are the baseline, state fixed effects and birth 
year fixed effects. 
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Secondly, based on the same analogy of higher job opportunities and wages for 
educated women, some women may decide to delay cohabitation and births, 
which could eventually lower overall fertility levels. Thirdly, educated women 
tend to have higher aspirations for their children so are more inclined to invest Ǥǯ
constraints, these women choose to have fewer children (quantity) in order to 
raise the ǲqualityǳ of children, through for example increased investment in ǯ
schooling and healthcare. Related to this is the fact that the economic contribution 
of the children is non-existent or minimal, especially whilst young, because they 
would not be available for home productions/businesses. The increased 
investment in education as well as health cost of children, associated with an 
increase in the overall cost, and lower economic returns consequently leads to a 
fall in the demand for children. In addition, the improved health of children 
implies higher survival rates and hence fewer births to act as replacements in the 
event of deaths (Benefo and Schultz, 1996). 
	ǡǡǲǳexposure to 
foreign values via the mass media have led to a diminishing cultural and 
traditional preference for big family sizes. An important element that straddles 
these various aspects of modernisation is education, which is expected to change 
the structure, tastes and norms of the society. Educated people are the early 
adopters of new programmes (including contraception) or technology that later 
diffuses to all. They are also less fatalistic, and they take control of decisions that 
affect them and their families through knowledge acquisition, gaining access to 
resources and intermingling in wider social circles. With acquired new values 
comes weakening norms, such as less dependency on children as a form of social 
security in old age, which is a characteristic in societies with no institutional 
  158 
programs for the aged, such as in SSA. There is also a change in the view that 
childbearing is the status quo for women. Further, with increased tastes for 
consumer goods and less ǲhoardingǳ of children because of declining infant and 
child mortality, fertility rate is expected to eventually decline.  
Several of these underlying channels by which education influences fertility have 
been empirically investigated and found relevant. However, there are still many 
that need to be explored, especially in SSA, and also examined with different 
econometric methods to establish an irrefutable association between education 
and fertility. This chapter contributes to the existing literature in that regard.  
The chapter is made up of four main sections. Section 3.1 presents the general 
literature review, which discusses the economic theory of fertility and a priori 
analyses as well as some empirical findings of its determinants (primarily focusing 
on education). It also shows why the proximate determinants are potentially 
endogenous and should be considered as such in a fertility model.  
The next, section 3.2, empirically examines the proximate determinants of fertility, 
the predicted values of which would be used as inputs in a structural fertility 
model. This section is divided into three sub-sections, with each of the proximate 
determinants analysed in considerable detail. Sub-sections 3.2.1, 3.2.2, and 3.2.3 
look at contraceptive use, age at cohabitation, and the duration of breastfeeding 
respectively. In each of these sub-sections, we briefly discuss background and 
related literature, econometric model and specification, as well as analysis of 
estimated results. These are relevant because they do not only present the 
opportunity to draw attention to the various measures used in the prediction of 
each proximate determinant, and how they consequently affect fertility but also 
give expositions to other reasons (besides fertility) behind their adoption.  
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The third, section 3.3, presents estimates and analysis of the structural model of 
fertility in two sub-sections. This is preceded by an explanation of the conceptual 
framework. Sub-section 3.3.1 examines the predicted effects of the three 
proximate determinants of fertility in two components. The first component 
presents a model that is analogous to the conventional production function ȋǲǳȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌȌǣȋ
A) Ȃ the probability of a woman having at least one child, (Model B) Ȃ the 
unconditional number of children a woman has, and (Model C) Ȃ the number of 
children a woman has conditional on having given birth to one. These three 
measures are used because breastfeeding is not defined for some women. This is 
because they have never given birth or do not have children below five years of 
age (age at which information on breastfeeding patterns are made available). This 
also results in a sample selectivity bias, but no attempt is made at solving it 
because we could not identify a priori variable(s) that may be likely to influence 
childbirth (such as sterility) but not the duration of breastfeeding in the available 
data.  
The second component 3.3.2 presents a sensitivity analysis, which examines 
whether the explained variation of the predicted proximate determinants 
captures all the variations in models A, B, and C. This involves the introduction of 
some of the socioeconomic variables into the structural model to check their 
significance. This is expected to reveal whether some unobserved characteristics 
still influence fertility in spite of the proximate determinants. If the socioeconomic 
variables in these test models are found significant despite the presence of the 
proximate determinants, then it means the structural fertility model is not 
complete Ȃ presumably due to omission of some proximate determinants or 
imperfect measurement of those that are included. 
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The final, section 3.4, looks at a reduced form estimation of fertility (number of 
live births). This gives the full and direct influence of education on fertility, 
controlling for other socioeconomic variables. This allows for the capture of the 
full impact of education. The section also checks whether fertility has changed 
over the years. One primary limitation of this chapter, like the previous, is that 
education is considered as exogenous; hence the estimated outcomes may be 
associational rather than causal. It is however anticipated that the control 
variables employed in the various models might reduce the bias in the estimates, 
by capturing a fraction of the unobserved factor in the error term. Moreover, as in 
the previous chapter, all the models here are estimated using GLSS 1 and 4 (except 
for age at cohabitation that has information in only GLSS 1). The estimations are 
performed for women of reproductive age between 15 and 49 years inclusive, and 
all the analyses are disaggregated into full, rural and urban as well as women aged 
15-34 and those aged 35-49 sub-samples. The summary of results in chapter 3 is 
however presented together with the general conclusions in chapter 4.  
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3.1. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Proponents of education and fertility theories could basically be divided into three 
main schools of thoughts: the demand side (the New Home Economics); the 
interaction of demand and supply (the synthesis model); and the supply side 
(proximate) theorists. The demand theory structured from the perspectives of 
microeconomics is based on the consumer choice theory. It proposes that 
households desire for children primarily depend on their costs. But unlike the 
traditional economic theory of household production of consumer or producer 
goods that has explicit market prices that of children do not. Hence shadow prices, 
which depend on the prices and quantities of their production inputs (example: 
socioeconomic variables), are derived. Then given household full income and ǡǤǯ
(1960) seminal paper, which addresses determinants of fertility within the 
framework of consumer choice theory. The theory illustrates that children are 
desired for the benefits they generate towards household activities as well as their 
direct utility to parents, like the many consumer or producer goods in the 
household utility function. Parents thus assess the utility of having more children 
with other products in the function and make a choice thereof. In line with this 
comes increased cost (direct and opportunity costs) because parents receive ǲǳȋǣǡǡȌǤǯ
utility to be maximised subject to the constraints of income and prices, households 
trade-ǲǳs to fewer 
births. The preference for child quality overrides quantity even with increased 
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household income because of the interaction of child quality and quantity; 
increased quantities of child services instead of number of children are desired.  
Becker and Lewis (1973) further elaborate the above concept with their shadow 
price analysis theory. They explain that quality and quantity are interrelated; one 
cannot be produced independent of the other. An increase in the quantity of 
children raises the cost or shadow price of their quality and vice versa.  For 
example a decline in the shadow price of child quality, one that is exogenous to the 
household, like a decline in the price of schooling or healthcare, is likely to cause a 
decline in the equilibrium quantity of children desired. Thus the shadow price of 
child quantity rises with the level of child quality chosen. Similarly, the shadow 
price of child quality rises with child quantity chosen. This explains the many 
observed empirical analysis whereby income elasticity of demand for quality of 
children is high at the same time that the observed quantity elasticity is low; and ǲǳǤ 
ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǲ-ǳ to changing from an 
economy car to a luxury one rather than an increase in the number of cars with Ǥǲ-ǳ
bringing to attention the importance of female time allocation between home 
based and outside work (Willis, 1974 cited in Willis, 1987). He suggests this gives 
one of the plausible reasons41 behind the negative relationship between income 
and fertility.  His female cost of time hypothesis is based on the assumption that 
child-care iǯ-child 
related household production activities. Hence when a woman does not engage in 
market work, the shadow value of her time and therefore the marginal cost of 
                                                        
41
 7KHRWKHUEHLQJWKH³TXDOLW\-TXDQWLW\´LQWHUDFWLRQV hypothesis. 
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children becomes an increasinǯǤ
do participate in the market, the cost of time tends to depend on her marginal 
wage rate.  
Female time allocation is somewhat influenced by her education, a link that 
explains the lowering effects of female education on fertility. Since wage tends to 
be positively correlated with education, the opportunity cost of educated women 
leaving the labour force for child services (bearing and rearing) increases. Hence ǯtunity costs of time are 
relatively higher, fewer children are desired. This somewhat distributes the 
determining factors of fertility behaviour between children (quality) and women 
(time allocation and labour force participation). Thus the influence of education is ǯǡǯ
child quality theory, but also from the angle of parents (mother in particular). 
Empirical evidence that supports the demand theory includes studies42 such as 
Schultz (1997) who indicate that children are an important form of human capital 
investment with increasing returns that leads to parents having to invest more 
(usually through education), which consequently reduce fertility. He finds that the 
changing composition of income between labour and physical capital, as well as 
between male and female productivity are as important for fertility decrease as 
the overall level of national income. Handa (2000) also affirms that the negative 
impact of education on fertility appears to occur through raising the value of time 
for the woman rather than changing tastes or desire for children. 
                                                        
42
 Empirical studies reviewed in this study focus on those with education as the primary determining factor 
of fertility outcome. 
  164 
However, not all the empirical studies do support these theories. Data limitation is 
usually suggested as the reason behind this (Keeley, 1975). Although Keeley 
(1975) defends the quantity-quality theory, he also admits to its limitations as 
being static because it does not take the dynamic part of childbearing as well as 
the sequential nature of decisions made under uncertainty into account. He also ǡǲǡǡ
determined variables; and it is very difficult to break out a single segment of Ǥǳ
contradict the demand theories of fertility include DeRose et al. (2002) and Yu 
(2006). Based on a focused-group study in Ghana using current students in the 
secondary and university level of education, DeRose et al. (2002) found that 
fertility preferences of girls at the Junior Secondary level and higher do not reflect 
the inverse pattern of education and fertility. They argue in their paper that 
schooling per se has little effect on fertility preferences and that differentials by 
education observed in national level data may be heavily determined by selection 
factors determining school continuation43. The better-educated women in the 
sample expected to get better jobs which would enable them to care for more 
children relative to those who had not yet achieved the same degree of success. 
What the study failed to account for is the potential opportunity cost of these 
students time when they join the labour force. But it appears such expectations of 
educated women are not unique to Ghana. Yu (2006) finds similar results in 
Australia, which indicate that educated women do expect higher fertility in the 
                                                        
43
 Girls who participated were selected by school administrators. The paper assumes that if they were 
chosen to favourably reflect the school, it is likely that they may be the kind of students who will 
continue in the educational process and therefore not represent the attitudes of girls whose education 
ended when or before secondary school was completed. Therefore their fertility preferences may 
better reflect the attitudes of the university women they will become than attitudes of women who 
attained up to the junior or senior secondary school level. 
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future relative to the least educated women. However in her case, the association 
is non-linear. She also explained the positive relationship as that although 
educated women face higher opportunity costs with regard to fertility decisions, 
they are also potential higher earners, and tend to marry men with higher 
incomes. Therefore they might be able to afford more children. But their 
expectation is not realised due to deferred age at cohabitation as well as 
unexpected problems with fecundity and partners; and thus the negative 
relationship between actual fertility and education (Yu, 2006). 
There have been many criticisms of the quantityȂquality trade-off, mainly but not 
only from sociologists and demographers. Many of who do not believe such stark 
and simple model as the demand theory could explain fertility behaviour. They 
questioned the unaccounted for variables such as the role of taste, norms or 
culture, and the natural fecundity of individuals as well as the costs of regulations. 
One of the later critics is Robinson (1997) who argues that most of the 
assumptions and proposed theories explaining fertility decline in relation to 
economic development are not crucial. According to him, the relative time-
intensity of the technology necessary to child services44 compared to other 
household production as well as the increasing value of time of women as a result 
of the high opportunity cost of market labour participation appear sufficient ǯǤ
addition, fertility transitions are likely driven by a fall in the expected total utility 
of child services rather than a change in consumer preferences towards quality 
over quantity. He explains that given the desire for sexual pleasure, and also 
because in most developing countries control over the processes of conception, 
                                                        
44
 Leibeinstein (1975) (cited in Robinson, 1997) explain child service as three types of utilities that parents 
derive from having children: consumption, labour productivity and age-old security utilities.  
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pregnancy and childbirth is difficult, unreliable and costly, fertility can increase 
independent of the effect of expected child benefit or cost. Thus there are many ǯǯ
term.  
Similar doubts and criticisms have evolved over the years; one of the earliest ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǲǳǤ
describes fertility behaviour based on the general direction of the flow of wealth 
from pre-modern or transitional to modern societies, and also the belief that 
fertility transition is more to do with social and cultural change than merely for 
economic reasons. His explanation is that in pre-modern societies45, the net 
wealth flow is from children to parents whereas in modern ones the reverse is 
more the case. The consequent fertility implication is that more children are 
desired in the former relative to the latter society. He explains that the 
contributions of children include working for the parents during both childhood 
and adǡǡǯǡ
the survival of family lineage and undertake religious services for ancestors. 
However such child services tend to decline during transitional and modern 
societies46 making children more costly than beneficial to parents leading to lower 
fertility.  
                                                        
45
 Made up of the primitive: consisting of tribes or clans with minimal outside security or indeed control, 
and communal land hence the importance of size; and traditional: the period whereby the State and 
Church intervened in community disasters, increased use of money, travel and trade as well as 
introduced national legal system toward freehold tenure of land and thus weakening the strength of 
extended families. 
46
 This is the period where societies become more monetised and urbanised; therefore women do not 
only stay at home to bear and care for children but also participate in work outside the home.  
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The costs and benefits are however not wholly due to economic reasons, even in 
transitional societies. As one of his fundamental arguments, Caldwell47 lists non-
economic reasons for lower fertility to include the spacing of births to reduce 
infant or child mortality, which then maximises the number of living children; 
cessation of sexual relations by a woman on the birth of her first grandchild or 
when husband takes on a new wife; postponement of age at marriage due to 
education and job opportunities; and problems of control, noise and emotional 
deprivation. An additional reason for lower fertility is the separation (especially 
emotional obligations) of the nuclear family from the extended family. Parents are ǯ
ancestors. Thereby giving more emotion and wealth to their children than they 
expect back as well as anticipates a similar treatment from their children to 
grandchildren.  
Education seems to play an important role in this reversal flow of wealth. Children ǯ
in a bid to have better salaries and occupy influential positions in the society. 
Although this means more wealth at adulthood and thus the family, the net flow of 
wealth changes to children from the parents. One possible reason is that school ǯ
out of the household. Education also facilitates social and cultural change by ǲǳǡǡǡǯǤ 
Bulatao and Lee (1982) illustrate similar outline for their analysis of fertility 
baǯǤ
                                                        
47
 He based some of these reasons on a study of the Yoruba people in Nigeria.  
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combination of three major features, namely, supply, demand and the cost of 
regulation. The supply of children is the number of surviving children a couple 
could have without delibeǢǯ
size and composition. The main supply-side determinants are child survival and 
natural fertility.  The latter involves spontaneous intrauterine mortality, age at 
marriage or exposure to sexual intercourse, post-partum infecundability 
(indicates breastfeeding and sexual abstinence), waiting time to conception and 
the onset of permanent sterility. The above authors also explain that the degree of 
impact of these variables on natural fertility differs holding the others constant. 
However, the most dominant ones are age at marriage and post-partum 
infecundability. The timing of marriage is noted to have a strong negative 
association with fertility by way of lowering exposure to sexual intercourse in the 
more fecund years of the reproductive span. With regard to breastfeeding, 
increase in its duration typically increases the period of postpartum amenorrhoea, 
and in some cultures postpartum sexual abstinence, which subsequently extends 
the period of infecundability. 
Child survival also influences fertility on the supply side since it removes the ǲǳǤ
been observed that children are more likely to survive to see their fifth birthday 
with increased education of women (Benefo and Schultz, 1996). This is because 
educated women tend to be healthier and therefore beget healthier children; and 
also with increased knowledge acquired from schooling and other media, are able 
to care better for their children by providing better nutrition, water and 
sanitation; as well as making use of available health services and being less 
fatalistic. Thus with fewer chances of deaths parents are well able to plan and 
stick to their desired fertility without addiǲǳǤ
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The other important supply side determinant of fertility is the natural fecundity 
level of parents, which is primarily dependent on age.  
Determinants of the demand-side are the direct benefits and cost of children, their 
opportunity costs, the effects of income and wealth, and norms and tastes of 
children. The benefits of children involve the financial and practical assistance to 
household both in the current (in societies where child labour is renowned) and 
the expected future as insurance for old age. Costs also involve partly financial and 
time costs, and opportunity cost, which is primarily determined by forgone 
earnings. Whilst benefits of children tend to increase, costs tend to lower with the 
demand for children; thus the total number desired depends on the net value the 
children. The increase in income and wealth rather tend to be associated more 
with fewer children because parents would rather increase child quality. This may 
also depend on norms and tastes, which has no tangible measurement but may 
vary by religion, culture or exposure to new consumer goods. 
Fertility regulation is only employed when the supply of birth exceeds demand. 
However the deliberate use of control depends on cost. The regulation costs 
involve both the physical and the psychological costs. The former does not only 
involve monetary but also travel and information costs, which are major 
deterrents of use in developing countries. Besides these, communication between 
partners, religious or other moral attitudes as well as perceived health 
consequences, not to mention the trauma of abortion, bears considerable 
psychological costs on potential users. Thus the ultimate fertility outcome is 
determined when supply equals demand of birth and also upon the use of fertility 
controls. 
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ǲǳȋǡ
1988), since they incorporate the social and biological constraints to the economic 
decision-making of the demand theory in explaining the rationale behind fertility 
behaviours. Birdsall adds that the difference between these and the demand-
oriented theory is the emphasis on the endogeneity of tastes. This is explained as ǯǯhe fertility 
behaviour and average consumption of other families, as opposed to the ǯ
income. However one of the main limitations of the synthesis model is that the 
supply side and the cost of regulation are treated as exogenous (Shultz, 1986 cited 
in Birdsall, 198848).  
Although the supply side and cost of regulation are expected to have direct effects 
on fertility, their outcomes are also varied by health, socioeconomic and cultural 
background including education, income, location and ethnic or religious beliefs. 
In addition they are likely to be simultaneously influenced with the level of 
fertility itself or correlated with some unobserved variables making the supply 
side determinants endogenous. That is, it is possible that fertility, age at marriage, 
the duration of breastfeeding, labour force participation and child survival are 
determined simultaneously. For example, a woman is more likely to marry early 
because she is more fecund or as a result of an inefficient use of contraception. 
Highly fertile women may also breastfeed for longer as well as abstain from sexual 
intercourse to control their fertility.  
                                                        
48
 Other limitations, which are somewhat similar to the demand-oriented theory are also outlined in the 
paper.  
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Another school of thoughts regarding fertility behaviours is the supply-oriented 
only approach. Bongaarts (1978) expounding on works of Davis and Blake in the 
1950 identified variables that directly impacts on fertility behaviour. He labels 
these as intermediate variables because they are biological and behavioural 
factors through which all the socioeconomic, cultural and environmental factors 
work to influence fertility levels. He divides the intermediate variables, also 
known as proximates, into 3 main categories namely exposure factors: 
proportioned married; deliberate marital fertility control factors: contraception, 
and induced abortion; and natural marital fertility factors: lactational 
infecundability, frequency of intercourse, sterility, spontaneous intrauterine 
mortality and the duration of fertile period. He argues that fertility levels change 
only when one or more of these proximate variables change. He gives examples 
such as fertility levels fall with rises in educational levels because more educated 
women marry relatively late or frequently use contraceptives. Also, labour force 
participation rate of women is weakly related to fertility because it has a strong 
positive effect on contraceptive use as well as a strong negative and compensating Ǥǯs 
possible to estimate variations in fertility levels if all the proximate variables are 
captured in a model; and upon such, all the direct effects of socioeconomic, 
environment and cultural variables would be eliminated49. 
Bongaarts (1982) however demonstrates empirically that not all of the above 
mentioned proximate variables have massive effects on the variation of fertility 
among populations. He finds fertility level is more sensitive to some proximates 
than others. For example variations in the level of intrauterine mortality has least 
                                                        
49
 This is because they are all supposed to work through the proximate or intermediate determinants. 
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effect on fertility compared to variations in proportion married and contraceptive 
use. Upon using aggregate analysis on countries at various stages of fertility 
transitions (developing, developed and historical populations), he estimates that 
only four of the proximate variables largely influence variance in fertility levels. 
The remaining variables are much less important. According to his model the most 
important determinants of fertility are the proportions married, contraceptive 
prevalence and its effectiveness, the incidence of induced abortion, and the 
duration of postpartum infecundability. They explain about 96 percent of the 
variation in fertility levels.  The unexplained part is due to errors in measurement, 
specification and observed total fertility rates, deviations from the total fecundity 
value, absence of data such as induced abortion (except in developed countries).  
The principal proximate determinants in SSA tend to be slightly different though 
within the ambit of the general framework. They include lactational amenorrhea 
due to breastfeeding, decreased exposure to conception due to postpartum sexual 
abstinence, and pathological involuntary infertility due to gonorrhoea (Bongaarts 
et al., 1984). Thus following Bongaarts (1978) argument, education and other 
socioeconomic characteristics influence fertility basically because they initially 
modify the above intermediate factors. They further explain that socioeconomic 
variables, education for instance, can have negative fertility effects on one set of 
proximate variables (say contraceptives) and positive effects through another set 
(for example duration of breastfeeding). The overall net effect of education on 
fertility could therefore be positive, negative or insignificant depending on the 
relative contributions of the positive and negative effects of the proximate Ǥ	ǯ
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fertility level determining concept, especially using individual level data50. Only 
two of the studies are discussed here because of their relevance to this chapter. 
These studies focus on two countries in SSA, and also use a theoretical concept of 
which this chapter relates to.  
Baschieri and Hinde (2007) for instance used the model to estimate birth intervals Ǥǯǯ
data, which is one of the rare types that contains month-by-month information on 
contraception, breastfeeding behaviour and postpartum amenorrhoea. But since 
the data do not contain all the required intermediate variables51, a discrete-time 
hazard model with a gamma-distributed error term to account for unobserved 
heterogeneity is employed in the estimations. They basically estimate four 
different models: the first includes only duration, and tests whether the raw 
hazard varies with duration since first birth; the second includes only variables 
measuring the proximate determinants, that is, age of mother at first birth, 
breastfeeding, amenorrhoea, use of types of contraception, and length of interval 
between marriage and first birth; the third includes only social, economic and 
cultural variables; and the fourth includes both the proximate and socioeconomic 
and cultural variables.  
Their purpose for the different models is that they would be able to compare the ǮǯǮǯǢǮǯ
variables to examine whether the socioeconomic variables become insignificant in 
the latter model. They find that months from marriage to first birth, breastfeeding 
                                                        
50
 This may probably be due to data limitation. 
51
 Their data lacks information on induced abortion, spontaneous intra-uterine mortality, duration of 
viability ova and sperm and frequency of sexual intercourse. 
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and use of modern contraceptives52 significantly reduces the risk of conception of 
second birth among women who are aged 18-22 years at the time of their first ǤǮǯǮǯǤǡ
education of the woman is found significant and suggests reduced hazard to 
conception. Also the survival of the first child significantly reduces the hazard to 
the conception of the second birth. However, results of the combined model seem 
to suggest that some socioeconomic variables53 have direct impact on the second 
birth interval, even in the presence of proximate variables.  
Upon introducing unobserved heterogeneity term into the combined model, they ǯ
whilst proximate variables become more significant. Meanwhile, similar models 
estimating the third birth interval shows that all the variations in length are 
captured by the proximate variables. They however conclude, after conducting 
log-likelihood ratio test and few caveats, that social, economic and cultural factors 
become insignificant upon incorporating full proximate determinants in a fertility 
model. This is especially so when an unobserved heterogeneity term is included in 
the model to capture variation in the proximate determinants that are hard to 
measure directly (Baschieri and Hinde, 2007). They also conclude that including 
socioeconomic variables in the model could improve the effects of the proximate 
variables whereby unobserved heterogeneity is not controlled. 
With a less detailed living standard data set, compared to the calendar data of 
DHS, Appleton (1996) estimates the effects of two proximate determinants on the 
                                                        
52
 With intra-uterine device (IUD) relatively more effective than the pill or other modern contraceptives. 
53
 )RUH[DPSOHKLJKHUHGXFDWHGZRPHQDVZHOODVWKHLUSDUWQHU¶VHGXFDWLRQEHFDPHVLJQLILFDQWDQG
seems to have an increased hazard to conception compared with women of no education. 
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ǯǤ
education and other socioeconomic variables on age at cohabitation and the 
duration of breastfeeding is first estimated. Then the effects of these two ǮǯȋȌe results. In this way 
the possible endogeneity of the proximate determinants is controlled in order to 
obtain consistent estimators. He finds that female primary schooling barely has 
any influence on the proximate variables and thus fertility. However attainment of 
secondary level education by these women has the effect of increasing the age at 
cohabitation and decreasing the duration of breast-feeding. The overall effect on 
fertility is somewhat dependent on their age. It seems that delaying cohabitation 
by three years reduces the number of children a woman gives birth to by one, 
whilst the duration of breast-feeding only tends to reduce fertility of women over 
thirty-five. Thus for younger cohorts, the net effects of education is negative 
because shorter breastfeeding does not have any influence on fertility. But for 
older cohorts the effects of cohabitation and breastfeeding tends to counteract 
each other resulting in an increase in fertility.  
Appleton (1996) cautions the outcome may plausibly be influenced by omitted 
variables. He also debates on whether the result is depicting an age or cohort 
effect; explaining that if it is the former then the negative effects of education on 
the fertility of younger women would be reversed upon reaching middle age, 
ceteris paribus. On the other hand if it is a cohort effect, then the negative 
association between female schooling and fertility should also be expected to hold ǯǤ
exogenous variables in fertility models by arguing that assumed exogeneity ǯ
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breastfeeding. A limitation of his study however is that variables identified to have 
predicted the proximate variables are not tested for exclusive restriction. 
ǯǡǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǮǯ
Ǥ
the literature on the subject by using data collected at different survey periods of a 
decade apart for robustness check. And additional sensitivity analysis is 
performed to test for the potential feedback from the unobserved proximate 
determinants.  
Before examining the effects of the proximate determinants on fertility, we first 
explore the impact of education and other socioeconomic factors on these 
proximate determinants. For the purposes of this study, emphasis is given to the 
role of education on the various direct determinants of fertility. Similar to the 
demand theory, education to a large extent plays a decisive role in many of the 
supply-side determinants. Education does not always work alone, it sometimes 
operate through other socioeconomic variables (such as rural/urban residence 
and household wealth) as well as several of the direct determinants 
simultaneously, which may make its distinct effects difficult to capture. However, 
holding some of these other socioeconomic variable constant, education is 
predicted to delay the age at marriage or exposure to sexual activities, increase 
the effective use of contraceptives, but shorten the duration of breastfeeding. The 
overall impact on fertility cannot be determined a priori because, as already 
mentioned, the impact of the increase in contraceptives use and age at 
cohabitation must be weighed against the impact of shortened breastfeeding 
duration. The following sections present the first-stage proximate determinants 
models outlined above.  
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3.2. MODELLING PROXIMATE DETERMINANTS  
This section examines socioeconomic variables and their anticipated impact on 
contraception, age at cohabitation, and the duration of breastfeeding. Education is 
however the prime interest with the remaining socioeconomic variables used as 
controls. Each proximate determinant has sub-divisions on (1) Ȃ background and 
literature, which briefly review some related empirical literature that mainly shed ǯ determinant; (2) Ȃ data, 
econometric model and specification as well as variables used and their expected 
impact in estimations; and (3) Ȃ the discussion of estimation results.  
 
3.2.1 Contraceptives Use 
3.2.1.1   Background and Literature Review 
Contraception is one of the main regulatory instruments of fertility and it mostly 
involves deliberate actions on the part of the user. Many developed countries 
success with lower fertility goals have been suggested to stem from the effective 
use of contraception, not to mention increased supply and access at reduced costs. 
Developing countries however have failed to achieve such goals despite their ǯǤ
Oliver (1995) note that Ghana is one of the first countries in SSA to implement a 
population policy in 1969 but population is still growing, fertility is high and 
contraceptive use is low. Actually, prevalence of contraception in SSA in general is 
noted as the lowest amongst developing countries (Martin, 1995). With the 
exception of Botswana, Kenya and Zimbabwe, the demand for contraceptive use in 
SSA is often reported to be virtually negligible. Bongaarts et al. (1984) however 
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explain that the nominal contraceptive behaviour in SSA is due to high illiteracy 
rates and desire to fulfil traditional reproductive norms; one of which is the desire 
for big family size. Therefore not only does lower percentage of female education 
affect contraceptive use, not to mention accessibility, but also strong cultural links 
to ancestry and family prevent usage. Caldwell et al. (1992) gives support the 
concept of cultural and ancestral beliefs as one of the reasons for low 
contraceptive use with their studies on Nigeria. They however observe a new type 
of contraceptives demand emerging where it is acquired primarily for purposes of 
delaying the onset of childbearing and marriage as well as maintaining and 
perhaps increasing the length of birth intervals. Westoff and Bankole (2000) 
assent to this pattern having done a similar research in the same country.    
It is well documented that contraception becomes essential in limiting family size, 
when upon exposure to modernisation or indeed education, breastfeeding as well 
as postpartum abstinence is shortened. In this way, unwanted pregnancies are 
avoided and planned family size achieved. Contraception also helps in the 
avoidance of forced marriages due to unplanned pregnancies. This is especially 
beneficial to younger girls whose schooling otherwise may have to be terminated 
due to such event. Consequently fertility levels are controlled because research 
shows that the longer women wait to start giving birth, the fewer children they 
tend to have. However, the effective use of contraceptives is not observed 
worldwide, especially in developing countries with lower levels of education. 
Since low fertility rates, a plausible consequent of high contraceptive use, are 
mainly observed in countries with high proportions of female education.  
The economic theory behind the positive association between the education of 
women and contraceptive is based on the former and fertility. This is because the 
  179 
demand for contraception is a derived demand, that is, it is conditional on the 
demand for children given her natural fecundity level. The hypothesis is that 
education positively influences the use of contraceptives as a result of its negative 
influence on fertility. A list of explanations for this relationship gathered from 
various theories and empirical analysis in a nutshell includes an increase in the ǯȋ 
rearing) whilst the economic benefits received from having the children decreases ǯǤ
raising the wage that a woman could earn in the labour force, which in turn may 
reduce fertility. The direct costs of child services are also increased by female 
education because women with more schooling tend to also aspire to educate Ǥǯǡ
more so when extra investments are made concerning time spent to ensure good 
learning habits. Other investments also made to improve child quality are good 
nutrition and health care, which may in turn reduce mortality. Coupled with the 
reduction in child benefit as a result of less reliance by educated women on their 
children to contribute to family income or housework while young as well as 
economic/social security at old age, cost per child may be inclined to increase and 
hence smaller family size desired. This then increases the demand for 
contraceptives. 
However women have to use contraceptives appropriately for it to be effective. 
This makes education relevant as it has been found that educated women tend to 
seek knowledge, and they also have the ability to better process information 
(Mackinnon, 1995), therefore may be more able to effectively use contraceptives. 
They also have easier acquisition and use of facilities than the less educated 
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because they have the social and economic resources to afford the cost. A 
relatively strong influence of education on contraceptive use widely noted is the 
break in dependency on traditional values (Leridon, 2006); the shrouds of culture 
and beliefs are dropped in order for new ideas to be practiced upon exposure. 
Other studies have also found that education gives relative autonomy (Hogan et al. 
1999; Benefo, 2005) to the woman and improve communication about family 
planning between spouses (Lasee and Becker, 1997; Oheneba-Sakyi and Takyi, 
1997; Tawiah, 1997; Hogan et al. 1999). Such weakening of religious/traditional 
hold on couples, improved information and communication leads to a reduction in 
the psychosocial cost, which subsequently increases contraceptive use. 
ǯ
existing literature is yet to conclude on its universal relevance. For example Ezeh ȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍǯ
Ǥǯ
recommends its inclusion in estimations should not to be overlooked. This finding 
is however contradicted by Tawiah (1997) using the same data; he finds the 
association not statistically significant. However, what both studies appear to 
agree on, from their added qualitative reseǡǯ
critical.  
ǯǡ
evidence to support the hypothesis that educated women are more likely to use 
contraceptives compared to the less or un-educated women. Amongst such 
findings is that of Weinberger (1987) who shows in her studies that even a few 
years of schooling usually have marked positive effect on contraceptive use. 
Martin (1995) concurs to this finding and adds that schooling however short 
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prompts a visible change in contraceptive behaviour. Studies on Ghana in 
particular have frequently found educated women most likely to use 
contraceptives relative to the uneducated counterparts. Ezeh (1993) for example 
finds educated wives are more likely to approve of using family planning methods 
compared to the uneducated ones and Oliver (1995) using the second wave of the 
GLSS finds an extra year of schooling increases the probability of current use of 
modern contraceptives by 0.3 percent. 
Ainsworth et al., (1996) studying fertility and current contraceptive use in ǡ
ǯ ? ? ? ?ǡ
female education statistically significant in half of the countries. They deduced 
from their study that these are countries where wives and husbands have roughly 
similar schooling levels or the wife has more schooling than the husband. This 
they suggest is consistent with the female bargaining power theory. Where the 
husbands tend to be more likely to be educated than the wife, both the husband ǯǡǯǤ
evidences of the positive relationship between education and contraceptive use on 
Ghana with various datasets include Oheneba-Sakyi and Takyi (1997); Tawiah 
(1997); Kirk and Pillet (1998); Parr (2003); and Benefo (2005)54. A number of 
similar outcomes have also been noted in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Moreno, 1993), Nigeria (Feyisetan and Ainsworth, 1996), Zimbabwe (Thomas 
and Maluccio, 1996), Kinshasa (Shapiro and Tambashe, 1997), Kenya (Lasee and 
Becker, 1997); and Turkey (Koc, 2000). 
                                                        
54
 Oheneba-Sakyi and Takyi (1997) and Tawiah (1997) used the 1988 DHS; Kirk and Pillet (1998) used 
1988 and 1993 DHS; Parr (2003) used the 1998 DHS; Benefo (2005) used the first and second waves 
of GLSS to estimate child schooling and contraceptive use in rural Africa. 
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There are also factors that correlate with both education and fertility that need to 
be controlled for in the econometric model (Kravdal, 2002); and there are 
empirical evidences to their influence on contraception. These include place of 
residence (Moreno, 1993; Oheneba-Sakyi and Takyi, 1997; and Kirk and Pillet, 
1998), age (Thomas and Maluccio, 1996; Parr, 2003), religion and ethnicity 
(Tawiah, 1997; Adongo et. al., 1998; Koc, 2000) and household wealth (Thomas 
and Maluccio, 1996). Also important to the analysis is direct cost of child services 
and contraceptives, which studies like Oliver (1995), Feyisetan and Ainsworth 
(1996), and Benefo (2005) find statistically significant. 
 
3.2.1.2   Econometric Model, Specification, Data and Variables Used 
It can therefore be gathered from the above outlined economic theory and 
empirical evidence that educated women are more likely to control or reduce 
their fertility and consequently, are expected to increase contraceptives use. 
Therefore the decision to use contraception is proposed to be a function of all the 
variables that affect fertility as well as the costs of the contraceptives. Thus the 
model for contraceptives use in this study is an extension of the economic model 
of fertility based on the standard household production model and utility Ǥǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ
where utility is maximised by the consumption of child services and consumer 
commodities subject to the constraints of income and prices. Fertility decisions 
are thus made based on a reduced form equation: 
฀ ฀฀,;,,,* XYwPxRPxCFF ฀  ----------------------------------- (1) 
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Where PxC is all the direct cost of children such as food, clothing and shelter, the 
availability and quality of health services as well as primary and secondary 
schools (Montgomery, 1993). The cost of fertility regulation (PxFR) can be divided 
into actual and perceived costs. The actual costs include access and use, which are 
explained as purchase price (PurPx), price of information, travel and waiting time 
(IT). The quality of services by providers may also play some vital role in 
contraceptive use. Perceived costs include psychosocial costs (Psoc) relating to 
difficulty in spousal communication, religious concerns (RlȌǯ
attitudes that differs by ethnicity (Eth). Due to these costs, the incentive to control 
fertility has to be considerably strong. This incentive may be associated with a 
cǯǯǤȋw): earnings that would 
have to be forgone (opportunity cost) with increased fertility.  
Availability of household resources (Y) including non-labour income, housing 
characteristics, durable goods and assets also contributes as inputs in producing 
and achieving desired fertility. Agricultural wage (Aw) rates especially for children 
in rural households may also influence fertility decisions because of their 
contributions to household income. All the factors described so far also vary by ǯȋX), which include her age 
(A), education (Ed) and residence (R); as well as all unobserved and unmeasured 
( ) features like taste, innate ability as well as errors in measurements. Since the 
demand for contraception is inferred from that of fertility, the reduced form 
function of contraceptives use follows that of fertility in equation (1) with an 
opposite expected impact of the variables in the model. For example, whereas a 
variable like education is expected to lower fertility levels in the equation, it 
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would be anticipated in this section that education would increase contraceptive 
use. The equation, based on the variables mentioned above is expanded to 
become: 
฀ ฀฀,,,,,,,,,,,,* REdAAwYwEthRlPsocITPurPxPxCFC ฀  -------------------- (2) 
However, considering the lack of some of the variables described above in the data 
for this study, proxy variables are used in replacement where suitable. For 
example, distance to the nearest health facility/family-planning provider (Dsfp) is 
used in the estimations instead of the purchase price of contraceptives (PurPx). 
This is because the data, as in many others of its kind, report only householdǯ
responses to costs, which may vary with quality or source. Its inclusion may thus 
introduce plausible endogeneity bias in the estimates. For many developing 
countries, distance to the nearest health provider best captures the cost of 
contraceptives than cash price, which is small and do not vary much within a 
region. Similarly wage (w), information (IT) and psychosocial costs (Psoc) are 
dropped from the equation due to lack of data. With regard to wage, few women 
are reported as having received one because they usually are not found in wage 
employment. However, the use of education in its stead is expected to capture the 
wage effects on contraceptive use. Education (Ed) as proxy for wage, for instance, 
captures the value of the individuǯ
who do not work or are unpaid family workers. Education and wage are also 
predicted as highly correlated (Schultz and Tansel, 1993) and the econometric 
problem of sample selection bias is avoided. Education also increases accessibility 
to information (IT) and improves the efficient use of resources not to mention the 
weakening of cultural or religious norms hence reducing psychosocial costs 
(Psoc).  
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The use of education also presents a possible econometric problem of endogeneity 
bias. This is because there could be some unobserved variables that 
simultaneously determine education and contraception not to mention reverse 
causality: where the use of contraceptives may have an impact on education 
because it allowed a woman to complete or further her education. Solving the 
problem of endogeneity first requires the use of variables that are highly 
correlated with education but neither with contraception nor the error term. 
Secondly, the selected variable should pass the exclusion restriction test, that is, it 
must be a variable that can be excluded from the model without causing any 
specification problem. The initial part of the first condition is relatively easy to 
achieve; but the remaining and second condition present a primary problem for 
most researchers due to data limitation. Attempts made to solve the problem in 
the previous chapter proved cumbersome with minimal satisfactory results. 
Therefore for simplicity and also the fact that the predicted form of contraceptives 
would be further used in a subsequent second-stage model, this study like many 
others including Ainsworth et al., (1996), Moreno, (1993), Feyisetan and 
Ainsworth, (1996), Thomas and Maluccio (1996), Shapiro and Tambashe (1997), 
Lasee and Becker (1997), and Koc (2000) estimates contraceptive use by 
presuming education as exogenous. Thus the outcome on education is interpreted 
as associative instead of causative.  
Finally, a factor score index of household durable goods and housing qualities is 
used as proxy for household wealth or resources (Y). Another score index is 
generated for access to health facilities and personnel (Dsfp), and also for the 
prices of food and non-food (PxFN) that forms part of the cost of children (PxC). ǯare included in the form of distances to primary (DsP), 
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middle (DsM), and secondary (DsS) level of schooling. Translating equation (2) 
into an empirically feasible contraceptive model by taking variables with 
information in the data set employed into consideration gives an equation model 
estimated in three versions. The first is variant 1 and it is estimated thus: 
฀ ฀฀,,,* RAEdC ฀  ------------------------------------ (3': Variant 1) 
This provides a parsimonious version of the model and gives the chance for 
attention to be particularly drawn to the influence of education, which is the 
primary focus of this study. The influence of education (Ed) on contraceptive use 
is examined with control variables age (A), rural and region of residence (R). 
These might minimise the problem of omitted variable bias but would not entirely 
solve it. This is because Location might also present an endogeneity problem if 
fertility control programs are intentionally or strategically placed to encourage 
use, or where demand is high. Besides the availability of contraception is likely to 
be high in urban relative to rural locations, and educated women have higher 
tendencies to migrate to urban areas. However, this would be more likely to seek 
job opportunities in formal employment than because of increased access to 
contraception. Therefore since the incentives behind placement of fertility 
programs are not entirely known, given the available data, and most health 
facilities are established to provide services other than contraception, this study 
presumes location to be exogenous. The error term is u.  
ǡǯȋRl), ethnicity (Eth) and 
household asset index score (Y), are also included in the model to be estimated as 
variant 2 thus:  
฀ ฀฀,,,,,,* YEthRlRAEdC ฀  ---------------------------- (3': Variant 2) 
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And the final version of the model (variant 3) where variables representing some ǯǣ 
฀ ฀฀,,,,,,,,,,,,* DsfpDsSDsMDsPPxFNAwYEthRlRAEdC ฀  --------- (3': Variant 3) 
The different versions allow for the strength of female education on contraception 
and therefore fertility to be tested by controlling and including variables that may 
also correlate with education or have direct effects. This may help policy makers 
in making decisions as to the sector to invest limited national resources. That is 
whether to invest more into education, which can subsequently affect 
contraceptive use or directly invest into contraceptive facilities that may promote 
its use. The analysis is also stratified into rural and urban areas as well as women 
aged 15-34 and those aged 35-49. In this way differences in the average level of 
education in these sub-samples are exposed and the magnitude of their influence, 
if at all, are duly examined.  These empirical analysis procedures are repeated 
throughout this study unless otherwise stated.  
 
3.2.1.2.1   Dependent Variable: Definition and Descriptives  
The data on contraceptive use is of women of reproductive age between 15 and 49 
inclusive. GLSS 1 has more detailed information including knowledge, ever used, 
currently using as well as cost and distance. Thus some women are observed to 
have some knowledge about contraceptives but have never used one. Indeed, very 
few women use any contraceptives in GLSS 1. Also, there are women who used 
contraceptives before the survey period but no more using, and vice versa. In 
contrast, GLSS 4 asked respondents to mention the main contraceptive currently 
being used. The data set does not have records of knowledge or ever used 
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contraceptives by the sampled women. Both data sets however, have methods of 
traditional and modern contraceptives listed. Therefore in order to have some 
form of comparative analysis, current use of contraceptive is estimated for both 
data sets. But ever-used contraception is also examined for only GLSS 1 for 
explorative purposes. It must be noted that the impact of physical facilities in the 
communities may be less meaningful in this case because a respondent may have 
dwelt at a different address when the contraceptive was used.   
Table 3.1 gives the information on knowledge, ever and current use of 
contraceptives by method amongst women who have had sexual relations55. 
Traditional methods of contraception include abstinence, rhythm, withdrawal, 
herbs/potions to drink, herbs/portions to insert and douche. Modern methods are 
condom, spermicides/foam, diaphragm, pill, IUD, injection female sterile, male 
sterile and other scientific. The statistics for GLSS 1 show that knowledge of 
contraceptives is very high in Ghana, around 79.8 percent. Of these, about 72.7 
percent of the women observed have heard of at least one traditional method and 
59.9 percent of at least one modern method. Abstinence and the pill are the most 
widely known amongst the traditional and modern methods respectively. Friend 
appears to be the most mentioned source of knowledge for all contraceptive types 
except abstinence and diaphragm that cited relative/spouse and family planning 
clinic respectively. Also closely following friends as source of knowledge for use of 
the pill is family planning clinic. 
                                                        
55
 This is not categorically stated in GLSS 4 unlike GLSS 1. But there are about 20 observed women aged 
between 15 and 24 inclusive in GLSS 4 with no response to contraceptive use. It is assumed the lack 
of response suggests they had not commenced sexual relationship hence not asked questions on 
contraceptive use as was done in GLSS 1. Though in GLSS 1, this was made clearer with a 
subsequent question on cohabitation: interpreted in the survey as whether the woman has 
commenced sexual relations. Those who had not, about 198 women, were not asked the questions on 
contraceptive knowledge and use.  
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Fewer women have ever used contraceptives, also reported only for GLSS 1. This 
is about 48.1 percent with 43.2 percent of them ever-using traditional and 21.6 
percent for modern contraceptives. Similar to knowledge, abstinence is the most 
ever used traditional contraception followed by Rhythm withdrawal, douche and 
herbs. The corresponding method for modern contraception is the pill, 
spermicides, condom, diaphragm, injection and IUD. However, condom is widely 
known but less used than spermicides. 
The percentage of women who currently use contraceptives is dramatically low, 
especially compared to those that know about contraception in the country. About 
a third of the women currently use contraceptives in GLSS 1, of which 28.5 percent 
patronise the traditional methods and as few as 4.9 percent use modern methods. 
The analogous figures for GLSS 4 are 16.7 percent for overall use with 5.0 percent 
and 11.6 percent for traditional and modern use respectively56. Often cited 
current traditional use of contraception differs between the two survey years. 
Abstinence is the most cited traditional method in GLSS 1 whilst the rhythm 
method dominates in GLSS 4. But the pill is the most commonly used modern 
methods in both surveys. The second favourite is spermicides in GLSS 1 but was 
probably not available during the GLSS 4 survey year, which rather suggests 
injection as the second preference. This is probably because it is one of the most 
advertised in the media and can be bought without prescription from pharmacies 
and small-scale drug stores (Oliver, 1995). Other sources include chemical sellers, 
hospitals, family planning and prenatal clinics.     
                                                        
56
 Survey sample weights are used in the calculations for GLSS 4. 
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Table 3.1: Knowledge and Use of Contraceptives by Method Among Women Who have Started Sexual Relationsa 
GLSS 1 GLSS 4   
Method Knowledge Source of  Ever  Currently  Where  Currently Currentlyc  Where  
  Knowledgeb Used used Obtainedb used used Obtainedb 
All 79.82  48.09 30.31  15.13 16.69  
Any Traditional  72.67  43.19 28.5  4.4 5.04  
Abstinence 60.14 Rel/spouse 31.19 19.49  0.99 1.06  
Rhythm 39.47 Friend 21.74 14.94  2.58 3.1  
Withdrawal 32.91 Friend 9.7 4.36  0.33 0.36  
Herbs (portions) 31.29 Friend 2.64 0.39  n.a   
Herbs (insert) 26.35 Friend 2.35 0.98  n.a   
Douche 17.09 Friend 4.75 2.01  0.12 0.11  
Other n.a     0.38 0.41  
Any Modern 59.89  21.55 4.9  10.73 11.64  
Condom 45.79 Friend 6.27 0.83 Chem. Seller 1.95 1.98 Other 
Spermicides 34.72 Friend 8.67 1.67 Pharmacy n.a   
Diaphragm 22.87 Fam.Pl. Clinic 0.73 0.2 
Hospital/ 
Fam.Pl. Clinic n.a   
Pill 52.2 Friend/Fam.Pl. Clinic 13.96 2.3 Pharmacy 5.46 6.08 Other 
IUD 13.03 Friend 0.54 0.1 Fam.Pl. Clinic 0.33 0.4 Hospital 
Injection 29.73 Friend 0.64 0.1 Fam.Pl. Clinic 2.52 2.62 Prenatal Clinic 
Female Sterile n.a     0.27 0.32 Hospital 
Male Sterile n.a     --   
Other scientific n.a     0.21 0.24 Hospital 
Observation 2042     5843   ǣǯ
g Standards Survey, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) & 1998/99 (GLSS 4) 
a. Based on respondents affirmative response to having cohabited at the time of the survey. 
b. Most common response given 
c. Survey sample weights are used in the calculations.
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Contraceptive knowledge, ever- and current-use of traditional and modern 
method by socioeconomic variables of the woman is presented in Table 3.2 
(GLSS1) and 3.3 (GLSS 4). Knowledge and use as expected generally increases 
with schooling but the most dramatic is observed amongst women in GLSS 1 who 
currently use modern contraceptives. This increases from 1.4 percent of women 
with no education to 14.1 percent of those with secondary and above level of 
education. The analogous figure in GLSS 4, albeit not as dramatic, is roughly 10.0 
and 15.7 percent. Comparison across age groups however suggests a non-
monotonic sequence. Similar to the reports of the Ghana Demographic and Health 
Survey (GDHS, 2003), both survey years show an increase in contraceptive use 
with age to a maximum of age 30 Ȃ 3457, then falls thereafter. A similar pattern can 
also be observed with traditional knowledge of contraceptives; but when it relates 
to modern, the age group with the highest knowledge is 25 and 29 inclusive. 
With regard to the place of residence, women in urban areas always appear to 
know and use more contraceptives than those in rural areas in GLSS 1. Knowledge 
of traditional contraceptives for instance is about 82.5 percent among women in 
urban compared to 67.2 percent of those in rural areas. The corresponding figures 
for knowledge of modern methods are 77.2 and 50.2 percent respectively. Current 
use is also highest among urban women whereby traditional is recorded as 38.7 
compared to 22.8 percent in rural areas, and modern use is 7.7 percent to 3.4 
percent in rural areas. Comparison by residence among women in GLSS 4 however 
reveals a different pattern. Indeed there appears to be hardly any variations in the 
usage of contraceptives, either traditional or modern, between urban and rural 
dwellers (Table 3.3). However comparison across expenditure per adult quartiles 
                                                        
57
 Except current modern use in GLSS 4 that rises till age 35 ± 39 and falls thereafter.  
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is consistent with expectation in both survey years: knowledge and use rise with 
expenditure. In all categories women in the highest expenditure quartile have the 
most knowledge and highest ever as well as current use, compared to women in 
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Table 3.2: Knowledge and Use of Contraceptives by School, Age, Residence & Expenditure  
Among Women Who have Started Sexual Relationsa  (1987/88) 
GLSS 1 Traditional Modern 
 Obs. Knowledge Ever Use Current Use Knowledge Ever Use Current Use 
Women's Sch.        
None 970 64.64 33.81 21.24 45.36 9.79 1.44 
Primary 260 80.77 48.46 31.15 71.92 22.31 3.08 
Middle/JSS 720 79.58 52.22 35.97 72.78 33.89 9.03 
Sec. & Higher 92 80.43 56.52 39.13 78.26 46.74 14.13 
Woman's age        
Age at/below 24 620 72.1 42.74 30.48 59.03 19.68 6.13 
Between 25 & 29 472 76.06 48.09 31.78 66.1 27.12 5.08 
Between 30 & 34 361 77.29 47.92 32.96 62.6 27.7 6.65 
Between 35 & 39 239 73.22 42.68 25.52 61.51 17.57 4.18 
Between 40 & 49 350 64 32.86 18 49.14 13.71 1.14 
Current Residence       
Urban 732 82.51 55.19 38.66 77.19 32.24 7.65 
Rural 1310 67.18 36.49 22.82 50.23 15.57 3.36 
Expend. per Adult       
Lowest 490 64.49 34.69 21.63 44.29 11.02 1.43 
Second  504 74.6 40.67 28.97 62.5 17.06 2.98 
Third 515 70.1 45.24 29.51 65.05 26.99 6.41 
Highest 533 80.86 51.41 33.4 66.79 30.21 8.44 
All Women 2042 72.67 43.19 28.5 59.89 21.55 4.9 ǣǯalculation using the Ghana Living Standards Survey, 1987/88 (GLSS 1)  
a. Based on respondents affirmative response to having cohabited at the time of the survey
  194 
Table 3.3: Knowledge and Use of Contraceptives by School, Age, Residence & Expenditure 
Among Women (1998/99) 
GLSS 4    With Sample weightsa 
  Traditional Modern Traditional Modern 
 Obs. Current use Current use Current use Current use 
Women's Sch.      
None 2443 2.95 9.21 3.7 9.96 
Primary 1081 4.35 10.82 4.77 12.7 
Middle/JSS 1876 5.6 11.89 6.53 12.28 
Sec. & Higher 443 7.45 14 7 15.69 
Woman's age      
Age at/below 24 2070 2.22 5.36 2.46 5.57 
Between 25 & 29 968 5.48 15.19 6.14 15.84 
Between 30 & 34 863 7.07 16.22 8.52 18.88 
Between 35 & 39 784 5.87 17.09 6.9 19.42 
Between 40 & 49 1158 4.4 8.2 4.63 7.56 
Current Residence      
Urban 2195 4.56 10.93 4.3 11.33 
Rural 3648 4.3 10.61 5.5 11.83 
Expend. Per Adult     
Lowest 1465 2.59 6.69 2.5 7.12 
Second  1460 4.11 10.41 5.14 11.99 
Third 1460 4.93 11.85 4.98 12.27 
Highest 1458 5.97 13.99 7.14 14.57 
All Women 5843 4.4 10.73 5.04 11.64 ǣǯ
ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?ȋ
 ?Ȍ 
a. Survey sample weights are used in the calculations. 
 
The style of question in GLSS 1 leads to multiple responses for contraceptive use, 
with use of both traditional and modern contraceptives as one possible response. 
Therefore, for the purpose of consistency and because only few sampled women 
used modern contraceptives alone, those who used modern contraceptives alone 
and those who used both modern and traditional contraceptives are grouped into 
one category in GLSS 1. On the other hand, responses in GLSS 4 are exclusive to 
each type of contraceptive with no allowance for use of both modern and 
traditional contraception. The dependent variable is thus divided into three ǣǲ ?ǳǢǲ ?ǳǲ ?ǳ being 
used. 
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Because the dependent variable is in three categories, the estimation is conducted 
by employing a multinomial logit econometric method. The reference category is 
women who do not use contraceptives. The econometric model estimates 
coefficients of explanatory variablesǡȾ1ǡȾ2, ǥȾ- - -  (4) 
These coefficients indicate the effects of the controlled variables on each category 
of contraceptive outcome with reference to the base group. The expressions for 




One set of coefficients is then normalised to zero otherwise yi would have same 




Ⱦ1 is normalised to zero. Therefore, the probability of outcome 2 or 3 
occurring relative to the base category is:  
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The Multinomial Logit model uses the maximum likelihood estimations where 
each observation has conditional log likelihood58: 
 
The full sample sizes for the contraceptive estimations are 2240 and 5863 of 
women of reproductive age 15 Ȃ 49 gathered during GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. 
These are women with all the information required for the econometric 
estimations. The observations here are a bit more than those used in Tables 3.1 to 
3.2 above. This is because the women who had not cohabited, and therefore not 
asked questions about contraception, have now been included as practitioners of 
abstinence and therefore traditional contraceptives users (Oliver, 1995) in GLSS 1 
but as non-users in GLSS 459. Therefore for the full sample, it can now be observed 
that women currently using traditional contraceptives constitute about 34.8 
percent and those using modern are 4.5 percent in GLSS 1. Also the percentage of 
women who have ever-used contraceptives are as usual higher: 48.2 and 19.6 for 
traditional and modern contraceptives respectively. However the current 
contraceptives figures for GLSS 4 remain about the same with 4.4 percent of 
women using traditional and 10.7 percent of them uses modern contraceptives. 
                                                        
58
 Wooldridge, J.M, 2002, Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data Analysis 
59
 This is because GLSS 4 does not have information on cohabitation, and with an observation of 20 
women, we believe this will not make much difference on outcomes.  
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Tables 3.4 and 3.5 show these summary statistics and those of the explanatory 
variables used in the estimations for GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics of Variables Used by Full Sample, Residence and Age Sub-Samples, 1987/88 
















Contraceptives           
Current Use  (Trad.) 0.348 0.477 0.280 0.449 0.462 0.499 0.397 0.489 0.211 0.408 
Current Use  (Mod.) 0.045 0.207 0.031 0.174 0.067 0.250 0.052 0.222 0.024 0.152 
Ever Use (Trad.) 0.482 0.500 0.408 0.492 0.607 0.489 0.523 0.500 0.368 0.483 
Ever Use  (Mod.) 0.196 0.397 0.145 0.352 0.283 0.451 0.212 0.409 0.153 0.360 
External Usea 0.365 0.248 0.293 0.212 0.486 0.255 0.370 0.246 0.351 0.252 
School           
None 0.454 0.498 0.539 0.499 0.313 0.464 0.379 0.485 0.666 0.472 
Primary 0.133 0.340 0.132 0.338 0.135 0.342 0.148 0.355 0.092 0.289 
Middle/JSS 0.362 0.481 0.306 0.461 0.455 0.498 0.419 0.494 0.200 0.401 
Sec. & Higher 0.051 0.220 0.023 0.151 0.097 0.296 0.054 0.226 0.042 0.202 
Still in School 0.046 0.209 0.041 0.197 0.055 0.228 0.062 0.242   
Age           
15_24 0.362 0.481 0.366 0.482 0.356 0.479 0.491 0.500   
25_34 0.375 0.484 0.364 0.481 0.393 0.489 0.509 0.500   
35_49 0.263 0.440 0.270 0.444 0.251 0.434     
40_49 0.156 0.363 0.173 0.378 0.128 0.334   0.594 0.491 
Current Residence           
Rural 0.627 0.484     0.621 0.485 0.643 0.479 
Northern Region 0.142 0.349 0.189 0.392 0.062 0.242 0.127 0.333 0.185 0.389 
Religion & Ethnicity           
Christian 0.625 0.484 0.585 0.493 0.692 0.462 0.635 0.481 0.596 0.491 
Muslim 0.138 0.344 0.108 0.311 0.187 0.390 0.133 0.339 0.151 0.358 
Traditional 0.172 0.377 0.232 0.422 0.071 0.256 0.166 0.372 0.188 0.391 
Other 0.066 0.248 0.075 0.263 0.050 0.219 0.066 0.248 0.065 0.246 
Non-Akan 0.533 0.499 0.526 0.500 0.544 0.498 0.513 0.500 0.587 0.493 
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Table 3.4 contd: Summary Statistics of Variables Used by Full Sample, Residence and Age Sub-Samples, 1987/88 
















Household Asset Scoreb           
Basic 
3.26 
E-17 1.000 -0.460 0.374 0.773 1.222 0.007 0.988 -0.020 1.035 
High 
5.73 
E-18 1.000 -0.060 0.214 0.102 1.610 0.011 1.118 -0.032 0.546 
Community variables           
Distance Primary school  0.632 1.829 1.008 2.226   0.618 1.829 0.670 1.830 
Distance Middle school  2.268 4.959 3.615 5.860   2.158 4.829 2.575 5.298 
Distance Secondary school  13.492 19.632 21.398 21.110   12.956 18.810 14.993 21.720 




E-17 1.000   -0.020 0.760 0.055 0.874 




E-17 1.000   0.008 0.788 -0.022 0.804 




E-17 1.000   -0.008 0.791 0.022 0.794 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage 2.809 2.710 4.262 2.205   2.824 2.716 2.769 2.695 
Ratio of female to men's wage 0.300 0.435 0.460 0.463   0.308 0.438 0.277 0.425 
Ratio of child to men's wage 0.307 0.408 0.469 0.423   0.305 0.406 0.310 0.412 
Observation 2240  1405  835  1651  589  ǤǲǳǤ 
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Table 3.5: Summary Statistics of Variables Used by Full Sample, Residence and Age Sub-Samples, 1998/99 
















Contraceptives           
Current Use  (Trad.) 0.044 0.205 0.043 0.203 0.045 0.208 0.041 0.198 0.050 0.218 
Current Use  (Mod.) 0.107 0.309 0.106 0.308 0.109 0.311 0.102 0.302 0.118 0.323 
External Usea 0.151 0.133 0.149 0.140 0.154 0.120 0.153 0.131 0.146 0.135 
School           
None 0.418 0.493 0.511 0.500 0.263 0.441 0.363 0.481 0.528 0.499 
Primary 0.185 0.389 0.184 0.388 0.187 0.390 0.206 0.404 0.144 0.351 
Middle/JSS 0.322 0.467 0.272 0.445 0.404 0.491 0.354 0.478 0.256 0.436 
Sec. & Higher 0.076 0.265 0.033 0.180 0.146 0.353 0.077 0.267 0.073 0.260 
Still in School 0.124 0.330 0.106 0.307 0.155 0.362 0.185 0.388 0.001 0.032 
Age           
15_24 0.356 0.479 0.333 0.471 0.395 0.489 0.533 0.499   
25_34 0.313 0.464 0.322 0.467 0.298 0.457 0.467 0.499   
35_49 0.331 0.471 0.346 0.476 0.307 0.461     
40_49 0.198 0.398 0.204 0.403 0.186 0.389   0.596 0.491 
Current Residence           
Rural 0.624 0.484     0.610 0.488 0.651 0.477 
Northern Region 0.135 0.341 0.171 0.377 0.073 0.261 0.121 0.327 0.161 0.368 
Religion & Ethnicity           
Christian 0.776 0.417 0.760 0.427 0.801 0.399 0.793 0.405 0.739 0.439 
Muslim 0.122 0.327 0.098 0.298 0.161 0.368 0.118 0.322 0.130 0.336 
Traditional 0.062 0.240 0.093 0.291 0.009 0.095 0.050 0.219 0.084 0.277 
Other 0.041 0.199 0.048 0.215 0.029 0.168 0.038 0.192 0.047 0.211 
Non-Akan 0.490 0.500 0.499 0.500 0.474 0.499 0.477 0.500 0.514 0.500 
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Table 3.5 contd: Summary Statistics of Variables Used by Full Sample, Residence and Age Sub-Samples, 1998/99 
















Household Asset Scoreb           
Basic 
-4.60 
E-17 1.000 -0.419 0.704 0.694 1.032 0.031 1.016 -0.062 0.964 
High 
-5.38 
E-17 1.000 0.248 0.930 -0.411 0.977 -0.040 1.003 0.081 0.989 
Community variables           
Distance Primary school  4.504 54.666 7.221 69.079   5.281 59.537 2.935 43.160 
Distance JSS school  5.473 35.510 8.774 44.641   5.663 36.993 5.088 32.314 
Distance Secondary school  15.433 56.260 24.743 69.603   15.417 56.824 15.466 55.117 




E-17 1.000   0.001 0.795 -0.001 0.779 




E-17 1.000   0.012 0.905 -0.024 0.479 




E-17 1.000   0.008 0.815 -0.016 0.736 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage 4.992 4.128 7.894 2.009   4.863 4.155 5.252 4.060 
Ratio of female to men's wage 0.376 0.435 0.591 0.412   0.365 0.433 0.398 0.439 
Ratio of child to men's wage 0.270 0.390 0.428 0.416   0.260 0.387 0.290 0.396 
Observation 5863  3657  2206  3921  1942  ǤǲǳǤ 
b. Generated scores using Principal Component Analysis.
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3.2.1.2.2   Explanatory Variables: Definitions, Descriptives and Expected Impacts 
The explanatory variables of interest are observed at personal, household, cluster 
and community levels. Those collected at personal levels include education, age, 
rural and region of residence as well as religion and ethnicity60. Information on 
household wealth or resources, as the name suggests, are collected at household 
levels and external contraceptive use is at cluster level but for the individual 
woman. Finally community variables included in the model are distances to ǡǯǡǡǡǯǯǡǯǯǤhe 
community level variables are unfortunately collected in rural areas only. 
Therefore for the full samples and the sub-samples stratified by age, urban 
clusters are replaced with zero according to the zero-order condition (Maddala, 
1977).  
Education is defined as years of completed schooling of sampled women. It is 
included in the model in categorical terms, namely, no education (base category), 
primary, middle/JSS, secondary and above as well as women still in school. 
Education is expected to increase contraceptive use because as proxy for wage 
and hence opportunity cost of time, fewer children may be demanded with its Ǥǯ
with educated women, they are more likely to desire fewer births and hence 
would require more contraceptives. Education also reduces information cost on 
acquiring contraceptives. However, an increase in education can also increase 
income or household wealth in general, unless unearned income is used. 
                                                        
60
 This is however that of the household head in GLSS 1. 
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Otherwise the other measures of wealth may tend to have a negative impact on 
contraceptives if it increases the demand for children. But empirical evidences 
usually show the substitution price effect of education counteracts the income 
effect, and the net effect on the demand for children is negative, hence increased 
demand for contraception.  
Of the sampled women, about 45.4 percent have no education at all in GLSS 1 and 
barely reduces in GLSS 4 (41.8 percent). Average schooling is highest at the 
middle/JSS levels in both surveys and constitutes about a third of the sampled 
women. This is followed by primary schooling, of which 13.3 percent have 
completed in GLSS 1 and 18.5 percent in GLSS 4. However less than 10 percent of 
them have secondary and above education: 5.1 and 7.6 percent in GLSS 1 and 4 
respectively. Also, roughly 4.6 percent of the women were still in school at the 
time of the survey in GLSS 1 with a corresponding 12.4 percent in GLSS 4. Finally 
the rural/urban sub-samples show that there are more uneducated women in 
rural than urban areas. This is about 53.9 percent in rural areas compared to 31.3 
percent in urban areas in GLSS 1. The corresponding figures for GLSS 4 are 51.1 
and 26.3 percent. All the remaining schooling categories consequently indicate 
higher average levels attained in urban areas relative to rural ones. 
This difference in education levels by residence is one of the reasons for its control 
in the model. It also to some extent indicates the quality of education, which is 
higher in urban than rural areas. Residence also controls for accessibility of 
contraceptives and hence cost; whereby urban residents may have easy access to 
information, the actual product as well as less extended family pressure to 
conform to traditional values. Other ǯ
areas because of generally higher living standards and educated women are more 
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likely to work in formal environments and higher wages. This is expected to 
increase the demand for contraceptives as a result of fewer demands for children. 
The positive relationship between urban residence and contraceptives has been 
observed in other studies including Moreno (1993), Oheneba-Sakyi and Takyi 
(1997), and Kirk and Pillet (1998).  
In addition to place of residence (rural/urban) of which about three-quarters of 
the sampled women reside in the former, region of residence is also included in 
the model to basically control for level of development and exposure to modern or ǲǳǤ-South divide in terms of development 
and poverty. Therefore based on administrative regions, a dummy variable ǲ ?ǳǲ ?ǳǤ
Northern regions are made up of Northern, Upper East and West. They are least 
developed compared to the Southern regions including the Brong-Ahafo, Ashanti, 
Volta, Eastern, Central, Western and the Greater Accra regions. The northern 
regions also have less access to public facilities such as schools, hospitals and 
other infrastructure compared to the south. So the expectation is that residents up 
north may be less inclined to use contraceptives with increased costs resulting 
from lack of these facilities. Around 15 percent of the women in this study on 
average reside in the northern regions. 
To a greater extent, tastes are also controlled with the rural/urban as well as the 
north/south stratification. Additional variables also acting as such controls are 
religion and ethnicity. Christianity (base category) appears to be the most 
practiced religion amongst women in the GLSS 1 (62.5%) and GLSS 4 (77.6%) 
study samples. This is made up of Catholics, Protestants, and other Christianity. 
The other religious affiliations are Muslims (13.8% in GLSS 1 and 12.2% in GLSS 
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4), Traditional (17.2% in GLSS 1 and 6.2% in GLSS 4), and other: the Bahai faith, 
Eckankar, and Buddhism (6.6% in GLSS 1 and 4.1% in GLSS 4).  
With regard to ethnicity, the women are separated into the Akans (base category) 
and the non-Akans. The Akans are the twi-speaking people in the country and 
forms the largest language group, nearly half of the entire women in this study. 
The non-Akans are the Ewes, Ga-Adangbes, Mole-Dagbanis, Hausas and others. 
Religion and language are expected to be pro-natalist, upholding traditional values 
that promote extending family size and ancestry. This may not be so much the 
case for the Christian (especially Catholics) and the Muslim religions but they 
nonetheless do not much encourage use of contraception. Therefore the overall 
effect may be geared towards less inclination to contraceptive use. However, 
Adongo et al., (1998) caution this may not always be the case because Traditional 
religion reflects socioeconomic determinants rather than a factor independently 
affecting reproductive change61. For GLSS 1, the religious belief and ethnicity of 
the household head is used as a proxy for that of the women since there are no 
individual records unlike in GLSS 4. 
ǯǡ
hence demand for contraception. It may also control censoring, in that, some 
women may not have completed their fertility or even began. Age in years is 
included in the model in categorical terms: 15 Ȃ 24 (base category), 25 Ȃ 34, and 
35 Ȃ 49.  The effect of age on contraceptive use is expected to be non-monotonic. 
                                                        
61
 Their study is based on the influence of traditional religion on reproductive preferences of the heads of 
the Kassena-Nankana lineage in Northern Ghana. It is a qualitative study where questions on 
reproductive preferences were administered to both lineage heads and ancestral spirits through with 
the assistance of soothsayers. Their findings showed that some ancestral spirits preferred smaller 
families than even the lineage heads. One of the main reasons given is economic and social changes 
in their environment.    
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Contraception is likely to increase with age, decline and increase again. Younger 
women would probably use contraceptives to delay marriage or birth. But this 
will decrease as they reach childbearing age band (any use would more likely be 
for birth-spacing), to be picked again upon achieving the desired number of births. 
But then again the increase during the latter phase would not be as large due to 
declining natural fecundity levels or menopause (Thomas and Maluccio, 1996). 
External contraceptive use is included in the model to sort of capture the influence 
of other people or friends using contraceptive within a community on an 
individual in that community. It is calculated as the proportion of other women, 
except the individual, in the cluster who use contraceptives. As Table 3.1 shows, 
the most common source of knowledge of contraception methods is from friends. 
And it is expected that as the proportion of women in a cluster that use 
contraception increases, so too will individual women adopt and increase use of 
contraception.  
The household wealth measure used in this study is a factor score index of 
household durable goods and physical characteristics of dwelling place using 
principal component analysis. Bollen et al. (2002) by comparing several proxies of 
economic status in their study on fertility in Ghana and Peru recommends 
principal components score as the best amongst indicators such as expenditure 
per adult; sum of current value of assets as reported by owners; simple sum of the 
assets, that is, the total number owned; sum of the median value of goods, that is, 
median value of asset across all households; and occupational status of the 
household head. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) also support the reliability of the 
principal component procedure as a proxy of economic status. They find it 
performs as well as consumption expenditure, and in some cases better, although 
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it does not have theoretical backings as expenditure. The drawback however is 
that potential measurement errors of the proxy variables (albeit fewer than 
expenditure) or their correlation with other variables in the model are not 
corrected with the use of principal component analysis. Filmer and Pritchett 
(2001) suggestions to the choice between using the component analysis for asset 
index and consumption expenditure is that the latter is better depending on its Ǥǡǲǡ
household per capita expenditures is most likely the more effective way of 
extracting the maximum amount of information from the data while reducing the Ǥǳ
analysis in generating asset scores as proxy for wealth not only because it 
performs better with the Ghana data (Bollen et al. 2002) but also because the 
predicted outcome of the dependent variable (that is, contraceptive, in this 
section) is further used in the ultimate estimation of fertility. 
Principal component analysis transforms original set of variables into a smaller 
number of linear combinations in a way that captures most of the variability in the 
pattern of correlation (Pallant, 2007).  Each principal component is a weighted 
linear combination of the original variables. Variables used in this study for the 
component analysis are household durable goods and physical characteristics of 
the house. The household durable goods in GLSS 1 includes sewing machine, 
stove, fridge-freezer, air-conditioner, fan, radio, cassette player, phonographs, 
stereo equipment, video equipment, washing machine, black and white television, 
colour television, bicycle, motor bike, car and camera. The physical characteristics 
of dwelling place include the house has room greater than one, piped water, flush 
toilet, electricity, and non-dirt floor. The variables used in GLSS 4 are same as the 
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ones above but also includes furniture, house, plot of land, shares, boat, canoes 
and outboard motors. 
Of the 22 variables in GLSS 1 and 29 in GLSS 4, only half remained in the former 
and 10 in the later survey year upon assessment for their suitability for factor 
analysis. First variables are examined for factorability using correlation matrix as 
well as the Kaiser-Meyer-Oklin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy and the 
Barlett test of sphericity62 (Pallant, 2007). Factors are then extracted using 
principal component analysis followed by oblique rotation of factors using 
Oblimin rotation. The final number of factor components kept for further analysis ǯcriterion63 and the scree test64. Summary statistics of the 
variables used and graphs (screeplot) are presented in Appendix B-1 to B-3. The 
KMO value is 0.82 in GLSS 1 and 0.90 in GLSS 4, both of which exceeds the 
recommended value of 0.6 (Kaiser, 1970 & 1974 cited in Pallant, 2007); and the ǯǤ
the factorability of the correlation matrix.  
The principal component analysis initially more than two components but upon 
assessing the total variance explained and the screeplot as well as the 
communalities65, two components factors are retained for further analysis. These 
two component factors used showed Eigen values exceeding 1 and explained 52.3 
                                                        
62
 A good indication that the data is suitable for factor analysis is that the correlation matrix has many 
coefficients with values of 0.3 and above; KMO has a value of at least 0.6 and the Barlett test is 
significant. 
63
 That suggests factors retained should have Eigen values greater than one. 
64
 This is a graph made up of Eigen values and the principal components. The cut-off point for factors to 
be retained in the analysis is where the line changes slope. Although the test is subjective, it is usually 
found to have high inter-scorer reliability (Kline, 2008). 
65
 This shows how much of the variance in each item is explained; only variables with values above 0.3 
are retained for the final analysis. Lower value may imply that the variable does not fit well with the 
other variables in its component, and removing them tend to increase the total variance explained 
(Pallant, 2007). 
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and 58.8 percent of the variance in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. The first component 
in GLSS 1 explained 34.2 percent of the variance and the second explained 18.1 
percent. The corresponding figures in GLSS 4 are 44.0 and 14.7 percent 
respectively. The two factors also show many higher variable loadings on each of 
the factors, giving reasonable meaning to the pattern formed. Table 3.4 gives 
loadings on the component, pattern and structure matrix. Factor loadings are 
correlations between variables and factors; and those with values above 0.3 are 
considered significant, after rotation (Kline, 2008). Such values are bolded in table 
3.6 below.  
Table 3.6: Component, Pattern and Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Two 









 Component Component Component  
 1 2 1 2 1 2  
Electricity 0.683 -0.38 0.802 -0.103 0.775 0.107 0.61 
Fans 0.698 -0.318 0.775 -0.037 0.766 0.166 0.587 
Black & White TV 0.642 -0.33 0.737 -0.071 0.719 0.122 0.521 
Piped Water 0.619 -0.358 0.735 -0.106 0.708 0.087 0.511 
Fridge-Freeze 0.729 -0.117 0.676 0.168 0.721 0.345 0.546 
Flush Toilet 0.567 -0.09 0.525 0.131 0.56 0.269 0.329 
Stove 0.554 -0.103 0.523 0.114 0.552 0.25 0.317 
Video equipment 0.504 0.643 0.016 0.813 0.229 0.817 0.668 
Colour TV 0.497 0.633 0.016 0.800 0.226 0.805 0.648 
Washing Machine 0.397 0.669 -0.088 0.797 0.12 0.774 0.606 
Air Conditioner 0.444 0.458 0.083 0.611 0.243 0.633 0.407 
GLSS 4 
 Component Component Component  
 1 2 1 2 1 2  
Fans 0.832 0.057 0.832 -0.026 0.834 -0.075 0.696 
Electric iron 0.827 0.025 0.822 -0.057 0.825 -0.105 0.684 
Fridge-Freeze 0.8 0.164 0.817 0.085 0.812 0.036 0.667 
TV 0.791 0.159 0.808 0.08 0.803 0.033 0.651 
Electricity 0.765 -0.251 0.717 -0.325 0.737 -0.368 0.648 
Piped water 0.688 -0.355 0.624 -0.422 0.649 -0.459 0.599 
Stove 0.631 0.136 0.645 0.073 0.641 0.035 0.416 
Video equipment 0.528 0.277 0.566 0.224 0.553 0.19 0.356 
House -0.165 0.757 -0.043 0.771 -0.089 0.773 0.6 
Room Gter1 0.004 0.747 0.121 0.745 0.077 0.737 0.558 
  Note: a Ȃ Unrotated loadings; b Ȃ Rotated loadings (rotation converged in 4 iterations) 
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The pattern and structure matrices reveal the first component factor in GLSS 1 
strongly loads on electricity, fans, black and white television, piped water, fridge-
freezer, flush toilet, and stove; and the second factor loadings are video 
equipment, colour television, washing machine and air conditioner. GLSS 4 
showed slightly different loadings to the above for the first component factor that 
includes fan, electric iron, fridge-freezer, television, electricity, piped water, stove 
and video equipment. The second factor in this survey year is whether the 
household has rooms greater than one, owns a house, piped water and electricity. 
Although piped water and electricity showed cross-loadings, which strongly 
loaded in both factors, they are stronger in the first.  The Oblimin rotation also 
reveals a weak correlation between the two components used in both surveys. 
The correlation in GLSS 1 is positive with a value of 0.26, and that of GLSS 4 is 
negative with a value of 0.06. These support the use of the two component factors 
as separate scores.   
Loadings on the first component factor in each survey year seem to measure 
material wealth and housing qualities that are relatively basic in households 
considering the period of the survey. And the second factor shows wealth 
indicators typical of households with higher earnings. Therefore factor scores of 
these components are used as measures of wealth in estimations and labelled as 
basic and high household assets. The expected impact of these wealth scores, 
holding education constant, cannot be determined a priori. This depends on 
whether ǮǯǤǡ
negative relationship between these scores and contraceptive is expected. But the 
reverse is more the case as fewer children tends to be demanded with increases in 
wealth. This is possibly because of the hypothesised household behaviour of 
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ǮǯǮǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ
this case, demand for contraceptives increases. 
Distance to health facilities and personnel represent the cost of contraceptives in 
this study. In order to have all the facilities represented66 but with fewer indicator 
variables, a principal component analysis is also employed here to generate a 
factor score to be used in the regression. The factor score also helps to solve the 
problem of high correlation that is present among all these community variables. 
The variables used in this case are distance67 to the nearest hospital, clinic, family 
planning clinic, pharmacy, doctor, nurse, community health worker, family 
planning worker, and pharmacist in GLSS 1. These same variables in addition to 
distance to the nearest drugstore, maternity home, midwife, medical assistant, 
traditional healer, and traditional birth attendant are used in GLSS 4. A Table 
showing summary statistics and screeplot that supports use of the component 
analysis for both survey periods can be found in Appendix B-4 to B-6. The 
procedure used in arriving at the final component factor used for additional 
analysis is same as described under household wealth. The KMO value for GLSS 1  ?Ǥ ? ?
 ? ?Ǥ ? ?Ǥǯ  
significant in both surveys, and based on the Kaiser criterion two components 
showing Eigen values greater than 1 are maintained for the analysis. 
The total variance explained by these components is 81.0 and 90.5 percent in 
GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. It can be observed after rotation (pattern and structure 
columns of table 3.7) that the first factor in the pattern matrix loads strongly on 
                                                        
66
 As contraceptives are often not only obtained from family planning clinics but also from hospitals, 
pharmacies, and chemical sellers (Table 3.1). 
67
 All distances used in this analysis are measured in kilometres. 
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family planning clinic and worker, pharmacy, pharmacist, hospital and doctor in 
GLSS 1. The second factor, in the same survey year loads on nurse, clinic and 
community health worker. The outcome in GLSS 4 is same as 1 regarding 
relatively more substantial loadings on the first factor. But the second factor on 
the other hand loads highly on pharmacy, pharmacist, hospital, doctor, maternity 
home and midwife. The first factor in both survey periods shows substantial 
loadings on both facilities and workers of those facilities, thus it is aptly named 
distance to health facilities and personnel. But with a higher correlation matrix of 
0.5 in GLSS 1 and 0.7 in GLSS 4 between the two components, only scores of the 
first factor are used for the econometric estimations. This may not undermine the 
results because the first component factor alone explains 67.6 percent of the 
variance in GLSS 1 and 79.9 percent in GLSS 4. Just as would be expected of a cash 
price, distance to the nearest health facilities and personnel is expected to be 
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Table 3.7: Component, Pattern and Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Two-









 Component Component Component  
 1 2 1 2 1 2  
Fam. Pl. clinic 0.863 -0.302 0.965 -0.1 0.91 0.43 0.836 
Fam. Pl. worker 0.886 -0.252 0.94 -0.035 0.92 0.48 0.848 
Pharmacist 0.835 -0.27 0.914 -0.07 0.876 0.431 0.77 
Pharmacy 0.918 -0.159 0.885 0.082 0.929 0.567 0.869 
Hospital 0.949 -0.105 0.861 0.154 0.946 0.627 0.912 
Doctor 0.92 -0.105 0.838 0.145 0.918 0.605 0.857 
Nurse 0.642 0.656 -0.056 0.948 0.464 0.917 0.843 
Clinic 0.639 0.61 -0.018 0.894 0.472 0.884 0.781 
Com. Health worker 0.668 0.358 0.227 0.61 0.561 0.734 0.575 
GLSS 4 
 Component Component Component  
 1 2 1 2 1 2  
TBA 0.934 -0.291 1.01 -0.046 0.978 0.676 0.957 
Trad. Healer 0.894 -0.307 1.003 -0.083 0.943 0.633 0.893 
Nurse 0.948 -0.232 0.946 0.041 0.975 0.716 0.952 
Medical Asst. 0.95 -0.226 0.941 0.049 0.976 0.721 0.954 
Fam. Pl. worker 0.951 -0.218 0.932 0.06 0.975 0.726 0.952 
Clinic 0.851 -0.267 0.924 -0.045 0.892 0.614 0.796 
Fam. Pl. clinic 0.851 -0.267 0.924 -0.045 0.892 0.615 0.796 
Com. Health worker 0.95 -0.207 0.917 0.076 0.971 0.73 0.945 
Drug store 0.92 -0.173 0.854 0.111 0.933 0.721 0.877 
Pharmacy 0.814 0.5 -0.06 0.997 0.652 0.955 0.913 
Pharmacist 0.822 0.497 -0.051 0.997 0.66 0.96 0.923 
Doctor 0.874 0.427 0.073 0.92 0.729 0.972 0.947 
Hospital 0.798 0.447 -0.005 0.918 0.651 0.914 0.836 
Maternity home 0.864 0.388 0.114 0.863 0.73 0.944 0.898 
Midwife 0.959 0.122 0.512 0.532 0.892 0.898 0.935 
Note: a Ȃ Unrotated loadings; b Ȃ Rotated loadings (rotation converged in 4 iterations) 
Similarly two price scores are generated using the principal component analysis. 
These price scores cover commodities households usually use. The prices68 of 
commodities used in GLSS 1 include cassava, guinea corn, millet, bread, gari, 
garden eggs, tomatoes, egg, tilapia, palm oil, groundnut oil, sugar, milk, and soap. A 
dummy controlling missing values is also included. Those used in GLSS 4 are 
maize, plantain, fish, sugar, guinea corn, millet, bread, gari, yam, cocoyam, onion, 
garden eggs, and tomatoes. After a satisfactory assessment of the KMO measure of 
sampling adequacy: 0.84 in GLSS 1 and 0.86 in GLSS 4 as well as a statistically 
                                                        
68
 These are in real terms. 
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ǯǡnt factors with Eigen values 
exceeding 1. However a scree plot (reported in Appendix B-7 to B-9) shows a 
break after the second component; therefore the first two components, explaining 
a total of 52.2 percent of the variance in GLSS 1 and 83.4 percent in GLSS 4, are 
kept for the analysis. The first component explains 38.7 and 52.2 percent of the 
variance in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. The equivalent for the second component 
are 13.6 and 31.2 percent respectively.  
With the aid of an Oblimin rotation, the first factor is noted with substantial 
loadings on variables such as egg, milk, garden egg, soap, tomatoes, palm oil, 
cassava, gari, tilapia, bread and sugar, as well as the missing dummy variable in 
GLSS 1 (Table 3.8). Since these mainly show a range of basic foodstuffs consumed ǡǲǳǤ
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Table 3.8: Component, Pattern and Structure Matrix for PCA with Oblimin Rotation of Two 









 Component Component Component  
 1 2 1 2 1 2  
Egg 0.702 -0.279 0.767 -0.177 0.735 -0.038 0.57 
Milk 0.767 -0.069 0.761 0.044 0.769 0.182 0.594 
Missing price -0.807 -0.056 -0.758 -0.175 -0.79 -0.313 0.654 
Garden egg 0.72 -0.139 0.739 -0.033 0.733 0.101 0.538 
Soap 0.753 -0.021 0.732 0.09 0.748 0.223 0.567 
Tomatoes 0.622 -0.343 0.712 -0.254 0.666 -0.124 0.505 
Palm oil 0.719 -0.058 0.711 0.047 0.72 0.177 0.521 
Cassava 0.647 -0.248 0.704 -0.154 0.676 -0.026 0.479 
Gari 0.628 -0.007 0.607 0.085 0.622 0.196 0.394 
Tilapia 0.556 -0.093 0.566 -0.012 0.564 0.091 0.318 
Bread 0.633 0.231 0.533 0.325 0.593 0.423 0.454 
Sugar 0.577 0.201 0.489 0.288 0.542 0.377 0.374 
Millet 0.21 0.835 -0.072 0.871 0.087 0.858 0.742 
Guinea corn 0.177 0.805 -0.094 0.836 0.058 0.819 0.679 
Groundnut oil 0.387 0.547 0.193 0.607 0.304 0.643 0.449 
GLSS 4 
 Component Component Component  
 1 2 1 2 1 2  
Guinea corn 0.826 -0.546 1.006 -0.184 0.973 -0.003 0.98 
Millet 0.836 -0.53 1.005 -0.165 0.976 0.016 0.979 
Maize 0.834 -0.528 1.004 -0.164 0.974 0.016 0.975 
Gari 0.904 -0.407 0.995 -0.023 0.991 0.156 0.983 
Sugar 0.955 -0.219 0.933 0.173 0.964 0.34 0.959 
Fish 0.956 -0.067 0.849 0.316 0.906 0.468 0.918 
Bread 0.897 0.039 0.74 0.392 0.811 0.525 0.806 
Plantain 0.52 0.777 0.009 0.934 0.176 0.935 0.875 
Cocoyam 0.469 0.771 -0.031 0.907 0.132 0.902 0.814 
Tomato 0.466 0.713 -0.002 0.852 0.151 0.852 0.725 
Garden egg 0.484 0.705 0.018 0.851 0.171 0.855 0.731 
Onion 0.44 0.653 0.01 0.785 0.151 0.787 0.619 
Yam 0.36 0.592 -0.024 0.697 0.101 0.693 0.48 
Note: a Ȃ Unrotated loadings; b Ȃ Rotated loadings (rotation converged in 4 iterations) 
 
Loadings on factors in GLSS 4 however show a slightly different pattern. The first 
factor highly loaded on guinea corn, millet, maize, gari, sugar, fish and bread. It is ǲǳǢǲǳ
because it loaded on plantain, cocoyam, and tomatoes, garden egg, onion, and yam. 
With a component correlation of 0.18 between the two factors in both surveys, 
which imply a weak correlation between the two factors and therefore can be 
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used as separate variables, factors 1 and 2 are included in the regression model to 
represent commodity prices. Increases in these commodity prices is expected to 
have positive effects on the demand for contraception as the net effect on the 
desire for more children declines. Oliver (1995) explains this relationship with ǣǯ
reduce the demand for these commodities and probably substitute with increased Ǥǯ
cost increases and other needs in the utility function are unmet. The income effect 
will thus counteract the substitution effect with the presumption that the latter 
will be smaller given the combined negative income and own-price effect on the 
demand for children. 
ǯǡ
middle/JSS and secondary schools at the period of the two surveys. The average 
distance to schooling appears to have increased in GLSS 4, compared to GLSS 1. 
For example, distance to primary school, for rural areas only, is 1.0 kilometre in 
GLSS 1 and 7.2 kilometres in GLSS 4. Corresponding figures for middle/JSS are 3.6 
kilometres in GLSS 1 and 8.8 kilometres in GLSS 4; and those for secondary school 
are 21.4 in GLSS 1 and 24.7 in GLSS 4. The effect of distance to school on 
contraceptive use cannot be determined a prior.  
ǯǤ
households that may not be able to afford the cost may withdraw children from Ǥǯ
cost and also make them available for unpaid family work or other paid work that 
may increase household resources. It may also result in increased demand for 
children and quest for contraception may fall. The reverse could happen in higher 
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income or educated households, or the outcome may be statistically insignificant. 
This is because of the culture of child fosterage in SSA, especially West Africa 
(King, 1987 in Knodel et al., 1990). Caldwell and Caldwell (1987) also suggest that 
the cost of children to biological parents and fertility is rendered meaningless due ǯǡǤ 
Agricultural69 ǯ
time. But unlike formal wage rates, agricultural wage rates are not dependent on 
education. It is fixed in communities based on gender and age. Thus we have wage 
rates for men, women and children. They are however highly correlated so in 
order to include all in the model without possibly causing multicollinearity, the ǯǤ
Hence we have three variables for these wage rates named as log of real70 ǡǯǯǡ
ratiǯǯǤ
determined a prior. This is because fertility could increase if increased wage rates 
results in polygamy and/or increased births due to the economic returns to 
children and therefore a fall in contraceptive use. On the other hand the 
opportunity cost of time, especially for the women, may cause fertility to decrease Ǥǯ
likely to increase fertility since some of the benefits of having a child are accrued 
earlier in life. 
                                                        
69
 Total amount of money received as a result of weeding. 
70
 Adjusted the measure for regional variations in price and inflation during the period of survey. The 
regional and monthly inflation adjustments are obtained from the basic information document provided 
by the World Bank for GLSS 1. That for GLSS 4 is obtained from the poverty profile data supplied with 
the GLSS 3&4 datasets. It is made up of the consumer price index using separate series for food and 
non-food as well as for Accra, urban and rural areas. A single overall cost of living index was 
constructed combining the geographic, and overtime variations (GSS, 2000).  
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3.2.1.3   Estimation Results 
This section discusses the marginal impact of education and other socioeconomic 
variables on current and ever- (only for GLSS 1) use of contraception. The 
multinomial logit estimation model is used for the analysis and the results on 
education alone are presented in tables 3.9 and 3.1071 for brevity. Table 3.9 shows ǯ
well as residence in both GLSS 1 and 4, and 3.10 shows the impact by Age. Table 
3.11 ǯ
contraception. The results in GLSS 1 are first discussed followed by those in GLSS 
4. There are three estimated models for each sample as discussed in the 
specification model. The first (variant 1) shows the influence of education on the 
use of traditional and modern contraceptives relative to none, controlling for 
women still in school, age and current residence. The second model (variant 2) 
differs from the first only by controlling more variables like religion and ethnicity, 
and most importantly household wealth that tends to correlate with education. 
The final model (variant 3) includes all the variables variants 1 & 2 as well as rural 





                                                        
71
 These are abridged versions of the various models estimated. Only the coefficients on education 
showing their statistical significance are shown here. The full results are presented in Appendix B-10 
to B-12.   
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Table 3.9ǣǯǡ
and Residence Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 
GLSS 1 
 Full  Rural  Urban  
 Trad. Modern Trad. Modern Trad. Modern 
Variant 1: Parsimonious  
Primary 0.068 0.014 0.023 0.025 0.16** -0.019 
Middle/JSS 0.042 0.06*** 0.027 0.043* 0.071 0.079** 
Sec. & above 0.021 0.14* -0.022 0.212 0.051 0.127 
Variant 2: Full model 
Primary 0.06 0.01 0.014 7.02E-06 0.145* -0.002 
Middle/JSS 0.017 0.049*** 0.016 1.29E-05* 0.064 0.008* 
Sec. & above -0.038 0.093 -0.046 1.02E-04 0.025 0.009 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary 0.046 0.007 0.012 1.96E-05 0.105 -0.003 
Middle/JSS 0.009 0.042*** 0.018 3.54E-05* 0.03 0.008* 
Sec. & above -0.04 0.079 -0.046 2.36E-04 0.001 0.009 
Observation 2240  1405  835  
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary 0.017 0.059** 0.005 0.092*** 0.051* -0.01 
Middle/JSS 0.03** 0.046** 0.029 0.036 0.034** 0.047* 
Sec. & above 0.048* 0.094** 0.054 0.051 0.051 0.094* 
Variant 2: Full model  
Primary 0.015 0.046** 0.003 0.073*** 0.049* -0.014 
Middle/JSS 0.024* 0.033* 0.023 0.025 0.031** 0.037 
Sec. & above 0.034 0.075** 0.034 0.043 0.045 0.067 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary 0.008 0.031* -0.001 0.053** 0.036* -0.019 
Middle/JSS 0.019* 0.027* 0.017 0.02 0.024* 0.031 
Sec. & above 0.024 0.062* 0.026 0.039 0.033 0.06 
Observation 5863  3657  2206  
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects after estimating multinomial logit regression models. Variant 1 control for 
women currently in school, age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity 
and household wealth in addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as 
well as other determinants. See Appendix B-10 and B-11. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 
1% respectively. 
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Table 3.10ǣǯǡǯ
Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 
GLSS 1 
 Age15-34  Age35-49  
 Traditional Modern Traditional Modern 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary 0.054 0.028 0.102 -0.015** 
Middle/JSS 0.033 0.075*** 0.053 4.97E-04 
Sec. & above 0.034 0.124 -0.021 0.007 
Variant 2: Full model  
Primary 0.046 0.022 0.094 -1.9E-05*** 
Middle/JSS 0.008 0.063*** 0.029 4.76E-07 
Sec. & above -0.037 0.084 -0.031 6.14E-06 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics Current usea 
Primary 0.037 0.015 0.06  
Middle/JSS -0.001 0.052** 0.033  
Sec. & above -0.044 0.068 0.054  
Observation 1651  589  
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary 0.03* 0.047* -0.017 0.078* 
Middle/JSS 0.025* 0.047** 0.038 0.032 
Sec. & above 0.033 0.091** 0.063 0.088 
Variant 2: Full model  
Primary 0.027* 0.037* -0.017 0.062* 
Middle/JSS 0.022 0.039* 0.028 0.018 
Sec. & above 0.025 0.085* 0.042 0.055 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary 0.017 0.022 -0.015 0.039 
Middle/JSS 0.015 0.03 0.025 0.013 
Sec. & above 0.017 0.071* 0.033 0.043 
Observation 3921  1942  
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects after estimating multinomial logit regression models. Variant 1 control for 
women currently in school, age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity 
and household wealth in addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as 
well as other determinants. See Appendix B-10 & B-11. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively.  
a- did not distinguish between traditional and modern in this model. 
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The Impact of Education 
In accordance to expectations, estimates show educated women are more likely to 
use contraception compared to their uneducated counterparts in most of the 
samples examined. Also not surprising, education tends to influence modern 
contraceptives more than traditional use, as observed from the many statistically ǯǤ
that some level of education is required for understanding and confident practice 
of modern contraception. This is more so in earlier years or introductory stages of 
modern methods.  
In GLSS 1 for instance, the impact of education is found statistically significant 
from the post-primary level and only with the use of modern contraceptives. 
Women with middle/JSS level of education are associated with an increase of 
about 6 percent in the probability of current use of modern contraceptives, ceteris 
paribus. Those with secondary education and above are associated with higher 
probabilities than the level before it. The increase in the tendency to use the 
modern methods with this highest level of education is about 14 percent 
compared to none, ceteris paribus. This is more than a fifty percent increase and 
somewhat tallies with the higher opportunity cost of time hypothesis with regard 
to higher education. 
When stratified by current residence, it is noted that the highest level of education 
loses its significance. However where significant, education appears to have lower 
imǤǯ
education at the primary level is also found statistically significant in the influence 
of traditional contraceptive use in urban areas. Traditional contraception however 
is believed to be less effective than modern, except abstinence. When the data is 
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also distinguished by age, it is estimated that only women with middle/JSS 
education in the younger group (Age 15 Ȃ 34) statistically have a positive 
tendency to use modern contraception. For the older group (Age 35 Ȃ 49), it is 
primary education that is statistically significant but contrary to the expected 
outcome. For example older women with primary education have lower 
tendencies to use modern contraception in GLSS 1. This may be due to a ǲǳǡ
side effects, and availability in these early years.  
ǡ
 ?ǯ
contraceptive use is observed among both traditional and modern users in all 
samples where education is statistically significant. In the full sample of Variant 1, 
education is found statistically significant on the impact of contraceptive use at all 
levels except for primary on traditional use. In rural areas, there does not appear 
to be the need to be educated in order to use traditional contraceptives. However 
in urban areas the rate of traditional use increases with primary and middle/JSS Ǥǯ the influence of modern 
contraceptives use in both rural (primary level) and urban (post-primary level). It 
can also be observed from the age stratification table that education increases the 
use of contraceptives among younger women than older ones. This is more so 
with regard to modern compared to traditional methods. It generally appears that 
education barely influences contraceptives use amongst older women. This is 
likely to be an age instead of a cohort effect, based on the assumption that the 
older women in GLSS 4 (whose educational influence is statistical less significant) 
behaved similarly as the younger ones in GLSS 1 (with the relatively higher 
educational influence in statistical significance) when they were at that age. It 
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therefore means that as women grow older, the educational impact on 
contraceptive use becomes less relevant, which intuitively makes sense because 
they may be nearing or at the end of their fecundity stage in the reproductive 
phase. 
The impact of education on contraceptive use seems to be quite robust, especially 
with the modern methods, as the inclusion of other variables (even household 
wealth) in the model does not often remove the statistical significance but 
sometimes weakens it (see Variants 2 and 3)72. The magnitudes of the coefficients 
do not change dramatically, and the direction of impact remains consistent in all 
the models. Overall, education appears to have a relatively weaker to no 
association with traditional methods. This probably implies minimal or no need to 
have an education for the practice of traditional contraception. It is also observed 
that where significant, the estimated magnitudes of education on modern methods 
are larger than those of traditional. The impact is almost twice as large with 
regard to secondary and above level of education in GLSS 4 (Variant 1). This 
contrast with Oliver (1995) who used GLSS 273 and finds that schooling has a 
larger influence on the current use of traditional compared to modern Ǥǯǯ-samples in 
 ? ?ǯǤǡ
significant impact of education on modern contraceptive use in either urban areas 
or among older women. But outcomes in the remaining sub-samples are 
consistent with hers. The general positive relationship between education and 
contraceptive use is in accordance with many other studies including Weis (1993), 
                                                        
72
 Except weaker ones at higher levels of education. 
73
 A follow-up data with similar questions to GLSS 1 used in this study.  
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Feyisetan and Ainsworth (1994), Thomas and Maluccio (1996), Ainsworth et al. 
(1996), Lasee and Becker (1997), and Benefo (2005). 
Table 3.11 ǯ-use of 
contraception in GLSS 1. The outcomes are rather different from current use in 
some ways, but also have some similarities. The first notable difference is that ǯ
education. This is mainly from post-primary education (Variant 2) whereas the 
only statistically significant impact of education on current use of traditional 
methods in the same data is primary level in urban areas (they are positively 
related). There are also substantial differences between magnitudes of middle/JSS 
and secondary and above, where both are found significant. For instance whilst 
women with middle/JSS level of education show 6.8 percent lower probabilities, 
those with secondary and above show 16.8 percent lower probabilities of ever 
having used contraception compared to none, ceteris paribus (Variant 2).  
ǯnd ever use of modern 
contraception is however consistent with current use. It is positive and at least 
like the full sample in variant 1 of Table 3.9, the magnitudes increase with the 
level of education. However, the impacts are stronger with ever than current use, 
which concurs with Oliver (1995). For example, primary, middle/JSS and 
secondary and above levels of education increases the probability of ever using 
contraception by 9.2, 17.7 and 31.4 percent respectively in the full sample 
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Table 3.11ǣǯǡǡ
Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 
GLSS 1 








Sec. &  
above 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Full 0.01 -0.042 -0.121** 0.092** 0.177*** 0.314*** 
Rural -0.013 -0.03 -0.176** 0.069* 0.149*** 0.417*** 
Urban 0.049 -0.06 -0.117 0.113 0.212*** 0.291*** 
Age15-34 0.001 -0.033 -0.113 0.113** 0.183*** 0.303*** 
Age35-49 0.045 -0.09* -0.165** 0.015 0.149** 0.345** 
Variant 2: Full model  
Full 0.003 -0.068* -0.168*** 0.085** 0.162*** 0.254*** 
Rural -0.025 -0.048 -0.241*** 0.06 0.138*** 0.434*** 
Urban 0.045 -0.101* -0.165** 0.117 0.196*** 0.23** 
Age15-34 -0.008 -0.066* -0.178*** 0.107** 0.174*** 0.259*** 
Age35-49 0.047 -0.101* -0.166** 0.008 0.115* 0.238 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Full 0.011 -0.051 -0.149** 0.048 0.119*** 0.22*** 
Rural -0.014 -0.014 -0.226*** 0.035 0.092*** 0.424*** 
Urban 0.04 -0.114* -0.169* 0.067 0.159** 0.204* 
Age15-34 0.007 -0.042 -0.155* 0.059 0.118*** 0.196** 
Age35-49 0.028 -0.093 -0.145 0.005 0.089* 0.261* 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects after estimating multinomial logit regression models. Variant 1 control for 
women currently in school, age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity 
and household wealth in addition to those in Model 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as 
well as other determinants. See Appendix B-12. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% 
respectively. -- Survey sample weights are used in GLSS 4. 
 
 
Similarly, the influence of education on ever use is greater in urban than rural 
areas, except at the secondary and above where the reverse is true. At this highest 
level of education, women in rural areas have higher probabilities (41.7%) than 
urban ones (29.1%). However, whereas the impact of education begins to show 
from the primary levels in rural areas, it does so from post-primary in urban 
areas. This is probably because contraception is less available in rural than urban 
areas. Outcomes by age stratification also show educated women of both the 
young and old have higher tendencies of ever using contraception, unlike current 
use where older educated women (primary level) do the converse compared to 
none. The estimates on education and ever-use contraception also appear to be 
fairly consistent with different specification models (Variants 2 & 3). 
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The Impact of Control Variables 
This sub-section briefly discusses the control variables used in the estimations. It 
mainly focuses on estimates of Variant 2, which includes household wealth. Tables 
3.12 & 3.13 present abridged versions of the results, and they comprise 
coefficients with their statistical significance by the full sample of all women, 
residence and age for current contraception use. Many of the control variables in 
only Variants 1 do not change much in Variant 2, but the few that do dramatically 
and of interest would be mentioned in the course of the discussion.  
Women still in school show increased preference for traditional contraceptive use 
relative to none in GLSS 1. The impact is larger in rural (55%) than urban (37%) 
areas. They are also less likely to use modern contraception compared to none in Ǥǯ-
sample also indicates a positive relationship with traditional contraception as 
opposed to none. This probably reflects preference for the more discreet option of 
fertility regulation by younger women74 or the practice of abstinence to avoid 
forced marriage as well as being stigmatised as a drop out in this earlier year. 
Recall women who had not started sexual relationships were included in this 
sample as traditional contraceptives practitioners. The results here maybe 
confirming some of the suggestions made in Turner (1991) by a group of ǲǥǤ
planning program that improves and takes advantage of some of the traditional 
methods will be more apt to be accepted by the population than an exclusively Ǥǳ 
                                                        
74
 They form the majority of women still in school; only two women in the data are above the age of 34 
years and still in school. So the variable was dropped from the older sub-sample of the data. 
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Table 3.12: The Impact of Other Socioeconomic Variables on Current Use of Contraception, 
by All Women & Residence Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 
GLSS 1 Full Rural Urban 
 Traditional Modern Traditional Modern Traditional Modern 
Variant 2: Full model 
Still in  
School 0.478*** -0.006 0.549*** 1.71E-06 0.365*** -0.004** 
Age25-34 -0.1*** 0.002 -0.049 -4.38E-07 -0.198*** 0.001 
Age35-49 -0.19*** -0.014 -0.155*** -3.49E-06 -0.274*** -0.003 
Rural -0.116*** -0.014     
Northern  
Region -0.061 -0.018 -0.029 -4.62E-06 -0.188* -0.003 
Muslim -0.113*** -0.02* -0.092** -0.001*** -0.144* -0.003 
Traditional 0.033 -0.012 -0.017 -8.41E-07 0.2* -0.053*** 
Other -0.182*** -0.028*** -0.201*** -1.96E-04*** -0.153* -0.004** 
Non-Akan 0.052* 0.012 0.04 1.77E-06 0.081 0.002 
HAS- Basic 0.049*** -0.001 0.052 -5.28E-06 0.061*** -7.35E-05 
HAS- High 0.004 0.004* 0.043 5.31E-07 0.003 0.001* 
GLSS 4       
Still in  
School -0.04*** -0.089*** -0.041*** -0.091*** -0.031*** -0.087*** 
Age25-34 0.034** 0.1*** 0.031* 0.105*** 0.042* 0.086** 
Age35-49 0.025** 0.061*** 0.012 0.059** 0.051* 0.055* 
Rural 0.022* 0.016     
Northern  
Region -0.016 0.029 -0.023 0.021 -0.001 0.044 
Muslim -0.005 0.005 -0.007 0.011 7.71E-05 0.001 
Traditional 2.41E-04 -0.07*** -0.002 -0.072*** 0.034 -0.033 
Other 0.015 -0.055*** 0.01 -0.049** 0.023 -0.066** 
Non-Akan -0.008 -0.008 -0.007 -0.008 -0.011 -0.005 
HAS- Basic 0.006 0.002 0.007 -0.005 0.003 0.011 
HAS- High -0.003 2.67E-04 -0.005 -0.004 0.001 0.001 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects after estimating multinomial logit regression models. Variant 2 comprises all 
the categories of education already discussed as well as control variables such as women currently in school, age, rural 
residence, and Northern regional location, religion, ethnicity and household wealth. The final Variant 3 includes all the 
variables already mentioned as well as other determinants. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% 
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Table 3.13: The Impact of Other Socioeconomic Variables on Current Use of Contraception, 
ǯȂ 1987/88 & 1998/99 
 Age15-34  Age35-49  
Variant 2: Full model  
GLSS 1 Traditional Modern Traditional Modern 
Still in School 0.463*** -0.009   
Age25-34 -0.112*** 0.004   
Age40-49   -0.047 -1.21E-06 
Rural -0.119*** -0.021* -0.063 4.27E-09 
Northern Region -0.046 -0.023 -0.077 -6.09E-07 
Muslim -0.121** -0.021* -0.082* -1.29E-04** 
Traditional 0.026 -0.02 0.057 4.67E-07 
Other -0.206*** -0.034*** -0.106* -8.03E-06*** 
Non-Akan 0.038 0.013 0.076* 5.66E-07 
HAS- Basic 0.055** -0.004 0.043 2.49E-07 
HAS- High 0.014 0.005 -0.172 2.20E-07 
GLSS 4     
Still in School -0.038*** -0.085***   
Age25-34 0.026*** 0.082***   
Age40-49   -0.016 -0.112*** 
Rural 0.029** 0.02 0.001 -0.006 
Northern Region -0.006 0.025 -0.033* 0.042 
Muslim 0.008 0.031 -0.036** -0.042* 
Traditional 0.007 -0.056*** -0.009 -0.091*** 
Other 0.024 -0.048** -0.016 -0.06* 
Non-Akan -0.006 -0.009 -0.014 -0.011 
HAS- Basic 0.005 -0.002 0.002 0.005 
HAS- High -0.008 -0.006 0.007 0.015 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects after estimating multinomial logit regression models. Variant 2 comprises all 
the categories of education already discussed as well as control variables such as women currently in school, age, rural 
residence, and Northern regional location, religion, ethnicity and household wealth. The final Variant 3 includes all the 
variables already mentioned as well as other determinants. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. -- Survey sample weights are used in GLSS 4. 
 
 
In GLSS 4 however, women still in school show a strong negative association with 
both traditional and modern contraceptives use. Unless these women are sexually 
inactive, there are likely to be higher incidences of unplanned pregnancies that 
may end up in various unpleasant circumstances. One of which is abortion that is 
currently illegal in the country and usually conducted without medical help or 
quack doctors ending up in young deaths.  
It also appears age in general is strongly related to traditional contraception. The 
older a woman gets, the less likely she is to practice traditional contraception. This 
is also observed in Benefo (2006). Women aged between 25-34 are 10 percent 
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less likely to use traditional relative to none or modern methods compared to 
those between 15-24 years inclusive in GLSS 1, ceteris paribus. The corresponding 
effect of the oldest group, 35Ȃ49 years, is around twice that much. The 
relationship with modern contraception is not significant. Again the opposite is 
found in GLSS 4, where traditional and modern contraceptives use tend to 
increase with age but at a decreasing rate. Women aged between 25 and 34 are 
three percent more likely to use contraception compared to those between 15 and 
24 years in the full sample, ceteris paribus. Meanwhile women age 35 to 49 are 2.5 
percent more likely to do so compared to the same base category. The rural and 
urban sub-samples show slightly bigger differences in magnitudes between the 
age categories.  
The reason for the difference in age effects between the two survey years could be 
the level of exposure to contraception in those periods. It is assumed that 
contraception, especially modern, might have been made more common during 
the later year that has encouraged use in general. The magnitudes decreasing with 
age cohorts are expected because aging makes women less fertile, decrease 
exposure to possible pregnancies and possibly achieved desired family size hence 
lower needs for contraception (Caldwell et al., 1992; Feyisetan and Ainsworth, 
1996; Koc, 2000).    
Rural residence has a negative significant effect on traditional contraceptives use 
in GLSS 1. Women in rural areas are also less likely to be using modern methods 
but the significance level do not quite reach the acceptable conventional levels. 
Younger women (in the age stratified table 3.13) in rural areas are noted as being 
11.9 and 2.1 percent less likely to adopt the use of traditional and modern 
contraceptives respectively. The negative relationship between rural residence 
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and contraceptives use is as expected and commonly found in related studies 
(Ainsworth et al., 1996; Thomas and Maluccio, 1996). Some of the reasons behind ǯ
cost of child services in urban areas that leads to reduced aspirations for big 
family size and hence increased need for contraception. There is also the fact that 
contraception is relatively easier to access, by way of facilities and information, in 
urban relative to rural areas. Thus in the specification where most of the 
facilities75 are also controlled current residence appears to lose its significance in 
the equation (Variant 3, Appendix B-10 to B-12).  
Estimations in GLSS 4 on the other hand suggest not only a weaker but also 
contrary outcome to expectations. Contraceptive use tends to be higher in rural 
compared to urban areas in this period. This is also statistically significant only 
with regard to traditional methods. The control of community variables in Variant 
3 did also lead to a non-significant rural residence pertaining to traditional 
methods, and a rather weak negative association with modern contraceptives. 
This perhaps is due to chance. Current residence however does not matter at all in 
the practice of contraception among older women in this sample.    
Regional dummy (Northern) included in the specifications to sort of capture the 
varying development levels in the country seems rarely relevant, especially with 
the additional control of other socioeconomic variables. However where 
significant, it shows a negative association with traditional contraceptives use. 
In accordance with their pro-natal beliefs, Muslims tend to use contraceptives less 
than Christians in GLSS 1Ǥǲǳ
                                                        
75
 Information on facilities are collected in only rural areas at community levels. Urban observations are 
replaced with zero in the econometric estimations.   
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also less likely to use both traditional and modern methods. Traditional beliefs 
appear influential on contraceptives use only in urban areas. They are likely to use 
traditional contraceptives but strongly oppose to the use of modern methods 
compared to the Christian religion. The general pattern observed in GLSS 1 that 
suggests women of all other religion are more likely to practice contraception 
compared to Christians is also observed in GLSS 4 where significant. Linked to 
religious beliefs is ethnicity, controlled in this study as non-Akan. Ethnicity barely 
shows any influential impact on contraceptives use among the women Ǥǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍ 
Akan households are 3.4 percent more likely to use modern contraceptives 
methods. 
Asset scores76 on household durable goods and housing qualities included in the 
model to control for household wealth indicate they are positively related to the 
use of contraception methods in GLSS 1 but not at all in GLSS 477Ǥǲǳǲǳ
score is associated with modern contraceptives use. This is however observed in 
the full sample as well as the urban sub-sample. Younger women in households ǲǳ
compared to none. The positive relationship between household wealth and 
contraceptive use is what was expected and consistent with other studies (Weis, 
1993; Oliver, 1995; Feyisetan and Ainsworth, 1996; and Thomas and Maluccio, 
1996) with various measures. This supports ǲǳǲǳ
substitution theory.  
                                                        
76
 Women in households with higher asset scores suggest access to higher wealth. 
77
 ([FHSWIRUDZHDNQHJDWLYHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ³KLJK´VFRUHDQGPRGHUQFRQWUDFHSWLRQDPRQJZRPHQ
aged 15-34 when community variables are also controlled (Variant 3). 
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Estimates of the control variables for ever-use of contraceptives are given in Table 
3.14. The signs of the coefficients generally follow the pattern of current use but 
with relatively more statistical significance of the variables in ever-use. The 
correlation between the explanatory variables and ever-use also appears stronger 
than current use. For instance whereas women still in school are more likely to 
use traditional contraception compared to none, they are less likely to use modern 
methods. The latter was also the case with regard to current use but was not 
statistically significant. Actually most of the variables under the modern 
contraceptives column are now observed as statistically significant.  Younger 
women are noted as more likely to have ever use modern but less likely to have 
used traditional contraceptives relative to none, with the bigger impact in urban 
than rural areas. The results on older women are similar to those of current use. 
Rural as well as Northern regional residence however now show strong negative 
association with ever use of modern contraceptives. The results on these two are 
as expected because women in these areas are less exposed to information or 
facilities that may promote the adoption of modern contraception. These areas are 
less developed and more tied to their cultural values than women in urban areas 
and Southern regions of the country. The effects of religion and ethnicity though 
are roughly the same as those of current use. Though household wealth also has ǡǲǳ
women is now also noted as influential in the ever use of contraception. The 
influence is positive with regard to the use of traditional contraception among 
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Table 3.14: The Impact of Other Socioeconomic Variables on Ever Use of Contraception, by 
All Women, Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88  
GLSS 1 Full  Rural  Urban  
 Traditional Modern Traditional Modern Traditional Modern 
Variant 2: Full model 
Still in School 0.455*** -0.104*** 0.534*** -0.072** 0.332*** -0.185*** 
Age25-34 -0.128*** 0.094*** -0.067* 0.063** -0.239*** 0.137*** 
Age35-49 -0.154*** 0.025 -0.092** -0.003 -0.261*** 0.058 
Rural -0.026 -0.073***    
Northern 
Region 
0.003 -0.137*** 0.033 -0.095*** -0.061 -0.204*** 
Muslim -0.044 -0.072*** -0.016 -0.085*** -0.075 -0.079 
Traditional 0.035 -0.039 -0.001 -0.022 0.178* -0.101 
Other -0.121** -0.077** -0.107* -0.062** -0.161* -0.09 
Non-Akan 0.009 0.03 -0.025 0.004 0.057 0.066 
HAS- Basic 0.077*** 0.002 0.112** -0.045* 0.074*** 0.007 
HAS- High 0.002 0.017* 0.319 0.107 -0.012 0.021* 
       
 Age15-34  Age35-49    
 Traditional Modern Traditional Modern   
Still in School 0.44*** -0.116***    
Age25-34 -0.142*** 0.101***     
Age40-49   -0.087* 0.012   
Rural -0.032 -0.073** 0.016 -0.074*   
Northern  
Region 
0.034 -0.163*** -0.053 -0.079* 
  
Muslim -0.056 -0.068* -0.02 -0.074*   
Traditional 0.03 -0.038 0.051 -0.044   
Other -0.146** -0.079** -0.07 -0.066   
Non-Akan -0.007 0.017 0.048 0.066*   
HAS- Basic 0.091*** -0.005 0.055* 0.014   
HAS- High 0.014 0.023 -0.091 0.017   
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects after estimating multinomial logit regression models. Model 2 comprises all 
the categories of education already discussed as well as control variables such as women currently in school, age, rural 
residence, and Northern regional location, religion, ethnicity and household wealth. The final Model 3 includes all the 
variables already mentioned as well as other determinants. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% 
and 1% respectively. -- Survey sample weights are used in GLSS 4. 
 
Community Characteristics 
These are community variables included in the final specification (Variant 3) to ǯ
contraception. Tables 3.15, 3.16, & 3.17 show the results on only the community 
variables for current use in GLSS 1, GLSS 4 and ever use in GLSS 1 respectively, 
which forms part of the individual and household characteristics already 
discussed. The full results on the other variables of this specification model can be 
found in Appendix B-10 to B-12. This also gives output on all three models 
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including the influence of external contraception: the proportion of other women 
in cluster who use contraceptives. This is created using individual response on 
contraceptives use. 
The outcome of the external effects of contraceptive use is as expected. That is as 
the proportion of other women who use contraceptives (either traditional or 
modern) increases in the cluster, individuals own contraceptive use also 
increases. This is in accordance with premise explaining that women are ǯǤ
other women, individuals pick practices that are deemed successful, which in this 
case seems to be fertility regulation. According to the results noted in the full 
sample in GLSS 1 for instance, an increase in the proportion of women using ǯ ?Ǥ ? ?ȋȌ
or 0.07 (Modern) compared to none, ceteris paribus. The analogous figures in 
GLSS 4 are 0.15 and 0.26 for traditional and modern respectively. As has been 
commonly observed with many of the other variables in this study, the results on 
this also suggest appreciable differential impact between urban and rural areas as 
well as younger and older women. The estimated coefficients are bigger in urban 
than in rural areas, and among younger than older women in GLSS 1. However the 
reverse is the case in GLSS 4. 
Only few of the community variables controlled are significant. It is virtually non-
existent in GLSS 1 where it looks like the community variables have no impact on Ǥǯ
some statistical significance, which is weak and probably by chance. Meanwhile 
the outcome suggests a positive relationship with modern contraceptives use in 
the full sample.  
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In contrast, relatively more of the community characteristics are found 
statistically significant in GLSS 4. It is observed that increased distance to the 
nearest middle school is associated with a higher probability of modern 
contraceptives use. This is also significant in the rural and women aged 15-34 sub-Ǥǯ
desire for more children that may finally lead to increased demand for 
contraception. This would probably be more so for women who may have ǲǳǤ 
As anticipated in the discussion of the specification model increased cost of 
contraceptives, that is access to the nearest health facilities/personnel, lowers the 
probability of contraceptive use, especially in rural areas. This is consistent with 
similar studies including Oliver (1995), Thomas and Maluccio (1996) and 
Feyisetan and Ainsworth (1996). The outcome on price of other commodities is 
also as expected in the estimations model. This is represented by the price score of ǲǳǲǳ
sign. Traditional contraceptives use tends to increase with the price score of ǲǳǡ-samples. This is because child services 
eventually become expensive, which lowers the demand for children and 
therefore increases the demand for contraceptives.  
It ǯǯǤ
prior due to the presumption that increased wages within farming communities 
could increase the demand for children, the value of time appears to have 
counteracted this outcome giving the opposite as the likely results. That is, a ǯǯ
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use of modern contraceptives by 0.8 percentage points among all women, ceteris 
paribus. The same magnitude is also observed among rural women, but it is lower 
(0.6) and higher (1.1) percentage points among women aged 15-34 and those 
aged 35-49 respectively. However the tendency of modern contraceptives use is ǯ
among women aged 35-49. The reason behind this final outcome is not quite clear, 
as one would have expected a contrary outcome with increased opportunity cost 
of time. 
Unlike the estimation results on current use in GLSS 1, those on ever use indicate 
statistically significant associations with distance to middle school, price score of ǲǳǲǳǤ
ever using modern contraception decreases with increased distance to the nearest 
middle school. A kilometre increase in distance lowers the probability among all 
women by 1.0-percentage points, but it lowers by 0.6 and 1.2 percentage points 
among rural women and younger women between the ages of 15-34 respectively, 
ceteris paribus. The other side of the argument may explain the direction of this 
relationship, which is that children may be withdrawn from school as costs Ǥǯcost, increase the demand for children 
and thereby lower the demand for contraception. 
The results of the price scores are however as anticipated. And although of a 
different era and contraception definition, the price scores have consistent results 
as tho
 ?Ǥǲǳ
instance tends to increase the use of modern contraception, but only statistically Ǥǲǳ
is statistically significant in the full sample as well as among younger women.   
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Table 3.15: The Impact of Community Characteristics on Current Contraceptives Use by All Women, Residence and Age, 1987/88  
Current Use GLSS 1 
 Full  Rural  Age15-34  Age35-49 
Variable Tradition Modern Tradition Modern Tradition Modern Current use 
 M.E/t-ratio M.E/t-ratio M.E/t-ratio M.E/t-ratio M.E/t-ratio M.E/t-ratio M.E/t-ratio 
Distance Primary school  0.004 -0.003 0.002 -3.00E-06 0.006 -0.003 -0.006 
 0.67 -1.43 0.4 -1.48 0.8 -0.98 -0.47 
Distance Middle school  0.001 -0.001 0.002 -2.09E-07 0.001 -0.001 0.003 
 0.43 -0.6 0.61 -0.29 0.16 -0.47 0.79 
Distance Secondary school  0.001 2.79E-04 0.001 2.54E-07 0.001 -2.07E-05 0.001 
 0.63 1.25 0.61 1.45 0.88 -0.06 0.58 
Access to Health facilities/personnel -0.007 0.004 -1.79E-04 2.50E-06 -0.007 0.004 -0.009 
 -0.37 1.17 -0.01 0.9 -0.32 1 -0.36 
Price score of foodstuffs -0.004 -0.006 -0.009 -3.98E-06 0.001 -0.009 -0.008 
 -0.24 -1.75 -0.57 -1.41 0.04 -1.96 -0.28 
Price score of cereals -0.006 0.003 -0.002 7.96E-07 -0.022 0.005 0.031 
 -0.35 0.82 -0.13 0.24 -1.09 0.9 1.35 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage -0.002 -1.64E-04 -0.005 1.37E-08 -0.004 0.001 0.002 
 -0.22 -0.08 -0.64 0.01 -0.4 0.34 0.19 
Ratio of female to men's wage -0.021 -0.016 -0.019 -1.35E-05 0.002 -0.013 -0.08 
 -0.53 -1.56 -0.53 -1.44 0.03 -0.95 -1.34 
Ratio of child to men's wage -0.036 0.024 -0.014 1.47E-05 -0.064 0.02 0.051 
 -0.79 2.18*   -0.34 1.65 -1.13 1.35 0.77 
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Table 3.16: The Impact of Community Characteristics on Current Contraceptives Use by All Women, Residence and Age, 1998/98 
Current Use GLSS 4 
 Full  Rural  Age15-34  Age35-49  


















Distance Primary school  1.04E-04 -6.30E-05 1.21E-04 -7.18E-05 -1.88E-05 -1.38E-04 8.91E-05 1.37E-04 
 0.6 -1.2 0.6 -1.32 -0.02 -1.37 0.73 1.17 
Distance Middle school  -4.60E-04 3.06E-04 -0.001 3.36E-04 -0.001 4.74E-04 -2.25E-04 -1.34E-04 
 -1.28 2.88**  -1.25 3.01**  -1.05 2.96**  -0.85 -0.77 
Distance Secondary school  -7.42E-05 1.08E-04 -8.64E-05 1.08E-04 -1.64E-05 1.74E-04 -1.79E-04 -1.39E-04 
 -0.65 1.23 -0.67 1.3 -0.14 1.82 -0.98 -0.64 
Access to  
Health facilities/personnel 0.002 -0.019 0.002 -0.02 -2.05E-04 -0.026 0.003 0.001 
 0.37 -2.21*   0.37 -2.26*   -0.04 -1.79 0.31 0.07 
Price score of foodstuffs 0.003 -4.97E-04 0.003 -0.001 0.002 -0.002 0.008 -0.009 
 2.47* -0.14 2.31* -0.35 0.99 -0.57 2.28* -0.6 
Price score of cereals -0.002 -0.015 -0.002 -0.012 -0.004 -0.011 4.97E-04 -0.004 
 -0.34 -1.28 -0.38 -1.52 -0.38 -1.25 0.16 -0.43 
Log of real  
Men's Agric. Wage 6.79E-05 0.008 1.95E-04 0.008 -0.001 0.006 0.003 0.011 
 0.05 3.35*** 0.13 2.90**  -0.62 2.46*   1.57 2.25*   
Ratio of  
female to men's wage 0.003 -0.02 0.003 -0.022 0.001 -0.011 -5.86E-05 -0.045 
 0.29 -1.6 0.26 -1.74 0.12 -0.68 0 -2.12*   
Ratio of  
child to men's wage -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.004 -0.022 -0.012 0.047 
 -0.14 -0.12 -0.38 -0.12 0.51 -1.73 -1.06 1.94 
Observation 5863  3657  3921  1942  
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Table 3.17: The Impact of Community Characteristics on Ever Use of Contraceptives by All Women, Residence and Age, 1987/88  
Ever Use GLSS 1 
 Full  Rural  Age15-34  Age35-49  

















Distance Primary school 0.012 -0.006 0.011 -0.003 0.012 -0.004 0.01 -0.002 
 1.78 -0.94 1.67 -0.83 1.37 -0.53 0.95 -0.25 
Distance Middle school 0.005 -0.01 0.004 -0.006 0.006 -0.012 0.004 -0.003 
 1.64 -2.77**  1.32 -2.49*   1.47 -2.69**  0.83 -0.76 
Distance Secondary school 0.001 3.65E-04 4.53E-04 2.14E-04 0.001 -2.86E-04 -4.39E-04 0.001 
 0.66 0.56 0.48 0.49 1.24 -0.37 -0.29 0.6 
Access to  
Health facilities/personnel 
-0.013 0.009 -0.003 0.003 -0.011 0.009 -0.012 0.004 
 -0.62 0.76 -0.14 0.4 -0.44 0.63 -0.41 0.23 
Price score of foodstuffs -0.015 0.006 -0.02 0.009 0.002 -0.007 -0.055 0.07 
 -0.82 0.51 -1.13 1.04 0.09 -0.49 -1.69 3.48*** 
Price score of cereals -0.023 0.021 -0.01 0.009 -0.034 0.027 0.003 0.014 
 -1.33 2.08*   -0.6 1.31 -1.65 2.13*   0.09 0.9 
Log of real  
Men's Agric. Wage 
-0.008 0.003 -0.016 0.006 -0.01 0.007 0.001 -0.007 
 -0.97 0.58 -1.74 1.21 -0.99 1.03 0.06 -0.99 
Ratio of  
female to men's wage 
-0.041 -0.005 -0.026 -0.014 -0.032 0.012 -0.056 -0.045 
 -1.02 -0.19 -0.63 -0.74 -0.66 0.36 -0.77 -1.19 
Ratio of  
child to men's wage 
0.006 0.004 0.028 -0.013 -0.001 -0.012 0.009 0.036 
 0.12 0.15 0.57 -0.65 -0.02 -0.33 0.11 0.87 
Observation 2240  1405  1651  589  
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3.2.2 The Duration of Breastfeeding  
3.2.2.1   Background and Literature Review 
Breastfeeding is one of the immediate determinants of fertility that also has unique 
roles in the reproductive process. Not only does it supply the nutritional and 
immunological protection needs of babies, but also delay the resumption of 
ovulation. Both of which, on their own or a combination of the two, could 
determine fertility levels. The former increases the chances of child survival that is 
associated with extended birth interval and hence likely to lower fertility. This ǯ
mortality to achieve desired family size or naturally becoming less fecund over 
time. Prolonged post-partum amenorrhoea also delays next birth, which in turn 
improves the health of mother and child with the latter consequently lowering 
fertility. 
Before the use of contraceptives became widespread, it was one of the main 
processes of controlling childbirths in both developed and developing countries. 
With the onset of development of modern contraceptives, the act does not feature 
much as a contraceptive in developed countries. However in many developing 
countries, especially SSA, it is one of the few prevailing contraceptives78 used in 
controlling fertility. Weis (1993) show early cessation of breastfeeding is a critical 
risk factor for conception in the absence of other forms of contraceptives; 
although he argues that breastfeeding is not a reliable contraceptive. And Pérez-
Escamilla et al. (2007) also noted that shorter breastfeeding duration increases 
the risk of unplanned pregnancies. The period of breastfeeding and postpartum 
                                                        
78
 Usually associated with sexual abstinence for cultural or customary reasons. 
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abstinence gets shortened mostly because of weakening traditional values with 
the onset of modernisation and the spread of education. This consequently 
increases unplanned or unwanted births and overall fertility; unless modern 
contraceptives prevalence increases. Bongaarts et al. (1984) emphasise that ǲ fertility will occur only in populations where increases in 
contraceptive use and in age at marriage are sufficiently large to outpace the 
effects of the shortening of breastfeeding and the abandonment of postpartum 
abstinence as well as any declines in pǤǳ 
Breastfeeding has been found to protect against infections to the extent that an 
increase by 40 percent worldwide would reduce deaths from respiratory infection 
by 50 percent in children less than 18months of age (WHO, 1995 cited in Oddy et 
al., 2003). Although the adverse mortality impact of shortened breastfeeding 
duration dominates in poorer countries, reduced immunity to infectious diseases 
is more the case in affluent countries. Faldella et al., (1999) suggest babies in 
affluent countries would benefit from prolonged breastfeed because it prevents 
gastrointestinal, respiratory and allergic diseases early in life as well as reduce the 
risk of certain chronic diseases in adult life. Belfield and Kelly (2010) also find that 
breastfeeding at birth increases the probabilities of infants being in excellent 
health at 9 months, protective against obesity at 24 months and improve cognitive 
outcomes at 54 months. They also find breastfeeding up to 6 months and above 
increases infant motor scores at 9 months. 
Although the decision to breastfeed should primarily be based on these important 
health reasons, socioeconomic factors have been observed as having a higher 
tendency in determining the outcome. Literature on the topic indicates that 
education plays a strong decisive role in breastfeeding duration (Jain and 
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Bongaarts, 1981; Trussell et al., 1992). It is commonly noted to shorten the period 
of breastfeeding, especially in developing countries (Akin et al., 1981; Anderson 
and Rodrigues, 1983; Weinberger, 1987; Popkin, 1989; Weis, 1993; Adair et al., 
1993; Appleton, 1996; Giashuddin and Kabir, 2004; and Pérez-Escamilla et al., 
2007). But the opposite is rather observed in developed countries (Donath and 
Amir, 2000; Yngve and Sjöström, 2001; Dennis, 2002; Giashuddin and Kabir, 2004; 
Lakati et al, 2007). Yngve and Sjöström (2001) for instance find that it is low 
educational attainment that rather negatively affects breastfeeding in Europe. This 
may be because the influence of breastfeeding on infant morbidity and mortality is 
well understood by the educated (Popkin, 1989) in these developed countries who 
then at least breastfeed till the medically accepted months. The immediate 
discrepancy in breastfeeding duration thus appears to be the level of development 
of the country understudy. However, like the developed countries at the early 
stages of development, educated women in developing countries have adopted ǲǳ-formula can be 
seen as high status consumption good amongst peers. 
Studies in Sri Lanka (Akin et al., 1981) and Bangladesh (Weis, 1993) have gone 
further to show that although educated women generally breastfeed for shorter 
periods, they breastfeed for at least the number of months recommended by 
health professionals. In Sri Lanka, duration drops with additional education only 
when the child is 9 months plus. Also, almost 100% of Bangladeshi women 
breastfeed in the immediate postpartum period till 15 months where it falls to 
90%. Indeed similar to the developed countries, educated mothers in developing 
countries are at least as likely as uneducated ones to initiate breastfeeding. Hakim 
and El-Ashmawy (1992) find in Giza that 61.4 percent of the uneducated mothers 
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initiate early suckling compared to 84.4 percent of the educated mothers. Other 
studies that assent to the positive link between education and the initiation of 
breastfeeding include Huffman (1984), Popkin (1989) and Becerra (1990). 
However, they also note that duration amongst the educated is shorter. 
Time also appears very influential to a large extent and it is also related to Ǥǯ
well as its duration, and this is where it connects with education. Due to a higher ǯǡ
tend to be shorter than the uneducated. Most educated women are also in formal 
employments, and so unless paid maternity leave exist or some arranged support 
system is provided by employers, breastfeeding duration ceases earlier for these 
women. Many developed countries are guided by the rules of international 
organisations79 including WHO, UNICEF, ILO and country specific medical 
associations that ensures that legal requirements are met to protect such women. 
This perhaps partly explains why educated women in employment in developed 
countries exhibit improved breastfeeding practices than their counterparts in 
developing countries.      
Apart from a possibly unsupportive employment system working against 
educated women, urban residence (where most educated may be located) and 
income that is positively related with education do not seem to promote extended 
breastfeeding in developing countries. This is because urban residence is ǲǳ
bottle-feeding are deemed as the best. Also widespread advertisements 
portraying convenience and sophistication by mega-company producers of infant 
                                                        
79
 See Yngve and Sjöström (2001) for more information on these organisations and their rules.  
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formulars in cities overshadows the advantages of breastfeeding. Ties to 
traditional values are also weaker in urban areas not to mention dwindling 
breastfeeding role models for younger women to emulate in urban areas. The 
ability to easily afford these infant formulars, and the convenience and time value 
gained as a result imply a likely shortening of breastfeeding duration among 
educated working mothers. In so far as education shortens breastfeeding and 
hence possibly increase fertility levels, the overall net impact of education on 
fertility could decrease holding all other variables constant. 
 
3.2.2.2   Econometric Model, Specification, Data and Variables Used 
A reduced form demand equation for health input is adopted to estimate the 
model for breastfeeding duration as it is considered as one (Pitt, 1993). This also 
entails an economic framework that maximises the utility of a household based on 
its production and subject to the constraints of income, wage and time. Details of 
the derivation of the reduced form equation are presented in chapter 2 of this Ǥǯǡ
production as well as those of other commodities enters into the household utility Ǥǯincome 
streams increase as a result of it (Belfield and Kelly, 2010). Apart from the health 
of the baby, breastfeeding may also improve the health of the mother, foster 
emotional and physical developments that bonds mother to baby and thereby 
increases utility that extends to the entire household. Breastfeeding is time-
intensive and competes with time spent in earnings for the mother. Thus 
maximising the household utility function faced with a household income budget 
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that is mostly earned, and a fixed time as constraints gives a modified reduced 
form equation for the estimation of breastfeeding as: 
฀฀฀
BF ฀BF Ed,Am, R, Sx, BY, Rl, Eth,Y,DsW ,DsMk, Aw,Dsfp, PxFN฀ ฀................. 14฀ ฀ 
Where Ed is education, Am ǯǡR is rural and region of residence, Sx is 
gender of the child, BY is the birth year of the child, Rl is religion, Eth is ethnicity, Y 
is household wealth, DsW is distance to the nearest water source, DsMk is distance 
to the nearest market, Aw is agricultural wage, Dsfp is distance to the nearest 
health facilities and personnel, and PxFN is prices of food and non-food.  
As already discussed in the estimation model of contraceptives, education is used 
as proxy for wages/employment. This also turns out to be a time cost to 
breastfeeding because of its positive relation to wages. And the hypothesis is that 
education increases employment opportunities and wage rates, which then 
implies higher cost of breastfeeding hence shorter duration.  
The impact of employment though appears to depend on the type or location 
rather than whether the woman work or not, hence empirical findings has not 
been consistent. Jain and Bongaarts (1981) did not find an important or consistent 
effect of work after marriage on the duration of breastfeeding whereas Anderson 
and Rodrigues (1983)80 find working women breastfeed relatively longer than 
those not working. Akin et al (1981) explanation is that work per se does not 
affect duration of breastfeeding but rather the location of the work as they find a 
strong negative effect of working away from home on the duration of 
breastfeeding. A further analysis in Tunisia, Yemen and rural Egypt show same 
outcome (Akin et al., 1986). Huffman (1984) also finds that where there is a high 
                                                        
80
 They explained the data did not distinguish type of work, that is, whether from home or outside home. 
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rate of female employment outside the home, the duration of breastfeeding 
reduces in developed countries. Yngve and Sjöström (2001) concur with the 
observation but their findings do not concern only employment outside the home 
but employment in general. But in Nairobi where mothers manage to combine 
work with breastfeeding, Lakati et al., (2007) noted no significant association 
between employment and the duration of breastfeeding. 
As mentioned in the previous section, education is also correlated with location 
and income. Therefore they are controlled in order to separate their influence 
through education. This gives the estimates on education as its own and not 
indirect effects of residence and income. In-spite of this, there may still be some 
unobserved or unmeasured variables that correlate with both breastfeeding and 
education causing omitted variable bias and potential endogeneity. However as 
already explained, this is not solved in this study due to lack of data. Other 
background information is controlled in addition to residence and income in an 
attempt to reduce any potential bias.     
These are age of the mother, gender and year of birth of the child, religion and 
ethnicity. Age of the mother is included in the model to control fecundity. Older 
women are less likely to easily fall pregnant and thereby terminate breastfeeding 
because they are less fecund. This also somewhat means they are less likely to use 
contraceptives, which is one of the reasons given by women for terminating 
breastfeeding. Apart from removing the risk of pregnancy hence no need for 
breastfeeding for that purpose, some women fear contraception, particularly 
modern, may turn their breast milk sour and unfit for the baby. Therefore in 
breastfeeding models where contraceptive use is also included, high prevalence is 
commonly found to reduce the duration of breastfeeding (Akin et al., 1981; 1986; 
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Weis, 1993). Relating this to age therefore suggests that older women are 
anticipated to breastfeed for longer. However, Akin et al., (1981) also argue that 
older women have smaller volumes of breast milk, so a negative relationship is 
more likely to be the case between age and breastfeeding duration. It is therefore 
unsurprising that the empirical literature on the topic shows mixed findings with 
regard to age. Studies that find older women breastfeed for longer include Akin et 
al. (1986), Adair et al. (1993), Donath and Amir (2000), Yngve and Sjöström 
(2001) and Dennis (2002), and studies with reverse findings include Akin et al. 
(1981) and Giashuddin and Kabir (2004).  
The gender of the child is included in order to test for possible gender 
discrimination against female children. It is however not commonly found 
significant in many of the studies searched (Jain and Bongaarts, 1981; Akin et al., 
1986; Weis, 1993; Appleton, 1996), except Adair et al., (1993) whose finding is 
more related to exclusive breastfeeding. They find that male infants are 
exclusively breastfed for shorter periods; implying that they are not totally 
weaned earlier but rather mothers supplement their breast milk to meet their 
increased need for growth (ibid). ǯh may also indicate 
whether breastfeeding patterns are reflections of some cohort effects. Religion 
and ethnicity are similarly controlled to show traditional values and social 
attitudes towards breastfeeding duration. Women with traditional values for 
instance are expected to breastfeed for longer because they may still have ties 
with their roots. 
 Also apart from their roles as control variables for education, rural residence and 
household wealth are themselves principal determinants of breastfeeding 
(Huffman, 1984). Most studies note that ǯ
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influence breastfeeding, with longer duration observed in rural than urban areas 
(Jain and Bongaarts, 1981; Huffman, 1984; Akin et al., 1986; Popkin, 1989; Weis, 
1993; Pérez-Escamilla (2003); Giashuddin and Kabir, 2004; Pérez-Escamilla et al.; 
2007). Household wealth, also a significant determinant of breastfeeding, is 
expected to shorten duration as many empirical studies show. Giashuddin and 
Kabir (2004) indicate that mothers from wealthy families breastfeed less in 
Bangladesh because they can afford wet nurse and baby formula or substitutes for 
breast milk. Earlier studies such as Akin et al (1981) observe similar outcome in 
Sri-Lanka and Appleton (1996) finds household consumption per capita reduces 
the duration of breǯǤǡ Adair et al. (1993) in the 
Cebu regions (Philippines), Dennis (2002) in a literature review between 1990 to 
2000, and Lakati et al., (2007) in Nairobi show high socio-economic status tend to 
reduce breastfeeding duration in developing countries.  
Since the major cost to breastfeeding is time, other time consuming activities the 
mother undertakes, which also increase the value of her time, are included in the 
model to examine their impact on breastfeeding habits. These are distance to the 
nearest water source and market, as well as distance to health facilities and 
personnel. The anticipation is that increased distance to these venues shortens the 
duration of breastfeeding, all other variables held constant. Agricultural wage 
rates ǡǯǯǤ
increase in agricultural wage rates for men and children are expected to increase 
the duration of breastfeeding, especially in households where they are present. A 
converse outcome is anticipated with an increase in female wage rates. The prices 
of food and non-food form part of the household budget income. To the producers 
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of these commodities, increase in prices implies a rise in income that could result 
in shorter duration of breastfeeding. However the opposite is the anticipated 
outcome for consumers.  
The estimation process follows that of contraceptives use, where three versions of 
the model are estimated for all women (that is the full sample), the rural and 
urban as well as women aged 15 to 34 and 35 to 49 sub-samples. The first 
specification model (Variant 1) involves education and control variables including ǯǡȋȌǡ
gender of the infant as well as it year of birth. The second specification (Variant 2) 
is made up of the first plus to religion, ethnicity and household wealth. The final 
model (Variant 3) is that of the above in addition to distance to the nearest water 
source, market, and health care facilities/personnel, prices food and non-food 
commodities, and agricultural wage rates for men, women and children. 
 
3.2.2.2.1   Dependent Variable: Definition and Descriptives  
The breastfeeding analysis is based on the information of the youngest child of 
individual women in households. The age of these women are between 15 and 45 
inclusive. Breastfeeding duration is recorded in months as age last child was 
completely weaned in both data sets. Follow-up questions, especially in the GLSS 
4, imply that the duration of breastfeeding is not exclusive. That is, other forms of 
feeding are noted in addition to breast milk. These questions include the age the 
child received any liquid other than breast milk for the first time; the age the child 
was first given pure water; and the age the child first received solid food other 
than breast milk. 
  250 
In GLSS 1, only women who were randomly selected in households for the fertility 
questionnaire and have had at least one live birth have records of breastfeeding 
duration for the last child. However in GLSS 4, all women in the household with 
children of 5 years old and below have records of breastfeeding for each child. In 
order to have consistency in the analysis, only women with children aged 5 years 
and below are chosen for estimations in GLSS 1. Equally, only the last child81 in 
GLSS 4 is used. With a sample selection of children of 5 years and younger, fewer 
measurement errors are expected due to relatively short re-call periods.  
Breastfeeding is modelled with womenǯ education as the primary determinant 
using survival analysis. This is because although all women eventually wean their 
children from breastfeed, many had not done so at the time of the survey resulting 
in censored82 data. Thus their exact duration of breastfeeding is unknown. 
Deleting such women from the analysis will drastically reduce the number of 
observations, as about half of the women in the sample are still breastfeeding; 
which is reasonable since the survey sample is on infants. Also, not 
accommodating for censoring in the model would not fully explain breastfeeding 
duration in general but for a smaller completed sample. In contrast including 
these observations without the appropriate statistical methods may lead to bias 
estimates of the covariates; hence the relevance of the application of survival 
analysis for this model. The event of interest is the duration of breastfeeding and 
failure is when it ceases. 
                                                        
81
 This study assumes the last child to be the youngest child of each woman in the household. 
82
 This is when some women have not yet completed breastfeeding at the time of the survey. GLSS 1 
records about 55.35 percent of women still breastfeeding, which suggests right censoring. The 
analogous figure for GLSS 4 is 47.73 percent. 
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The duration of breastfeeding is denoted by a finite period T, which takes on 
values t  é ?ǡ ?ǡ ?ǡǥǤǡn. The various durations are in order of magnitudes with t1฀ t2 
฀ t3 ฀ ǥ฀ tn ฀ ฀. The probability that the duration will end (fail) before time t is 
measured by the cumulative distribution function of T. That is 
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀tTtF Pr  --------------------------- (15) 
On the other hand, the probability of surviving through time t, that is, not yet 
completed breastfeeding at that time is expressed as survival function: 
฀ ฀ ฀ ฀ )(1Pr tFtTtS ฀ ------------------------------------------ (16) 
The instantaneous probability of leaving a state or failure (woman completing the 
duration of breastfeeding) at time t, given that she has not done so at this time is 
termed as the hazard function. This is formally expressed as: 
฀ ฀ )()( tStft ฀  --------------------------------- (17) 
where f(t) is the density function. Also survivor probabilities at time period t can 
be expressed in terms of hazard as: 
฀ ฀฀ t iitS , )1()( ฀ ฀ -------------------------------------------- (18) 
Suppose at a point in time ti where women are still breastfeeding, if ri defines the 
number of observations at risk of failing at that time, and di is the number of 
failures that ends at time ti , the hazard rate can be estimate as: 
iii dr฀฀ --------------------------------------------- (19) 
and the survivor function estimated as:  
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฀ ฀ ฀฀ ฀฀ ฀฀฀฀ 1|1| )/1(/)( ii ti iiiiti rdrdrtS  -------------------------------------- (20) 
This is also known as the Kaplan-Meier estimator used for non-parametric 
analysis. Estimates of a survivor function for the duration of breastfeeding 
amongst women in GLSS 1 and 4 are presented in Tables 3.18 and 3.19 
respectively. The Kaplan-Meier Survivor and the Nelsen-Aalen (N-A) Cumulative 
Hazard functions show the distribution of the duration of breastfeeding. It 
summarises the various months of breastfeeding, those at risk of failing 
(completing the duration of breastfeed), number of women who have actually 
failed (that is completed), and those censored. The survivor column shows the 
probability of continuing breastfeeding beyond a particular month. The first 
month for example indicates that less than 1 percent of the sampled women have 
completed breastfeeding in that month in both GLSS 1 and 4 with a survival 
probability of 0.999 and 0.996 respectively. With 1,304 and 2, 396 women at risk 
of completing during the first month in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively, only 1 had 
failed in GLSS 1; and the corresponding figure in GLSS 4 is 9. 
The median duration of breastfeeding appears to have increased between the two 
survey years. The median is observed around the 18th month in GLSS 1 and 
somewhere between the 23rd and 24th months in GLSS 4. The survival 
probability in the latter year is around 57 percent in the 23rd month, which 
suddenly dropped to 23 percent in the 24th month. It seems that relatively more 
women prefer to terminate breastfeeding just before tǯ
birthday, then survival rates rapidly falls to 7 and 1 percent at the third birthday 
in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. Graphical representation of the survival functions of 
GLSS 1 and 4 are given in Figure 3.1 with a 95 percent confidence interval.  
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Table 3.18: Duration of Breastfeeding: Survival Analysis; Failures, Censoring and the Kaplan 
Meier Empirical Hazard (GLSS 1 - 1987/88) 
Month Riskset Failed Censored Survivor 
N-A Cum. 
Hazard 
1 1304 1 23 0.9992 0.0008 
2 1280 7 36 0.9938 0.0062 
3 1237 4 28 0.9906 0.0095 
4 1205 0 25 0.9906 0.0095 
5 1180 2 28 0.9889 0.0112 
6 1150 4 37 0.9854 0.0146 
7 1109 9 28 0.9774 0.0228 
8 1072 19 33 0.9601 0.0405 
9 1020 15 49 0.946 0.0552 
10 956 15 24 0.9312 0.0709 
11 917 3 27 0.9281 0.0741 
12 887 95 46 0.8287 0.1813 
13 746 9 15 0.8187 0.1933 
14 722 41 24 0.7722 0.2501 
15 657 29 34 0.7381 0.2942 
16 594 18 22 0.7158 0.3245 
17 554 6 9 0.708 0.3354 
18 539 177 38 0.4755 0.6638 
19 324 12 5 0.4579 0.7008 
20 307 25 6 0.4206 0.7822 
21 276 2 4 0.4176 0.7895 
22 270 6 6 0.4083 0.8117 
23 258 2 6 0.4051 0.8195 
24 250 137 37 0.1831 1.3675 
25 76 2 3 0.1783 1.3938 
26 71 4 0 0.1682 1.4501 
27 67 2 5 0.1632 1.48 
28 60 3 4 0.1551 1.53 
29 53 1 5 0.1521 1.5488 
30 47 10 4 0.1198 1.7616 
32 33 1 1 0.1161 1.7919 
33 31 0 1 0.1161 1.7919 
34 30 0 1 0.1161 1.7919 
35 29 0 1 0.1161 1.7919 
36 28 12 6 0.0664 2.2205 
37 10 0 1 0.0664 2.2205 
38 9 0 1 0.0664 2.2205 
40 8 0 2 0.0664 2.2205 
42 6 0 1 0.0664 2.2205 
50 5 0 1 0.0664 2.2205 
52 4 0 1 0.0664 2.2205 
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Table 3.19: Duration of Breastfeeding: Survival Analysis; Failures, Censoring and the Kaplan 
Meier Empirical Hazard (GLSS 4 - 1998/99) 
Month Riskset Failed Censored Survivor 
N-A Cum. 
Hazard 
1 2396 9 57 0.9962 0.0038 
2 2330 7 57 0.9933 0.0068 
3 2266 14 38 0.9871 0.0129 
4 2214 10 52 0.9827 0.0175 
5 2152 4 52 0.9808 0.0193 
6 2096 7 48 0.9776 0.0227 
7 2041 1 72 0.9771 0.0231 
8 1968 12 64 0.9711 0.0292 
9 1892 14 53 0.9639 0.0366 
10 1825 9 36 0.9592 0.0416 
11 1780 6 50 0.9559 0.0449 
12 1724 109 53 0.8955 0.1082 
13 1562 14 40 0.8875 0.1171 
14 1508 39 62 0.8645 0.143 
15 1407 42 40 0.8387 0.1728 
16 1325 27 40 0.8216 0.1932 
17 1258 12 40 0.8138 0.2028 
18 1206 258 62 0.6397 0.4167 
19 886 17 23 0.6274 0.4359 
20 846 45 36 0.594 0.4891 
21 765 6 19 0.5894 0.4969 
22 740 19 17 0.5743 0.5226 
23 704 8 11 0.5677 0.534 
24 685 405 20 0.2321 1.1252 
25 260 8 9 0.2249 1.156 
26 243 32 8 0.1953 1.2876 
27 203 8 7 0.1876 1.3271 
28 188 28 4 0.1597 1.476 
29 156 1 13 0.1586 1.4824 
30 142 47 10 0.1061 1.8134 
31 85 0 2 0.1061 1.8134 
32 83 6 2 0.0985 1.8857 
33 75 0 3 0.0985 1.8857 
34 72 4 4 0.093 1.9412 
35 64 1 1 0.0915 1.9569 
36 62 48 0 0.0207 2.7311 
37 14 0 1 0.0207 2.7311 
40 13 0 4 0.0207 2.7311 
42 9 2 1 0.0161 2.9533 
44 6 0 3 0.0161 2.9533 
48 3 1 0 0.0107 3.2866 
64 2 0 1 0.0107 3.2866 
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Since the fundamental aim of the study is to assess the effects of schooling on the 
duration of breastfeeding, survival functions are also analysed by schooling in 
categorical forms (Tables 3.20 & 3.21). It can be observed that in both years, 
secondary and above school leavers have lower survival rates; they are more 
likely to complete breastfeeding earlier than their less educated counterparts. In 
GLSS 1, the median duration of breastfeeding observed amongst women with 
secondary and above education is 15 months, compared to 18 months amongst 
primary and middle school leavers, and 24 months amongst women with no 
education. The corresponding durations in GLSS 4 are 16 months amongst 
secondary and above educated women, 20 months amongst middle school leavers, 
and 24 months amongst women with primary and those with no education. This 
somewhat supports the negative relationship between education and 
breastfeeding found in existing empirical literature (see inter alia Akin et al., 1981; 
Weis, 1993; Pérez-Escamilla, 2003). With relatively more active participation in 
the labour market, educated women are more likely to have jobs outside their 
homes that discourage lengthy breastfeeding. These women are also particularly 
found in formal institutions with little to no chance for periodic breaks for 
breastfeeding. The more educated women are also likely to give breast-milk 
substitutes to their infants because they can afford childcare assistance, baby 
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Table 3.20: Duration of Breastfeeding: Time at Risk; Incidence Rate, and Survival Time 
(GLSS 1 - 1987/88) 
 Time at Incidence No. of Survival Time 
 Risk Rate Subjects 25% 50% 75% 
Education       
None 9803 0.028 613 18 24 30 
Primary 2611 0.037 173 18 18 24 
Mid/JSS 6544 0.042 474 14 18 24 
Sec. & above 533 0.053 44 12 15 18 
Total 19491 0.035 1304 15 18 24 
Residence       
Urban 6239 0.044 448 13 18 20 
Rural 13252 0.030 856 18 24 24 
Total 19491 0.035 1304 15 18 24 
Educ.; Residence       
None; Urban 2373 0.033 158 16 18 24 
None; Rural 7430 0.027 455 18 24 30 
Primary; Urban 712 0.048 51 14 18 20 
Primary; Rural 1899 0.033 122 18 24 24 
Mid/JSS; Urban 2830 0.051 209 12 16 18 
Mid/JSS; Rural 3714 0.035 265 16 18 24 
Sec. & above; Urban 324 0.059 30 12 14 17 
Sec. & above; Rural 209 0.043 14 14 36 36 
Total 19491 0.035 1304 15 18 24 
Year of Birth      
1982 1152 0.047 57 16 18 24 
1983 1456 0.048 73 12 18 24 
1984 2717 0.046 138 14 18 24 
1985 5156 0.043 271 15 18 24 
1986 5023 0.028 302 18 20 24 
1987 2911 0.008 338 18 20 24 
1988 219 0.009 69 15 15 15 
Missing 857 0.048 56 12 18 24 
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Table 3.21: Duration of Breastfeeding: Time at Risk; Incidence Rate, and Survival Time 
(GLSS 4 - 1998/99) 
 Time at Incidence No. of Survival Time 
 Risk Rate Subjects 25% 50% 75% 
Education       
None 21434 0.028 1246 18 24 28 
Primary 6219 0.035 388 18 24 24 
Mid/JSS 10239 0.037 657 18 20 24 
Sec. & above 1447 0.052 105 12 16 19 
Total       
Residence       
Urban 10436 0.041 686 15 18 24 
Rural 28903 0.029 1710 18 24 26 
Total 39339 0.033 2396 18 24 24 
Educ.; Residence       
None; Urban 3742 0.037 234 18 24 24 
None; Rural 17692 0.027 1012 22 24 30 
Primary; Urban 1816 0.044 123 14 18 24 
Primary; Rural 4403 0.032 265 18 24 24 
Mid/JSS; Urban 3906 0.041 257 16 18 24 
Mid/JSS; Rural 6333 0.034 400 18 24 24 
Sec. & above; Urban 972 0.055 72 12 15 19 
Sec. & above; Rural 475 0.046 33 12 16 19 
Total 39339 0.033 2396 18 24 24 
Year of Birth       
1992_93 2162 0.047 103 18 22 24 
1994 2926 0.048 140 18 23 24 
1995 4237 0.046 200 18 24 24 
1996 6556 0.032 315 18 24 26 
1997 5701 0.008 438 19 24 26 
1998_99 1871 0.006 319 18 24 30 
Missing 15886 0.036 881 18 24 24 
Total 39339 0.033 2396 18 24 24 
 
Comparison between residences also indicates that women in rural areas 
breastfeed longer than those in urban areas. In both GLSS 1 and 4, the median 
duration of breastfeeding is 24 months in rural areas, compared to 18 months in 
urban areas.  Further checks also reveal that women in urban areas with no 
education generally breastfeed for shorter periods than their counterparts in the 
rural areas in both survey years. This pattern in breastfeeding is observed across 
all the levels of education and residence of the women. Also, women with 
secondary and above education, especially in urban areas have the lowest 
duration of breastfeeding in both surveys. A similar estimation analysis is 
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conducted for the years of birth of the children to assess whether they determine 
the distribution of their duration of breastfeeding. The pattern appears consistent 
over birth years: only few differences are observed within survival rates, 
especially in GLSS 4.  
A follow-up to these descriptives is the conduction of a Log-rank test to check the 
null hypothesis of no subgroup differences in the survivor functions (Table 3.22). 
For the education categories, both survey years rejected the null hypothesis at the 
1 percent significant level with Chi-squares 103.03 and 191.64 for GLSS 1 and 
GLSS 4 respectively. Similar outcomes are observed with regard to residence and ǯǤ Chi-squared test for the latter, for example, suggests that 
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Table 3.22: Log-rank test for equality of survivor functions, 1987/88 & 1998/99 
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  
 Events Events Events Events 
 Observed Expected Observed Expected 
Education     
None 275 374.71 608 775.72 
Primary 96 90.71 220 189.23 
Mid/JSS 274 195.54 377 285.32 
Sec. & above 28 12.04 75 29.73 
Total 673 673 1280 1280 
chi2(3)  103.03  191.64 
Pr>chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Residence     
Urban 274 185.44 433 287.7 
Rural 399 487.56 847 992.3 
Total 673 673 1280 1280 
chi2(1)  75.64  130.42 
Pr>chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Educ.; Residence     
None; Urban 78 81.36 139 120.37 
None; Rural 197 293.35 469 655.34 
Primary; Urban 34 21.21 79 48.16 
Primary; Rural 62 69.5 141 141.08 
Mid/JSS; Urban 143 77.61 162 97.55 
Mid/JSS; Rural 131 117.93 215 187.77 
Sec. & above; Urban 19 5.26 53 21.61 
Sec. & above; Rural 9 6.78 22 8.12 
Total 673 673 1280 1280 
chi2(7)  169.37  263.98 
Pr>chi2  0.0000  0.0000 
Year of Birth     
1982/1992_93 54 49.02 102 88.52 
1983 70 61.81   
1984/1994 125 119.64 139 118.2 
1985/1995 220 218.7 194 171.33 
1986/1996 139 160.61 212 226.71 
1987/1997 22 33.55 48 73.32 
1988/1998_99 2 0.82 12 18.58 
Missing 41 28.87 573 583.35 
Total 673 673 1280 1280 
chi2(7)  19.53  28.28 
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To obtain parametric estimates, covariates are introduced into the hazard 
function of equation 16 to give a continuous time hazard functional form such as:  
)(
0
')(),( ฀฀฀ xetXt ฀ ------------------------------------------ (21) 
ɉ0 (t) is the baseline hazard rate that does depend on t but not on the covariates 
(X). It is also known as the proportional hazard because the hazard for any X is 
proportional to the baseline hazard ɉ0 (t) (Cameron and Hall, 2003). The hazard 
rate could be constant as expressed by the exponential distribution, or varying as 
could be seen the Weibull distribution or log-logistic. )(
'฀xe  is the exponential 
function and Ⱦ is a vector of the parameters to be estimated. The associated 
survivor function is: 





฀฀฀ ฀ ฀฀฀฀  ----------------- (22) 
Where ฀฀ tt dH 0 0 )( ฀฀฀ is the integrated baseline hazard at t.  
However a discrete time proportional hazard specification is applied in this study 
because responses are bunched up at months 12, 18, and 24. This specification 
allows for a flexible baseline hazard, hence no prior need to assume a functional 
form of the effect of duration. Also a flexible baseline hazard rate specification 
allows for non-monotonic variation with the duration, which then captures a lot 
more possible effects on the hazard rate. The model outlined below generally ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǤ
assumption underlying the model specification is that durations are intrinsically 
discrete. They are only observed in disjointed time intervals like [0 = m0, m1), (m1, 
m2), (m2, m3ȌǡǥǤǤǡȋk-1, mk=฀); thus covariates may vary between time intervals 
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but are assumed to be constant within each of them. For example the probability 
that a woman i will cease breastfeeding at the jth interval is given as:  
฀ ฀ );();(),(Pr 11 itjitjjj XmsXmsmmT ฀฀ ฀฀  ----------------------------------- (23) 
And the survivor function at the start of the jth interval is:  
฀ ฀ );(Pr 11 itjj XmsmT ฀฀ ฀ --------------------------------------------- (24) 
Therefore the hazard of exit in the jth interval is given by: 
฀ ฀ )];(/);([1|),(Pr)( 111 itjitjjjjitj XmsXmsmTmmTXh ฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀  --------- (25) 
which for the discrete-time case can be rewritten as: 
฀ ฀)exp(exp);( ' jititj XXms ฀฀ ฀฀฀  ------------------------------(26) 
Where ฀j is log (HitȌ é ?ǡ ?ǡǥǡǤ 
Upon the assumption that all intervals are to be of unit length, which for this study 
is a month, and for each woman i the recorded duration of breastfeeding 
corresponds to the interval (ti-1, ti). Women are also identified with an indicator vi 
=1 as having completed breastfeeding and vi = 0 as still breastfeeding and thus 
right-censored. The number of intervals or months is defined to comprise the last 
within which the woman is observed. This also includes the censored spells. Thus 








)];(log[)1()];();1(log[),(log ฀฀  ----------- (27) 
This can be rewritten in terms of the hazard function as:  
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)](1[log)1()](1[)(loglog 1  ------ (28) 
where the discrete-time hazard in the jth month is: 
)]exp(exp[1)( ' jijijj XXh ฀฀฀฀฀฀  ----------------------(29) 
where ฀฀฀ jjmmj d1 )(log 0 ฀฀฀฀ ; and can be interpreted as the logarithm of the 
integral of the baseline hazard over the relevant interval, especially for a fully non-
parametric baseline hazard with a separate parameter for each duration interval. 
On the other hand the j฀ may be explained by some semi-parametric or 
parametric function )( j฀ . With a binary indicator variable 1฀itD if a woman i 
stops breastfeeding in month j, and 0฀itD  otherwise, equation 27 can thus be 












)](1log[)1()(loglog  --------------------- (30) 
However, it is well noted by Lancaster (1990) that duration analysis usually 
produces incorrect results if unobserved heterogeneity is ignored.  
Jenkins (1997) also suggests that including unobserved heterogeneity is 
important because it tends to have the effect of over-estimating the negative 
duration dependence and under-estimating positive duration in the baseline 
hazard when not controlled. This implies that the sampled population with higher 
values of unobserved characteristics captured in the error term are inclined to fail 
faster in negative duration, ceteris paribus. Thus at any given survival time, the 
population understudy are made up of observations with lower hazard rates and 
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the proportional effects of a given regressor is no longer constant and 
independent of survival time (ibid). 
Therefore an additional random parameter is included in the model to account for 
the random unobserved or un-measurable variables (also known as frailties). The 
random parameter is then assumed to follow some parametric distribution like 
the Gamma or inverse Gaussian. Indeed the choice of heterogeneity distribution 
seems not to matter as long as the baseline is non-parametrically estimated 
(Meyer, 1990). This study incorporates the Gamma distributed random variable in 
its models because the Gamma distribution gives a closed form expression for the 
likelihood in order to avoid numerical integration (ibid). By introducing a Gamma 
distributed random variable to capture unobserved heterogeneity between 
individuals, the instantaneous hazard rate (that is similar to equation 20) 
becomes: 
)]log()[()()(),( '0)(0
' ฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀ ฀฀฀ XetetXt x  ------------------------------(31) 
where µ is a Gamma distributed random variable with unit mean and variance z. 
The discrete-time hazard function then becomes:  
฀ ฀)]log(exp[exp1)( ' ijijijj XXh ฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀฀  ------------------------------ (32) 
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where )( j฀ is a function explaining duration dependence in the hazard rate, 
including the non-parametric baseline hazard specification. This study presents 
estimated models of both equations 29 and 32 for comparison in the discussion of 
results using pgmhaz in STATA (Jenkins, 1997). The first of the two equations is 
the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model (without heterogeneity) and the second 
is the Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) model with Gamma distributed unobserved 
heterogeneity by Meyer (1990). 
 
3.2.2.2.2   Explanatory Variables: Definitions and Descriptives 
Table 3.23 presents the summary statistics of variables used in estimating the full 
samples of both surveys. Those for rural and urban as well as age 15-34 and 35-49 
sub-samples are presented in Appendix B-13a & B-13b for GLSS 1 and 4 
respectively. The summary tables also show on the average the proportion of 
women who breastfed, months of breastfeeding duration and completed months Ǥǡǲ ?ǳǲǳǲ ?ǳǤ
of breastfeeding patterns in the country. It appears nearly every woman who gives 
birth breastfeed and does so for at least one year on the average. Two different 
types of breastfeeding duration are given in the table; the first includes those of 
babies who are still breastfeeding (their age at the time of survey is used), and the 
second consists of only completed duration. In both cases, the duration of 
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breastfeeding seems to have increased between GLSS 1 and 4, which is also 
observed in the overall non-parametric assessments. Indeed a Wald test shows 
the difference in means of the two survey years as statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. That is, average breastfeeding has increased by about 3 months over 
the decade. This could be due to various breastfeeding campaigns in the media by 
the Ministry of Health, depicting nutritional and health advantages of the practice. 
They also advise clinics to encourage women to breastfeed exclusively and for 
longer duration.  
The definitions of explanatory variables such as education, age, current residence, 
religion, ethnicity, household wealth, distance to health facilities/personnel, price 
of commodities and agricultural wage rates are as defined in the contraception 
modelling. Half of the sampled women have no education and about three-
quarters live in rural areas. Majority of the women are also middle aged, which 
usually is the prime time for high fecundity. Christianity seems to be the most 
practiced religion amongst these women, half of whom are non-Akans. 
The gender of the child ǲ ?ǳ
and zero otherwise. There is roughly equal representation of both genders and 
many of these infants are born after 1984 in GLSS 1 and 1994 in GLSS 4. However 
the percentage of missing birth years in the latter survey year is high; around a 
third was found missing. So they are included in the estimation model as a dummy ǲ ?ǳǤYear of birth of the child is also 
in categorical terms, where in GLSS 1 birth85-86 means the child was born in the 
year 1985 or 1986 and birth87-88 means child was born in 1987 or 1988. In GLSS 
4, the dummies for birth years are birth95-96 and birth97-99 denoting infants 
born in 1995 or 1996 and those born between 1997 and 1999 respectively. The 
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base category for GLSS 1 is child born between 1982 and 1984 and that for GLSS 4 
is child born between 1992 and 1994.  
Distance to the nearest water source and community market is measured in 
metres and kilometres respectively. Although distance to the nearest water source 
appears shorter than that to the market on average, the former shows larger 
dispersions around the mean; at least in GLSS 1. The reverse is true in GLSS 4. 
Finally, an additional variable in the form of the log of breastfeeding duration, 
which uniquely identifies each time period at risk for each person, is incorporated 
in the estimations to check whether the hazard increases monotonically or not. 
The estimated outcomes83 of the proportional hazard models showed evidence of 
a monotonic increase in the baseline hazard. That is, the baseline of the hazard 
slopes upwards in both survey years of the study. However in order to estimate 
the models with a non-parametric baseline as outlined in the econometric model 
specification above, binary dummy variables are created for each duration 
interval. These are included in all the estimations to allow for flexibility in the 






                                                        
83
 Not reported here for brevity. 
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Table 3.23: Summary Statistics ± the Duration of Breastfeeding 
 
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Breastfeed 0.989 0.106 0.991 0.092 
Months Breastfeed1 13.823 8.640 16.031 8.805 
Completed Months Breastfeeding2 16.375 7.299 19.849 7.390 
Censored 0.491 0.500 0.469 0.499 
None 0.482 0.500 0.521 0.500 
Primary 0.131 0.338 0.162 0.368 
Middle/JSS 0.355 0.479 0.274 0.446 
Sec. & above 0.032 0.176 0.043 0.203 
Age15_24 0.279 0.449 0.190 0.393 
Age25_34 0.475 0.500 0.500 0.500 
Age35-49 0.245 0.430 0.309 0.462 
Rural 0.665 0.472 0.713 0.452 
Female child 0.458 0.498 0.507 0.500 
Northern Region 0.160 0.366 0.171 0.377 
Child's birth82-84/92-94 0.205 0.404 0.100 0.300 
Child's birth85-86/95-96 0.419 0.494 0.211 0.408 
Child's birth87-88/97-99 0.335 0.472 0.319 0.466 
Missing birth year 0.040 0.197 0.370 0.483 
Christian 0.611 0.488 0.742 0.438 
Muslim 0.143 0.350 0.126 0.332 
Traditional 0.182 0.386 0.078 0.268 
Other 0.064 0.245 0.054 0.226 
Non-Akan 0.533 0.499 0.504 0.500 
HAS- Basic -0.125 0.854 -0.189 0.900 
HAS- High -0.054 0.612 -0.011 0.979 
Water distance (m) 1364.48 16544.43 764.17 16943.36 
Market distance (km) 5.418 10.580 10.492 37.052 
Access to Health facilities/personnel 0.008 0.798 -0.030 0.446 
Price score of foodstuffs -0.004 0.821 -0.008 0.867 
Price score of cereals 0.022 0.819 0.010 0.989 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage 2.944 2.697 5.759 3.895 
Ratio of female to men's wage 0.306 0.438 0.429 0.440 
Ratio of child to men's wage 0.323 0.413 0.318 0.404 
 1410  2454  
Note: 1. Includes current age of babies who are still breastfeeding; 2. Only babies who have completed breastfeeding
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3.2.2.3   Estimation Results 
Similar to the presentation of results on the contraceptive modelling, only 
estimated coefficients showing their level of statistical significance are given in 
this text for brevity. Also these results are those that accounted for unobserved 
heterogeneity and the gamma variance likelihood ratio test is found significant at 
the 5 and 1 percent level in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively (the full samples). They are 
therefore the preferred84 of the two models estimated using the pgmhaz command 
in STATA. Where significant, models that control for unobserved heterogeneity 
tend to have slightly bigger magnitudes of the coefficients compared to those that 
do not account for it. This is suggestive of plausible under-estimation of 
covariates. The entire results on both models, with their t-ratios, are presented in 
Appendix B-14 to B-23, but an abridged version is presented in text. Again results 
in GLSS 1 are discussed first for each specification, and then followed by GLSS 4.  
The Impact of Education 
All else equal, increased education levels generally tend to raise the hazard of 
ceasing breastfeeding (table 3.24). This concurs with the theoretical expectations 
since the value of time, which breastfeeding strongly depends on, increases with 
education levels. The statistical significance of education is however observed 
beyond primary education of the women in GLSS 1 (all specifications of the full 
sample). For example, in Variant 1 that includes education and control variables ǡǡǯǡhe impact of middle/JSS 
level of education tends to increase the hazard of terminating breastfeeding by 
about 54 percent, ceteris paribus. The corresponding figure for women with 
                                                        
84
 Except for the rural/urban as well as women aged 35-49 sub-samples in GLSS 1, and the urban sub-
sample in GLSS 4 whose results suggest that unobserved heterogeneity is not significant.  
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secondary and above education is about 108 percent. However, the introduction 
of additional control variables such as religion, ethnicity and household wealth 
(Variant 2) as well as some general community variables (Variant 3) seems to 
reduce the magnitude of the hazard. This is by about 10 percent in the case of 
middle/JSS and 40 percent in that of secondary and above education levels. 
Separating the sampled women into rural/ urban sub-samples show estimates 
that suggest the impact of education differs by residence. First, the rural sub-
sample indicates that only middle/JSS level of education is influential in the 
duration of breastfeeding. The statistical irrelevance of secondary and above level 
of education in this area may be due to the small percentage (1%) of sampled 
women with that level of education in the area. In contrast, the estimated hazard 
in the urban sub-sample mirrors that of the full sample in Variant 1, but only 
secondary and above level remains statistically significant in Variant 2. The age 
sub-samples follow the general trend in the survey year, especially in the context 
of the younger sub-sample. Also in this sub-sample, primary education (as well as 
the higher levels) is found significant in influencing the duration of breastfeeding, 
but only in Variant 1. The old age (35-49) sub-sample however shows only 
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Table 3.24: Hazard Model Estimates of Education on the Duration of Breastfeeding 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary 0.264 0.206 0.281 0.361* 0.025 
Middle/JSS 0.54*** 0.481*** 0.407** 0.617*** 0.357 
Sec. & above 1.079*** 0.488 1.283*** 1.574*** 0.166 
Variant 2: Full model  
Primary 0.221 0.193 0.241 0.309 0.066 
Middle/JSS 0.418*** 0.44*** 0.273 0.466** 0.526* 
Sec. & above 0.721** 0.348 0.932** 1.187*** 0.197 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary 0.197 0.182  0.23 0.163 
Middle/JSS 0.405*** 0.443***  0.424** 0.574** 
Sec. & above 0.699** 0.293  1.089** -0.015 
Observation 1410 937 473 1064 346 
      
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary 0.323** 0.272* 0.205 0.425** 0.117 
Middle/JSS 0.431*** 0.465*** 0.301* 0.57*** 0.173 
Sec. & above 1.268*** 1.675*** 0.718*** 1.394*** 0.876** 
Variant 2: Full model  
Primary 0.174 0.155 0.106 0.246 0.053 
Middle/JSS 0.213* 0.29* 0.128 0.317* 0.029 
Sec. & above 0.853*** 1.193*** 0.415* 0.846*** 0.837** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary 0.162 0.141  0.262 0.014 
Middle/JSS 0.209* 0.277*  0.355** -0.033 
Sec. & above 0.84*** 1.148***  0.847*** 0.821* 
Observation 2454 1750 704 1695 759 
Note: These coefficients are the estimated hazard rates using non-parametric proportional hazard model. Variant 1 consists ǯǡǡǡ
gender of child. Variant 2 comprises all the variables in Model as well as religion, ethnicity and household wealth. The final 
Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other determinants. See Appendix B-14 to B-23 for the full 
results. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
The estimated outcome in GLSS 4 is quite similar to GLSS 1 but with more and 
higher statistical significance of primary level education. In Variant 1 of the full 
sample for instance, a woman with primary level education may face an increased 
hazard of terminating breastfeeding by about 32 percent, ceteris paribus. The 
analogous figures for women with same education level but currently reside in 
rural areas, or younger women (aged 15-34) are 27 and 43 percent respectively. 
And as already observed in the former survey year, the magnitude of impact 
increases with higher education levels. Controlling more covariates however 
tends to result in the loss of statistical signific
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survey year too the magnitude of educational influence appears to increase with 
each level with the highest being at secondary and above. Thus, secondary and 
above education have the greatest tendency of shortening breastfeeding in Ghana. 
The effect on the hazard is usually more than twice that of middle/JSS education 
in most of the models estimated in both GLSS 1 and GLSS 4. Invariably, the inverse 
relationship between breastfeeding and education found in this study has also 
been broadly observed in others such as Weinberger (1987), Weis (1993); 
Appleton (1996) and Pérez-Escamilla et al., (2007). 
 
Estimates of Non-Parametric Baseline 
Tables 3.25 and 3.26 present the estimated hazard of duration in Variant 1 for 
GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. This differs very slightly, entirely negligible points, 
from Variants 2 and 3. Including an unrestricted duration helps to identify the 
shape, and also test whether the hazard varies with the duration. It also avoids 
conflicting estimation of coefficients of the variables due to mis-specified baseline 
hazard (Meyer, 1990). It can be observed from estimates in GLSS 1 that the hazard 
of stopping breastfeeding non-monotonically reduces from the second to the 
eleventh month, compared to the base category of 0-1month. The twelfth month 
however show an increased hazard of termination of about 120 percent in the full 
sample. The next increased hazards of noticeable magnitudes are at the 18, 24, 
and 30 and above. This unsurprisingly matches the bunched-up points observed 
in the Kaplan-Meier analysis. These points also appear to be the recommended 
duration by campaigners in the health sector, especially with regard to the first 
two points. The extended breastfeeding beyond these points might rather be 
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related to various ethnic or traditional values practiced upon childbirth and 
feeding. 
The patterns observed in the residence and age demarcations are fairly consistent 
with that of the full sample. Breastfeeding seems to be totally ceased after month 
24 mostly in the urban and older aged (35-49) sub-samples. It should however be 
noted that the hazard rates at the peak points are higher amongst the younger 
than the older women. Urban women as would be anticipated also show higher 
hazards, especially at 12 and 18months, compared to their rural counterparts. The 
reason behind this might be the opportunity cost of time, and/or exposure to ǲǳǤ
from past breastfeeding practices might be the reason for completed duration by 
this month among the older aged group.  
GLSS 4 also shows similar breastfeeding patterns as that of GLSS 1 but with peaks 
at 12, 18, 24, and above 30months. Also like GLSS 1, hazard rates at the 
termination peak points are higher in urban than rural areas, as well as amongst 
younger relative to older women. For instance the hazard of termination during 
the 12 month is about 66 percent higher amongst urban relative to rural women, 
ceteris paribus. Correspondingly, younger women experience 27 percent higher 
risk of ending breastfeeding compared to older women. Unlike GLSS 1 though final 
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Table 3.25: Baseline Hazard Estimates from Variant 1, GLSS 1. 
Month Hazard 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
2 -1.823*** -2.075*** -1.334* -1.538*** -3.639*** 
3_4 -3.044*** -3.434*** -2.394** -2.595*** " 
5 -3.023*** -3.414*** -2.372* -2.568*** " 
6 -2.306*** -2.706*** -1.647* -2.136*** " 
7 -1.462*** -1.991*** -0.691 -1.402** -1.585* 
8 -0.675* -0.948** -0.18 -0.746* -0.581 
9 -0.857** -2.616*** 0.361 -0.517 -1.929* 
10 -0.793** -1.189** -0.179 -0.436 -1.907* 
11 -2.373*** -3.249** -1.391 -2.269** -2.585* 
12 1.201*** 0.734** 1.859*** 1.447*** 0.671* 
13 -1.01** -2.382** 0.157 -0.85 -1.305* 
14 0.59** -0.204 1.5*** 0.617* 0.507 
15 0.374 -0.397 1.274*** 0.806** -0.851 
16 0.013 -0.688 0.851 0.52 -1.511* 
17 -1.022* -1.728** -0.192 -0.379 1.121*** 
18 2.695*** 1.999*** 3.414*** 3.08*** " 
19 0.438 -0.377 1.205* 0.816 -0.285 
20 1.29*** 0.313 2.239*** 1.709*** 0.483 
21 -1.141 -1.496* -0.11 -0.319 -2.224* 
22 -0.008 -0.774 " 0.641 " 
23 -1.056 -1.422 2.874*** -0.219 1.777*** 
24 3.779*** 3.048*** " 4.343*** " 
24plus   0.042  0.225 
25 0.494 -0.087  1.557  
26 1.265* 0.703  0.921  
27 0.633 -0.623  0.96  
28 1.77 0.622  1.749*  
28plus  0.742    
29 0.209   1.169  
30 2.771***   3.434***  
30plus 2.18*   1.833**  
Constant -2.742*** -2.977*** -3.61*** -2.999*** 4.673 
ln_varg (cons) -1.371** -3.435 -12.552 -0.954* -16.275 
lltest 5.421 0.028 -1.30E-05 7.546 -0.007 
lltest_p 0.01 0.434 0.5 0.003 0.5 
Note: These coefficients are the estimated hazard rates using non-parametric proportional hazard model. *, **, & *** 
represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ȋǲȌfficient just 
before it covers that as well. For example the hazard coefficient of month 21 under the urban sub-sample is actually for 
both months 21 and 22. This is because none of the women in that subsample terminated in month 21 but some did in 22, 
requiring that the dummy variable be created for the two months to ensure the identifiability condition of the estimation 
model (Jenkins, 1997). Similarly, the hazard for month 23 is for both 23 and 24; and so on. Also, a plus by a month number 
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Table 3.26: Baseline Hazard Estimates from Variant 1, GLSS 4. 
Month Hazard 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
2 -1.482*** -2.405** -0.552 -1.462** -1.511* 
3 -0.762* -0.998* -0.337 -1.027* -0.508 
4 -1.074** -1.267** -0.712 -1.184* -0.956 
5 -1.969*** -2.347** -1.382 -1.676** -2.543* 
6 -1.388*** -2.329** -0.439 -1.136* -1.843* 
7 -3.314** -3.005** -0.293 -2.721** -2.113*** 
8 -0.794* -2.982** " -0.477 " 
9 -0.598 -1.569** 0.388 -0.325 -1.097 
10 -1.004** -1.543** -0.259 -0.503 -2.464* 
11 -1.387** -2.219** -0.452 -1.165* -1.761* 
12 1.602*** 1.278*** 2.119*** 1.785*** 1.293*** 
13 -0.348 -0.702 0.197 -0.276 -0.488 
14 0.729** 0.25 1.421*** 0.998** 0.249 
15 0.892*** 0.259 1.733*** 0.97** 0.741* 
16 0.53* 0.014 1.263** 0.708* 0.226 
17 -0.221 -0.797 0.579 0.245 -1.338 
18 3.112*** 2.628*** 3.797*** 3.394*** 2.611*** 
19 0.702* 0.099 1.557** 1.229** -0.488 
20 1.764*** 1.332*** 2.289*** 2.059*** 1.249** 
21 -0.152 -1.359 1.231 -1.205 0.166 
22 1.054*** 0.388 1.99*** 1.489*** 0.212 
23 0.242 -0.178 0.676 0.299 0.026 
24 4.948*** 4.374*** 5.482*** 5.206*** 4.437*** 
25 1.899*** 1.461** 2.67** 2.187*** 1.307 
26 3.448*** 2.887*** " 4.089*** 1.899** 
27 2.239*** 1.526** 2.813** 2.641*** 1.473* 
28 3.667*** 3.077*** 3.654*** 3.914*** 3.111*** 
29 0.472 0.029 4.658*** 1.313 3.09*** 
30 4.742*** 3.798*** " 5.147*** " 
31 plus 3.758*** 2.959*** 3.792*** 4.09*** 3.022*** 
Constant -4.049*** -4.318*** -4.469*** -4.346*** -3.322*** 
ln_varg (cons) -0.882*** -1.571** -0.796 -0.827* -1.239** 
lltest 29.745 4.754 3.033 13.106 4.868 
lltest_p 0.0000 0.015 0.041 0.0000 0.014 
Note: These coefficients are the estimated hazard rates using non-parametric proportional hazard model. *, **, & *** 
represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. ȋǲȌ
before it covers that as well. For example the hazard coefficient of month 21 under the urban sub-sample is actually for 
both months 21 and 22. This is because none of the women in that subsample terminated in month 21 but some did in 22, 
requiring that the dummy variable be created for the two months to ensure the identifiability condition of the estimation 
model (Jenkins, 1997). Similarly, the hazard for month 23 is for both 23 and 24; and so on. Also, a plus by a month number 
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The Impact of Control Variables 
The discussion here is primarily based on the second specification (Variant 2) of 
the econometric estimations. This is used because it contains relatively more of 
the control variables and has fairly consistent outcomes with the other 
specifications. However, it would be mentioned where differences in outcomes 
appear to be non-negligible.  
As anticipated and also observed in the non-parametric analysis, the risk of 
terminating breastfeeding is lower amongst women who reside in rural areas 
compared to their urban counterparts, ceteris paribus (table 3.27). This is true in 
both GLSS 1 and 4, especially in the full and younger sub-samples. In the full 
samples for instance, women residing in rural areas face about 40 and 28 percent 
reduced hazard of shortening breastfeeding relative to those in urban areas in 
GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. The direction of impact is also observed amongst the 
older sub-group but not found statistically significant, at least in Model 2 and 3. 
However in Variant 1 where there are fewer control variables the negative impact 
of rural residence in this sub-sample is statistically significant at the 10 percent 
level in GLSS 1 and 1 percent in GLSS 4. This outcome is probably due to the ǲǳǡ
touch with cultural values and face lesser opportunity cost of time compared to 
urban women. The result in this study is also in accordance with others including 
Weiss (1993), Giashuddin and Kabir (2004), Pérez-Escamilla et al., (2007) and 
Belfield and Kelly (2010). 
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Table 3.27: Hazard Estimates of Control Variables from Variant 2, GLSS 1 & 4. 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1      
Age25-34 -0.177   -0.215 -0.194 
Age35-49 -0.056 0.14 -0.033  0.003 
Rural -0.401***   -0.52*** -0.261 
Female child -0.174 -0.263* 0.052 -0.167 -0.132 
Northern Region -0.581*** -0.622*** -0.503 -0.899*** -0.14 
Child's birth85-86 -0.363*** -0.246* -0.332* -0.371** -0.364* 
Child's birth87-88 -0.801*** -0.892** -0.521 -0.692** -1.406** 
Missing birth year 0.264 0.081 1.094** 0.493 0.001 
Muslim -0.203 -0.13 -0.27 -0.388* 0.086 
Traditional -0.113 -0.07 -0.077 -0.376* 0.271 
Other 0.302 0.108 -0.077 0.215 0.653 
Non-Akan -0.166 -0.036 0.274 -0.023 -0.433* 
HAS- Basic 0.244*** 0.187 0.231*** 0.226** 0.288* 
HAS- High 0.053 -0.974 0.053 0.038 -0.236 
      
GLSS 4      
Age25-34 0.151 0.199    
Age35-49 0.162 0.241 -0.095 0.135  
Age40-49     -0.142 
Rural -0.281**   -0.272* -0.285 
Female child -0.066 -0.146 0.142 -0.112 0.063 
Northern Region -0.648*** -0.57*** -0.516* -0.6*** -0.646** 
Child's birth95-96 -0.233* -0.227 -0.095 -0.186 -0.335 
Child's birth97-99 -0.81*** -0.919*** -0.503* -0.659** -1.171*** 
Missing birth year -0.04 0 -0.14 0.033 -0.164 
Muslim -0.035 0.004 -0.138 -0.173 0.167 
Traditional -0.305 -0.214 -0.464 -0.19 -0.389 
Other -0.042 0.068 -0.236 -0.261 0.422 
Non-Akan -0.292*** -0.354*** -0.096 -0.197 -0.44** 
HAS- Basic 0.343*** 0.328*** 0.23*** 0.418*** 0.209* 
HAS- High -0.147*** -0.163** -0.078 -0.181*** -0.097 
Note: These coefficients are the estimated hazard rates using non-parametric proportional hazard model. Variant 1 consists 
of education and control variables such as ǯǡǡǡ
gender of child. Variant 2 comprises all the variables in Model as well as religion, ethnicity and household wealth. The final 
Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other determinants. *, **, & *** represent statistical 
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Similar to women in rural residence, those located in the northern regions also 
show reduced risk of shortening breastfeeding. Compared to the southern regions, 
the north is less developed and hence less exposed, lack many health and 
socioeconomic infrastructure that may promote anything other than known 
cultural practices of lengthy breastfeeding. Also relating to religion, Muslims and 
Traditionalists tend to experience lower cessation risks of breastfeeding 
compared to Christians amongst younger women in GLSS 1. None of the samples 
in GLSS 4 however showed any statistical influence of religion on breastfeeding. 
Meanwhile, the non-Akan ethnic group seems to breastfeed for longer duration 
than the Akans, especially in GLSS 4 where it is mostly statistically significant.  
ǯ
year and breastfeeding duration. It appears that, all else held equal, children born 
in later years do not stand the risk of earlier termination of breastfeeding. For 
example in GLSS 1, children born in 1985 and 1986 as well as those born in 1987 
and 1988 tend to be breastfed for longer than those born in 1982 to 1984, the 
default category. Similarly in GLSS 4, children born in 1995 and 1996 (full sample) 
receive longer breastfeeding, and more so with regard to those born in 1997 to  ? ? ? ?ǡ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?Ǥǯǡǯ
depicts the mixed results found in existing empirical literature on developing 
countries. Results in Variant 2 do not show any influence on the duration of 
breastfeeding in the country. However in GLSS 1, signs on the coefficients are 
negative and found significant at the 10 percent level in the younger aged (15-34) 
sub-sample of Variant 3; whilst a contrary outcome is observed in GLSS 4 
(Appendix B-22). It also appears that mothers are more likely to breastfeed female 
infants for longer periods than males, but only in GLSS 1 and mainly in rural 
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communities. This however does not suggest discrimination. One of the common 
reasons given for such outcomes is that infant males feed more and therefore are 
weaned earlier to meet their increased demand for food. 
ǲǳ
with the duration of breastfeeding. This suggests that women in households that 
own standard basic household goods and housing qualities tend to have increased 
hazard of shortening breastfeeding, ceteris paribus. And this is statistically 
significant in both survey periods as well as all sub-samples except the rural 
residence sub-sample in GLSS 1. All else held constant, estimates of the full 
samples of GLSS 1 and 4 indicate that the risk of discontinuing breastfeeding 
increases approximately by 24 and 34 percent respectively. The coefficient 
magnitudes of the sub-samples in GLSS 1 do not differ much from the full sample. 
Yet in GLSS 4, the risk amongst women residing in rural areas is about 10 percent 
higher than urban women. Similarly younger women (age15-34) face about 20 
percent increased risk than older women (age35-49). The positive association 
observed here concurs with the results of Akin et al. (1981), who also explain that 
such results is indicative of breastfeeding being seen by such households as 
inferior goods. 
ǲǳ
discontinuing breastfeeding, but found statistically significant in only GLSS 4: full 
sample, rural and younger women sub-samples. Breastfeeding duration amongst 
women in these households thus increases with wealth, implying that the practice ǲǳȋǤǡ ? ? ? ?ȌǤ 
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Community characteristics 
This section discusses additional socioeconomic determinants of breastfeeding 
included in the econometric estimations that makes up Variant 3. The abridged 
version is presented in table 3.28. All of these variables are community based 
except distance to the nearest water source, which was collected at the household 
level. Quite surprisingly, none of these variables show any statistical significance 
in GLSS 1. In contrast, the estimates in GLSS 4 lend support to the premise that 
market distance, other commodȋǲǳ
this case), and the proportion of women to male agricultural wage rates influence 
the duration of breastfeeding.  
Table 3.28: Hazard Estimates of Other Determinants: Variant 3, GLSS 1 & 4. 
     
GLSS 1 Full Rural Age15-34 Age35-49 
Water distance  -9.98E-06 -9.24E-06 -9.35E-06 2.30E-05 
Market distance -4.93E-05 0.001 -4.14E-04 -0.003 
Access to Health facilities/personnel -0.046 -0.046 -0.089 0.13 
Price scorǲǳ 0.105 0.076 0.068 0.078 ǲǳ -0.014 -0.027 0.017 -0.103 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage 0.026 0.035 0.002 0.047 
Ratio of female to men's wage -0.231 -0.25 -0.173 -0.402 
Ratio of child to men's wage -0.127 -0.01 -0.153 -0.016 
     
GLSS 4     
Water distance  2.24E-06 2.63E-06 2.35E-05 2.23E-06 
Market distance 0.004** 0.004** 0.005** 0.003 
Access to Health facilities/personnel -0.075 -0.083 -0.043 -0.136 ǲǳ 0.11*** 0.095** 0.1* 0.157* 
Price sǲǳ -0.032 -0.017 -0.026 -0.062 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage 0.025 0.038 0.029 0.014 
Ratio of women to men's wage -0.245* -0.259* -0.42** -0.02 
Ratio of child to men's wage 0.023 0.028 0.137 -0.177 
Note: These coefficients are the estimated hazard rates using non-parametric proportional hazard model. Variant 1 consists ǯǡǡǡ
gender of child. Variant 2 comprises all the variables in Variant 1 as well as religion, ethnicity and household wealth. The 
final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other determinants. *, **, & *** represent statistical 
significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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The results in this later survey period show that a kilometre increase in distance 
to the nearest market increases the hazard of stopping breastfeeding by 0.4 
percent on the average for all women, ceteris paribus. This result adds to the 
evidence that the ǯǤ
Since it is women who usually shop for households, the opportunity cost of her 
time increases with lengthen breastfeeding; hence may tend to shorten the 
practice to meet some of these other household commitments. Also most women 
in the country work in the informal sector, which constitutes mostly petty trading 
in local markets, thus when the distance to their place of work increases, they may 
choose to breastfeed for a shorter period. Although the explanation regarding 
trading may relate with findings on employment in some studies, especially those 
in developed countries (Yngve and Sjöström, 2001; Dennis, 2002), it contrasts 
with that of Lakati et al. (2007) in Nairobi. They found no significant association 
between the duration of breastfeeding and employment; and explained that the 
mothers in the study were able to find ways of successfully combining work with 
breastfeeding. This probably explains the statistically insignificant relationship 
observed in GLSS 1. 
The price score of ǲǳ also increases the hazard of terminating breastfeeding 
whilst the ǯreduces it. These 
two variables might seem to show perverse outcomes. Although with regard to the 
former, they may actually be a reflection of increased household incomes in 
farming (producer) households and thus the ability to afford breast milk 
substitutes. It may also increase the time cost of the women, as her assistance 
might be required in the fields of production or the markets for trading.  
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Equally, one would have expected that an increase in the proportion of women to ǯ
time, and therefore possible shorter duration of breastfeeding. But the converse 
result found here might be evidence of some level of autonomy in the household, 
achieved as a result of the possible economic gains from increased wage rates. 
Hence the woman may be in a position to decide when to have birth, the number 
of children to have and how to space them. Breastfeeding practices might help in 
the last two, especially in societies where contraceptive use is uncommon or 
accessible; longer breastfeeding periods may act as contraception. Appleton 
( ? ? ? ?ȌǯǯǤ 
 
3.2.3 Age at Cohabitation  
3.2.3.1   Background and Literature Review 
Cohabitation is specified as all consensual unions including marital and non-
marital. Age at cohabitation is described as one of the immediate determinants of 
fertility since the risk of conception increases with exposure to cohabitation. Thus 
with delayed age at cohabitation, fertility is likely to be reduced due to limited 
number of more fecund years available in the reproductive period; and also 
reduced desire for children because partners might have developed characters 
and commitments during the delayed period prior to cohabitation that may 
conflict with the demands of big family sizes (Bulatao and Lee, 1982). Similar to 
contraceptive use, age at cohabitation needs to substantially increase for a 
dramatic decline in fertility in developing countries. Bongaarts et al. (1984) argue 
that reductions in fertility will only occur in societies where increases in 
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contraceptive use and age at marriage are sufficiently large to outpace the effects 
of the shortening of breastfeeding. They indeed observed such impacts in urban 
and amongst well-educated women in relatively developed African countries.  
There have been other evidences of delayed timing of cohabitation on reduced 
fertility (Appleton, 1996; Baizán, 2003), which could subsequently reduce 
population growth and improve economic development. This is because in 
addition to fertility reduction, cohabitation is likely to influence school attendance, 
labour force determination of women and hence social status, inequality in 
income and ability as well as the distribution of income and other household 
resources (Becker, 1973; Bloom and Reddy, 1986). The study of cohabitation 
patterns thus becomes essential in lieu of such varied influence on society. This 
notwithstanding, the timing of cohabitation may not always be due to the desire to 
influence fertility, but rather, actually be the consequence of it. Highly fecund 
women are also more likely to enter into early cohabitation; also not ignoring the 
fact that in some societies marital status of women is determined by their 
fecundity, resulting in some sort of self-selection and reverse causality. There may 
also be some unobserved or unmeasured parameters that influence both fertility 
and timing of cohabitation simultaneously making the latter an endogenous 
variable in an analysis of a fertility model. Appleton (1996), Baizán (2003), and 
Billari and Philipov (2004) found such an outcome in their fertility analysis on ǯǡ Central and Eastern Europe respectively.  
Not only does the possible endogeneity of the timing of cohabitation require that 
its estimates in a fertility model without variables to control endogeneity would 
not be consistent, but also it being a proximate determinant necessitates for the 
search for factors that influence it. Among others, education seems to be one of the 
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notable determinants of age at cohabitation from the various empirical studies 
examined (inter alia Bloom and Reddy, 1986 in India; Weinberger, 1987; Martin, 
1995; Singh and Samara, 1996; Billari and Philipov, 2004 in Central and Eastern 
Europe; Ikamari, 2005 in Kenya; and Behrman et al., 2006 in Guatemala). 
Often, years spent in school by women or even men prevent early cohabitation. In 
most societies, the two are incompatible due to their demanding nature (Appleton, 
1996) as well as lack of economic resources to achieve efficiency in both 
institutions. Thus, enrolment in school in itself is enough to postpone marriage to 
a later age. Billari and Philipov (2004) for instance find a significant impact of 
enrolment, even more than the current level of education, on the timing of first 
union in Central and Eastern Europe. Education also exposes women to many 
career opportunities that stifle desires for early cohabitation. Becker (1991; cited 
in Billari and Philipov, 2004) indicates that women with increased educational 
attainment benefit less from cohabitation. This is because with increased human 
capital as well as financial independence the economic advantage of cohabitation 
becomes less influential and hence they are more likely to postpone cohabitation. 
Singh and Samara (1996) also explain that young adults are encouraged to delay 
marriage due to increased access of women to formal and highly paid 
employment. They said this made being single affordable. With improved 
opportunities for educated women in SSA, young adults are encouraged to pursue 
diverse interests to improve their socio-economic status, which hitherto had been 
acquired through marriage and childbirth. Also as years of education increases, 
women get exposed to other value systems to the neglect of the traditional system 
of early marriage and increased childbirths. Caldwell et al., (1992) points out that 
early marriage is likely to be avoided by young and educated people with the 
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increased demand for contraceptives to avoid pregnancies and hence forced 
marriages usually observed under the traditional system. 
As well as education, another factor also noted as influential in determining the 
timing of cohabitation is urbanisation, as pointed out by Bongaarts et al. (1984). 
Both factors are somewhat related whereby one sometimes works in conjunction 
with the other to delay cohabitation. Urban women are usually more educated and 
with higher opportunity cost of their time relative to their rural counterparts. 
However, both also have their unique contributions to the timing of cohabitation. 
Women in urban areas are less influenced by traditional or cultural norms that 
promote early marriage. Also, exposure to cosmopolitan life-style patterns in 
cities directs their decisions on the timing of cohabitation. For instance, Ikamari 
(2005) finds rural women are 1.13 times more likely to enter into a first marriage 
relative to urban women. Additional influential factors of the timing of 
cohabitation include parental background, family norms and values, age, religion 
and ethnicity, as well as community infrastructure.  
 
3.2.3.2   Econometric Model, Specification, Data and Variables Used ǯ
(1984) theoretical framework on search time (also expressed as the timing of 
consensual union) that outlines the mating process in the marriage market. In this 
framework, they show a mating process that occurs for the individual in a 
heterogeneous society with a life-cycle timing of family formation, which is based ǯȋ ? ? ? ?Ȍing of persons with complementary ǯȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǤǡ
marital matches are made through a search period, and the payoff to delayed 
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ǲǳȋas spouse with 
greater expected earnings potentials). The theory also holds when there exists a 
strong household division of labour relating to market and non-market activities 
between partners, and education is presumed to be a complementary factor in the ǲǳȋȌǤȋȌǡ
which is similar to the individual's earnings function relates the human capital, or 
earnings potential, or other traits of the spouse obtained through search in the 
marriage market to the individual's endowments such as schooling, search time as 
well as characteristics of the marriage and labour markets. For an individual (i) 









i rdGGSEM 176543210 ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀  --------- (34) 
where wpiM  is the human capital of spouse (p) of the individual (i) woman (w), 
and the explanatory variables E, S, and ฀ are the education level, search time, and 
other characteristics (beauty, culinary abilities or intelligence) of the woman that 
attracts higher-quality partners respectively; G represents gender-specific labour 
market conditions, d and r are features of the marriage market reflecting the 
dispersion of potential mates and the ratio of potential mates to competitors 
respectively whilst ฀ is the error term. The anticipated outcomes for education, 
search time, other attractive characteristics and the ratio of potential mates to 
competitors are positive whilst the dispersion of potential mates is negative. 
However, Boulier and Rosenzweig (1984) argue that search time and education 
might be endogenous in the framework and therefore developed a series of 
functions to overcome the problem. Search time is modelled on a concept related 
to two different but connected stages of the life cycle of the individual. One stage is 
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the period when the individual is younger and in formal education and the other is 
the post-school single state phase till union formation. First, Boulier and 
Rosenzweig explain that the offspring who live฀years, endowed with a level of 
attractiveness and provided with an optimal level of schooling, selects an optimal 
search time, and hence mate, by maximising lifetime welfare that equals weighted 
sum of per period utilities in the post-school, unmarried, and married states. This 
is given by the expression:  
iiiii ISQESW )()(max ฀฀฀฀ ฀  ----------------------------------- (35) 
subject to the mating function of equation (34). 
In equation 35, Qi represents post-ǲǳǡod, 
฀represents years offspring lives, Ii represents per period marital income or 
utility accruing to offspring i, and E and S are as previously defined. 
Per period single and marital welfare are described by the functions 
),,( wwiwiwi GEQQ ฀฀ and ),,,,( pwwiwiwpiwi GGEMII ฀฀ , where, presumably, Q1, Q2, 
Q3, >0; and I1, I2, I3, I4 >0. They show that own education and the attractiveness 
endowment contribute positively to both single and marital welfare. Own job 
opportunities also positively ǯǯ










i rdGGES 276543210 ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀  -----------(36) 
Search time ǯ
education, age, job opportunities in the labour market, dispersion of potential 
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mates and the ratio of potential mates to competitors and other personal ǲǳǤ 
The second model, explaining the stage that involves parents of the offspring, is 
based on the concept that the individual female is also an offspring of parents who 
might have invested in her education during her formative years by also 
considering her personal ǲǳǡ
be influential in the marriage market. Therefore parents provide an optimal 






฀฀  ----------------------------------------- (37) 
subject to their budget constraint  
iEiZi EpZpY ฀฀ ------------------------------------------- (38) and with some knowledge ǯȋ ? ?ȌǤ














i YPPrdGGE 39876543210 ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀  -------
--------------------------------------------------------------(39) 
where pZ and pE are price indices of parental consumption goods and schooling 
respectively, Zi is consumption goods and Yi ǯ
family. Educational attainment thus becomes a function of the exogenous 
variables describing the offspring, the labour market, and the availability of 
partners, educational costs, and the family budget constraints. Meanwhile, the 
necessary first order condition for the offspring is: 
฀ ฀ HQIIS ฀฀฀฀ 12฀฀ --------------------------------------(40) 
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which suggests that the optimal duration of search time is determined when the 
gains from marriage per unit of time, H, which is assumed positive, are equal to 
the marital search gains accruing over the duration of the marriage. Therefore the 
exogenous effects of changes in the marriage and labour market variables as well ǲǳ
depending on how they are assumed to affect the gains from search and the 
difference between welfare in marriage and when single. Also, the effects of 
changes in the conditions of the labour and marriage markets and the 
attractiveness endowment on educational attainment will depend on how such 
variables affect the costs and returns to education, as well as how education 
affects the search time. 
Hence if the assumption that education raises market productivity relative to 
home, which suggests that education contributes more to single than marital 
income for the woman, whilst attractiveness increases gains to marriage, and time 
in school is not compatible with both work and marriage but spouse search can be 
carried out with schooling and work, then it could be observed that an exogenous 
increase in education will result in an increased age at which women marry 
holding the level of attractiveness constant. On the other hand, with the same level 
of schooling, attractive women are more likely to marry earlier as well as women 
resident in communities with high male to female sex ratio. Given that the 
likelihood of marriage is high with regard to women with attractive features, 
and/or women in marriage markets with favourable gender ratio, the reverse 
outcome could be that less attractive women and women in unfavourable 
marriage markets will achieve higher education levels than otherwise. Finally, 
increased job opportunities for younger women, and life expectancy would result 
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in higher investments in education and search time because the overall payoffs to 
both would also increase.   
Since the interest of this section of the study is mainly on the timing of consensual 
union (search time) a modified version of equation (36) is estimated due to lack of 
data. Hence, age at cohabitation is estimated as a function of education (Ei), age 
(฀i), current residence (Ri), regional location (Li), religion (rli) and ethnicity (ethi) 
as well as socioeconomic status (sesiȌǯ
(com) variables. This is given as: 
฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ ฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀฀ comsesethrlLREAC iiiiiiii 876543210  --------- (41) 
 
3.2.3.2.1   Explanatory Variables: Definitions, Descriptives and Expected Impacts 
Similar to all the previous estimates of this study, the endogeneity of education 
though acknowledged, because of possible correlation between the error terms of 
the structural relationships of education as well as search time and the mating 
function, is not solved for lack of instrumental variables. However, the application 
of a discrete choice proportional hazard model in the econometric estimations, 
controlling for unobserved heterogeneity is expected to be advantageous in this 
regard. For not only would it control for the endogeneity of education but also for ǲǳ
endowment as well as other unavailable information that influences search time 
such as bride price or dowry. Education here is also measured in categorical terms 
and as already explained, expected to have a positive relationship with the timing 
of cohabitation. Variables like age, current/regional location, and the 
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socioeconomic status of family also act as controls in the absence of identifiable 
instruments. 
In spite of this, they also have their own direct impacts on age at cohabitation. The ǯǡǡcts cohort effects. Younger cohorts are expected to 
delay cohabitation compared to the older ones due to increased enrolment in 
school in over the years. The younger generation are also more exposed to 
modern cultures, have higher educational achievements and better job 
opportunities that discourages early marital or non-marital sexual unions to a 
large extent. Women in rural residence and/or northern regional locations have 
less dispersed potential partners because they are relatively less densely 
populated and undeveloped. Thus women resident in these areas are expected to 
marry relatively earlier than their urban or southern counterparts. Religious and 
ethnic beliefs are also likely to contribute to the timing of cohabitation but 
probably with less influence than education and urbanisation. Different ethnic or 
religious groups have their own norms regarding consensual unions and family 
formation, but most are likely to be pro-natalists and hence encourage earlier 
cohabitation. The Akans for example have been noted to be more likely to have 
early or premarital sexual unions compared to the other ethnic groups because of 
their matrilineal lineage (Addai, 1999b cited in Gyimah, 2003). 
The ǯ is included in the model to 
capture ǯ. These are measured in ǲ ?ǳǲ ?ǳǢǲ ?ǳǲ ?ǳǤ
father is more likely to educate as well as have higher aspirations for his child 
relating to better job opportunities and potential partners, thereby extending the 
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age at which the child enters into cohabitation. The outcome on father being a 
farmer however cannot be determined a prior since some farming households 
may want to keep their offspring for longer to help with household chores or 
home productions; whilst others upon an anticipation of a dowry increasing the 
household wealth may encourage earlier cohabitation.  
Community characteristics included in the estimations are access to health ǯǡȋǡǡ
secondary), and agricultural wage rates for men, women and children. The first 
two sets of communiǲǳǯǤ
They also act as additional controls to education. And the theory on the demand 
for children suggests that the higher the cost of childcare, the fewer the demand 
for children and a higher possibility of increased age at cohabitation. Boulier and 
Rosenzweig (1984) also find that women in areas where life expectancy is 
relatively high (possible in areas where the prevalence of health facilities is high) 
invest more and achieve higher levels of education, which consequently means 
later entry into cohabitation. Increase in the price of formal education, measured 
as distance to the various levels of schooling in the community, may also lower 
educational attainments and therefore possible early entry into cohabitation. The 
impact of the returns to agricultural labour for men and women cannot be 
determined a prior, however that of children has the probability of increasing the 
desire for a larger family size and hence decrease the age at cohabitation. 
The results on the community variable should however be taken with caution 
because they might not entirely reflect the conditions of the community when the 
women understudy were being brought-up. The available information is only on 
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current community residence. Table 3.29 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
variables used in the reduced form model. Following previous procedures in this 
study, the models are estimated in the full sample, as well as rural/urban and 
younger/older sub-samples. The impact of education is also first estimated with 
the controls of age and current residence, and then additional two models are 
estimated with one controlling for family background and the other community 
variables as well.  
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Table 3.29: Summary Statistics: Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 (GLSS 1)  












Explanatory           
None 0.454 0.498 0.539 0.499 0.312 0.463 0.379 0.485 0.664 0.473 
Primary 0.133 0.340 0.132 0.338 0.135 0.342 0.148 0.355 0.092 0.289 
Middle/JSS 0.362 0.481 0.306 0.461 0.456 0.498 0.419 0.494 0.201 0.401 
Sec. & above 0.051 0.220 0.024 0.152 0.097 0.296 0.054 0.226 0.043 0.202 
Still in School 0.046 0.210 0.041 0.197 0.055 0.228 0.062 0.242 0.000 0.000 
Age15-24 0.362 0.481 0.366 0.482 0.356 0.479 0.491 0.500 0.000 0.000 
Age25-34 0.376 0.484 0.365 0.482 0.393 0.489 0.509 0.500 0.000 0.000 
Age35-49 0.262 0.440 0.269 0.444 0.251 0.434     
Rural 0.627 0.484     0.621 0.485 0.644 0.479 
Northern Region 0.142 0.349 0.189 0.392 0.062 0.242 0.127 0.333 0.184 0.388 
Father Schooled 0.313 0.464 0.238 0.426 0.440 0.497 0.357 0.479 0.191 0.393 
Father Farmer 0.614 0.487 0.713 0.452 0.446 0.497 0.562 0.496 0.758 0.429 
Christian 0.624 0.484 0.584 0.493 0.692 0.462 0.635 0.482 0.595 0.491 
Muslim 0.138 0.345 0.108 0.311 0.187 0.390 0.133 0.339 0.152 0.359 
Traditional 0.172 0.378 0.232 0.422 0.071 0.257 0.166 0.372 0.189 0.392 
Other 0.066 0.248 0.075 0.263 0.050 0.219 0.066 0.248 0.065 0.246 
Non-Akan 0.533 0.499 0.526 0.500 0.544 0.498 0.513 0.500 0.588 0.493 
Access to Health  
facilities/personnel 0.000 0.792 0.000 1.000   -0.019 0.760 0.053 0.873 
Primary distance 0.629 1.820 1.002 2.215   0.619 1.829 0.656 1.795 
Middle/JSS distance  2.261 4.946 3.606 5.845   2.159 4.830 2.548 5.251 
Sec. distance 13.482 19.614 21.383 21.088   12.964 18.813 14.937 21.658 
Log of real Men's  
Agric. Wage 2.811 2.710 4.264 2.204   2.826 2.716 2.770 2.695 
Ratio of female to  
men's wage 0.301 0.435 0.461 0.463   0.309 0.438 0.278 0.425 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage 0.307 0.408 0.469 0.423   0.306 0.406 0.311 0.412 
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Table 3.29 contd: Summary Statistics: Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 












Dependent           
Age at Cohabitation1 16.922 2.431 16.598 2.136 17.468 2.776 16.800 2.232 17.266 2.894 
Age at Cohabitation2 16.873 2.271 16.597 2.053 17.365 2.545 16.746 2.133 17.186 2.558 
Cohabit 0.909 0.287 0.930 0.255 0.874 0.332 0.878 0.327 0.997 0.058 
Censored 0.091 0.287 0.070 0.255 0.126 0.332 0.122 0.327 0.003 0.058 
 2237  1403  834  1650  587  
Note: Age at Cohabitation1 includes current age of those not yet cohabitated and Age at Cohabitation2 involves only completed age of cohabitated 
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3.2.3.2.2   Dependent Variable: Definition and Descriptives  
As already mentioned, age at cohabitation here is defined as all consensual marital 
and non-marital unions of women aged 15 to 49 inconclusive. The summary 
statistics show that the mean age at cohabitation is approximately 17 years and about 
91 percent of the women understudy had cohabited at the time of the survey 
(Table 3.29: Full sample). The data lends support to the view that schooling and 
cohabitation is a relatively rare combination with less than 5 percent of the sampled 
women still in school. The data is also right censored because about 203 out of 
2,237 women had not cohabited at the time of the survey; that is 9 percent 
censored. This makes the application of non-parametric proportional hazard 
model for the econometric estimations appropriate in achieving consistent results. 
It would also help to clear any possible underlying econometric bias resulting 
from the bunched-up responses observed in the sample. Table 3.30 shows 
estimates of the survival and hazard functions of age at cohabitation using the 
Kaplan-Meier estimator in equation (19). The survival and hazard are estimated 
given a particular time ti (years) and the number of observation at risk (the 
number of women at age ti or older who had not cohabited before that age), as 
well as those who failed (that is those who started cohabiting at age ti) and those 
censored (women at age ti, who have never cohabited or will not begin at that 
age). 
It could be observed from the table that less than 5 percent of women in Ghana 
will reach the age of 22 without having ever cohabited. Indeed only 1 percent of 
the sampled women had not cohabited by age 26 and about half of that percentage 
will never cohabit if not done so by the age of 41. Also, the survivor function 
shows the median age of cohabitation as around 16 years with a survival 
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probability of 54 percent. This is two years earlier than estimated for a ǡǯȋǡ ? ? ? ?ȌȋBloom 
and Reddy, 1986). Figure 3.2 gives the graphic representation of the survival 
function with a 95 percent confidence interval. 
  
Table 3.30: Age at Cohabitation: Survival Analysis; Failures, Censoring and the Kaplan Meier 
Empirical Hazard (GLSS 1 - 1987/88) 
Years Riskset Failed Censored Survivor 
N-A Cum. 
Hazard 
10 2237 10 0 0.9955 0.0045 
11 2227 3 0 0.9942 0.0058 
12 2224 18 0 0.9861 0.0139 
13 2206 34 0 0.9709 0.0293 
14 2172 119 0 0.9177 0.0841 
15 2053 413 66 0.7331 0.2853 
16 1574 419 50 0.538 0.5515 
17 1105 269 29 0.407 0.7949 
18 807 354 16 0.2285 1.2336 
19 437 127 8 0.1621 1.5242 
20 302 181 5 0.0649 2.1235 
21 116 23 7 0.0521 2.3218 
22 86 25 6 0.0369 2.6125 
23 55 11 4 0.0295 2.8125 
24 40 12 4 0.0207 3.1125 
25 24 10 1 0.0121 3.5292 
26 13 2 2 0.0102 3.683 
27 9 1 2 0.0091 3.7941 
28 6 2 0 0.006 4.1275 
29 4 0 1 0.006 4.1275 
31 3 1 0 0.004 4.4608 
40 2 0 1 0.004 4.4608 









A comparison by school and residence also indicate that women with higher 
education as well as those residing in urban areas seems more likely to enter in 
cohabitation at a later age than those with no education and rural dwellers 
respectively (Table 3.31). Women with secondary and above level of education, 
for example, cohabit three years later than those with no education, at median 
survival rates. Women with middle/JSS level of education also appear to cohabit 
later, about year, compared to none or even primary education the quarter and 
75th percentile survival rates. However, primary and no education seem to suggest 
roughly similar age at entry into cohabitation. It can also be observed that women 
who reside in urban areas cohabit about a year later than their counterparts in 
rural areas. Interestingly, women with no and those with secondary and above 
education behave similarly in both urban and rural locations, but those with 
primary as well as middle/JSS in urban cohabit later than those in rural areas. 
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There also seems to be no difference in the timing of cohabitation by age cohort. 
And a Log-rank test to check the null hypothesis of no subgroup differences in the 
survivor functions does not reject the hypothesis (Table 3.32). However, the null 
hypothesis is rejected at the 1 percent significance level with regard to the 
education and residence categories. 
Table 3.31: Age at Cohabitation: Time at Risk; Incidence Rate, and Survival Time by School, 
Residence and Cohort (GLSS 1 - 1987/88) 
 Time Incidence No. of Survival time  
 at risk rate subjects 25% 50% 75% 
Education       
None 16923 0.0570821 1016 15 16 18 
Primary 4894 0.0529219 298 15 17 18 
Mid/JSS 13873 0.0517552 809 16 17 19 
Sec. & above 2165 0.0420323 114 17 19 21 
Total 37855 0.0537313 2237 15 17 18 
Residence       
Urban 14568 0.0500412 834 16 17 19 
Rural 23287 0.0560399 1403 15 16 18 
Total 37855 0.0537313 2237 15 17 18 
Educ.;Res.       
None; Urban 4350 0.0556322 260 15 16 18 
None; Rural 12573 0.0575837 756 15 16 18 
Primary; Urban 1890 0.0481481 113 16 17 18 
Primary; Rural 3004 0.0559254 185 15 16 18 
Mid/JSS; Urban 6772 0.0490254 380 16 18 20 
Mid/JSS; Rural 7101 0.0543585 429 15 16 18 
Sec. & above; Urban 1556 0.0411311 81 17 19 22 
Sec. & above; Rural 609 0.044335 33 17 19 20 
Total 37855 0.0537313 2237 15 17 18 
Woman's Age       
Age at/below 24 13304 0.0462267 810 15 17 18 
Age between 25 &34 14416 0.0578524 840 15 17 18 
Age between 35 & 49 10135 0.0577208 587 15 17 18 
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Table 3.32: Log-Rank Test for Equality of Survivor Functions, 1987/88 
 GLSS 1  
 Events Events 
 Observed Expected 
Education   
None 966 845.08 
Primary 259 220.77 
Middle/JSS 718 789.99 
Sec. & above 91 178.16 
Total 2034 2034 
chi2(3)  109.06 
Pr>chi2  0.0000 
Residence   
Urban 729 896 
Rural 1305 1138 
Total 2034 2034 
chi2(1)  80.95 
Pr>chi2  0.0000 
Educ.;Res.   
None; Urban 242 223.47 
None; Rural 724 621.61 
Prim.; Urban 91 92.79 
Prim.; Rural 168 127.98 
Mid/JSS; Urban 332 448.78 
Mid/JSS; Rural 386 341.21 
Sec. & above; Urban 64 130.96 
Sec. & above; Rural 27 47.2 
Total 2034 2034 
chi2(1)  166.6 
Pr>chi2  0.0000 
Woman's Age  
Age at/below 24 615 601.12 
Age between 25 &34 834 834.96 
Age between 35 & 49 585 597.92 
Total 2034 2034 
chi2(1)  0.85 
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A discrete time proportional hazard specification is also applied in the estimation 
of covariates outlined in the theoretical framework. The application of this 
econometric model is due to the heavier cluster of responses around 14 to 20 
years. The specification also allows for a flexible baseline hazard with no prior 
need for an assumption of a functional form as observed in the previous section on 
breastfeeding duration. And the maximum likelihood function, equation (32), 
employed here would give estimates on covariates with control for unobserved 
heterogeneity, as well as those without for comparison.  
 
3.2.3.3   Estimation Results 
The preferred results are presented in text showing coefficients only with stars to 
identify their level of significance. The full results can be found in the Appendix B-
24 to B-28, giving details on t-statistics as well as results on estimates without the 
control of unobserved heterogeneity. Most of the estimates are observed with the 
same direction of impact but sometimes with different levels of significance in all 
the models. Also where statistically significant, the magnitudes are relatively 
larger in the models with controlled unobserved heterogeneity, suggesting that 
studies that do not control for them underestimate the influence of explanatory 
variables. The likelihood ratio test of the gamma variance finds unobserved 
heterogeneity statistically significant in all estimated samples except the sub-
sample of women aged 15-34. The implication of a significant unobserved 
heterogeneity is that there exist unobserved characteristics in the sample under-
study that also trigger the risk to cohabit in addition to the observed ones.  
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The Impact of Education 
Analogous to other studies on the topic (inter alia Weinberger, 1987; Martin, 
1995; Appleton, 1996; Singh and Samara, 1996; Billari and Philipov, 2004; 
Ikamari, 2005; Behrman et al., 2006), age at cohabitation is delayed with the rise 
in levels of education, especially from post-primary education (Table 3.33). Middle 
level education reduces the hazard of cohabitation by 23 percent relative to none, 
whilst secondary and above does so by about 99 percent, ceteris paribus (Variant 
1: full sample). The magnitudes and statistical significance does not change much 
with the control of additional variables (Variant 2) but increases slightly more 
with the control of the community variables (Variant 3). 
Table 3.33: Hazard Rate Models of Age at Cohabitation: the Impact of Education, 1987/88 
GLSS 1 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary 0.083 0.161 -0.261 -0.012 0.382 
Middle/JSS -0.227** -0.036 -0.802*** -0.189** -0.38* 
Sec. & above -0.987*** -1.258*** -1.609*** -0.751*** -1.472*** 
Still in School -1.083*** -1.394*** -0.897* -0.986*** n.a 
Variant 2: Full model 
Primary 0.074 0.095 -0.106 0.024 0.26 
Middle/JSS -0.225** -0.138 -0.505** -0.138* -0.468* 
Sec. & above -0.922*** -1.426*** -1.086*** -0.636*** -1.555*** 
Still in School -1.059*** -1.392*** -0.89* -0.966*** n.a 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary 0.034 0.024  0.016 0.145 
Middle/JSS -0.298*** -0.271  -0.159* -0.624** 
Sec. & above -1.053*** -1.874***  -0.644*** -1.976*** 
Still in School -1.125*** -1.644***  -0.976*** n.a 
Observation 2237 1403 834 1650 587 
 
In the rural sub-sample however, only the highest level of education is found 
statistically significant; and women who reach that level show more than a 100 
percent reduction in the hazard to cohabit early. The influence of education in 
urban areas on the other hand starts from middle/JSS, as do the remaining sub-
samples. Interestingly, the educational impact in the older sub-group appears to 
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be twice as large, or even more (Variant 3 & 4), as the younger sub-group. Women 
still in school also have lower risk to cohabit than otherwise. This corroborates 
the hypothesis that schooling is less compatible with marital or non-marital 
consensual unions.  
Estimates of non-parametric baseline 
Table 3.34 presents the estimated outcome on the non-parametric baseline hazard 
of Variant 1 for all the samples. These do not differ from the estimates of the other 
specifications. The results here suggest that compared to the base category of age 
10-12, the hazard of entering into early cohabitation increases monotonically 
from 13 till 18 years, and then continues to increase but non-monotonically to 
beyond 25 years. Also, the highest hazard for cohabitation in the full sample 
occurs around 20 years. However amongst women living in rural areas, this 
occurs around age 22 and those in urban areas observe it around age 25 and 
above. Not surprisingly the estimated hazards in the older sub-sample appear 
higher, especially after age 17, than the younger sub-sample. This may be 
reflecting a less liberal view of women staying single for longer during the older ǡǲǳǤǡ
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Table 3.34: Baseline Hazard Estimates of Age at Cohabitation from Model 1, GLSS 1. 
Year Hazard     
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
13 2.607*** 2.441*** 3.128*** 2.676*** 2.4*** 
14 3.91*** 3.827*** 4.288*** 3.96*** 3.741*** 
15 5.35*** 5.317*** 5.816*** 5.327*** 5.316*** 
16 5.766*** 5.798*** 6.449*** 5.685*** 5.768*** 
17 5.761*** 5.797*** 6.754*** 5.679*** 5.627*** 
18 6.643*** 6.924*** 7.687*** 6.393*** 6.789*** 
19 6.278*** 6.707*** 7.546*** 5.961*** 6.445*** 
20 7.498*** 8.416*** 8.814*** 6.947*** 8.022*** 
21 6.289*** 7.017*** 8.155*** 5.707*** 6.764*** 
22 6.828*** 8.714*** 8.131*** 5.916*** 7.809*** 
23 6.522*** 8.232*** 8.372*** 5.788*** 7.276*** 
24 7.076*** 8.691*** 9.177*** 6.747*** 6.841*** 
25plus 7.028*** 8.583** 9.725*** 5.985*** 8.15*** 
constant -6.791*** -6.299*** -6.906*** -6.826*** -6.724*** 
ln_varg (cons) -1.33** -0.662 -0.111 -3.638 -0.667 
lltest 6.295 3.97 11.905 0.032 7.77 
lltest_p 0.006 0.023 0.000 0.429 0.003 
 
The Impact of Control Variables and Community Characteristics 
Table 3.35 reports the estimates of the effects of the control variables in Variant 2 
and the community variables in Variant 3. The coefficients of age cohorts show 
lower risk of cohabitation. For instance, compared to women between the ages 15 Ȃ 24 inclusive, those aged 25Ȃ34 and 35Ȃ49 are about 20 and 30 percent 
respectively less likely to cohabit if they had not done so by the time of the survey, 
ceteris paribus. The corresponding figures for the rural sub-sample are 32 and 44 
percent. However the results of the urban and older sub-samples are not 
statistically significant.  
As anticipated, women residing in rural areas are more likely to cohabit earlier than 
their urban counterparts, all else held constant. This may be reflecting the consequences 
RIDQ³XQ-PRGHUQLVHG´ community as well as lack of job opportunities and/or relatively 
less dispersion of the population in these rural areas (Boulier and Rosenzweig, 1984). 
Younger women in rural residence are also noted as having greater risk to cohabit 
compared to those in XUEDQDUHDVEXWWKLVLVQRWVLJQLILFDQWLQWKHROGHUZRPHQ¶VVXE-
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sample. In accordance to our expectation too, northern regional residence positively 
affects age at cohabitation but statistically significant mostly in specification Variant 3 
(Appendix B-24 to B-28). Like rural residence, the area is less developed with lack of 
many infrastructures that promote investment in human capital.  
With regard to the influence of family background, it is noted that women whose 
fathers are farmers are estimated as having higher risk of cohabitation than otherwise. 
This is also statistically significant in the urban but not the rural sub-sample. This 
probably is a reflection of migration upon cohabiting to increase the household wealth 
of parents; or the women from farming households move first to seek better 
socioeconomic lifestyle, which ends in an earlier cohabitation. Indeed it is not 
uncommon in the country for families to send their offspring to better-off relatives in 
towns for economic reasons as well as exposure to improved life-styles that might 
LPSURYHWKHLUFKDQFHVRIILQGLQJ³EHWWHU´SDUWQHUV7KHODFNRIVWDWLVWLFDOVLJQLILFDQFHLQ
the rural sub-sample however may be due to a higher percentage of fathers who are 
farmers and thus lack of variation in the sample.  
Also, the religious background of the family is only found significant in some sub-
samples. The urban and younger sub-samples show that Muslims are more likely to 
cohabit earlier than Christians, all else held constant. However, women in families that 
practice the traditional religion cohabits later than Christians, as can be observed in 
rural and older sub-samples. Finally, the results also show that non-Akans tend to 
cohabit later than the Akans, which is expected as the matrilineal lineage encourage 
earlier births and has been observed to be more tolerant towards sexual behaviour and 
premarital sex (Fortes, 1978 and Addai, 1999b cited Gyimah, 2003). 
Of the community variables controlled, only distance to the nearest primary and 
middle/JSS schools, as well as PHQ¶VDJULFXOWXUDOZDJHUDWHare found statistically 
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significant in the study. As age at cohabitation is directly related to fertility decisions, it 
is expected that variables increasing the cost of child quality may delay cohabitation if 
they especially aspire to invest more in their offspring, that then reduce their desire for 
bigger family sizes. The converse will probably be the case if the family cares less 
about improvement in human capital or the opportunity to do so is unavailable. In our 
study, the former is more the case since the hazard to cohabit reduces by roughly 5 and 
2 percentage points with a kilometre increase in the distance to primary and middle/JSS 
schools respectively, ceteris paribus. Distance to the various health facilities and 
personnel is however not found statistically significant. The returns to agricultural 
labour are only found relevant with regard to men, indicating that the risk of women 
HQWHULQJLQWRFRKDELWDWLRQLQFUHDVHVDVPHQ¶VZDJHUDWHVLQFUHDVH.  
Table 3.35: Hazard Rate Models of Age at Cohabitation: the Impact of Control and 
Community Variables, 1987/88. 
GLSS 1 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
Variant 2: Full model 
Age25-34 -0.202** -0.32** -0.117 -0.138*  
Age35-49 -0.303*** -0.439*** -0.207   
Age40-49     -0.079 
Rural 0.334***   0.335*** 0.221 
Northern Region 0.198 0.361 0.202 0.222 0.194 
Father Schooled -0.029 0.015 -0.104 -0.109 -0.094 
Father Farmer 0.244*** 0.149 0.471*** -0.014 0.136 
Muslim 0.064 -0.252 0.392* 0.207** 0.083 
Traditional -0.121 -0.238* 0.061 0.048 -0.409* 
Other 0.103 0.079 0.397 -0.003 -0.146 
Non-Akan -0.198** -0.264** -0.177 0.117 -0.377** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Access to Health  
facilities/personnel 0.01 -0.071  0.06 -0.135 
Primary distance -0.049* -0.065*  -0.017 -0.143** 
Middle/JSS distance  -0.017* -0.021  -0.012 -0.018 
Sec. distance 0 0.005  -0.001 0.006 
Log of real Men's  
Agric. Wage 0.041 0.102*  0.01 0.087 
Ratio of female to  
men's wage 0.099 0.066  0.034 0.465 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage -0.031 -0.258  0.034 -0.254 
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3.3. FERTILITY: THE STRUCTURAL MODEL 
This section models fertility adopting the theoretical framework of Bongaarts 
(1978), which proposes that changes in fertility are entirely the direct result of 
changes in proximate determinants; and that the effects of socioeconomic and 
cultural factors only work through these proximate determinants. This implies 
that introducing all proximate determinants in a model leaves no place for 
socioeconomic variables since their effects are already captured via the proximate 
determinants. Thus all the important variation in fertility is captured by variations 
of the proximate determinants of fertility and any residual direct effect is probably 
due to incomplete or inaccurate measurement of the proximate determinants 
(Bongaarts, 1982). 
This chapter follows Appletonǯ (1996) method of modelling fertility because of 
the similarity of the datasets. Although the living standard data lacks month-by-
month details of the DHS calendar data used by Baschieri and Hinde (2007), using 
two different sets of data in this chapter facilitates the observation of trends in 
fertility behaviour over a given period. The proposed structural equation model is 
tested on two independent samples in the same country. The first sample was 
collected in 1987/88 and the second in 1998/99. 
Fertility is hypothesised to be a direct function of the proximate determinants: 
breastfeeding, contraceptive use and age at cohabitation, and an indirect function 
of education and other socioeconomic variables. These proximate determinants 
are selected on pragmatic grounds because of their strong correlation with 
fertility behaviour (Bongaarts in Bulatao and Lee, 1982) and data availability in 
the two surveys. They also cover two of the three principal proximate 
determinants of fertility outlined in Bongaarts et al., (1984) for SSA. Bongaarts et 
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al., (1984) find that variations in postpartum infecundability and in age at 
marriage dominate the other sources of natural fertility variations. The former 
reflects differences in breastfeeding habits, as with an intermediate range of 
duration, each additional month of breastfeeding (without taking intensity to 
account) approximately adds over half a month to postpartum amenorrhea (ibid). 
Also, the norms of some cultures involves abstaining from sexual activities whilst 
breastfeeding, which greatly reduces the risk of conception. 
This concurs with earlier studies like Nag et al., (1980) which found the four 
variables that increase fertility are: an occurrence of earlier resumption of 
ovulation and menstruation during the post-partum period as a result of 
decreased incidence and duration of breastfeeding; decline in the practice of 
postpartum abstinence; reduction in the loss of reproductive performance of 
women caused by early widowhood; and reduction in the incidence of sterility as 
a result of the improved treatment of venereal diseases. Also Jain (1981) focusing 
on the influence of education suggested ǯ
breastfeeding, use of contraception and age at marriage affect fertility levels. 
Contraception becomes crucial in fertility control when, upon exposure to 
modernisation or indeed education, women shorten traditional practices of 
breastfeeding as well as postpartum abstinence. In addition, contraceptive use can 
help in reducing or eliminating forced marriages due to unplanned pregnancies 
and subsequently big family sizes. Married couples are also able to avoid 
unwanted pregnancies and space births by using contraceptives, which in totality 
leads to controlled fertility levels and possibly set the demographic transition in 
motion. Martin (1995) and Martin and Juarez (1995) show how high variation in 
contraceptive use in some developing countries, like Latin America, Asia and 
  309 
North Africa, determine variation in the total fertility of the educated and 
uneducated.  
The timing of cohabitation (sexual activities) has also been noted as very 
influential in determining fertility levels. Delayed age at cohabitation for instance 
is highly effective in lowering fertility through lower exposure to intercourse in 
the early, more fecund years of the reproductive period (Bulatao and Lee, 1982). 
Empirical evidence of this negative association could be observed in studies such 
as Appleton (1996). However, the overall impact of these proximate determinants 
on fertility level could be negative, positive or insignificant depending on the 
direction of impact of the socioeconomic variables that influence them (Bongaarts 
et al., 1984). Thus Bongaarts et al., (1984) conclude that fertility decline will occur 
only in populations where increases in contraceptive use and age at marriage are 
sufficiently large to outpace the effects of the shortening of breastfeeding and the 
abandonment of postpartum abstinence as well as any declines in pathological 
sterility. Cleland et al., (1984) find that the greater fertility reducing effects of 
nuptiality and contraceptives use almost always compensate for the fertility 
increasing effects of shorter breastfeeding intervals among modern or enlightened 
populace. 
Proximate determinants may be endogenous because of the act of self-selection 
(Bulatao and Lee, 1982) and/or have similar unobserved variables that may 
simultaneously determine the final outcome (Appleton, 1996). Couples may 
consciously control a proximate determinant with the aim of controlling fertility, 
which results in simultaneity and likely bias in estimated coefficients (ibid). Some 
examples include deliberate extension of breastfeeding or abstinence by more 
fecund women to reduce the risk of conception; fecund women marrying earlier 
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because of their ease of reproduction85; deliberate delay of age at cohabitation to 
reduce fecund; and the possibility that fertile women may tend to use 
contraceptives to control their fertility.  
ǯestimation of a ǲǳǡof which the first stage involves the estimation of reduced 
form models of the proximate variables (as performed in section 3.2). Then the 
predicted values obtained are used in the second stage to estimate their influence 
on fertility. It is described as a structural model because it is the final of a two-
stage regression procedure. However we do not have measures of all aspects of 
the proximate determinants controlled for, such as the intensity of breastfeeding 
and frequency of sexual intercourse. Consequently, there is likely to be a problem 
with omitted variables. The proximate determinantǯ 
tested as well as the exclusion restrictions on the socioeconomic variables used as 
instruments.  
The reproduction function thus estimated is:  
),,,,( ฀฀฀ BCAF ------------------------------------------- (42) 
where F represents fertility defined variously as the probability of having at least 
one child, the number of children ever born, and the number of children 
conditional on least one birth86. The predicted median age at cohabitation is 
                                                        
85
 An anecdotal evidence in Ghana for instance has indicated that some women are divorced because of 
their inability to bear children, whereas others have also been made to show their fecundity by 
conceiving or give birth before they are married or accepted as partners.  
86
 The first two are estimated without including breastfeeding because not all the women have had 
children below the age of six to have information on that. However the outcome of the second is 
compared with the third that includes breastfeeding because the latter may be subjected to sample 
selectivity bias. But then breastfeeding duration would not influence the fertility of a woman who has 
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represented as A, predicted current contraceptive use as C, the predicted median 
duration of breastfeeding as B, and error term is ฀. Tǯ  is 
controlled in all the estimations as well because it plays an important role in 
determining fecundity levels over the reproductive life span of the woman. All 
other things held constant, younger women are relatively less likely to have given 
birth or have had more births than older ones. 
The analyses in section 3.2 so far give evidence to the premise that education 
influences the proximate determinants as anticipated, which consequently implies 
that it indirectly also influences fertility. Education, as noted, generally increases 
the use of contraception and the age at cohabitation, but reduces the duration of 
breastfeeding amongst women in the country. The impacts on the first two 
proximates are expected to possibly result in a reduction in fertility levels, 
whereas the last one may lead to an increase. For an overall negative impact on 
fertility, the negative influences of contraception use and age at cohabitation must 
be big enough to countermand the likely positive influence of shortened 
breastfeeding practices.  
 
3.3.1 Estimation Results: Structural Determinants of Fertility 
This sub-section examines the predicted impact of the proximate determinants on 
three different measures of fertility, and test for possible unobserved influences in 
the next sub-section. The three structural fertility models examined are: Model A Ȃ 
the probability of a woman having at least one child; Model B Ȃ the unconditional 
number of live births; and Model C Ȃ the number of live births conditional on one 
                                                                                                                                                                 
never given birth, so in a way the impact of the proximates are being observed for different samples of 
the population, which we presume would also be of relevance to policy on the topic. 
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having already occurred. The first measure is estimated using a probit model, 
whereas the second and third are estimated using OLS regression methods. The 
presumption is that the proximate determinants may influence the onset of births 
and subsequent ones differently. There is also the econometric problem of sample 
selection bias. This is because only women who have ever given birth have 
information on the duration of breastfeeding. No attempt was made at controlling 
for this selectivity bias87 that could affect Model C. This is due to lack of 
information on an exclusive variable or variables that might have effects on the 
probability of having at least one child but do not have any on the number of live 
births. 
 
3.3.1.1   The Probability of Having At Least One Child 
The probit model is estimated using predicted contraceptives88 and predicted age 
at cohabitation for GLSS 1, but only predicted contraceptives for GLSS 4, as it does 
not have information on age at cohabitation. The model is also estimated without 
predicted age at cohabitation for GLSS 1 for robustness check; the difference in 
outcome between the two is quite negligible. This procedure is repeated with the 
estimations of the other fertility measures in this section, and the same patterns 
were observed. Table 3.36 presents the marginal effects of the proximate 
determinants on the probability of having at least one child in both survey years. 
Following earlier patterns in this study, only the coefficients of proximate 
                                                        
87
 Appleton (1996) attempted at correcting the sample selection problem using a Heckman two stage 
procedure, but found the sample selection correction term insignificant. He explained it as being a 
possible consequence of using only a functional form as identification, so dropped it from the final 
estimations of the fertility models. 
88
 All contraceptive methods are included in the fertility model as their current use. 
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determinants with their level of significance are presented in text for brevity. The 
relevant summary statistics and full results are given in Appendix B-29 to B-32. 
The choice of a final model for analysis is based on a general-to-specific process. 
Two separate models consisting of actual and predicted values of proximate 
determinants are estimated to check their significance in predicting fertility. 
Subsequently, both the actual and predicted values are combined in an estimation 
to test for the exogeneity of the variables. A Hausman test with a null hypothesis 
that a particular proximate variable is exogenous is performed. If the predicted 
value is significant despite the inclusion of the actual values of the proximate 
determinant, the null is rejected. This implies the proximate determinant is 
endogenous, which is usually the outcome of our tests (not reported for brevity). 
Thus predicted values are used in all the analyses of the models in this section. 
Finally, age is included in all the models to control for exposure as well as 
fecundity. Although younger women are more fecund than older women, the latter 








  314 
Table 3.36: Marginal Effects after Probit for Having a Child, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural 
Model A) 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Age at Cohabitation -0.001 0.001 -2.58E-04 1.99E-04 5.79E-05 
Traditional contraceptives  -0.152*** -0.176*** -0.209*** -0.236*** -0.002 
Modern contraceptives  0.02 0.026* -0.006 0.036* -0.001 
Variant 2: Full model 
Age at Cohabitation -5.82E-05 4.31E-04 0.002 6.40E-05 2.60E-04 
Traditional contraceptives  -0.133*** -0.106*** -0.153*** -0.198*** 0.002 
Modern contraceptives  0.026** 0.002*** -0.004* 0.041** -2.89E-04 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Age at Cohabitation -0.001 -5.04E-05 0.001 -1.57E-05 3.14E-04 
Traditional contraceptives  -0.079*** -0.05*** -0.076*** -0.128*** -1.92E-04 
Modern contraceptives  0.015* 0.002** -0.002 0.03** -2.85E-04 
Observation 2237 1403 834 1650 587 
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Traditional contraceptives  -0.038 -0.036 0.062* 0.103* -0.003 
Modern contraceptives  0.223*** 0.193*** 0.075 0.14* -0.009 
Variant 2: Full model 
Traditional contraceptives  0.037* 0.006 0.071** 0.132*** -0.002 
Modern contraceptives  0.088*** 0.106*** 0.031 0.068* 0.003 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Traditional contraceptives  0.009 0.004 0.062** 0.03 0.001 
Modern contraceptives  0.071*** 0.061*** 0.017 0.091*** 0.001 
Observation 5863 3657 2206 3921 1942 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects after estimating probit models. Variant 1 control for women currently in 
school, age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity and household wealth 
in addition to those in Model 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other 
determinants. See Appendix B-30. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
    
The estimated results of the proximate determinants regarding the probability of 
a woman having at least one child (Model A) are not consistent. As can be 
observed from the table above, age at cohabitation is found statistically 
insignificant. This is contrary to Appleton (1996) who found that age at 
cohabitation reduces this measure of fertility. However in GLSS 1, the probability 
of a woman having at least one child is strongly reduced by the use of traditional 
contraception. In the full sample for example, her chances at having at least one 
child are reduced by 15.2 percentage points in Variant 1, ceteris paribus. The 
corresponding figures for the rural, urban and younger women (age15 -34) sub-
samples are 17.6, 20.9 and 23.6 percentage points respectively. The magnitudes 
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however show a modest fall in Variant 2, and about half the size in Variant 3 
where household wealth as well as community characteristics is included in the 
predictions.  
The outcomes regarding traditional contraception here suggest that even though 
modern contraception is the more effective of the two, abstinence as traditional 
contraception surpasses all others (including modern contraception) in the 
effectiveness of achieving reduction in fertility. This may explain the results on 
traditional contraception in GLSS 1 where a higher proportion of women used the 
method (see table 3.1) 
In contrast, GLSS 4 indicates a positive relationship between the use of traditional 
contraception and the probability of having at least one child.  This is strongly 
significant mainly in urban areas and amongst younger women when household 
wealth is also controlled (Variant 2). The positive association is also observed in 
relation to modern contraception wherever statistically significant. This is not 
only in the case of GLSS 4 but also in GLSS 1 for all sub-samples except urban 
(Variant 2). Here modern and traditional contraception, tends to reduce the 
probability of having at least one child, ceteris paribus. 
The results showing positive relationship between contraception (especially 
modern) and the probability of having at least one birth in both GLSS 1 and 4 seem 
perverse. However, a possible explanation is that most women in the study may 
be using contraceptives to space instead of prevent births. Moreover, the 
likelihood of first birth, right after marriage, is greater particularly in SSA, during 
which fewer women use contraceptives. Caldwell et al. (1992) find this outcome in 
their study where little practice of contraception between marriage and first birth 
is observed among married women. They note that the demand for contraception 
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rather increased between subsequent births, which led them to conclude that the 
use of contraception for spacing is far more important than for stopping births in 
the region. 
 
3.3.1.2   The Number of Children 
This section discusses the estimation results of unconditional number of children 
born, as well as those born upon a woman having given birth to at least one child. 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is used in these estimations. The exogeneity test 
explained in the previous section is also carried here. Similar to the probability of 
having at least one child, the number of births is estimated with the predicted 
values of the proximate determinants. Table 3.37 provides the effects of age at 
cohabitation and contraception on unconditional number of births (Model B), and 
table 3.38 presents the conditional model of at least one birth (Model C) that 
comprises the aforesaid proximate determinants as well as breastfeeding Ǥǲǳcurrently. This is done first in GLSS 1, 
followed by GLSS 4. For each survey sample, the traditional method of Model B is 
initially discussed, and then followed by the corresponding outcome in Model C. 
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Table 3.37: Regression Results for Unconditional Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 
&1998/99 (Structural Model B) 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Age at Cohabitation -0.012** -4.81E-04 -0.005 -0.001 0.008 
Traditional contraceptives -0.248*** -0.388*** -0.245** -0.329*** -1.069*** 
Modern contraceptives -0.263*** -0.044 -0.452*** -0.107* -0.03** 
Variant 2: Full model 
Age at Cohabitation -0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.004 -0.02* 
Traditional contraceptives -0.327*** -0.383*** -0.624*** -0.329*** -0.307* 
Modern contraceptives -0.154*** 0.007* -0.036*** -0.041 -0.021** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Age at Cohabitation -0.011** -0.012** 0.003 0.004 -0.02* 
Traditional contraceptives -0.143* -0.088 -0.35*** -0.191*** 0.02 
Modern contraceptives -0.115** 0.001 -0.033*** -0.062 -0.012** 
Observation 2237 1403 834 1650 587 
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Traditional contraceptives -0.147 -0.412*** -0.119 0.336** -0.382*** 
Modern contraceptives 0.064 0.399*** -0.04 -0.259 -1.963*** 
Variant 2: Full model  
Traditional contraceptives -0.083 -0.319*** -0.095 0.19** -0.331*** 
Modern contraceptives -0.065 0.199* -0.103 -0.109 -0.513*** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Traditional contraceptives -0.096* -0.14*** -0.051 -0.027 -0.267*** 
Modern contraceptives 0.027 0.14** -0.078 0.089 -0.069 
Observation 5863 3657 2206 3921 1942 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects of the OLS regression models. Variant 1 control for women currently in school, 
age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity and household wealth in 
addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other 
determinants. See Appendix B-31. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
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Table 3.38: Regression Results for Number of Live Births Conditional on One, 1987/88 
&1998/99 (Structural Model C) 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Age at cohabitation -0.011** -0.006 -0.004 -1.39E-04 -0.003 
Traditional contraceptives 0.099 -0.017 0.326 -0.015 -0.23 
Modern contraceptives -0.275*** -0.08 -0.513*** -0.164** -0.02 
Breastfeeding duration -0.004 0.002 -0.009 0.001 0.013 
Variant 2: Full model 
Age at cohabitation -0.007 3.22E-04 -0.01 -0.003 -0.02 
Traditional contraceptives -0.011 -0.398* -0.436*** 0.008 -0.183 
Modern contraceptives -0.204*** 0.008 -0.036*** -0.14** -0.021** 
Breastfeeding duration 9.76E-05 0.001 0.014 -0.011*** 0.014 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Age at cohabitation -0.011* -0.011* -0.013 0.003 -0.038*** 
Traditional contraceptives -0.041 -0.048 -0.259*** -0.033 0.056 
Modern contraceptives -0.1* 0.002 -0.034*** -0.112* -0.009* 
Breastfeeding duration -0.001 0.007 -0.002 -0.009* 0.015 
Observation 1409 936 473 1064 345 
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Traditional contraceptives 0.059 -0.316** -0.435*** 0.407* -0.134 
Modern contraceptives -1.485*** -0.487** -0.861*** -1.499*** -2.046*** 
Breastfeeding duration -0.002 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.014 
Variant 2: Full model      
Traditional contraceptives -0.265** -0.382*** -0.435*** -0.055 -0.172 
Modern contraceptives -0.501*** -0.175 -0.712*** -0.508*** -0.327 
Breastfeeding duration -0.001 0.001 -0.007 0.004 0.036*** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Traditional contraceptives -0.143** -0.165*** -0.204* -0.068** -0.197* 
Modern contraceptives -0.148* -4.54E-05 -0.468*** -0.137 -0.063 
Breastfeeding duration 0.002 -0.006 -0.007 0.003 0.027* 
Observation 2447 1746 701 1690 757 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects of the OLS regression models. Variant 1 control for women currently in school, 
age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity and household wealth in 
addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other 
determinants. See Appendix B-32. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
 
Age at cohabitation reduces both the number of children ever born as well as the 
number of births conditional on one having already occurred in GLSS 1. The 
reduction in the number of births, in both instances, is around 1.1 percentage 
point for all women in Variants 1 and 3, ceteris paribus. This outcome is analogous ȋ ? ? ? ?ȌǡǯǤ
(1996) finds that a delayed cohabitation by 3 years is predicted to reduce the 
number of births a woman has ever had by 1.  
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This study also finds women residing in rural areas, as well as older women 
(aged35-49), seem to have reduced number of births with delayed age at 
cohabitation, especially in Variant 3 of both Models B and C. The older sub-sample 
(aged35-49) for instance indicate that delaying age at cohabitation by one year 
will perhaps reduce the number of births and the number of births conditional on 
one by about 2.0 and 3.8 percentage points respectively, ceteris paribus. The older 
sub-sample is presumed to somewhat give a closer view of the actual impact of 
age at cohabitation and indeed all the other proximate determinants, since nearly 
all the women at this age had cohabitated and nearing the end of their fecundity or 
have completed number of births. Estimates of the urban and younger (aged15-
34) sub-samples are statistically insignificant.  
The general negative impact of age at cohabitation observed might be due to 
cultural values, which discourages cohabitation especially when it is not marital 
and reasons of childbirth (Caldwell and Caldwell, 1987). It also aids sexual 
abstinence, which is the primary contraceptive advocated by traditionalists (ibid).  
All else held constant, traditional contraceptives use relative to modern or no 
contraceptives is also estimated as having lowering effects on fertility (Models B 
and C) whenever found statistically significant in GLSS 1. However, this is often 
observed in the former compared to the latter Model. What might probably be an 
explanation to the outcome in Model C is the inclusion of the duration of 
breastfeeding (another kind of traditional contraception), which obstructs the ǯǤ
had a child, the women become more careful and opt for a more effective 
contraception (that is if abstinence is not an option). It could also be observed that 
the estimated magnitudes of the urban sub-samples are usually bigger than the 
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rural ones where both are statistically significant in Models B and C. 
Disaggregating the samples into young and old show similar and strong limiting 
influence in the two sub-samples, but the older sub-sample have about three times 
the magnitude of the younger one (Model B, Variant 1). That is a percentage 
increase in traditional contraception has 0.33 reductions in the unconditional 
number of births by younger women whilst the analogous figure for the older ǡǤ ? ?ǲǳnot 
show such dramatic difference, and those in Model C do not show any statistical 
significance.  
Meanwhile in GLSS 4, the estimates of traditional contraception show rather more 
inconsistent outcomes especially in Model B. For example, in the full sample, the 
negative association of traditional contraceptive use and fertility is only found 
statistically significant in Variant 3 at the 10 percent level. In contrast, the method 
is observed as having a stronger negative influence in all the specification models 
in the rural but none in the urban sub-sample. The results in the urban sub-sample 
are quite unexpected since we anticipate that the prevalence of contraceptive use 
in urban areas should be relatively high and significant. The younger sub-sample 
also indicates perverse results where significant whilst the older sub-sample 
suggests traditional contraceptives use reduces the number of births by 
approximately one child with a three percent increase in use, ceteris paribus. 
Upon conditioning on having given birth to at least one (Model C) in the last five 
years prior to the survey however, traditional contraceptive usage becomes more 
statistically significant in many of the specification variants. This includes the 
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urban sub-sample, and they also show the expected sign in most of the samples 
where found statistically significant89.  
Modern contraception also appears to reduce the number of births in GLSS 1 
whenever found statistically significant, except for the rural sub-sample of Variant 
2 (Model B). In the urban sub-sample for instance, modern contraception is  ? ?Ǥ ?ǯ
figure for all women is 26.3 (Variant 1). Variants 2 and 3 however indicate a 
substantially lower impact in magnitudes amongst women in urban areas. 
Demarcation of the sample by age groups also shows statistically stronger support 
for modern contraception among the older age group, albeit with a much smaller 
magnitude. The association between contraceptive use and the number of births 
conditional on at least one having already occurred (Model C) is similarly negative 
and mostly statistically significant at the 1 percent level, except in rural areas 
(where none is significant). 
In GLSS 4, there appears to be no relationship between modern contraceptive use 
and the unconditional number of live births in the full sample (Model B). Indeed 
the only significant sub-samples are the rural and the older sub-samples. These 
however have contrasting direction of impact. Women in rural areas seem to have 
increased number of births with contraceptive use, whilst the older women are 
observed as having fewer births.  A plausible explanation to the increase in the 
number of births as a result of the use of modern contraception in rural areas is 
probably due to the lack of knowledge of correct usage leading to ineffective 
outcomes. The older sub-sample however indicates the anticipated outcome of a 
                                                        
89
 Except the younger aged sub-sample of Variant 1, which indicates a relatively weak positive 
association between traditional contraceptive use and fertility given that at least one birth had already 
occurred.  
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strong and considerable reduction in the number of births as a result of increased 
contraceptive use amongst women in the cohort. They experience up to two fewer 
births with a percentage increase in modern contraceptives use, ceteris paribus. 
The results in Model C show more statistically significant outcomes with similarly 
high magnitudes of impact amongst the older women. Generally, women who use 
modern contraception would have about one and a half fewer births conditional 
on having already had one, ceteris paribus (Full sample, Variant 1). This is more so 
in urban compared to rural areas, as well as amongst older compared to younger 
women.  
So far it has been commonly observed that both traditional and modern 
contraceptive use limit fertility, whether unconditional or conditional on having 
had one birth. In samples where both are found significant however, modern 
contraceptives use appears to have a higher limiting control than the traditional 
methods in GLSS 4. The reverse is the case in GLSS 1. This fairly substantiates the 
premise that all else held constant, modern contraception is the more effective of 
the two methods, but only when abstinence (traditional method) is less practiced. 
Also as expected, the impacts observed amongst urban contraceptive users often 
appear relatively larger than those of rural women. 
The generally negative association between contraceptive use and fertility to 
some extent gives support to the presumption made previously that contraceptive 
use is largely for the control of subsequent and hence total number of births but 
apparently not for first births. This is probably because women who already have 
children tend to be more conscious at controlling subsequent births, primarily 
with aim of spacing births; which could eventually lead to total fertility reduction. 
This is because of the fixed fecund phase of women in general.  
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In contrast to the other proximate determinants, this study finds estimates of 
breastfeeding duration statistically significant in only the younger (aged15-34) 
and older (aged35-49) sub-samples of GLSS 1 and 4 respectively (Variants 2 & 3). 
The former shows a negative association whilst the latter suggests a positive 
association between breastfeeding and number of births conditional on one birth. 
These conflicting outcomes are quite puzzling, since that of GLSS 1 for instance 
suggests that only women aged between 15 and 34 may experience the 
advantages of prolonged breastfeeding duration. But then again this could mean 
that the younger women who tend to breastfeed for shorter periods do so more 
intensively, which possibly triggers the hormones that inhibit early ovulation and 
hence the lower risk of conception. It may also explain why the results in the older 
sub-sample in GLSS 4 show that these women experienced increased births with 
breastfeeding. That is, although the older women might have breastfed for longer, 
it might not have been perhaps intensive, resulting in shortened period to 
ovulation.  
However why it happens in the different sub-sample differently may possibly be 
explained by the different sampling methods of the two survey years. Appleton 
(1996) finds a similar confounding outcome in ǯ that indicated a 
negative association between breastfeeding and fertility amongst only women 
aged over 35. The estimated coefficients in this study is relatively small; as 
younger women extending their breastfeeding duration by 12 months are 
predicted as having 0.13 fall in fertility in GLSS 1, ceteris paribus. In contrast, an 
older woman acting in the same manner is associated with increased fertility by 
roughly 0.42 in GLSS 4. 
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3.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
In order to examine whether the explained variation of the proximate 
determinants used in this study captures all the variations in the various fertility 
outcomes employed, education and the other socioeconomic variables are 
introduced into the structural models. This results in a semi-reduced form model 
where the socioeconomic variables are examined to see whether they still have 
direct impacts on fertility despite the presence of the proximate determinants 
earlier estimated. If the socioeconomic determinants are found significant despite 
the control of the proximates, then it means the structural models estimated 
earlier with only the proximate determinants have not accounted for all the 
variation in fertility. This subsequently makes the analysis conducted subjective to 
omitted variable bias. The converse outcome is what is anticipated because 
according to the proximate fertility model by Bongaarts (1982), almost all the 
critical variation in fertility is captured by variations in the proximate 
determinants. Any residual from the model is probably due to any unobserved or 
unmeasured proximate determinants excluded from the model. Thus there must 
be no direct impact of socioeconomic variables on fertility once all proximate 
determinants are controlled for, as in a perfect model.  
This is however not the case in this section, as results from the sensitivity analyses 
show. The results are presented in tables 3.39 and 3.40 for GLSS 1 and 4 
respectively. They show estimates of the full sample90 for the three fertility 
measures: the probability of having at least one child (Model A), the unconditional 
number of births (Model B) and the number of births conditional on one having 
                                                        
90
 The sensitivity analysis was also conducted for the rural/urban, as well as the younger/older age groups 
but not reported for brevity. They give similar results patterns, albeit with slightly different coefficient 
sizes and statistical significance. 
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already occurred (Model C). The proximate determinants, contraceptives, age at 
cohabitation and breastfeeding duration, are controlled in the models as predicted 
values of the specification variant 3 estimated under the various proximate sub-
sections under section 3.2.  
They suggest that our structural fertility models do not account for all the 
variation in fertility. This is because some of the socioeconomic determinants still 
have direct impact on fertility despite the presence of the proximate 
determinants; some of which are also statistically significant. This implies that a 
proportion of the variation in fertility is still unexplained and may be found in the 
residuals; it seems plausible that this is correlated with the socioeconomic 
variables. The outcome is not surprising because information on some of the key 
proximate determinants outlined by Bongaarts and others including Bulatao and 
Lee (such as induced and spontaneous abortion, rate of sexual intercourse, and 
intra-uterine mortality) are not available for this study. Nonetheless, with the 
majority of recommended essentials (patterns of cohabitation and breastfeeding, 
as well as contraceptives and induced abortion) for SSA, we expected the model to 
capture a greater proportion of the variation to make the remainder 
inconsequential. Probably, this was also not achieved because there are still 
problems of measurement errors due to deficiencies such as limited information 
on the intensity of breastfeeding, consistency in contraceptive use and forms of 
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Table 3.39: Sensitivity Test Results for Structural Fertility Model, 1987/88 (GLSS 1)  














Primary -0.047 -0.047 -0.257 -0.249 -0.081 -0.074 
 -1.7 -1.68 -1.86 -1.79 -0.51 -0.47 
Middle/JSS -0.016 -0.034 -0.71 -0.879 -0.824 -0.894 
 -0.55 -1.23 -4.79*** -6.34*** -4.99*** -5.77*** 
Sec. & above -0.116 -0.191 -1.218 -1.61 -1.41 -1.607 
 -1.69 -2.54*   -5.35*** -7.55*** -4.86*** -5.67*** 
Still in school -0.623 -0.569 -0.44 -0.121 1.079 1.016 
 -6.35*** -5.91*** -2.12* -0.64 2.18* 2.18* 
Age25-34 0.226 0.218 2.105 2.017 1.675 1.634 
 13.33*** 13.22*** 22.61*** 22.55*** 16.64*** 17.18*** 
Age35-49 0.249 0.243 4.98 4.851 4.849 4.803 
 17.01*** 17.10*** 35.41*** 35.81*** 30.68*** 31.35*** 
Rural 0.02 0.041 0.227 0.417 0.021 0.117 
 0.92 2.03*   2.07* 4.15*** 0.17 1.06 
Northern Region -0.033 -0.028 -0.389 -0.346 -0.317 -0.297 
 -1.05 -0.9 -2.72** -2.44* -1.95 -1.84 
Muslim 0.012 0.014 0.429 0.457 0.264 0.273 
 0.46 0.54 2.88** 3.06** 1.62 1.69 
Traditional -0.022 -0.011 0.126 0.228 0.279 0.311 
 -0.82 -0.41 0.97 1.79 1.91 2.15* 
Other -0.086 -0.083 -0.125 -0.111 0.036 0.034 
 -1.76 -1.71 -0.68 -0.61 0.19 0.17 
Non-Akan -0.016 -0.017 -0.286 -0.305 -0.311 -0.319 
 -0.92 -1 -3.23** -3.43*** -2.95** -3.03** 
HAS- Basic -0.026  -0.246  -0.126  
 -2.32*    -4.48***  -1.86  
HAS- High -0.005  -0.009  -0.038  
 -0.81  -0.38  -0.86  
Traditional contraceptives  -0.005 -0.026 -0.134 -0.31 -0.31 -0.375 
 -0.25 -1.32 -1.2 -3.09** -2.42* -3.18** 
Modern contraceptives  -0.005 0.005 0.106 0.197 0.208 0.241 
 -0.34 0.33 1.33 2.70** 2.28* 2.80** 
Age at Cohabitation -0.001 -0.001 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 -0.009 
 -1.88 -1.85 -2.58* -2.56* -2.20* -2.22* 
Breastfeeding duration     -0.002 -0.002 
     -0.65 -0.68 
Constant   1.825 1.985 2.911 2.975 
   6.63*** 7.51*** 9.10*** 9.53*** 
Observation 2237 2237 2237 2237 1409 1409 
Note: - Model A presents the marginal effects after probit; Models B and C presents OLS regression results on number of 
births and number of births conditional on at least one respectively.  
- Each Model is estimated with and without the control of household wealth. 
- The predicted values based on specification model 3 of the proximate variables are used in these estimations. 






  327 
Table 3.40: Sensitivity Test Results for Structural Fertility Model, 1998/99 (GLSS 4) 














Primary 0.014 0.01 -0.414 -0.447 -0.446 -0.498 
 0.67 0.49 -4.98*** -5.28*** -4.34*** -4.79*** 
Middle/JSS -0.06 -0.068 -0.809 -0.862 -0.916 -1.005 
 -2.48*   -2.70**  -10.34*** -10.93*** -9.45*** -10.54*** 
Sec. & above -0.204 -0.254 -1.473 -1.613 -1.64 -1.882 
 -4.70*** -6.28*** -14.99*** -17.50*** -11.06*** -12.91*** 
Still in school -0.592 -0.609 -0.314 -0.335 0.001 0.042 
 -12.59*** -13.57*** -2.64** -2.94**  0 0.16 
Age25_34 0.333 0.334 2.147 2.115 1.81 1.761 
 20.68*** 20.74*** 25.66*** 24.80*** 15.36*** 15.18*** 
Age35_49 0.453 0.451 4.585 4.59 4.342 4.332 
 34.42*** 33.20*** 54.65*** 55.00*** 31.75*** 32.43*** 
Rural 0.032 0.058 0.233 0.476 0.203 0.485 
 1.52 3.54*** 3.53*** 8.77*** 1.92 5.76*** 
Northern Region 0.046 0.05 -0.114 -0.035 -0.379 -0.323 
 2.00*   2.17*   -1.3 -0.41 -2.95** -2.52*   
Muslim -0.044 -0.047 0.116 0.09 -0.016 -0.053 
 -1.46 -1.56 1.36 1.05 -0.14 -0.46 
Traditional -0.104 -0.101 0.2 0.287 0.297 0.394 
 -1.87 -1.83 1.21 1.76 1.52 2.03*   
Other 0.016 0.025 0.188 0.23 0.191 0.229 
 0.32 0.52 1.22 1.46 1.17 1.32 
Non-Akan 0.037 0.034 -0.203 -0.156 -0.316 -0.258 
 2.15*   1.91 -3.49*** -2.68**  -4.04*** -3.37*** 
HAS- Basic -0.038  -0.171  -0.211  
 -3.75***  -6.01***  -4.22***  
HAS- High -0.013  0.146  0.149  
 -1.6  4.63***  3.33***  
Traditional contraceptives  0.022 0.017 -0.009 -0.061 -0.081 -0.133 
 1.24 0.93 -0.34 -2.13*   -1.94 -3.81*** 
Modern contraceptives  -0.016 -0.016 0.077 0.12 0.108 0.165 
 -0.67 -0.65 1.36 2.09*   1.2 1.93 
Breastfeeding duration     0.002 0.002 
     0.64 0.58 
Constant   1.244 1.012 2.006 1.817 
   6.20*** 5.34*** 6.56*** 6.55*** 
Observation 5863 5863 5863 5863 2454 2454 
Note: - Model A presents the marginal effects after probit; Models B and C presents OLS regression results on number of 
births and number of births conditional on at least one respectively.  
- Each Model is estimated with and without the control of household wealth. 
- The predicted values based on specification model 3 of the proximate variables are used in these estimations. 
- Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
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Some of the results of the proximate determinants here are quite different ǲǳ
still give similar outcomes. For example regarding the probability of having at 
least one child, none of the proximate determinants here are found statistically 
significant in both GLSS 1 and 4, unlike the previous model. Age at cohabitation on 
the other hand is still negative and statistically significant, but at a reduced level, 
in determining the unconditional number of births (Model B) and births 
conditional on at least one (Model C), all else held constant.  
Traditional contraceptives use is also estimated as having limiting impact on 
fertility in both models of GLSS 1 and 4 but mostly significant when household 
wealth is not controlled. In contrast, modern contraceptives use predicts the 
opposite outcome. Breastfeeding duration is not found statistically significant in 
both models of the two survey years. One possible explanation for the loss of 
statistical significance of some of the proximate determinants is that the 
socioeconomic variables may be picking much more details that explain variations 
in fertility compared to the available information on the proximate determinants 
in the current survey data used. In lieu of this, the next section focuses on only 
education and the other socioeconomic variables in a reduced form model. It is 
anticipated that the reduced form model would bring together the overall or full 
impact of education, with the control of the other socioeconomic variables, on 
fertility. 
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3.4. FERTILITY: THE REDUCED FORM MODEL  
The reduced form fertility model is estimated based on the conceptual and 
empirical framework outlined under the section on contraception of this study. 
This is primarily because the demand for contraception is derived from that for 
children, which implies that the exogenous variables that determines the desired 
number of births by a woman would also determine her use of contraception. 
Hence fertility, measured as the total number of children ever born to a woman in 
the survey period understudy, is estimated as function of the variables in equation 
3 under sub-section 3.2.1.2 and all the caveats therein. However, the anticipated 
outcomes of the variables are the opposite of those on contraception; as factors 
that tend to increase the use of contraception would reduce the number of 
children born to a woman. An additional difference to the model is that whereas 
multinomial logit was applied in the econometric estimation of contraception 
because of its categorical response, OLS regression method is applied here. Even 
though this may cause possible downward bias of estimates due to censoring from 
below at zero, because some women have not yet had children, empirical evidence 
from Ainsworth (1989) suggests using Tobit or Poisson econometric models that 
controls the impact of censoring does give identical results as OLS.    
 
3.4.1 Descriptives 
The fertility levels of the women understudy in the various age cohorts and 
current residence as well as levels of schooling is summarised in table 3.41. Also, 
the summary statistics of all the variables used in the estimations can be found in 
table 3.42. The descriptives indicate that roughly three-quarters of sampled 
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women in both years have at least one child. The average number of live births per 
woman in GLSS 1 is 3.14 and that of GLSS 4 is 2.84, suggesting a likely decrease in 
fertility levels between the two survey years. The average levels in GLSS 1 and 4 
also compares with those of DHS (1988): 3.17 and DHS (1998): 2.63 respectively. 
There are roughly the same proportion of women, about three-quarters of the 
total sample, living in rural areas in GLSS 1 and 4; but the former year constitute a 
more youthful sample than the later one. Age, which controls for fecundity or all 
biological factors that affects the supply of births, shows smaller family sizes by 
younger women in each school category compared to the older women. Women 
above age 34 for instance record the highest fertility levels (6.16 in GLSS 1 and 
5.36 in GLSS 4). This is because they have experienced a longer fecundity period 
and most probably would have completed the phase. Also despite the first survey 
year having relatively more youthful sample, it still records a higher average 
fertility than the later year; giving an impression of a transitional change towards 
lower fertility levels in the country.  
Separating the women by rural and urban dwellings also generally reveals lower 
fertility on average in urban compared to rural areas. Women with no education 
are observed as having the highest fertility levels, whereas the lowest are those of 
secondary and higher level of education in both surveys. With the primary level of 
education also showing a higher number of births than middle/JSS level, a clear 
pattern of a negative relationship between fertility and education can be observed 
in both GLSS 1 and 4. This and the pattern observed in the rural verses urban sub-
samples are as expected because of the higher opportunity cost of time in urban 
areas and amongst higher educated women. The tangible cost of living in urban 
areas is also higher, making child services more expensive and hence fewer 
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demanded. Other explanations include more media exposure and various 
infrastructures that aid in limiting family size if so desired in these areas, which 
also happen to have higher educated women. Also agricultural activities that 
usually require large family sizes are few in the urban centres; and the changed 
economic system of household as a unit of production to a unit of consumption 
and its outcome is better observed in urban areas. 
Table 3.41: Cross-Tabulations of Fertility and Education, Age and Residence  
(1987/88 & 1998/99) 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1 
School      
None 4.028 4.046 3.973 2.436 6.569 
Primary 2.956 3.119 2.690 2.180 6.463 
Middle/JSS 2.291 2.467 2.092 1.801 5.169 
Sec.& above  1.693 2.364 1.420 1.101 3.800 
Age      
Age15-24 0.921 1.008 0.771 0.921  
Age25-34 3.160 3.393 2.796 3.160  
Age35_49 6.161 6.660 5.262   
Residence      
Urban 2.696   1.834 5.262 
Rural 3.401   2.198 6.660 
Total 3.138 3.401 2.696 2.060 6.161 
GLSS 4 
School      
None 3.853 4.034 3.272 2.261 6.062 
Primary 2.457 2.731 2.007 1.372 5.595 
Middle/JSS 2.048 2.270 1.800 1.216 4.370 
Sec.& above 1.491 1.533 1.475 0.657 3.284 
Age      
Age15-24 0.439 0.537 0.303 0.439  
Age25-34 2.889 3.241 2.259 2.889  
Age35_49 5.360 5.811 4.518   
Residence      
Urban 2.179   1.143 4.518 
Rural 3.231   1.866 5.811 
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Table 3.42: Summary Statistics ± Number of Live Births, 1987/88 & 1998/99 
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child 0.798 0.402 0.709 0.454 
Number of live births 3.138 2.805 2.835 2.766 
None 0.454 0.498 0.418 0.493 
Primary 0.133 0.340 0.185 0.389 
Middle/JSS 0.362 0.481 0.322 0.467 
Sec.& above  0.051 0.220 0.076 0.265 
Still in school 0.046 0.209 0.124 0.330 
Age15-24 0.362 0.481 0.356 0.479 
Age25-34 0.375 0.484 0.313 0.464 
Age35_49 0.263 0.440 0.331 0.471 
Rural 0.627 0.484 0.624 0.484 
Northern Region 0.142 0.349 0.135 0.341 
Christian 0.625 0.484 0.776 0.417 
Muslim 0.138 0.344 0.122 0.327 
Traditional 0.172 0.377 0.062 0.240 
Other 0.066 0.248 0.041 0.199 
Non_Akan 0.533 0.499 0.490 0.500 
HAS- Basic 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
HAS- High 0.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 
Water distance (m) 1141 14587 511 11472 
Primary school distance (km) 0.632 1.829 4.504 54.67 
Middle/JSS school distance (km) 2.268 4.959 5.473 35.51 
Secondary school distance (km) 13.492 19.63 15.43 56.26 
Market distance (km) 5.015 10.26 8.58 33.42 
Access to Health facilities/personnel 0.000 0.792 0.000 0.790 
Price score of foodstuffs 0.000 0.792 0.000 0.790 
Price score of cereals 0.000 0.792 0.000 0.790 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage 2.809 2.710 4.924 4.141 
Ratio of female to men's wage 0.300 0.435 0.369 0.433 
Ratio of child to men's wage 0.307 0.408 0.267 0.388 
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3.4.2 Estimation Results 
Following the same procedure as in all the previous sections of this study, 
estimates of the models are presented in an abridged version in the text. These 
constitute only the coefficients with their statistical significance. The entire results 
are presented in Appendix B-33. Estimations are also conducted for the full 
samples, as well as by the residence (rural/urban) and age (younger: 15-34 
years/older: 35-49 years) cohorts. 
The Impact of Education 
The regression results obtained for the influence of education on the number of 
births while controlling for age, current residence, currently schooling, religion 
and ethnicity, household wealth as well as other community variables in three 
different models are presented in table 3.43 for GLSS 1 and 4. Similar to several 
studies in the area, this study generally finds the expected inverse association 
between education and fertility in all the models as well as both survey years, 
ceteris paribus. All the education categories also show a relatively high statistical 
significance except for the primary levels that are often found insignificant 
(mostly in GLSS 1). This is also consistent with the study of Benefo and Schultz 
(1996) on Ghana using GLSS 1 and 2 and Ainsworth et al (1996) using the 1993 
GDHS data. Both studies suggest the pattern is likely to be a consequence of low 
content and quality of education at the primary levels. Another more common 
effect of education on fertility in SSA is an inverted U-shaped. This is where the 
number of children tends to increase at lower levels of education, especially at the 
primary levels, and then reverses beyond this threshold. Thus fertility eventually 
declines as women advance beyond the primary stage of education. This is also 
explained as being the result of the initial impact of education lowering infant 
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mortality as well as healthier lifestyles subsequently making women more fecund. 
Studies that observed such outcomes include Martin (1995), Bankole (1995), 
Thomas and Maluccio (1996) and Handa (2000).  
Table 3.43: The Impact of Education on Fertility (Reduced Form Model), by All Women, 
Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary -0.239 -0.08 -0.569* -0.213 -0.017 
Middle/JSS -0.675*** -0.366** -1.138*** -0.521*** -0.851** 
Sec. & above -1.378*** -1.185*** -1.771*** -1.036*** -2.107*** 
Variant 2: Full model  
Primary -0.25 -0.119 -0.487* -0.246 0.059 
Middle/JSS -0.578*** -0.371** -0.867*** -0.499*** -0.512 
Sec. & above -1.047*** -1.001*** -1.312*** -0.853*** -1.477*** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary -0.254 -0.129 -0.496* -0.258 0.112 
Middle/JSS -0.558*** -0.34** -0.881*** -0.499*** -0.467 
Sec. & above -1.02*** -0.922** -1.316*** -0.843*** -1.55*** 
Observation 2240 1405 835 1651 589 
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary -0.427*** -0.355*** -0.474*** -0.287*** -0.468* 
Middle/JSS -0.861*** -0.859*** -0.817*** -0.565*** -1.432*** 
Sec. & above -1.597*** -1.97*** -1.386*** -1.138*** -2.303*** 
Variant 2: Full model  
Primary -0.384*** -0.339** -0.4** -0.266*** -0.357 
Middle/JSS -0.785*** -0.814*** -0.691*** -0.532*** -1.282*** 
Sec. & above -1.423*** -1.781*** -1.188*** -1.04*** -2.049*** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary -0.385*** -0.339** -0.401** -0.264*** -0.34 
Middle/JSS -0.782*** -0.807*** -0.691*** -0.524*** -1.245*** 
Sec. & above -1.417*** -1.768*** -1.188*** -1.035*** -2.005*** 
Observation 5863 3657 2206 3921 1942 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects of the OLS regression models. Variant 1 control for women currently in school, 
age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity and household wealth in 
addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other 
determinants. See Appendix B-33. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
 
Results in GLSS 4 on the other hand suggest a monotonically decreasing effect of ǯǡǤ
(2005) found similar results in 14 Middle Eastern countries. The difference 
between the outcomes in the two survey years is found statistically significant, 
especially from the post-primary level when additional control variables are 
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included as in Variants 2 and 3. This outcome thus suggests that women with post-
primary education generally have at least half (middle/JSS) to one (secondary and 
above) fewer births than women with no education in GLSS 1, which increases to 
about three-quarters to one and a half fewer births respectively in GLSS 4, ceteris 
paribus. This gives a clear indication of possible fertility decrease over the years 
with post-primary education, conditional on religion, ethnicity, household wealth 
and some community variables.  
Thus in order for the country to achieve its aim of reducing population and 
increasing economic growth, the policy of encouraging more girls in school should 
be continued and expanded to all parts of the country. Indeed there should be 
greater efforts at ensuring these girls remain in school, at least till secondary, if 
not the tertiary level. Because at these levels, all else held constant, (1) Ȃ women 
face higher opportunity cost of time and therefore total increase in child cost, (2) Ȃ 
obtain greater access to health facilities and therefore healthier children, (3) Ȃ 
exposure to other institutǯ
may not par well with many births, (4) Ȃ their higher literacy levels could help 
them to better understand their biological system and how to regulate its natural 
supply, and (5) Ȃ the mere length of time in school reduces the risk of exposure to 
conception and thus many births. 
Separating the GLSS 1 sample into rural and urban sub-sample show not only 
differences such as primary level of education being statistically significant in 
urban areas whilst that of rural is not, but also suggests larger coefficient impacts 
in urban compared to rural areas, ceteris paribus. A Wald test finds the difference 
in outcome statistically significant at the 10 percent level for the primary and 
secondary and above levels, and at the1 percent level for middle/JSS level in 
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specification Variant 1. The differences in coefficients lost their statistical 
significance for the primary and secondary and above levels of education as 
additional variables are controlled in Variants 2 and 3. The coefficient difference 
for the middle/JSS level remained significant but at the 5 percent level. 
The outcome is slightly different in GLSS 4 though. The impact of the different 
education levels do not always appear larger in urban compared to rural areas in 
this survey, especially from the post-primary levels. However the Wald test finds 
all the differences statistically insignificant except for those with secondary and 
above level of education in all three specification Variants. And the impact is 
higher in rural compared to urban areas. Empirically, women with secondary and 
above level of education in rural areas are more likely to have 1.97 and 1.78 fewer ǯȂ 1.39 and 1.19 Ȃ with the same level 
of education based on Variants 1 and 2, ceteris paribus. The outcome in Variant 3 
is similar to that of 2. This means that having rural women reach the highest level 
of education could now drastically reduce fertility levels even more than urban 
women in the country. Ainsworth et al. (1996) note similar outcome in Cameroon, 
Kenya, Niger, Nigeria, Uganda and Zambia but not Ghana91. 
Across surveys, the magnitudes of the education categories beyond primary levels 
is found statistically smaller with women in rural areas of GLSS 1 compared to 
rural women in GLSS 4 in all three specification models. However, the differences 
in the urban sub-samples between the two surveys are not statistically significant. 
No apparent reasons could be given for the differences in the outcomes of the sub-
samples (rural and urban) across the two surveys. However it is fairly obvious 
that some sort of fertility transition (decline), that seems to be related to 
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 Used the 1993 DHS survey data. 
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education has begun in the rural areas. Education appears to have in some cases 
nearly twice the decreasing impact it used to have in rural areas of the first survey 
now in the later one. This may either be due to the improved schooling qualities or ȋǲǳ
through the media, and weakened cultural/ancestral links) or a bit of both over 
time. 
Also, relatively more women might have been enrolled in school for longer over 
time, which may possibly culminate into an associated greater fertility decline; as 
would be observǯ
age. Estimation by cohorts is thus performed in this study and the results 
generally show negative association between education and fertility amongst all 
the cohorts, with significantly greater negative impact amongst those with 
secondary and above education. Indeed, the pattern is similar to those of the full 
samples of each survey, especially amongst the younger cohorts. That is, primary 
levels have no statistical influence on fertility decline in GLSS 1 but the converse is 
more the case in GLSS 4. The older cohort also shows some statistical significance 
from post-primary levels in GLSS 1 (all levels in GLSS 4), but loses the significance 
of middle/JSS (primary in GLSS 4), as more control variables are included in the 
specification model (see Variants 2 and 3 in both surveys). 
It is observed within each survey year that the negative relationship is larger in 
the older than the younger cohort in both surveys where coefficients are found 
statistically significant. According to a Wald test, the difference in the magnitudes 
are however statistically significant in only Variant 1 of GLSS 1 for the secondary 
and above category; but in all the variants in GLSS 4 for the post-primary 
education categories at the 1 percent level of significance. That is, for instance 
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older women with secondary and above education, relative to none, have slightly 
more than double the negative impact on fertility compared to younger women, 
ceteris paribus. The differentials in the coefficient magnitudes of cohorts across 
surveys are however not statistically significant amongst the younger cohort. They 
are amongst the older group in relation to the middle/JSS level of education. The 
overall cohort results in effect suggesǯǯǢ
end up having higher number of births to compensate for the lack or lower births 
when they were young or catch-up with others in their cohort. 
The Impact of Control Variables 
This sub-section briefly discusses the influence of the control variables based on 
Variant 2 of all the samples in GLSS 1 and 4. The coefficients in magnitudes are 
fairly consistent across models, however some variables lose statistical 
significance with increased control variables. This would be mentioned during the 
discussion of such variables. The results are reported in Table 3.44 in the same 
abridged type mentioned previously.  
The estimated results signify that being in school consistently lower the number 
of births by women in all the study samples. In the full sample, it is observed that 
women in school have 62 and 43 percent fewer births relative to those not in 
school in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively, ceteris paribus. The estimates are higher in 
rural areas, which are also significantly greater than urban areas. For instance 
being in school in rural areas reduce births by 91 percent in the former year and 
61 percent in the later year compared to around 34 and 38 percent in urban areas 
respectively.  
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Table 3.44: The Impact of Control Variables on Fertility (Reduced Form Model), by All 
Women, Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 
 Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
GLSS 1 
Still in School -0.616*** -0.912*** -0.336* -0.721***  
Age25-34 2.166*** 2.255*** 2.011*** 2.144***  
Age35-49 5.036*** 5.482*** 4.235***   
Age40-49     1.566*** 
Rural 0.24*   0.061 0.811** 
Northern Region -0.43** -0.306 -0.495 -0.36** -0.702* 
Muslim 0.396** 0.172 0.578** 0.063 1.287*** 
Traditional 0.049 -0.046 0.426 0.002 0.122 
Other -0.188 -0.175 -0.302 -0.288 0.076 
Non-Akan -0.264** -0.28* -0.267* -0.237** -0.203 
HAS- Basic -0.277*** -0.315* -0.223*** -0.208*** -0.335** 
HAS- High 0.006 0.039 -0.003 -0.006 0.019 
GLSS 4 
Still in School -0.43*** -0.612*** -0.376*** -0.488***  
Age25-34 2.221*** 2.426*** 1.885*** 2.221***  
Age35-49 4.631*** 4.984*** 4.005***   
Age40-49     1.139*** 
Rural 0.241***   0.165* 0.515*** 
Northern Region -0.09 0.004 -0.245** 0.035 -0.351* 
Muslim 0.117 0.08 0.115 -0.097 0.465* 
Traditional 0.106 0.032 0.59 0.003 0.18 
Other 0.119 0.126 0.01 0.088 0.14 
Non-Akan -0.208*** -0.324*** -0.013 -0.103 -0.297* 
HAS- Basic -0.169*** -0.161*** -0.19*** -0.119*** -0.203** 
HAS- High 0.147*** 0.137** 0.154*** 0.061* 0.317*** 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects of the OLS regression models. Variant 1 control for women currently in school, 
age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity and household wealth in 
addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other 
determinants. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Sample weights are 
applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
 
Younger92 women in school also confirms the negative association between being 
in school and fertility, which overall supports the hypothesis that school and 
fertility are the least likely combination of socioeconomic outcomes. This supports 
the findings regarding completed education and also the fact that education delays 
cohabitation. Women in school may not have the time or sufficient socioeconomic 
requirements to support the combination of schooling and birth. It should send 
signals to policy makers to improve enrolment rates amongst all women but 
especially those in rural areas in their quest to lower fertility.  
                                                        
92
 Very few older women (about 2 in GLSS 4) were still in school at the time of the surveys, so the 
variable was not controlled in that sub-sample. 
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Findings on the age of the woman and fertility in this study also corroborate the 
findings of a lot of studies on the topic including Bollen et al. (2002). Age reflects 
the fecundity level of women at various stages of their lifetime. With all factors 
held constant, older women are expected to have more number of births relative 
to younger ones. This is because they have gone through a larger part of their 
reproductive lives. Estimates in this study is as anticipated, which is that fertility 
tends to generally increase with the various age cohorts relative to the base group 
of age 15-24; and the categories are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. 
Women aged 25-34 have around 2.2 more births than the base category in the full 
sample of both surveys whilst women aged 35-49 have 5.0 and 4.6 more births 
than the base in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively. The differential in the coefficients of 
the older age categories is statistically significant suggesting possibly fertility over 
time.  A similar trend could be observed in the sub-samples but with more births 
among women in rural than urban areas, especially amongst the older cohorts. 
With older cohorts predicted on the whole as having more births than younger 
ones, it is a gain to population controllers that older educated women do not ǲ-ǳǤ 
Religious beliefs and ethnicity are also controlled not only to eliminate their 
influence through education but also to examine whether they have direct 
influence on fertility. The two are somewhat inter-linked but the effect of one 
could over-shadow the other, depending on the strength of the connection 
between the woman and her extended family or place of residence. It is possible 
that the influence of family norms through ethnicity is greatly felt by women in 
rural areas. Estimates of the religious categories in both survey years suggest 
insignificant influence on fertility except for the Muslim category. This indicates 
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that Muslim women tend to have more children than Christians in GLSS 1 (full, 
urban and older sub-samples). The relationship is only significant amongst the 
older cohort of GLSS 4. The lack of a general statistical significance may be 
suggestive that religion is not important in determining fertility, especially in the 
presence of socioeconomic variables. 
Ethnicity however is found mostly significant and shows that non-Akans often 
tend to have fewer births than the Akans, all else held constant. This may also be 
linked to the negative outcome regarding Northern residence, where although less 
developed than the South, are occupied mainly by non-Akans. The explanation, as 
mentioned somewhere in this study, is that the non-Akans are relatively less 
liberal with early sexual activities of women as well as extra marital affairs. The 
Akans also reward their women with a sheep at the birth of their 10th child in an 
organised ceremony, which feasibly encouraged more births in that ethnic group.  
But it appears to be less influential as the urban and younger cohorts no longer 
show it to be statistically significant in GLSS 4. This is indicative of the possible 
gradual loss of traditional/cultural ǲǳ exposure, 
especially through the media and also the campaign against high fertility. 
The current residence of the woman is also very important in determining her 
fertility level. It could influence her level of education attained and therefore 
fertility (hence its role as a control variable in the study); it shows the level of 
development and exposure to modern values as well as accessibility to 
infrastructures such as health facilities and other family planning activities; and 
finally it indicates the availability of institutions that may well determine job 
opportunities and weaken links to the extended family system, which does not 
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only expect an individual to owe allegiance to living members but also to those 
dead (ancestors).   
Based on the above outline, it was anticipated that women in rural residence 
would tend to have more children than those in urban areas, because of the lack of 
many of the institutions that promote otherwise. The opportunity cost of time for 
instance is lower in these areas, and fosterage in the cultural system allow without 
an acknowledged serious economic consequences. As expected, the results show 
women in the rural areas have relatively more children than their counterparts in 
urban centres. This supports findings by Benefo and Schultz (1996), Parr (1998) 
and Akin (2005). Prevalence of better schools and higher enrolment rates, which 
produce relatively more competitive women for the labour market, in the urban 
centres are some of the reasons for fewer births in urban areas. In addition, the 
social and economic environment in the rural areas that fosters early births does 
not feature prominently in urban areas. Urban women are also less fatalistic 
towards fertility decisions, especially with the rising cost of child services in the 
area. And finally, the probability of investing family wealth into having more 
children has changed in the urban areas of Ghana (Benefo and Schultz, 1996).  
Of notable interest in this study however is that in GLSS 1, the level of significance 
in the full sample reduced from 1 percent (Variant 1) to 10 percent (Variant 2 
shown in text) and finally to none (Variant 3). This may suggest that the 
availability of household hold wealth and increased access to relevant facilities in 
the various communities could make residence irrelevant in determining fertility 
levels. The pattern is similar among the different age cohorts but with varied 
levels of significance in Variant 2: the younger cohort indicate insignificance of the 
variable whilst the older cohort show 5 percent level of significance (Table 3.44).  
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The pattern in GLSS 4 is slightly different, in that the model that also controls the 
community variables does not make rural residence irrelevant (except for the 
younger cohort). It becomes less significant in the full sample but remains same in 
the older sub-sample. 
Like urban residence, household wealth is included in the estimations as a control 
variable to education, because they are positively correlated and there may be 
observed or unmeasured variables that simultaneously affect both93 and hence 
fertility levels of the women. In spite of this, it is also useful to ascertain whether 
the influence of education is that of itself or only picking some of the influence of ǡǡǲǳǲǳ
study. The results on education discussed gives clear indication that its 
association with fertility is basically devoid of the influence of household wealth 
or indeed any other socioeconomic variables so far controlled in the estimations. 
In addition to this important clearance, the results here also indicate that 
household wealth also has direct impact on fertility despite the influence of 
education. 
Based on the quantity-quality trade-off theory (Becker and Lewis, 1973), 
household wealth is expected to reduce the number of births per woman in the 
household. And the estimated results are as anticipated, but in relation to only ǲǳsehold wealth in both GLSS 1 and 4. This result concurs with those of 
Bollen et al. (2002) on Ghana using GLSS 2, and Peru. However, the outcome ǲǳ
insignificant (GLSS 1) or positively associated with fertility levels (GLSS 4).  This 
                                                        
93
 Details of this and method (PCA) used to derive the household wealth indicators are given under the 
section on contraceptives. 
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could conveniently be explained as a non-monotonic impact of overall household 
wealth on the number of children born. Thus fertility generally falls upon an ǲǳrises with greater household wealth only 
observed in the later survey year, ceteris paribus. This implies the quality-
quantity trade-off hypothesis could be observed only amongst the lesser-
resourced households, which also happen to constitute the majority of the women 
understudy. 
The Impact of Additional Control and Community Variables 
This section discusses the influence of the additional control variables included in 
the estimation procedures as specification Variant 3. All the remaining variables 
are observed at community levels, with the exception of distance to the nearest 
water source. These variables are included in the model to control for some of the 
physical costs of child services and accessibility to infrastructures that may 
influence fertility. These include health facilities, markets, and schools as well as ǲǳǲǳǡ
men, women and children.  
The variables could be separated into three segments. The first is the health 
related variables, which includes distance to the nearest water source and access Ǣǯ
distance to the nearest primary, middle/JSS, and secondary school, as well as price 
scores ǲǳǲǳǢ
the woman represented by distance to the nearest market, agricultural wage rates ǡǯǯ
agricultural wage. Most of the community variables are not statistically significant. 
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However, at least one variable in each of the segments created is found significant. 
Table 3.45 reports the estimates of these variables. 
For the health related segment, distance to the nearest water source (measured in 
metres) is predicted as increasing the number of births with each metre increase 
in distance. Accessibility of water reduces illness and increases the survival rate of 
children. Thus the need to have more children as replacements in case of infant 
mortality to meet the desired family size is reduced, which subsequently lowers 
fertility. Fetching water is also time consuming, and one of the main household 
chores of women in the households. Therefore with a closer source, some time is 
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Table 3.45: The Impact of Additional Control and Community Variables on Fertility (Reduced Form Model), by All Women, Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 
1998/99 
 GLSS 1    GLSS 4    











































 3.32*** 3.54*** 4.33*** -1.17 3.51*** 2.65**  -1.98*  4.74*** 
Market distance (km) 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.017 0.001 0.001 0.002 -0.002 
 1.27 1.06 0.69 1.34 0.87 0.4 1.54 -0.65 
Primary school distance (km) -0.013 -0.011 -0.005 -0.025 0.001 0.001 0.002 
-4.13 
E-04 
 -0.52 -0.41 -0.16 -0.45 0.99 0.82 1.6 -0.26 




E-04 -0.002 0.003 
 0.11 0.44 0.23 0.6 -0.31 0.08 -1.45 1.21 
Secondary  
school distance (km) 0.007 0.008 0.003 0.009 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 2.16*   2.38*   1.1 1.24 -0.7 -0.65 -0.69 0.44 
Access to Health  
facilities/personnel -0.057 -0.072 -0.04 -0.051 -0.011 -0.018 0.004 -0.078 
 -0.85 -1.04 -0.69 -0.32 -0.22 -0.38 0.07 -0.91 
Price score of 
 ǲfoodstuffsǳ -0.032 -0.056 -0.084 0.07 -0.033 -0.024 0.01 -0.076 
 -0.53 -0.85 -1.37 0.44 -1.42 -0.97 1.03 -1.13 
Price score of  ǲcerealsǳ -0.04 -0.047 -0.07 0.104 0.01 0.009 0.004 -0.006 
 -0.69 -0.79 -1.28 0.72 1.08 0.95 0.2 -0.23 
Log of real men's  
Agric. Wage -0.004 0.012 -0.007 -0.003 -0.01 -0.006 0.048 -0.078 
 -0.14 0.36 -0.27 -0.04 -0.57 -0.31 2.30*  -2.31*  
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Table 3.45 contd: The Impact of Additional Control and Community Variables on Fertility (Reduced Form Model), by All Women, Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 
1998/99 
 GLSS 1    GLSS 4    









Ratio of female to  
men's agric. wage -0.028 -0.03 0.264 -0.905 0.112 0.09 -0.036 0.315 
 -0.2 -0.2 2.00*  -2.51*  1.19 0.94 -0.34 1.58 
Ratio of child to  
men's agric. wage 0.087 0.026 -0.045 0.457 -0.022 -0.018 -0.088 0.124 
 0.52 0.15 -0.29 1.07 -0.22 -0.19 -0.88 0.67 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects of the OLS regression models. Variant 1 control for women currently in school, age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, 
ethnicity and household wealth in addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other determinants. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 
10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
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ǯǡhe nearest secondary school is found 
statistically significant; and that is only in GLSS 1 (the full and rural sub-samples). 
The result indicates that a kilometre increase in distance will tend to increase 
fertility by approximately 0.7 percent, ceteris paribus. The outcome is contrary to 
the theory of the demand for children, which argues that iǯ
schooling would increase the general cost of children, and consequently reduce 
the number desired. However, the outcome here is not unexpected since due to 
the act of child fosterage in West Africa, parents may not be the ones who bear the ǯǤmay therefore increase fertility or make the variable insignificant 
(King, 1987 in Knodel et al., 1990), as observed in this study. Caldwell and 
Caldwell (1987) also suggest that the cost of children to biological parents and ǯ
grandchildren, nephews and nieces. 
ǯal wage rates and the ratio of ǯǤThe 
expected outcome of the former could not be determined a prior. The explanation 
being that fertility could rise if increased wage rates result in increased births, due 
to the economic returns of children. On the other hand, fertility may actually fall 
with the increased wages due to the opportunity cost of time, particularly in 
relation to women. As the results show, both outcomes are possible with the 
samples under-Ǥ
 ?ǡǯ
wages is found statistically significant in sub-samples of younger and older age 
cohorts. The former suggests a positive association between the proportion of ǯcultural wage whilst the latter indicates a converse outcome. 
 ?ǡǯǤ
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ǯ
and in the same sub-samples. It is not very clear why this is case, but the results of 
both variables presumably suggest that the younger women are enticed by the 
higher economic returns of increased births, whereas the opportunity cost of time 
deter the older women from increasing the number of births as the agricultural 
wage rates rise. 
The Impact of Education on Fertility: The Pooled Sample 
Table 3.46 presents the results (abridged version) of the pooled sample estimates 
of education in both GLSS 1 and 4, which show a strong negative association 
between education and fertility level.  With the exception of the older (aged 35-
49) sub-sample, the negative relationship found is statistically significant for all 
levels of education.  
The dummy variable GLSS 1, which is one for the first survey year and zero 
otherwise, suggests a relatively higher fertility level in GLSS 1 than 4; this is after 
adjusting for education and the other socioeconomic variables included in the 
various models. All else held constant, the full sample approximately indicates 43-
percentage points higher fertility in GLSS 1 relative to GLSS 4. The differential 
between the rural and urban sub-samples over the decade is less dramatic 
compared to the age cohorts. For instance, according to Variant 1 women in rural 
and urban areas in GLSS 1 show approximately 41 and 48-percentage points 
higher fertility respectively, whereas younger and older women show 31 and 66-
percentage points higher compared to GLSS 4, ceteris paribus. This somewhat 
suggests that the possible fertility decline over the decade emanates largely from ǯǤǯǲǳ
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age cohorts on fertility levels, then it seems appropriate for policy makers to 
introduce measures to delay births. Some of these measures should include 
encouraging higher female enrolment in school whilst ensuring that they remain 
till at least the secondary level or above; opening more job opportunities for 
women in the labour market; creating a mentoring scheme whereby accomplished 
female professionals become role models to young and upcoming girls; increase 
access to contraception and discourage early marriages.  
Table 3.46: The Impact of Education on Fertility (Reduced Form Model), by All Women, 
Residence & Age Ȃ (Pooled: 1987/88 & 1998/99) 
Pooled Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Variant 1: Parsimonious 
Primary -0.37 -0.273 -0.484 -0.276 -0.273 
 -5.86*** -3.42*** -4.62*** -4.69*** -1.76 
Middle/JSS -0.852 -0.775 -0.931 -0.567 -1.328 
 -17.05*** -12.39*** -10.99*** -11.70*** -11.41*** 
Sec. & above -1.521 -1.745 -1.462 -1.067 -2.249 
 -20.36*** -13.56*** -14.51*** -14.88*** -13.83*** 
GLSS 1 0.426 0.407 0.482 0.31 0.658 
 9.18*** 6.77*** 6.78*** 7.11*** 5.74*** 
Variant 2: Full model 
Primary -0.346 -0.272 -0.418 -0.273 -0.168 
 -5.46*** -3.38*** -3.97*** -4.63*** -1.07 
Middle/JSS -0.781 -0.74 -0.793 -0.546 -1.121 
 -15.03*** -11.30*** -9.04*** -10.84*** -9.13*** 
Sec. & above -1.323 -1.57 -1.215 -0.959 -1.876 
 -16.71*** -11.62*** -11.34*** -12.92*** -10.38*** 
GLSS 1 0.436 0.451 0.446 0.321 0.727 
 9.20*** 7.20*** 6.11*** 7.20*** 6.31*** 
Variant 3: Full model with rural community characteristics 
Primary -0.343 -0.267 -0.418 -0.273 -0.152 
 -5.39*** -3.29*** -3.97*** -4.63*** -0.96 
Middle/JSS -0.775 -0.733 -0.793 -0.545 -1.1 
 -14.91*** -11.17*** -9.04*** -10.83*** -8.92*** 
Sec. & above -1.316 -1.555 -1.216 -0.955 -1.864 
 -16.59*** -11.46*** -11.34*** -12.85*** -10.31*** 
GLSS 1 0.442 0.475 0.446 0.384 0.644 
 8.38*** 5.83*** 6.11*** 8.05*** 4.87*** 
Observation 8103 5062 3041 5572 2531 
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.57 0.48 0.22 
Note: These coefficients are marginal effects of the OLS regression models. Variant 1 control for women currently in school, 
age, rural residence, and Northern regional location. Variant 2 controls for religion, ethnicity and household wealth in 
addition to those in Variant 1. The final Variant 3 includes all the variables already mentioned as well as other 
determinants. See Appendix B-34. *, **, & *** represent statistical significance level at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
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Chapter 4: CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter discusses the main findings and policy implications in the two 
thematic areas as well as possibilities for future research. The chapter is in three 
sections summarising conclusions on health and fertility in that order, and then 
finishing with plans for future research.   
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4.1. HEALTH 
This study examines the relationship between education and health status (the 
incidence of illness and its duration as well as height-for-age and weight-for-
height). The study analyses the effects on children and adult health separately 
because of their different capabilities as well as the fact that decisions for children 
are made by their parents or a responsible adult in the household. Hence it is the 
education of such household members like their parents or household heads that 
should be examined. The analysis on the health outcomes demonstrates several 
things. The premise that education affects health outcomes, as measured in this 
thesis, is confirmed. However, the results are very much mixed in relation to 
health status. The direction of impact is not always as expected albeit this is 
commonly noted in similar studies in developing countries, especially with regard ǯs outcomes. Firstly with regard to illness, parental education is found ǯ
has no influence in the later one. A two-stage instrumental variable (IV) approach 
indeed confirms the relationship regarding maternal education, and this time, in 
both surveys but statistically significant at only the primary levels. Paternal 
education, at the primary levels, however indicates a negative relationship with 
the IV approach in only GLSS 1. These results seem quite robust, as controlling for 
expenditure per capita does not alter the outcomes.  
Secondly, parental education appears comparatively less influential on the ǯ than on the incidence; many of the parental categories 
do not significantly influence the duration of illness unlike its incidence. But the 
pattern is similar, in that a positive relationship is observed between maternal 
education and illness duration in GLSS 1 (albeit only significant in urban areas) 
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but none in GLSS 4. Generally where statistically significant, parental education is 
positively associated with the duration of illness in GLSS 1. In GLSS 4, only 
paternal education is found statistically significant and it has a negative 
association with illness duration. These results on paternal education are 
significant mainly when expenditure per capita is also controlled for. Therefore 
one could argue in this case that paternal education as well as wealth is possibly 
required to reduce the duration of illness. This however would only remain a 
conjecture since the overall result is ambiguous, which does not allow for any 
categorical conclusion on this health measure. However, it is generally quite 
apparent that parental education plausibly tends to be related more to the onset 
of illness than its duration, all other things remaining same. 
A third health status indicator (the anthropometrics) is also examined for 
children. This is in a bid to check whether parental education influences these 
relatively more objective measurements differently from the subjective ones 
above. Unfortunately the estimations are conducted for only GLSS 1 due to lack of 
information in GLSS 4. The sample for estimations is divided into pre-school and 
school-aged children. Parental education is established as having a relatively more 
favourable influence on the anthropometric measures of pre-school children, 
especially in urban areas. Maternal secondary and above for instance seems to be 
positively related to the height-for-age and weight-for-height of pre-schoolers in 
the full sample. However the maternal influence is replaced by paternal when 
expenditure per capita is also controlled for in the model, but only for height-for-
age. The urban sub-sample however still shows strong positive association 
between maternal education (post-primary) ǯǤ-
for-height is not influenced by any measure of the parental education, which is 
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consistent with other similar studies on the country using the same data. The 
results on school-aged children are mixed but mostly insignificant.  
With such results, it could be concluded that the mostly perverse pattern observed 
with the preceding health measures of reported illness and its duration may be 
attributed to systematic reporting bias or over-reporting due to the subjective 
nature of the measures. This is especially with regard to urban children; here 
parental education affects one kind of health status (height) favourably but not 
another (illness). With the anthropometrics being the more objective 
measurement of health of the two, this study could ǯǯǤ This is not to say that analysing 
reported illness is wholly misleading in the study of health. Other health and 
policy related factors such as protected water sources as well as hygienic waste 
disposal have the same outcome in both reported illness and the anthropometrics. 
Therefore, in the absence of clinically tested or more objective measures of health 
especially for adults, reported illness may be informative.  
The estimated results for adults reveal that the relationship between personal 
education and illness as well as its duration is positive in GLSS 1; but the converse 
is true in GLSS 4, ceteris paribus. Apart from the probability of a bias caused by 
different re-call periods of the two surveys, a likely explanation of this observed 
trend is a higher exposure to more advanced modern healthy behaviours that 
might have been adopted by the educated in the later survey year. Controlling for 
the household expenditure per capita or parental education of these adults does 
not produce any dramatic change in the results. The pooled sample of the two 
surveys also supports the mixed outcome regarding the incidence of illness, but 
seems to indicate shorter duration of illness amongst adults with secondary and 
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above level of education relative to none. The pooled estimates suggest that the 
impacts on health outcomes are higher in the earlier survey year than the later. 
The study does not support the hypothesis that education mainly picks up the 
influence of expenditure. Almost all the estimated models that include both 
education and expenditure still show some level of statistical significance of the 
former, and in many cases exhibit only small changes from models from models 
that do not control for expenditure. The estimated magnitudes of education 
change slightly when household expenditure is controlled for; but they do not 
make education totally irrelevant. This implies that education in itself has a direct 
relationship with health outcomes even though it is positively correlated with 
expenditure and might also indirectly work through it. A similar pattern is also 
observed with controls for other policy relevant variables such as household 
public goods. 
The overall effect of education on health is somewhat ambiguous. However the 
favourable effects should not be dismissed as mostly it has been found very 
helpful in preventative care (see Elo, 1992; Joshi, 1994; Matthew and Diamond, 
1997; Lindelöw, 2004). It is just that the influence is not as large or uniform as one 
might expect.  
Another finding of this study is that education continues to have an influence on 
health even after controlling for household wealth (unearned income or 
expenditure). And in most cases the majority of households have better health 
when wealthier. This should guide to policy makers in the allocation of public 
funds. For in as much as investment in education is very important for the 
effective and efficient use of facilities that promote health, focus should also be 
geared towards advancing sectors that would help households to generate more 
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income or wealth. This also involves improving infrastructure and removing 
unnecessary bureaucracies observed in many public institutions including the 
health sector.  
In addition, actual medical facilities ought to be made more accessible as distance 
to health facilities is observed to be a prominent factor in the decision to seek 
treatment in Ghana (Bour, 2003) and other developing countries (see Mwabu et 
al., 1995; and Ssewanyana et al., 2004), and thereby health production. The 
unfavourable effects of long distances to health centres are not only observed in 
the demand for healthcare as noted by the above-mentioned authors but also in ǯs and its duration. Thus if the aim of the health sector ǲǳ
programme, and also to achieve their millennium development goals, then more 
work is needed to improve the proximity to health services.  
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4.2. FERTILITY 
Under this theme, the relation between ǯeducation and fertility is 
analysed by estimating both structural and reduced form models. The former is ǯ (1982) framework of the proximate determinants 
of fertility. All the variation in fertility is captured by variation in its proximate 
determinants, which thereby must serve as the channels through which education 
and the other socioeconomic determinants work. This framework is tested using 
some of the core proximate determinants in this study: contraceptives, age at 
cohabitation and the duration of breastfeeding. Due to the endogeneity of these 
proximate determinants, the impact of education and other socioeconomic 
variables on these proximates is first estimated, and then the predicted values of 
the determinants used as inputs in a structural fertility model. Regarding the 
proximate determinants, the results show that education, mostly post-primary, 
correlates positively with the use of contraception, delays the age at cohabitation 
and shortens the duration of breastfeeding amongst the women under study. 
However, the overall impact on fertility is not as consistent as one would have 
expected.  
First, the fertility model estimated reveals that contraceptive use influences the 
various measures of fertility differently. The results show that contraceptives are 
associated with a higher probability of having at least one child, unless the method 
of contraception used is predominantly abstinence94. The positive association 
between contraceptives and the probability of having at least one child however is 
not surprising, since they are used for timing rather than preventing births. 
                                                        
94
 As observed in GLSS 1, where traditional method of contraception tends to reduce the probability of at 
least one birth; and a higher proportion of women in this survey year record abstinence as the 
traditional method used. 
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Caldwell et al., (1992) observed this especially amongst married women in SSA, 
who they note, are less likely to use contraceptives between marriage and the first 
birth. When fertility is measured as the total number of children a woman has 
ever given birth to though, the results mostly give the anticipated negative 
correlation between contraceptives use and fertility. This is also the case when the 
number of births is conditional on at least one having already occurred. This gives 
the indication that contraception may eventually limit fertility in the long run. 
Secondly, age at cohabitation seems not to have any influence on the likelihood of 
having at least one birth but tends to reduce the overall number of births, 
particularly amongst rural and older women. However, the predicted effect of the 
duration of breastfeeding is ambiguous and should be cited with caution. This is 
because it is statistically significant in only one sub-sample in each survey year 
(the younger and older sub-samples in GLSS 1 and 4 respectively) with differing 
results. The estimated outcome of the first survey year implies that younger 
women who breastfeed for longer have fewer births whereas the converse is the 
case with older women in the later survey year. We could not ascertain whether 
latter perverse finding is a cohort or an age effect. It may reflect an omitted or 
unobserved variable that is highly correlated with breastfeeding and fertility that 
is overriding the true structural effect of breastfeeding. 
A sensitivity analysis conducted to examine the validity of education working 
through only the included proximate determinants on fertility suggests the 
existence of further unexplained variation in the structural model. This is 
performed through the addition of education and other socioeconomic variables 
as controls in the structural model. Some of them including education and 
household wealth are still found statistically significant, which is contrary to the 
  359 
ǯ. This suggests that there are still 
some unobserved proximate determinants of fertility that correlate with 
education, but have been excluded from the model. This is possible because not all 
the fundamental proximate determinants were included in the model, and even 
those included are not perfectly measured. Lack of control for possible extra 
proximate determinants and/or mis-measurement of the available ones is due to 
deficiency of information in the survey data used. 
In spite of this, the results of the proximate determinants only model goes far to 
show that contraception and age at cohabitation are two major channels for 
lowering fertility levels in the country. Therefore it could be inferred that 
education lowers fertility, in this case, through increased contraceptive use and 
delayed age at cohabitation. Less emphasis however ought to be placed on 
breastfeeding since the outcome is too ambiguous. Promotion of the practice in 
the country should therefore be done mainly in the interest of promoting child 
nutrition as well as the health of mother and child but not as a kind of fertility 
control. Instead increased accessibility to contraception as well as enrolment and 
remaining in school for longer to delay births would give the nation a better 
chance of lowering fertility. 
To further establish the influence of education on fertility and more completely 
capture its full influence, a reduced form model is estimated with education as the 
primary determinant and the other socioeconomic factors as control variables. As 
anticipated, education shows a strong negative association with the number of 
births in both GLSS 1 and 4, but is mostly found as statistically significant from the 
post-primary levels in the first survey. The outcome does not change even with 
the control for other socioeconomic variables, such as household wealth, age, 
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residence, religion and ethnicity as well as some community indicators. Having 
such a robust impact of education on fertility suggests it must not be undervalued 
in the quest to control population growth.  
Also one of the essential findings here is that there appears to be a structural shift 
whereby previously women had to have more than primary education to be 
associated with the lowering influence of fertility in the country. Currently, this 
has moved from the post-primary in GLSS 1 to primary in GLSS 4, which is 
indicative of a fallen threshold for when education reduces fertility. One 
explanation is plausible improvement in the content of primary education, or a 
gradual diffusion of ideas overtime from higher to lower grades, or a combination 
of both. However most importantly this chapter shows that education, either 
directly or indirectly, could reduce fertility levels in the country. A pooled sample 
estimation of the two survey years also suggests fertility levels are likely to be 
higher by roughly 40 percent in the first survey year compared to the later one, all 
else held same. This implies a fertility decline between the years in the country. 
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4.3. FUTURE RESEARCH 
This study raises new questions even as it finds solutions to those previously 
outlined. Data limitations mean that the findings are not always conclusive. Future 
research in this area would seek to explore the robustness of the results using 
more recent household living standard survey data, and also, other available data 
on health and fertility indicators such as maternal health care, clinically tested 
disease measures and additional proximate determinants including post-partum 
abstinence, sterility and the frequency of abortion. These would give more 
understanding of the health and reproductive behaviour in the country. Some 
researches, like Agyei-Mensah (2005), suspect increased abortion may explain a 
considerably part of the decreased fertility levels. There are currently no nation-
wide data on abortion, probably due to the sensitive nature of the indicator and 
the fact that it is currently illegal unless the pregnancy is life threatening and 
recommended by a medical practitioner. However a community-based study by 
Ahiadeke (cited in Agyei-Mensah, 2005) for instance reveals that women in 
southern Ghana abort 19 out of 100 pregnancies. Thus widespread pockets of 
such studies may contribute to finding variations in the fertility levels in the 
country.  
Additional research on the supply side, especially in relation to health, would be 
useful for further explanation to the outcomes observed in the household data. 
Analysis of the recently introduced national health insurance as well as the role of 
private investors/care providers in the supply of health could be valuable in 
understanding the demand for health.   
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APPENDIX A:  
A-1: Summary of Literature Reviewed on Both Final Health Outcomes and Inputs 
Author(s)/Area Dataset/Sample Health Measures (D.V) Educational 
Variables 
Control of a. income95  
b. parental education96 
Results: education 
Wolfe and Behrman 
(1984)/Nicaragua 
Household survey/women Wǯȋ
past 180 days too sick to 





diseases: typhoid & high 
blood pressure)97 










(not significant); days ill 
(not significant) 
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 Or any household wealth 
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 In the case oIDGXOWV¶VDPSOHV 
97
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(1987) 




height and bicep 
circumference) 
Mothersǣǯ
(defined as days too ill to 

















significant with the ǯ
family endowments. 
ǯ: 
personal schooling (Not 
significant) 
98Wolfe and Behrman 
(1987) 















Kenya: livestock pc (+); 
women: land pc (-); trees 
pc (-) 
ǯ: urban: 
predicted consumption (-) 
 
ADULTS 
Kenya: women: primary 
(+); secondary (-); men: 
secondary (+) 
ǯ: rural: ǯȋ-); ǯ
(+)  
 
                                                        
98
 7KHHGXFDWLRQHIIHFWVDUHQRPRUHVLJQLILFDQWZLWKWKHFRQWURORIWKHPRWKHU¶VFKLOGKRRGEDFNJURXQGUHODWHGDELOLWLHVPRWLYDtion, knowledge and tastes. 
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    CHILDREN 
Kenya: girls: land pc (+); 
trees pc (-) 
CHILDREN 
Kenyaǣǯ
primary (+); girls: male ǯȋ ?ȌǢboys: 
senior ǯ
secondary (-) 
Tanzania: girls: senior ǯȋ ?ȌǢ
boys: ǯ
primary (+) 
ǯ: rural: ǯȋ ?ȌǢ 
urban Ȃ boys: ǯȋ ?ȌǢǯ
primary (+) 







personal primary (+); ǯȋ ?ȌǢ 
rural Ȃ women: 
secondary (-) 
urban: personal primary 
(-) 
 
    CHILDREN 
Kenya: land pc (-); trees 
pc (-) 
Tanzania: land pc (+) 
CHILDREN 
Kenyaǣǯ
primary (-); senior ǯȋ-) 
ǯ: rural: ǯprimary (-) 
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Lawson (2004)/Uganda Household survey (DHS): 
1999/ children and adults 
Self-reported illness over the 





Expenditure per adult 
equivalent 
(instrumented): 
Adults Ȃ male (+) 
School-aged children Ȃ 
female (-)  








(+); female Ȃ ǯȋ ?ȌǢǯ
primary (+) 








boys: ǯȂ primary 










girls: ǯȂ primary ȋ ?ȌǢǯȂ 
secondary (+) 
Jalan and Ravallion 
(2003)/ rural India 
Household survey/ children 






Income: illness (-); 
duration (-) 
Illness: (-) Duration: (-) 
Katahoire et al., (2004)/ 
Uganda 
Household survey in a rural 
district of Samia Bugwe/ 








Maternal schooling ǯhooling Scores on family living conditions: includes iron 
roof, brick walls, cement 
floor, bicycle, radio, 
electricity and latrine. 
Morbidity; stunting; 
wasting: Not significant 
Mortality: (-); 
Immunisation: (+) 
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France, UK, Ireland, Italy, 
Greece, Spain, Portugal, 




Duration of good health 
(where poor health is 
chronic physical or mental 
health problems, illness or 
disability) 
Personal education Household income (+) 
except Spain highest 
income quartile (-), 
Denmark, Belgium, 
Ireland, Italy, Greece, 
Austria and Finland (not 
significant for any income 
quartile) 
Education: (+) in all 
countries except 
Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Belgium 
(not significant) 
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Doyle et al. 
(2007)/England 
Health survey 1997-2002/ 
children aged 15 and below 
Ill health status 
Chronic health condition 
(CHC) 
ǯ 	ǯ Annual family income: ill health (-); 
CHC (-) 
 
2SLS/IV (income):  
ill health (-);  
CHC (-) 
 




2SLS/IV (education):  
Ill Health: ǯȋ-);  
CHC: mother (-) ǯȋ
in all) 
 
Blunch (2004)/ Ghana  Household survey Ȃ GLSS 4/ 
children and adults (for 
prenatal) 
Illness 












Adult literacy course 
participation 
Formal schooling99 
Income of other 
household members 
Predicted maternal wage 
rates 
Illness: English reading 
(-); 
English writing (+); 
literacy course (+) 
Mortality: English 
writing (-); other 
education (-) 
Vaccinations: literacy 
course (+); Middle/JSS 
(+) 
Postnatal care: literacy 
course (+); secondary & 
above 
Prenatal care: primary 
(+) 
                                                        
99
 This is in categorical terms such as: Primary, Middle/JSS, Secondary & above, Vocational and other 
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or more  




Income of other 
household members 





Completed primary or 
more (-); Literacy & 
numeracy (-) 
2SLS/IV: none significant 
Rural 
OLS: Literacy & 
numeracy (-) 
2SLS/IV: Literacy & 
numeracy (-); literacy 
course (-); 
Urban 
OLS: Completed primary 
or more (-) 
2SLS/IV: none significant 
  Postnatal care 
 
  Postnatal care:  
Full sample 
OLS & 2SLS/IV: 
Literacy course (+) 
Rural 
OLS & 2SLS/IV: 
Literacy course (+) 
Urban 
OLS & 2SLS/IV: 
Literacy course (+) 
  382 
  Vaccinations   Vaccinations:  
Full sample 
OLS: Literacy course (+); 
Completed primary or 
more (+) 
2SLS/IV: Completed 
primary or more (+) 
Rural 
OLS: Literacy course (+); 
Completed primary or 
more (+) 
2SLS/IV: Completed 
primary or more (+) 
Urban 
OLS & 2SLS/IV: none 
significant 
Glewwe (1998)/ Morocco Household survey/Children 
at the age of 5 and below. 
Height-for-age (HAZ) ȗǯ

















Health knowledge (+) 
                                                        
100
 But not when the test scores (maths, French, Arabic and health knowledge) are included as endogenous. 
101
 Not significant when test scores are added. None of the test scores too are found statistically significant, either on their own or jointly. 
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Unearned income HAZ: 
(+) in only urban areas 
Child survival: (+) except 
urban south 
 
HAZǣǯȋ ?ȌǢǯȋ ?Ȍ 
Child survivalǣǯȋ ?ȌǢǯȋ ?Ȍ 







Income (+) HAZǣǯȋ ?ȌǢǯȋ ?Ȍ 
 









television, presence of 
toilet, number of cows, 
buffaloes etc (not 
significant); 
 





Alderman and Garcia 
(1994)/ rural Pakistan 
Household survey/ children 












Lavy et al., (1996)/ Ghana Household survey GLSS 2 
(1988-89)/Children up to 
11 years of age 
Probability of child survival 
 
ǯ
(years of education 
and its square) 
 Weak joint significance 
(individually 
insignificant)102 
                                                        
102
 The direction of effect depends on the sample: full(-); urban (+); rural (-); male (+); female (-) 
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  Height-for-age  
Weight-for-height 
Motheǯ
education (years of 
education and its 
square) 
 
Expenditure per capita 
(instrumented) 
HAZ: (+) 
WHZ: Not significant 
HAZ: Both significant (+) 
at higher levels of 
education 
WHZ: Only paternal 
Asenso-Okyere et al., 
(1997)/ Ghana 
Household survey GLSS 1 









per capita (only for) 
WHZ: not significant 
HAZ: (not significant) 
WHZ: (not significant) 
Glewwe and Desai (1999)/ 
Ghana 
Household survey GLSS 2 
(1988-89)/Children at the 
age of 5 and below. 
Height-for-age (HAZ) ȗǯ
(years of schooling; 
scores on cognitive 
achievement tests; ǯȌǤ 	ǯ
(years) 
Land (not significant) HAZ: - ǯ
education (not 
significant) 
















Infant mortality ȗǯ a. No 
 
Maternal education (-) 
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  Height-for-age (HAZ)   Maternal education (+) 
in only few countries 
when socio-economic 
variables are controlled. 
  Immunisation status   Maternal education (+) 
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A-2: The Impact of Parental Education on The Probability of Child Illness, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
Sample: 
Variant 1: parental 
education only 
w/ water & 
sanitation 





& water and 
sanitation 





income & quad 
& water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 1 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.068 3.15**  0.07 3.21**  0.065 2.92**  0.066 2.95**  0.064 2.95**  0.065 3.01**  
Mother's Middle 0.033 2.07*   0.035 2.18*   0.035 2.15*   0.037 2.26*   0.031 1.94 0.033 2.03*   
Mother's Sec & above 0.091 2.21*   0.094 2.28*   0.085 1.89 0.086 1.9 0.087 2.07*   0.088 2.11*   
Father's Primary 0.014 0.51 0.013 0.48 0.028 0.93 0.029 0.96 0.017 0.61 0.016 0.58 
Father's Middle 0.034 2.18*   0.034 2.17*   0.049 2.51*   0.051 2.60**  0.028 1.8 0.028 1.78 
Father's Sec & above 0.048 1.97*   0.048 1.99*   0.065 2.32*   0.067 2.39*   0.041 1.7 0.041 1.71 
Observation no. 6378            
Urban             
Mother's Primary 0.114 3.00**  0.104 2.77**  0.114 2.81**  0.106 2.68**  0.109 2.88**  0.101 2.69**  
Mother's Middle 0.097 3.71*** 0.089 3.38*** 0.099 3.64*** 0.092 3.38*** 0.089 3.39*** 0.083 3.13**  
Mother's Sec & above 0.177 3.56*** 0.169 3.39*** 0.191 3.53*** 0.184 3.39*** 0.156 3.05**  0.152 2.97**  
Father's Primary -0.036 -0.65 -0.03 -0.55 -0.036 -0.64 -0.029 -0.51 -0.041 -0.74 -0.035 -0.63 
Father's Middle -0.028 -1.05 -0.021 -0.78 -0.029 -0.76 -0.018 -0.46 -0.034 -1.28 -0.027 -1.01 
Father's Sec & above -0.053 -1.53 -0.049 -1.41 -0.052 -1.18 -0.044 -0.97 -0.062 -1.78 -0.058 -1.65 
Observation no. 2410            
Rural             
Mother's Primary 0.033 1.25 0.037 1.39 0.04 1.43 0.044 1.55 0.03 1.14 0.034 1.27 
Mother's Middle 0.009 0.42 0.011 0.52 0.011 0.51 0.014 0.67 0.01 0.5 0.012 0.57 
Mother's Sec & above 0.117 1.19 0.126 1.27 0.102 1.09 0.119 1.24 0.113 1.14 0.119 1.2 
Father's Primary 0.042 1.29 0.043 1.32 0.042 1.18 0.046 1.3 0.044 1.36 0.046 1.41 
Father's Middle 0.057 2.92**  0.059 3.02**  0.052 2.36*   0.056 2.53*   0.052 2.62**  0.053 2.70**  
Father's Sec & above 0.119 3.48*** 0.125 3.65*** 0.116 3.13**  0.127 3.36*** 0.111 3.27**  0.118 3.45*** 
Observation no. 3968            
*Refer to notes in text 
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A-3: The Impact of Parental Education on The Probability of Child Illness, 1998/99 (GLSS 4) 
GLSS 4 
Variant 1: parental 
education only 
w/ water & 
sanitation 
Variant 2: w/ 
expenditure 
& quadratic 
w/ expenditure & 
quadratic & water 
and sanitation 




income & quadratic 
& water and 
sanitation 
Sample: Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.009 0.59 0.011 0.76 0.006 0.49 0.009 0.76 0.005 0.35 0.008 0.53 
Mother's Middle 0.013 0.97 0.016 1.17 0.004 0.38 0.008 0.68 0.01 0.7 0.013 0.92 
Mother's Sec & above 0.01 0.35 0.014 0.5 0.006 0.26 0.01 0.42 0.005 0.2 0.01 0.35 
Father's Primary 0.029 1.53 0.028 1.48 0.002 0.16 0.002 0.12 0.031 1.61 0.03 1.57 
Father's Middle -0.007 -0.57 -0.006 -0.51 -0.023 -2.15*   -0.021 -1.99*   -0.008 -0.64 -0.007 -0.56 
Father's Sec & above 0.018 1 0.021 1.11 -0.01 -0.7 -0.007 -0.5 0.014 0.76 0.016 0.88 
Observation no. 11660            
Urban             
Mother's Primary -0.007 -0.29 -0.007 -0.31 -0.008 -0.4 -0.008 -0.37 -0.011 -0.46 -0.011 -0.46 
Mother's Middle -0.004 -0.18 -0.004 -0.2 -0.012 -0.66 -0.011 -0.62 -0.008 -0.4 -0.008 -0.39 
Mother's Sec & above 0.011 0.35 0.011 0.33 0 0 0.001 0.02 0.007 0.21 0.007 0.21 
Father's Primary -0.017 -0.61 -0.017 -0.61 -0.014 -0.56 -0.015 -0.59 -0.013 -0.48 -0.013 -0.48 
Father's Middle -0.02 -0.94 -0.02 -0.95 -0.032 -1.56 -0.031 -1.54 -0.02 -0.95 -0.02 -0.94 
Father's Sec & above -0.022 -0.9 -0.023 -0.92 -0.023 -0.96 -0.022 -0.94 -0.029 -1.2 -0.028 -1.19 
Observation no. 3547            
Rural             
Mother's Primary 0.015 0.82 0.019 1.04 0.017 1.13 0.021 1.38 0.011 0.64 0.016 0.87 
Mother's Middle 0.024 1.35 0.03 1.65 0.02 1.38 0.025 1.72 0.021 1.17 0.026 1.48 
Mother's Sec & above 0.019 0.4 0.027 0.55 0.021 0.52 0.029 0.72 0.012 0.26 0.019 0.4 
Father's Primary 0.043 1.79 0.041 1.73 0.007 0.4 0.007 0.38 0.043 1.78 0.041 1.73 
Father's Middle -0.008 -0.5 -0.006 -0.43 -0.025 -1.92 -0.023 -1.8 -0.009 -0.63 -0.008 -0.55 
Father's Sec & above 0.044 1.68 0.048 1.83 -0.004 -0.23 -0.001 -0.04 0.04 1.55 0.044 1.69 
Observation no. 8113            
*Refer to notes in text 
 
  388 
A-4: The Impact of Parental Education on The Probability of Child Illness, 1987/88 & 1998/99 (Pooled) 
Pooled 
Variant 1: parental 
education only w/ water & sanitation 
Variant 2: w/ 
expend. & quadratic 
w/ expend. & quadratic 
& water and sanitation 
Variant 3: w/ 
unearned income & 
quadratic 
w/ unearned  
income & quad & water  
and sanitation 
Sample: Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.023 2.16*   0.026 2.37*   0.024 2.21*   0.027 2.45*   0.02 1.84 0.022 2.05*   
Mother's Middle 0.015 1.69 0.018 1.98*   0.012 1.25 0.014 1.53 0.013 1.4 0.015 1.68 
Mother's Sec & above 0.03 1.53 0.035 1.74 0.019 0.92 0.022 1.08 0.029 1.44 0.033 1.64 
Father's Primary 0.013 0.94 0.012 0.87 0.005 0.37 0.003 0.23 0.013 0.93 0.012 0.87 
Father's Middle 0.003 0.3 0.004 0.4 -0.007 -0.74 -0.007 -0.74 -0.001 -0.12 0 -0.01 
Father's Sec & above 0.018 1.45 0.02 1.59 0.007 0.54 0.008 0.57 0.016 1.25 0.017 1.38 
GLSS_1 0.093 12.71*** 0.087 11.70*** 0.287 3.09**  0.302 3.25**  0.09 10.57*** 0.086 9.90*** 
Observation no. 18038            
Urban             
Mother's Primary 0.025 1.31 0.025 1.3 0.022 1.13 0.023 1.16 0.021 1.11 0.022 1.11 
Mother's Middle 0.023 1.52 0.023 1.51 0.019 1.17 0.019 1.2 0.02 1.28 0.02 1.28 
Mother's Sec & above 0.058 2.22*   0.057 2.21*   0.044 1.54 0.044 1.56 0.052 2.02*   0.052 2.02*   
Father's Primary -0.012 -0.48 -0.012 -0.48 -0.021 -0.84 -0.022 -0.86 -0.01 -0.39 -0.01 -0.39 
Father's Middle -0.017 -1.05 -0.017 -1.05 -0.029 -1.53 -0.029 -1.54 -0.018 -1.16 -0.018 -1.16 
Father's Sec & above -0.014 -0.71 -0.014 -0.71 -0.028 -1.25 -0.028 -1.25 -0.017 -0.85 -0.016 -0.85 
GLSS_1 0.135 10.66*** 0.135 10.66*** 0.301 2.04*   0.304 2.02*   0.148 9.66*** 0.148 9.66*** 
Observation no. 5957            
Rural             
Mother's Primary 0.023 1.77 0.027 2.08*   0.024 1.82 0.029 2.14*   0.02 1.53 0.024 1.84 
Mother's Middle 0.014 1.24 0.018 1.59 0.009 0.76 0.013 1.05 0.012 1.07 0.016 1.4 
Mother's Sec & above 0.022 0.63 0.032 0.88 0.008 0.23 0.015 0.41 0.021 0.59 0.03 0.82 
Father's Primary 0.021 1.33 0.022 1.36 0.015 0.88 0.014 0.87 0.02 1.23 0.02 1.27 
Father's Middle 0.004 0.36 0.006 0.53 -0.003 -0.29 -0.002 -0.2 -0.001 -0.1 0.001 0.07 
Father's Sec & above 0.041 2.39*   0.045 2.62**  0.031 1.71 0.033 1.85 0.038 2.25*   0.042 2.47*   
GLSS_1 -0.007 -0.36 -0.02 -0.94 0.195 1.29 0.206 1.36 -0.007 -0.31 -0.017 -0.81 
Observation no. 12081            
  389 
AȂ5a: First-stage regression of endogenous parental education variables, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
GLSS 1 Mat.Primary  Mat.Mid/JSS  Mat.Sec  Pat.Primary  Pat.Mid/JSS  Pat.Sec  
Full Sample: 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Age1629*Western 0.179 4.60*** 0.21 3.67*** 0.029 1.36 -0.095 -2.78** 0.132 2.05* 0.016 0.44 
Age3039*Western 0.127 3.65*** 0.262 4.62*** 0.024 1.22 -0.041 -1.08 0.053 0.82 0.062 1.6 
Age4049*Western 0.07 2.01* -0.016 -0.32 0.013 0.75 -0.117 -3.46*** -0.128 -1.92 -0.016 -0.47 
Age50pl*Western 0.008 0.26 0.104 1.64 -0.014 -0.85 0.007 0.16 -0.18 -2.50* -0.013 -0.31 
Age1629*Central 0.143 4.12*** 0.023 0.37 0.019 0.94 0.003 0.11 0.097 1.36 0.011 0.25 
Age3039*Central 0.112 3.47*** 0.063 1.01 0.029 1.31 0.023 0.83 0.03 0.42 0.011 0.25 
Age4049*Central 0.138 3.54*** -0.042 -0.69 0.03 1.34 0.044 1.21 -0.079 -1.07 -0.061 -1.63 
Age50pl*Central -0.003 -0.12 -0.101 -1.42 -0.022 -1.27 -0.031 -1.68 -0.142 -1.68 -0.106 -2.63**  
Age1629*GtAccra 0.043 1.4 0.213 3.87*** 0.016 0.63 -0.009 -0.32 0.072 1.26 0.086 1.86 
Age3039*GtAccra 0.061 2.26* 0.073 1.48 0.118 4.19*** -0.043 -1.83 -0.031 -0.6 0.138 3.39*** 
Age4049*GtAccra 0.11 2.91** -0.143 -2.69** 0.065 1.92 0.003 0.1 -0.042 -0.7 -0.013 -0.3 
Age50pl*GtAccra 0.008 0.24 -0.003 -0.04 -0.011 -0.42 -0.045 -1.61 -0.053 -0.77 0.06 1.09 
Age1629*Eastern 0.084 2.45* 0.315 5.92*** 0.024 1.15 -0.031 -1 0.117 2.13* 0.038 0.91 
Age3039*Eastern 0.117 3.32*** 0.237 4.44*** 0.019 0.84 -0.046 -1.49 0.159 2.88** -0.033 -0.86 
Age4049*Eastern -0.014 -0.47 0.028 0.53 -0.009 -0.54 -0.025 -0.74 -0.081 -1.41 -0.004 -0.11 
Age50pl*Eastern -0.011 -0.35 0.011 0.19 -0.004 -0.19 -0.052 -1.66 -0.165 -2.62** -0.064 -1.59 
Age1629*Volta 0.089 2.27* 0.272 4.97*** 0.012 0.64 -0.102 -2.70** 0.104 1.72 0.033 0.77 
Age3039*Volta 0.024 0.7 0.133 2.44* 0.076 2.93** -0.084 -2.14* 0.086 1.39 0.078 1.78 
Age4049*Volta 0.057 1.5 0.167 2.98** 0.008 0.47 -0.105 -2.83** -0.174 -2.97** 0.045 1.03 
Age50pl*Volta 0.037 0.82 0.046 0.72 0.013 0.59 -0.096 -2.19* -0.141 -1.97* -0.027 -0.56 
Age1629*Ashanti 0.132 4.72*** 0.247 5.39*** 0.044 4.47*** -0.018 -1.1 0.058 1.26 0.042 1.24 
Age3039*Ashanti 0.067 2.79** 0.113 2.59** 0.064 5.08*** 0.006 0.36 -0.075 -1.63 0.062 1.84 
Age4049*Ashanti 0.08 2.79** -0.065 -1.47 0.022 4.98*** 0.036 1.73 -0.071 -1.43 -0.053 -1.71 
Age50pl*Ashanti 0.038 1.45 0.019 0.41 0.031 3.36*** 0.013 0.71 -0.113 -2.30* -0.07 -2.31*   
Age1629*Brong-Ahafo 0.126 2.93** 0.257 4.49*** 0.049 2.55* -0.078 -2.44* 0.122 1.84 0.032 0.68 
Age3039*Brong-Ahafo 0.158 3.53*** 0.238 4.15*** 0.014 1.04 -0.057 -1.73 0.018 0.27 0.001 0.02 
Age4049*Brong-Ahafo 0.069 1.58 0.065 1.16 0.019 1.48 -0.074 -2.20* -0.108 -1.59 -0.049 -1.11 
Age50pl*Brong-Ahafo 0.025 0.56 -0.073 -1.27 -0.004 -0.34 -0.072 -2.33* -0.243 -3.42*** -0.099 -2.14*   
Age1629*Northern 0.037 2.11* 0.128 4.24*** 0.066 4.44*** -0.039 -2.18* 0.084 1.8 0.092 2.88**  
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Age3039*Northern 0.044 3.07** 0.163 5.43*** 0.063 5.93*** -0.067 -8.62*** 0.038 0.97 0.053 2.10*   
Age4049*Northern 0.028 2.84** 0.105 4.00*** 0.047 6.77*** -0.06 -8.15*** 0.033 0.84 0.026 1.1 
Age50pl*Northern 0.024 3.16** 0.143 3.63*** 0.035 5.19*** -0.044 -5.92*** 0.052 1.09 0.002 0.09 
Age1629*Upper-West 0.019 1.59 0.133 2.52* 0.049 5.67*** -0.126 -1.89 0.024 0.26 0.068 1.35 
Age3039*Upper-West 0.023 2.05* 0.126 2.85** 0.054 6.69*** -0.155 -2.57* -0.009 -0.1 0.042 0.99 
Age4049*Upper-West 0.084 1.44 0.125 2.78** 0.054 6.78*** -0.153 -2.55* 0.146 1.2 0.032 0.76 
Age50pl*Upper-West 0.029 2.55* 0.135 3.04** 0.056 7.26*** -0.156 -2.60** -0.023 -0.28 0.036 0.84 
Age1629*Upper-East 0.099 2.04* 0.232 2.90** 0.09 2.36* 0.021 0.25 0.183 1.54 0.129 1.99*   
Age3039*Upper-East 0.123 2.64** 0.107 2.47* 0.051 6.35*** -0.147 -2.58** 0.034 0.32 0.041 0.98 
Age4049*Upper-East 0.009 0.83 0.115 2.04* 0.039 3.98*** -0.135 -2.36* -0.089 -0.86 0.102 1.51 
Age50pl*Upper-East 0.029 2.77** 0.116 2.43* 0.054 5.23*** -0.146 -2.55* -0.121 -1.34 0.034 0.78 
Grandfather's education -0.002 -1.38 0.027 9.83*** 0.007 4.31*** -0.002 -1.79 0.008 2.86** 0.019 7.58*** 
Grandmother's education -0.004 -1.01 -0.007 -1.1 0.009 1.88 -0.006 -4.52*** 0.006 0.87 -0.004 -0.78 
Missing Grandparents  
education 0.03 2.91** 0.149 10.43*** 0.044 6.63*** -0.058 -8.07*** 0.124 8.17*** 0.065 6.20*** 
Constant 0.049 1.49 0.31 4.11*** 0.149 2.44* 0.051 1.59 0.574 7.02*** 0.12 2.14*   
Obs. 6378  6378  6378  6378  6378  6378  
R-sq. 0.043  0.171  0.089  0.039  0.159  0.083  
Adj. R-sq 0.035  0.164  0.081  0.03  0.151  0.075  
F-test of instruments 4.14  13.21  3.35  4.69  7.3  5.37  
P-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
*Notes: (1) Ȃ Only the estimates of the instrumental variables are reported; the control variables are suppressed for brevity. 
(2) Ȃ The first stage of models conditioning on expenditure (variant 2) are also estimated but not reported for brevity. 
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AȂ5b: First-stage regression of endogenous parental education variables, 1998/99 (GLSS 4) 
GLSS 4 Mat.Primary  Mat.Mid/JSS  Mat.Sec  Pat.Primary  Pat.Mid/JSS  Pat.Sec  
Full Sample: 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Age1629*Western 0.056 1.73 0.115 2.92** -0.007 -0.56 -0.105 -3.23** 0.044 0.96 0.024 0.83 
Age3039*Western 0.053 1.84 0.068 1.93 0.031 2.25* -0.102 -3.33*** -0.005 -0.13 0.097 3.47*** 
Age4049*Western 0.035 1.08 0.082 2.06* 0.01 0.67 -0.13 -4.14*** -0.122 -2.66** 0.103 3.13**  
Age50pl*Western 0.023 0.6 -0.068 -1.61 0.047 2.02* -0.076 -1.94 -0.176 -3.13** 0.02 0.53 
Age1629*Central 0.001 0.02 0.094 2.46* -0.024 -1.17 -0.089 -2.21* 0.109 2.09* -0.071 -2.23*   
Age3039*Central 0.027 0.72 0.065 1.94 0.006 0.28 -0.037 -0.94 0.042 0.87 -0.052 -1.68 
Age4049*Central -0.02 -0.54 0.086 2.35* -0.017 -0.81 -0.135 -3.55*** -0.012 -0.24 -0.007 -0.2 
Age50pl*Central -0.063 -1.61 0.023 0.6 -0.001 -0.06 -0.13 -3.28** -0.08 -1.47 -0.06 -1.75 
Age1629*GtAccra 0.142 3.39*** 0.056 0.97 0.068 2.83** -0.045 -1.08 0.071 1.19 -0.099 -1.87 
Age3039*GtAccra 0.076 2.20* 0.046 0.87 0.166 6.98*** -0.071 -1.89 -0.058 -1.11 0.048 0.94 
Age4049*GtAccra 0.058 1.5 0.067 1.15 0.119 4.44*** -0.063 -1.54 -0.113 -1.97* 0.046 0.84 
Age50pl*GtAccra 0.123 2.50* 0.043 0.66 0.068 2.40* -0.104 -2.59** -0.025 -0.38 -0.123 -2.12*   
Age1629*Eastern 0.118 3.69*** -0.001 -0.02 -0.042 -2.52* 0.056 1.95 0.103 2.32* -0.119 -3.59*** 
Age3039*Eastern 0.042 1.59 0.113 3.06** 0.022 1.24 0.011 0.44 0.038 0.93 -0.034 -1.07 
Age4049*Eastern 0.092 3.00** 0.053 1.34 0.006 0.35 -0.016 -0.64 0.057 1.29 -0.068 -2.03*   
Age50pl*Eastern 0.12 3.37*** -0.043 -1 0.031 1.39 0.021 0.73 -0.092 -1.94 -0.107 -3.12**  
Age1629*Volta 0.067 2.12* 0.048 1.23 0.007 0.39 -0.056 -2.59** 0.07 1.56 -0.036 -1.13 
Age3039*Volta 0.039 1.53 0.004 0.14 0.013 0.91 0.02 0.89 -0.079 -2.07* 0.058 1.86 
Age4049*Volta 0.085 2.76** 0.002 0.05 0.041 2.25* -0.026 -1.11 -0.073 -1.74 0.058 1.69 
Age50pl*Volta 0.047 1.36 -0.057 -1.44 0.026 1.32 0.023 0.78 -0.142 -3.05** -0.116 -3.79*** 
Age1629*Ashanti 0.064 2.02* 0.025 0.68 0 0 -0.008 -0.31 -0.024 -0.6 0.052 1.75 
Age3039*Ashanti 0.089 3.03** 0.001 0.02 0.007 0.45 -0.007 -0.29 -0.028 -0.75 0.031 1.11 
Age4049*Ashanti 0.1 3.02** -0.017 -0.44 0.011 0.68 0.086 3.07** -0.145 -3.58*** -0.027 -0.94 
Age50pl*Ashanti -0.023 -0.74 -0.011 -0.29 -0.027 -1.92 0.013 0.5 -0.22 -5.25*** -0.026 -0.86 
Age1629*Brong-Ahafo 0.136 3.00** 0.143 2.63** 0.037 1.87 -0.072 -2.01* 0.091 1.45 0.009 0.24 
Age3039*Brong-Ahafo 0.069 1.86 0.069 1.49 0.013 0.96 0.004 0.1 0.018 0.32 0.023 0.66 
Age4049*Brong-Ahafo -0.006 -0.15 -0.006 -0.11 -0.008 -0.63 -0.026 -0.69 -0.196 -3.22** 0.025 0.63 
Age50pl*Brong-Ahafo -0.052 -1.38 -0.067 -1.28 -0.005 -0.33 -0.059 -1.6 -0.284 -4.47*** -0.042 -1.04 
Age1629*Northern 0.071 2.54* 0.074 3.66*** 0.019 3.32*** -0.096 -1.91 0.025 0.55 0.112 3.28**  
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Age3039*Northern 0.062 2.52* 0.05 2.94** 0.017 3.61*** -0.089 -1.82 -0.025 -0.6 0.064 2.10*   
Age4049*Northern -0.016 -0.75 0.058 2.90** 0.016 3.28** -0.145 -2.95** -0.034 -0.76 0.005 0.18 
Age50pl*Northern 0.019 0.61 0.075 2.44* 0.01 1.93 -0.075 -1.25 -0.083 -1.82 0.027 0.72 
Age1629*Upper-West 0.007 1.32 0.077 1.18 0.005 0.11 -0.015 -0.42 -0.035 -0.37 0.195 3.01**  
Age3039*Upper-West 0.023 2.18* -0.001 -0.02 -0.032 -1.05 -0.023 -0.69 -0.118 -1.48 0 0 
Age4049*Upper-West 0.089 2.35* 0.127 1.87 0.1 1.81 -0.047 -1.55 -0.005 -0.06 0.138 2.47*   
Age50pl*Upper-West 0 -0.02 -0.061 -1.46 -0.027 -0.89 0.019 0.4 -0.215 -2.77** -0.028 -1.01 
Age1629*Upper-East 0.005 0.12 0.022 0.73 0.034 3.04** -0.082 -1.85 -0.065 -1.12 -0.045 -0.96 
Age3039*Upper-East -0.001 -0.03 0.052 1.65 0.023 3.30*** -0.1 -2.40* -0.086 -1.58 0.037 0.76 
Age4049*Upper-East -0.019 -0.51 0.024 0.78 0.023 2.99** -0.099 -2.37* -0.087 -1.58 -0.063 -1.4 
Age50pl*Upper-East -0.04 -1.01 0.012 0.35 0.015 2.55* -0.038 -0.73 -0.089 -1.46 -0.088 -1.98*   
Grandfather's education 0.006 4.62*** 0.009 5.74*** 0.005 5.72*** 0.002 1.45 0.004 2.54* 0.015 10.60*** 
Missing Grandfather's  
education 0.039 2.53* 0.027 1.52 0.029 2.96** -0.026 -1.88 0.049 2.31* 0.037 2.26*   
Grandmother's education -0.005 -2.23* 0.008 3.00** 0.013 6.12*** -0.005 -3.02** -0.011 -4.00*** 0.019 7.73*** 
Missing Grandmother's  
education -0.013 -0.91 0.024 1.43 -0.016 -1.68 -0.009 -0.63 -0.015 -0.75 0.022 1.37 
Constant 0.096 2.72** 0.32 7.08*** 0.096 3.68*** 0.05 2.59** 0.343 7.08*** 0.235 5.67*** 
Obs. 11660  11660  11660  11660  11660  11660  
R-sq. 0.035  0.1  0.081  0.027  0.117  0.105  
Adj. R-sq 0.03  0.096  0.077  0.022  0.113  0.101  
F-test of instruments 4.38  4.16  5.06  3.96  6.08  11.48  
P-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  
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AȂ5c: First-stage regression of endogenous parental education variables, 1987/88 & 1998/99 (Pooled) 
 Mat.Primary  Mat.Mid/JSS  Mat.Sec  Pat.Primary  Pat.Mid/JSS  Pat.Sec  
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Age1629*Western 0.099 3.86*** 0.13 4.02*** 0.003 0.28 -0.103 -4.15*** 0.07 1.89 0.02 0.87 
Age3039*Western 0.074 3.22** 0.114 3.82*** 0.026 2.34* -0.082 -3.37*** 0.004 0.11 0.085 3.76*** 
Age4049*Western 0.045 1.83 0.028 0.89 0.008 0.7 -0.123 -5.11*** -0.136 -3.62*** 0.061 2.48*   
Age50pl*Western 0.012 0.45 -0.017 -0.48 0.019 1.26 -0.045 -1.49 -0.18 -4.11*** 0.003 0.13 
Age1629*Central 0.051 1.8 0.053 1.6 -0.014 -0.93 -0.054 -1.95 0.091 2.18* -0.041 -1.62 
Age3039*Central 0.057 2.15* 0.045 1.47 0.01 0.64 -0.01 -0.35 0.024 0.61 -0.036 -1.46 
Age4049*Central 0.031 1.09 0.027 0.84 -0.007 -0.46 -0.073 -2.67** -0.05 -1.2 -0.023 -0.9 
Age50pl*Central -0.038 -1.35 -0.03 -0.86 -0.008 -0.48 -0.091 -3.33*** -0.111 -2.43* -0.074 -2.77**  
Age1629*GtAccra 0.091 3.53*** 0.113 2.87** 0.03 1.66 -0.024 -0.99 0.063 1.56 -0.014 -0.4 
Age3039*GtAccra 0.062 2.91** 0.04 1.12 0.129 6.98*** -0.053 -2.51* -0.057 -1.58 0.089 2.86**  
Age4049*GtAccra 0.07 2.67** -0.024 -0.6 0.081 3.80*** -0.031 -1.24 -0.098 -2.40* 0.035 1 
Age50pl*GtAccra 0.074 2.37* 0.012 0.27 0.022 1.08 -0.071 -3.01** -0.052 -1.1 -0.037 -0.97 
Age1629*Eastern 0.1 4.27*** 0.126 3.92*** -0.017 -1.27 0.024 1.13 0.098 2.86** -0.05 -1.94 
Age3039*Eastern 0.061 2.91** 0.147 4.85*** 0.019 1.34 -0.009 -0.47 0.068 2.08* -0.035 -1.4 
Age4049*Eastern 0.053 2.36* 0.035 1.09 -0.002 -0.17 -0.017 -0.82 -0.002 -0.04 -0.046 -1.81 
Age50pl*Eastern 0.074 2.82** -0.028 -0.81 0.018 1.1 -0.003 -0.14 -0.129 -3.41*** -0.091 -3.47*** 
Age1629*Volta 0.072 2.91** 0.121 3.78*** 0.004 0.32 -0.067 -3.41*** 0.076 2.10* -0.014 -0.53 
Age3039*Volta 0.031 1.5 0.035 1.28 0.026 2.11* -0.015 -0.75 -0.046 -1.42 0.063 2.50*   
Age4049*Volta 0.073 3.04** 0.053 1.73 0.028 2.11* -0.052 -2.58** -0.11 -3.21** 0.053 1.97*   
Age50pl*Volta 0.041 1.48 -0.031 -0.92 0.02 1.32 -0.015 -0.59 -0.15 -3.85*** -0.091 -3.57*** 
Age1629*Ashanti 0.092 4.23*** 0.104 3.64*** 0.014 1.33 -0.009 -0.56 0.002 0.05 0.045 2.02*   
Age3039*Ashanti 0.086 4.25*** 0.031 1.17 0.023 2.30* 0 0.02 -0.045 -1.58 0.036 1.7 
Age4049*Ashanti 0.096 4.18*** -0.042 -1.46 0.013 1.27 0.073 3.85*** -0.123 -3.94*** -0.039 -1.83 
Age50pl*Ashanti 0.002 0.1 -0.005 -0.17 -0.006 -0.64 0.018 1.03 -0.184 -5.79*** -0.043 -1.96*   
Age1629*Brong-Ahafo 0.132 4.22*** 0.18 4.55*** 0.037 2.73** -0.07 -2.90** 0.089 1.98* 0.021 0.68 
Age3039*Brong-Ahafo 0.092 3.28** 0.13 3.63*** 0.011 1.15 -0.019 -0.76 0.025 0.58 0.009 0.31 
Age4049*Brong-Ahafo 0.025 0.85 0.015 0.41 0 0.02 -0.044 -1.71 -0.17 -3.77*** -0.008 -0.27 
Age50pl*Brong-Ahafo -0.023 -0.81 -0.073 -1.87 -0.008 -0.79 -0.065 -2.61** -0.27 -5.70*** -0.069 -2.28*   
Age1629*Northern 0.054 3.20** 0.095 5.10*** 0.031 5.11*** -0.048 -1.85 0.049 1.53 0.105 4.52*** 
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Age3039*Northern 0.051 3.62*** 0.088 5.21*** 0.03 6.28*** -0.053 -2.19* -0.002 -0.08 0.06 3.03**  
Age4049*Northern -0.002 -0.24 0.069 4.01*** 0.023 6.21*** -0.089 -3.74*** -0.011 -0.38 0.012 0.66 
Age50pl*Northern 0.017 1.05 0.094 3.71*** 0.015 4.12*** -0.043 -1.44 -0.036 -1.11 0.016 0.68 
Age1629*Upper-West 0.015 2.34* 0.077 1.72 0.017 0.68 -0.05 -1.41 -0.038 -0.57 0.142 3.29**  
Age3039*Upper-West 0.015 1.6 0.046 1.31 -0.005 -0.27 -0.073 -2.22* -0.079 -1.33 0.014 0.55 
Age4049*Upper-West 0.082 2.55* 0.146 2.81** 0.096 2.42* -0.088 -2.81** 0.042 0.57 0.119 2.69**  
Age50pl*Upper-West -0.005 -0.82 -0.004 -0.11 -0.005 -0.25 -0.038 -0.87 -0.162 -2.78** -0.014 -0.57 
Age1629*Upper-East 0.027 0.88 0.079 2.57* 0.046 3.53*** -0.063 -1.59 -0.006 -0.1 0.004 0.1 
Age3039*Upper-East 0.023 0.82 0.076 2.78** 0.028 5.01*** -0.121 -3.55*** -0.069 -1.43 0.05 1.35 
Age4049*Upper-East -0.012 -0.46 0.058 2.18* 0.027 4.09*** -0.121 -3.56*** -0.088 -1.8 -0.026 -0.75 
Age50pl*Upper-East -0.028 -0.99 0.048 1.62 0.021 4.25*** -0.067 -1.52 -0.097 -1.79 -0.056 -1.67 
Grandfather's education 0.004 3.61*** 0.014 10.16*** 0.006 7.20*** 0.001 0.7 0.006 4.13*** 0.015 12.89*** 
Grandmother's education -0.004 -2.32* 0.004 1.64 0.012 6.28*** -0.005 -3.83*** -0.009 -3.51*** 0.015 6.59*** 
Missing Grandfather's  
education 0.038 2.55* 0.048 2.71** 0.035 3.71*** -0.03 -2.22* 0.067 3.23** 0.038 2.35*   
Missing Grandmother's  
education -0.013 -0.91 0.032 1.91 -0.014 -1.45 -0.012 -0.92 -0.001 -0.06 0.02 1.28 
GLSS_1 -0.055 -10.64*** 0.051 7.57*** -0.01 -3.43*** -0.046 -11.09*** 0.019 2.56* -0.031 -6.10*** 
Constant 0.109 3.92*** 0.306 7.85*** 0.109 4.44*** 0.064 3.91*** 0.394 9.28*** 0.214 6.24*** 
Obs. 1.80E+04  1.80E+04  1.80E+04  1.80E+04  1.80E+04  1.80E+04  
R-sq. 0.034  0.115  0.079  0.028  0.124  0.093  
Adj. R-sq 0.031  0.112  0.076  0.024  0.121  0.09  
F-test of instruments 39.921  75.547  12.017  24.323  79.266  33.627  
P-value 0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  0.0000  -1.20E+04  -5.50E+03  
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A-6: Probability of Child Illness Ȃ Treating Parental Education as Endogenous (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled); with and without conditioning on Expenditure 
2SLS/IV Variant 1: parental education only  Variant 2: w/ expenditure & quadratic 
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  GLSS 1  GLSS 4  Pooled  
 Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal Marginal  Marginal 
Full Sample: Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.659 7.14*** 0.529 3.64*** 0.568 4.37*** 0.641 6.76*** 0.548 3.84*** 0.56 4.22*** 
Mother's Middle -0.027 -0.22 -0.017 -0.11 0.161 1.13 -0.03 -0.27 -0.023 -0.17 0.123 0.98 
Mother's Sec & above 0.03 0.09 0.064 0.29 -0.032 -0.16 0.174 0.5 0.066 0.29 0.111 0.5 
Father's Primary -0.265 -2.48*   -0.098 -1.02 -0.178 -2.42*   -0.291 -3.84*** -0.114 -1.26 -0.218 -4.00*** 
Father's Middle -0.016 -0.16 -0.051 -0.6 -0.103 -1.3 -0.034 -0.35 -0.075 -0.89 -0.08 -1.06 
Father's Sec & above 0.092 0.33 0.03 0.27 -0.035 -0.3 0.134 0.49 0.018 0.17 -0.091 -0.91 
GLSS_1     0.104 6.66***    0.197 1.82 
Observation no. 6378  11660  18038  6378  11660  18038  
Over-identification stats.  
(Chi-sq) 









(41)   
43.237   
(41)  
P-value 0.0892  0.3703  0.3689  0.1329  0.5125  0.376  
Full Sample w/poor water 
& sanitation:             
Mother's Primary 0.657 7.03*** 0.543 3.75*** 0.568 4.36*** 0.614 5.84*** 0.572 4.09*** 0.501 3.53*** 
Mother's Middle -0.022 -0.19 -0.043 -0.3 0.164 1.15 -0.018 -0.16 -0.02 -0.15 0.13 1.05 
Mother's Sec & above 0.061 0.17 0.068 0.31 -0.025 -0.12 0.276 0.84 0.047 0.21 0.255 1.11 
Father's Primary -0.269 -2.57*   -0.109 -1.17 -0.183 -2.54*   -0.294 -3.99*** -0.121 -1.37 -0.226 -4.41*** 
Father's Middle -0.022 -0.22 -0.049 -0.57 -0.106 -1.34 -0.032 -0.33 -0.088 -1.05 -0.065 -0.87 
Father's Sec & above 0.088 0.32 0.064 0.54 -0.015 -0.12 0.092 0.35 0.047 0.41 -0.108 -1.14 
Prop. of 'others' in cluster  
with no water & toilet 0.056 2.38*   0.059 3.69*** 0.063 5.25*** 0.055 2.36*   0.066 4.50*** 0.066 5.66*** 
GLSS_1     0.094 5.98***    0.189 1.77 
Observation no. 6378  11660  18038  6378  11660  18038  
Over-identification stats.  
(Chi-sq) 









(41)    
49.186  
(41)  
P-value 0.0998  0.3388  0.3677  0.1085  0.421  0.1781  
*Refer to notes in text 
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A-6 cont: Probability of Child Illness Ȃ Treating Parental Education as Endogenous (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled); with and without conditioning on Expenditure 
 Variant 1: Parental education only  Variant 2: w/ expenditure & quadratic 
Urban sub-sample (GLSS 1 only) Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
 Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.708 14.18*** 0.712 15.15*** 0.66 8.22*** 0.655 8.19*** 
Mother's Middle 0.038 0.31 0.049 0.39 0.035 0.28 0.02 0.16 
Mother's Sec & above 0.444 1.8 0.441 1.77 0.705 17.35*** 0.701 15.77*** 
Father's Primary -0.344 -4.05*** -0.34 -3.73*** -0.347 -4.28*** -0.343 -3.91*** 
Father's Middle -0.08 -0.6 -0.092 -0.69 -0.137 -0.99 -0.103 -0.76 
Father's Sec & above -0.188 -1.23 -0.186 -1.2 -0.292 -2.53*   -0.276 -2.26*   
Prop. of 'others' in cluster with no water & toilet  -0.044 -0.77   -0.05 -0.74 
Observation no. 2410        
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq) 34.319 (34)  34.610 (34)  39.534 (37)  39.310 (37)  
P-value 0.4524  0.4387  0.3575  0.3668  
Rural sub-sample (GLSS 1 only)     Marginal  Marginal  
Community variables excluded     Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary     0.406 2.11*   0.395 2.04*   
Mother's Middle     0.036 0.29 0.045 0.36 
Mother's Sec & above     -0.038 -0.11 -0.012 -0.04 
Father's Primary     -0.15 -1.3 -0.154 -1.35 
Father's Middle     -0.05 -0.56 -0.05 -0.56 
Father's Sec & above     0.053 0.29 0.091 0.47 
Prop. of 'others' in cluster with no water & toilet      0.079 2.78**  
Observation no.     3968    
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq)     53.395 (39)  39.310  (37) 
P-value     0.0621  0.3668  
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A-6 cont: Probability of Child Illness Ȃ Treating Parental Education as Endogenous (GLSS 1 & 4, and Pooled); with and without conditioning on Expenditure 
 Variant 1: parental education only  Variant 2: w/ expenditure & quadratic 
Rural sub-sample (GLSS 4 only) Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Community variables included Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary     0.128 0.8   
Mother's Middle     0.008 0.07   
Mother's Sec & above     0.355 0.82   
Father's Primary     -0.035 -0.28   
Father's Middle     0.007 0.07   
Father's Sec & above     0.035 0.26   
Observation no.     8113    
Over-identification stats. (Chi-sq)     56.670 (41)    
P-value     0.0525    
Rural (Pooled)         
Community variables controlled         
Mother's Primary 0.241 1.39 0.254 1.45 0.258 1.52 0.291 1.69 
Mother's Middle 0.24 1.59 0.225 1.5 0.204 1.46 0.205 1.46 
Mother's Sec & above -0.26 -5.73*** -0.252 -4.23*** -0.249 -3.70*** -0.245 -3.26**  
Father's Primary -0.104 -1.01 -0.112 -1.12 -0.145 -1.7 -0.157 -1.92 
Father's Middle -0.131 -1.63 -0.126 -1.57 -0.136 -1.71 -0.146 -1.83 
Father's Sec & above 0.109 0.68 0.137 0.85 0.067 0.44 0.107 0.67 
Prop. of 'others' in cluster with no 
water & toilet   0.071 4.75***   0.076 5.38*** 
GLSS_D -0.014 -0.58 -0.031 -1.28 0.123 0.98 0.108 0.86 
Observation no. 12081        
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A-7: The Impact of Own Education on The Probability of Adult Illness, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
Sample: 
personal education 
only w/ water & sanitation 
w/ expend. &   
quadratic 
w/ expend. & quad. 
& water & sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned income 
& quad & water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 1 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Primary 0.08 3.41*** 0.082 3.47*** 0.07 2.80**  0.08 3.33*** 0.076 3.23**  0.078 3.29*** 
Middle 0.036 2.13*   0.039 2.29*   0.013 0.6 0.035 1.8 0.029 1.66 0.031 1.81 
Sec. & above -0.008 -0.29 -0.003 -0.11 -0.038 -1.22 -0.008 -0.26 -0.02 -0.78 -0.016 -0.61 
Observation  6519            
Urban             
Primary 0.098 2.48*   0.098 2.49*   0.099 2.25*   0.106 2.44*   0.065 2.20*   0.095 2.42*   
Middle 0.02 0.77 0.02 0.77 0.02 0.53 0.03 0.83 0.04 1.76 0.015 0.55 
Sec. & above -0.019 -0.55 -0.019 -0.54 -0.003 -0.06 0.008 0.18 -0.013 -0.32 -0.028 -0.8 
Observation  2659            
Rural             
Primary 0.067 2.27*   0.07 2.37*   0.061 2.03*   0.065 2.15*   0.064 2.16*   0.067 2.26*   
Middle 0.055 2.44*   0.058 2.56*   0.041 1.71 0.045 1.88 0.048 2.09*   0.051 2.22*   
Sec. & above 0.007 0.16 0.013 0.3 -0.013 -0.3 -0.005 -0.11 -0.005 -0.12 0.001 0.02 
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A-8: The Impact of Own Education on The Probability of Adult Illness, 1998/99 (GLSS 4) 
Sample: 
personal education 
only w/ water & sanitation 
w/ expend. &   
quadratic 
w/ expend. & quad. 
& water & sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned income 
& quad & water and 
sanitation 
             
GLSS 4 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Primary 0.021 1.34 0.023 1.44 0.01 0.67 0.013 0.87 0.02 1.23 0.021 1.33 
Middle -0.005 -0.39 -0.002 -0.18 -0.034 -2.70**  -0.03 -2.41*   -0.009 -0.68 -0.006 -0.46 
Sec. & above -0.034 -1.99*   -0.03 -1.74 -0.128 -4.43*** -0.129 -4.44*** -0.041 -2.47*   -0.037 -2.20*   
Observation  13547            
Urban             
Primary 0.007 0.27 0.004 0.17 -0.019 -0.92 -0.02 -0.97 0.005 0.22 0.003 0.14 
Middle -0.005 -0.24 -0.009 -0.44 -0.02 -1.04 -0.022 -1.13 -0.01 -0.53 -0.013 -0.68 
Sec. & above -0.037 -1.67 -0.041 -1.86 -0.049 -2.34*   -0.051 -2.40*   -0.046 -2.09*   -0.049 -2.23*   
Observation  4873            
Rural             
Primary 0.029 1.42 0.033 1.58 0.014 0.79 0.019 1.04 0.026 1.25 0.029 1.42 
Middle -0.011 -0.67 -0.004 -0.23 -0.042 -2.84**  -0.033 -2.24*   -0.015 -0.93 -0.008 -0.48 
Sec. & above -0.039 -1.55 -0.028 -1.07 -0.094 -3.81*** -0.082 -3.21**  -0.047 -1.85 -0.036 -1.4 
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A-9: The Impact of Own Education on The Probability of Adult Illness, 1987/88 & 1998/99 (Pooled) 
Sample: 
personal education 
only w/ water & sanitation 
w/ expend. &   
quadratic 
w/ expend. & quad. 
& water & sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned income 
& quad & water and 
sanitation 
Pooled Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Primary 0.023 1.96*   0.024 2.09*   0.021 1.82 0.022 1.9 0.02 1.7 0.021 1.84 
Middle 2.90E-05 0 0.003 0.33 -0.002 -0.19 -4.70E-04 -0.05 -0.004 -0.45 -0.001 -0.12 
Sec. & above -0.025 -1.99*   -0.021 -1.65 -0.026 -1.79 -0.024 -1.71 -0.031 -2.42*   -0.027 -2.09*   
GLSS_1 0.14 18.92*** 0.133 17.65*** 0.209 1.87 0.249 2.17*   0.145 17.02*** 0.139 16.11*** 
Observation  20066            
Urban             
Primary 0.009 0.47 0.009 0.46 0.004 0.21 0.004 0.22 0.007 0.36 0.007 0.36 
Middle -0.006 -0.42 -0.007 -0.44 -0.012 -0.75 -0.012 -0.74 -0.009 -0.61 -0.009 -0.63 
Sec. & above -0.033 -1.88 -0.033 -1.9 -0.04 -2.04*   -0.04 -2.01*   -0.039 -2.22*   -0.039 -2.23*   
GLSS_1 0.171 14.46*** 0.171 14.46*** 0.285 2.85**  0.282 2.68**  0.183 12.62*** 0.183 12.61*** 
Observation  7532            
Rural             
Primary 0.028 1.95 0.032 2.19*   0.022 1.5 0.026 1.76 0.025 1.69 0.028 1.93 
Middle -0.003 -0.24 0.003 0.25 -0.014 -1.2 -0.008 -0.71 -0.008 -0.69 -0.002 -0.2 
Sec. & above -0.02 -1.03 -0.011 -0.54 -0.03 -1.5 -0.022 -1.08 -0.027 -1.36 -0.018 -0.88 
GLSS_1 0.026 1.25 0.008 0.39 0.498 5.53*** 0.48 5.27*** 0.041 1.88 0.024 1.1 
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A-10: ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?ȋ
 ?ȌǢǯ  
Sample: 
w/ parental  
education only 
w/ water &  
sanitation 
w/ expend. &  
quadratic 
w/ expend.& quad  
 & water & sanitation 
w/ unearned   
income & quadratic 
w/ unearned income  
& quad & water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 1 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Primary 0.075 3.15** 0.076 3.20**  0.071 2.94**  0.074 3.05**  0.071 3.02**  0.073 3.07**  
Middle 0.028 1.58 0.03 1.72 0.021 1.03 0.025 1.27 0.021 1.21 0.024 1.34 
Sec. & above -0.022 -0.83 -0.018 -0.68 -0.029 -0.99 -0.023 -0.8 -0.032 -1.2 -0.029 -1.07 
Mother's Primary 0.092 1.98*  0.093 2.00*   0.093 1.97*   0.093 1.97*   0.087 1.88 0.088 1.9 
Mother's Middle -0.038 -1.18 -0.037 -1.14 -0.04 -1.21 -0.039 -1.17 -0.04 -1.24 -0.039 -1.2 
Mother's Sec & above 0.119 1.29 0.121 1.3 0.136 1.42 0.132 1.38 0.111 1.2 0.113 1.21 
Father's Primary 0.006 0.16 0.007 0.18 0.009 0.22 0.009 0.22 0.002 0.04 0.002 0.06 
Father's Middle 0.033 1.73 0.034 1.79 0.034 1.73 0.035 1.77 0.03 1.56 0.031 1.61 
Father's Sec & above 0.038 1.04 0.042 1.15 0.042 1.14 0.045 1.2 0.032 0.87 0.036 0.98 
Observation no. 6519            
Urban             
Primary 0.082 2.07*   0.082 2.07*   0.083 1.9 0.088 2.03*   0.08 2.03*   0.08 2.03*   
Middle -0.001 -0.02 -0.001 -0.02 -0.001 -0.04 0.006 0.16 -0.004 -0.15 -0.004 -0.15 
Sec. & above -0.054 -1.49 -0.054 -1.48 -0.039 -0.84 -0.031 -0.67 -0.059 -1.63 -0.059 -1.63 
Mother's Primary 0.213 3.46*** 0.213 3.46*** 0.221 3.46*** 0.223 3.48*** 0.209 3.40*** 0.209 3.39*** 
Mother's Middle -0.008 -0.2 -0.008 -0.19 -0.01 -0.23 -0.006 -0.14 -0.011 -0.26 -0.01 -0.24 
Mother's Sec & above 0.165 1.68 0.166 1.69 0.198 1.98*   0.192 1.91 0.16 1.63 0.161 1.64 
Father's Primary 0.151 2.35*   0.152 2.35*   0.155 2.30*   0.151 2.24*  0.15 2.34*   0.15 2.34*   
Father's Middle 0.027 1 0.027 1.01 0.033 1.12 0.035 1.23 0.025 0.95 0.026 0.96 
Father's Sec & above 0.033 0.73 0.034 0.74 0.052 1.09 0.049 1.03 0.029 0.64 0.03 0.66 
Observation no. 2659            
Rural             
Primary 0.066 2.21*   0.069 2.31*   0.071 2.28*   0.064 2.10*   0.063 2.12*   0.066 2.22*   
Middle 0.055 2.38*   0.058 2.49*   0.056 2.16*   0.046 1.86 0.049 2.09*   0.051 2.20*   
Sec. & above 0.003 0.08 0.009 0.21 0.017 0.33 -0.009 -0.19 -0.007 -0.17 -0.001 -0.03 
Mother's Primary -0.011 -0.16 -0.01 -0.14 -0.04 -0.59 -0.023 -0.34 -0.013 -0.2 -0.012 -0.18 
  402 
Mother's Middle -0.072 -1.32 -0.074 -1.37 -0.066 -1.18 -0.068 -1.22 -0.071 -1.29 -0.074 -1.35 
Mother's Sec & above -0.078 -0.32 -0.087 -0.36 -0.148 -0.59 -0.095 -0.35 -0.092 -0.37 -0.102 -0.42 
Father's Primary -0.078 -1.6 -0.077 -1.57 -0.097 -1.99*   -0.085 -1.72 -0.083 -1.7 -0.082 -1.67 
Father's Middle 0.054 1.9 0.056 1.95 0.039 1.3 0.05 1.7 0.05 1.74 0.051 1.77 
Father's Sec & above 0.038 0.61 0.046 0.72 0.028 0.43 0.036 0.57 0.034 0.53 0.041 0.65 
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A-11: ǡ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?ȋ
 ?ȌǢǯ  
Sample: 
w/ parental  
education only 
w/ water &  
sanitation 
w/ expend. &  
quadratic 
w/ expend.& quad  
 & water & sanitation 
w/ unearned   
income & quadratic 
w/ unearned income  
& quad & water and 
sanitation 
             
GLSS 4             
Full             
Primary 0.017 1.05 0.018 1.14 0.009 0.58 0.011 0.75 0.015 0.96 0.017 1.05 
Middle -0.01 -0.74 -0.007 -0.55 -0.031 -2.43*   -0.027 -2.17*   -0.012 -0.97 -0.01 -0.77 
Sec. & above -0.041 -2.32*   -0.038 -2.11*   -0.121 -4.59*** -0.122 -4.57*** -0.047 -2.67**  -0.044 -2.46*   
Mother's Primary -0.023 -1.13 -0.022 -1.09 -0.006 -0.31 -0.005 -0.29 -0.024 -1.2 -0.023 -1.15 
Mother's Middle 0.006 0.27 0.007 0.35 -0.038 -2.10*   -0.037 -2.06*   0.004 0.2 0.006 0.27 
Mother's Sec & above 0.034 0.9 0.036 0.95 -0.064 -1.62 -0.067 -1.71 0.03 0.82 0.032 0.86 
Father's Primary 0.057 2.41*   0.057 2.40*   0.036 1.82 0.037 1.83 0.057 2.43*   0.057 2.42*   
Father's Middle 0.022 1.51 0.023 1.62 0.002 0.17 0.004 0.34 0.018 1.29 0.02 1.4 
Father's Sec & above 0.007 0.32 0.009 0.39 -0.018 -0.91 -0.017 -0.86 0.003 0.15 0.005 0.22 
Observation no. 13547            
Urban             
Primary 0.008 0.32 0.006 0.24 -0.02 -0.93 -0.02 -0.97 0.008 0.3 0.006 0.23 
Middle -0.005 -0.24 -0.008 -0.39 -0.019 -0.96 -0.02 -1.03 -0.009 -0.44 -0.011 -0.56 
Sec. & above -0.038 -1.6 -0.041 -1.72 -0.049 -2.27*   -0.05 -2.30*   -0.045 -1.86 -0.047 -1.96 
Mother's Primary -0.064 -2.68**  -0.064 -2.67**  -0.026 -1.12 -0.026 -1.1 -0.065 -2.74**  -0.065 -2.73**  
Mother's Middle 0.003 0.11 0.002 0.07 -0.012 -0.56 -0.012 -0.58 -0.001 -0.05 -0.002 -0.07 
Mother's Sec & above -0.002 -0.06 -0.004 -0.09 0.004 0.13 0.005 0.13 -0.009 -0.23 -0.01 -0.25 
Father's Primary 0.049 1.43 0.047 1.39 0.046 1.63 0.044 1.58 0.048 1.43 0.047 1.4 
Father's Middle 0.003 0.13 0.001 0.04 -0.001 -0.03 -0.002 -0.1 -0.002 -0.08 -0.003 -0.15 
Father's Sec & above 0.014 0.46 0.011 0.37 0.01 0.44 0.009 0.38 0.008 0.29 0.006 0.21 
Observation no. 4873            
Rural             
Primary 0.021 1.03 0.024 1.19 0.011 0.62 0.015 0.84 0.018 0.88 0.021 1.04 
Middle -0.016 -0.96 -0.009 -0.56 -0.042 -2.83**  -0.034 -2.29*   -0.019 -1.17 -0.013 -0.77 
Sec. & above -0.045 -1.73 -0.035 -1.31 -0.092 -3.71*** -0.081 -3.19**  -0.051 -1.97*   -0.042 -1.57 
  404 
Mother's Primary 0.02 0.64 0.024 0.76 0.036 1.31 0.037 1.34 0.017 0.56 0.021 0.68 
Mother's Middle -0.006 -0.2 -0.001 -0.05 -0.028 -1.16 -0.025 -1.03 -0.005 -0.19 -0.001 -0.03 
Mother's Sec & above 0.079 1.1 0.085 1.2 0.018 0.29 0.025 0.4 0.072 1.02 0.078 1.11 
Father's Primary 0.067 2.10*   0.064 2.03*   0.04 1.58 0.039 1.53 0.066 2.09*   0.064 2.02*   
Father's Middle 0.031 1.6 0.035 1.79 0.008 0.49 0.013 0.8 0.029 1.48 0.032 1.66 
Father's Sec & above -0.017 -0.57 -0.017 -0.55 -0.024 -0.92 -0.021 -0.78 -0.02 -0.64 -0.019 -0.62 
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A-12: The Impact of Own Education on The Proǡ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?Ƭ ? ? ? ?Ȁ ? ?ȋȌǢǯ 
Sample: 
w/ parental  
education only 
w/ water &  
sanitation 
w/ expend. &  
quadratic 
w/ expend.& quad  
 & water & sanitation 
w/ unearned   
income & quadratic 
w/ unearned income  
& quad & water and 
sanitation 
             
Pooled Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Primary 0.02 1.74 0.021 1.84 0.019 1.62 0.02 1.68 0.018 1.51 0.019 1.62 
Middle -0.002 -0.17 0.001 0.09 -0.003 -0.34 -0.002 -0.24 -0.005 -0.56 -0.003 -0.3 
Sec. & above -0.028 -2.12*   -0.025 -1.87 -0.028 -1.94 -0.028 -1.91 -0.032 -2.46*   -0.029 -2.22*   
Mother's Primary -0.003 -0.18 -0.002 -0.14 -0.003 -0.2 -0.003 -0.16 -0.005 -0.32 -0.005 -0.28 
Mother's Middle -0.027 -1.91 -0.026 -1.78 -0.025 -1.74 -0.024 -1.6 -0.028 -1.97*   -0.026 -1.84 
Mother's Sec & above 0.026 0.91 0.028 0.95 0.031 1.01 0.031 1.04 0.026 0.9 0.027 0.94 
Father's Primary 0.031 1.83 0.031 1.86 0.03 1.79 0.03 1.79 0.03 1.78 0.03 1.8 
Father's Middle 0.013 1.32 0.016 1.54 0.013 1.22 0.014 1.39 0.011 1.12 0.014 1.35 
Father's Sec & above 0.01 0.65 0.013 0.81 0.011 0.68 0.013 0.8 0.007 0.45 0.01 0.61 
GLSS_1 0.141 18.62*** 0.135 17.49*** 0.206 1.85 0.246 2.14*   0.146 16.88*** 0.14 16.06*** 
Observation no. 20066            
Urban             
Primary 0.005 0.27 0.005 0.26 0.001 0.05 0.001 0.05 0.004 0.18 0.003 0.18 
Middle -0.008 -0.52 -0.008 -0.53 -0.013 -0.8 -0.013 -0.79 -0.01 -0.66 -0.01 -0.67 
Sec. & above -0.037 -2.06*   -0.038 -2.07*   -0.044 -2.18*   -0.043 -2.16*   -0.042 -2.30*   -0.042 -2.31*   
Mother's Primary -0.003 -0.15 -0.003 -0.14 -0.005 -0.2 -0.005 -0.2 -0.007 -0.28 -0.006 -0.28 
Mother's Middle -0.016 -0.82 -0.016 -0.83 -0.015 -0.78 -0.015 -0.78 -0.018 -0.92 -0.018 -0.92 
Mother's Sec & above 0.025 0.75 0.025 0.74 0.027 0.77 0.027 0.77 0.024 0.71 0.024 0.71 
Father's Primary 0.062 2.36*   0.062 2.35*   0.06 2.25*   0.06 2.25*   0.063 2.39*   0.062 2.38*   
Father's Middle 0.005 0.31 0.004 0.29 0.002 0.13 0.002 0.14 0.003 0.19 0.003 0.18 
Father's Sec & above 0.018 0.85 0.018 0.83 0.016 0.72 0.016 0.73 0.015 0.7 0.015 0.69 
GLSS_1 0.175 14.27*** 0.175 14.28*** 0.288 2.88**  0.286 2.72**  0.186 12.61*** 0.186 12.60*** 
Observation no. 7532            
Rural             
Primary 0.026 1.79 0.029 2.00*   0.021 1.42 0.024 1.65 0.023 1.57 0.026 1.78 
  406 
Middle -0.004 -0.34 0.001 0.08 -0.015 -1.22 -0.01 -0.8 -0.009 -0.74 -0.004 -0.31 
Sec. & above -0.022 -1.06 -0.014 -0.66 -0.03 -1.47 -0.023 -1.13 -0.027 -1.32 -0.019 -0.94 
Mother's Primary 0.005 0.23 0.008 0.35 3.47E-04 0.01 0.004 0.15 0.003 0.15 0.006 0.27 
Mother's Middle -0.04 -1.87 -0.036 -1.69 -0.037 -1.66 -0.033 -1.49 -0.041 -1.92 -0.037 -1.73 
Mother's Sec & above 0.038 0.64 0.046 0.76 0.033 0.53 0.04 0.63 0.032 0.55 0.039 0.65 
Father's Primary 0.016 0.72 0.016 0.71 0.007 0.33 0.007 0.33 0.014 0.61 0.013 0.61 
Father's Middle 0.024 1.73 0.028 2.01*   0.018 1.23 0.022 1.51 0.022 1.55 0.026 1.83 
Father's Sec & above -0.003 -0.12 0.001 0.04 -0.003 -0.12 0.001 0.02 -0.006 -0.27 -0.003 -0.11 
GLSS_1 0.026 1.26 0.009 0.43 0.498 5.54*** 0.482 5.29*** 0.04 1.86 0.075 6.09*** 














  407 
AȂ13a: Children Ȃ First-stage regression of endogenous expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: Illness) 
GLSS 1 Full    Urban    Rural    
 Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal 
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Log of land per capita -0.043 -6.62*** -0.914 -6.63***     -0.046 -6.02*** -0.954 -5.97*** 
Log of land per capita sq. 0.005 8.06*** 0.104 8.02***     0.005 7.77*** 0.114 7.71*** 
Missing land per capita -0.055 -2.46* -1.063 -2.25*     -0.127 -2.24* -2.317 -1.99*   
Log of durable goods  
per capita -0.09 -12.70*** -2.05 -13.17*** -0.114 -10.87*** -2.626 -11.14*** -0.06 -6.03*** -1.305 -6.19*** 
Log of durable goods  
per capita sq 0.018 18.99*** 0.4 18.96*** 0.021 15.72*** 0.467 15.55*** 0.014 9.55*** 0.291 9.59*** 
Formal employment (Head)     -0.096 -2.55* -1.985 -2.43*     
Self-employment (Head)     -0.059 -1.6 -1.126 -1.41     
Mother's Primary -0.064 -3.04** -1.362 -3.07** 0.034 1.09 0.654 0.96 -0.097 -3.56*** -2.051 -3.61*** 
Mother's Middle 0.015 0.94 0.31 0.91 0.031 1.35 0.687 1.37 0.018 0.84 0.341 0.77 
Mother's Sec & above 0.192 4.82*** 4.348 4.89*** 0.152 3.16** 3.522 3.25** 0.37 6.10*** 7.708 5.90*** 
Father's Primary 0.15 5.56*** 3.12 5.44*** 0.119 2.38* 2.508 2.31* 0.173 5.72*** 3.564 5.58*** 
Father's Middle 0.145 8.87*** 2.99 8.68*** 0.118 4.78*** 2.427 4.59*** 0.145 6.85*** 3.014 6.79*** 
Father's Sec & above 0.156 6.88*** 3.246 6.69*** 0.151 4.45*** 3.153 4.28*** 0.167 5.74*** 3.454 5.61*** 
Age (years) -0.014 -2.69** -0.292 -2.62** -0.01 -1.36 -0.206 -1.27 -0.015 -2.16* -0.309 -2.13*   
Age squared (years) 0.001 2.39* 0.017 2.33* 0.001 1.4 0.014 1.3 0.001 1.8 0.017 1.79 
Rural -0.1 -6.65*** -2.013 -6.36***         
Female 0.011 0.85 0.234 0.87 -0.006 -0.3 -0.116 -0.29 0.028 1.7 0.6 1.72 
Non-Akan 0.084 5.35*** 1.774 5.27*** -0.006 -0.28 -0.127 -0.26 0.138 5.92*** 2.932 5.93*** 
Western Region -0.082 -3.31*** -1.93 -3.55*** -0.127 -3.69*** -2.8 -3.73*** -0.143 -2.54* -3.279 -2.65**  
Central Region -0.419 -12.98*** -8.944 -13.08*** -0.579 -11.71*** -12.19 -11.82*** -0.511 -8.31*** -10.975 -8.22*** 
Eastern Region -0.222 -9.01*** -4.894 -9.12*** -0.212 -6.96*** -4.71 -7.09*** -0.321 -5.78*** -6.958 -5.71*** 
Volta Region -0.616 -20.05*** -13.067 -20.00*** -0.377 -7.80*** -8.064 -7.68*** -0.802 -13.41*** -16.962 -13.13*** 
Ashanti Region -0.387 -16.89*** -8.426 -16.88*** -0.265 -9.34*** -5.822 -9.33*** -0.486 -8.56*** -10.531 -8.49*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.274 -10.42*** -6.019 -10.61*** -0.292 -7.90*** -6.301 -7.95*** -0.335 -6.12*** -7.354 -6.13*** 
Upper West Region -0.579 -4.51*** -11.279 -4.31***     -0.671 -4.56*** -13.371 -4.42*** 
Northern Region -0.538 -17.32*** -11.407 -17.34*** -0.57 -14.50*** -12.061 -14.60*** -0.476 -8.02*** -10.183 -7.90*** 
Upper East Region -0.822 -15.46*** -17.176 -15.80*** -0.222 -2.62** -4.888 -2.68** -0.947 -13.06*** -19.769 -12.91*** 
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Price of Maize (kg)         0.03 5.31*** 0.609 5.16*** 
Price of Anti-malarial pill         -0.05 -2.10* -1.002 -1.99*   
Missing price         0.087 1.9 1.809 1.88 
Dist. to the nearest clinic         -0.004 -4.87*** -0.074 -4.77*** 
Male Agric. Wage         -0.024 -2.18* -0.485 -2.06*   
Ratio of female Wage         0.132 6.24*** 2.808 6.29*** 
Ratio of child Wage         0.16 6.21*** 3.366 6.17*** 
constant 10.756 331.22*** 116.143 166.89*** 10.87 188.41*** 118.434 94.92*** 10.656 114.09*** 113.903 57.23*** 
Observation no. 6378  6378  2410  2410  3968  3968  
R-squared 0.324  0.327  0.403  0.406  0.271  0.268  
adjusted R-squared 0.322  0.324  0.398  0.401  0.266  0.263  
F 137.098  131.081  74.728  71.281  55.453  55.053  
ll -4.70E+03  -2.40E+04  -1.50E+03  -8.90E+03  -3.00E+03  -1.50E+04  
F-test of instruments F(  5,  6352) =  150.45 F(  5,  6352) =  140.94  F(  4,  2387) =  108.25 F(  4,  2387) =  101.20 F(  5,  3936) =   64.32 F(  5,  3936) =   62.65 
P-value             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000 
*Notes: (1) Ȃ The first stage of models controlling water and sanitation, as well as for the duration of illness analyses, are also estimated but not reported for brevity; they are very much 
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AȂ13b: Children Ȃ First-stage regression of endogenous expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1998/99 (GLSS 4: Illness) 
GLSS 4 Full    Urban    Rural    
 Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Log of land per capita -0.055 -10.66*** -1.469 -10.55*** -0.052 -3.33*** -1.419 -3.31*** -0.052 -9.51*** -1.382 -9.48*** 
Log of land per capita sq. 0.004 11.06*** 0.108 10.88*** 0.003 2.76** 0.088 2.72** 0.004 10.20*** 0.106 10.14*** 
Missing land per capita -0.005 -0.21 -0.239 -0.35 -0.135 -2.11* -3.798 -2.22* -0.004 -0.13 -0.165 -0.23 
Log of durable goods  
per capita -0.115 -22.92*** -3.268 -24.25*** -0.151 -13.45*** -4.328 -14.29*** -0.111 -17.68*** -3.083 -18.30*** 
Log of durable goods  
per capita sq 0.016 40.20*** 0.445 41.12*** 0.018 25.69*** 0.499 26.57*** 0.015 27.94*** 0.424 28.18*** 
Mother's Primary 0.031 2.38* 0.82 2.31* 0.049 2.20* 1.298 2.10* 0.02 1.27 0.531 1.25 
Mother's Middle 0.049 4.10*** 1.331 4.10*** 0.051 2.58** 1.386 2.57* 0.051 3.35*** 1.37 3.35*** 
Mother's Sec & above 0.063 2.93** 1.823 3.06** 0.103 3.79*** 2.878 3.79*** 0.009 0.25 0.359 0.35 
Father's Primary 0.019 1.17 0.474 1.06 0.013 0.46 0.344 0.43 0.011 0.56 0.271 0.51 
Father's Middle 0.042 3.56*** 1.067 3.37*** 0.055 2.58** 1.447 2.47* 0.036 2.64** 0.933 2.53*   
Father's Sec & above 0.122 7.96*** 3.266 7.82*** 0.125 5.19*** 3.382 5.11*** 0.118 5.72*** 3.166 5.66*** 
Age (years) -0.003 -0.69 -0.078 -0.77 -0.005 -0.8 -0.135 -0.77 -0.002 -0.44 -0.064 -0.54 
Age squared (years) 0 1.7 0.011 1.76 0.001 1.34 0.014 1.32 0 1.32 0.011 1.39 
Rural -0.156 -14.29*** -4.184 -14.12***         
Female 0.017 1.99* 0.454 1.94 0.023 1.55 0.612 1.53 0.015 1.42 0.389 1.38 
Non-Akan -0.038 -3.35*** -1.101 -3.53*** -0.011 -0.62 -0.38 -0.76 -0.079 -5.49*** -2.166 -5.58*** 
Western Region -0.164 -8.75*** -4.662 -8.96*** -0.127 -4.54*** -3.585 -4.54*** -0.169 -4.56*** -4.661 -4.56*** 
Central Region -0.356 -18.05*** -9.901 -18.27*** -0.471 -16.86*** -12.972 -16.90*** -0.315 -8.58*** -8.59 -8.51*** 
Eastern Region -0.322 -16.33*** -8.835 -16.37*** -0.363 -13.51*** -10.091 -13.65*** -0.319 -8.72*** -8.542 -8.47*** 
Volta Region -0.274 -15.18*** -7.695 -15.43*** -0.407 -14.57*** -11.218 -14.60*** -0.269 -7.73*** -7.371 -7.66*** 
Ashanti Region -0.244 -13.55*** -6.788 -13.59*** -0.154 -6.27*** -4.185 -6.12*** -0.312 -8.62*** -8.516 -8.51*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.201 -9.17*** -5.661 -9.44*** 0.06 1.73 1.59 1.66 -0.314 -8.37*** -8.587 -8.33*** 
Upper West Region -0.816 -26.54*** -21.751 -27.21*** -0.615 -14.80*** -17.073 -15.19*** -0.913 -19.90*** -24.052 -19.68*** 
Northern Region -0.547 -22.38*** -14.682 -22.23*** -0.475 -12.47*** -12.964 -12.57*** -0.6 -14.97*** -15.852 -14.48*** 
Upper East Region -0.823 -35.67*** -21.895 -35.68*** -0.622 -13.40*** -17.243 -13.62*** -0.846 -22.51*** -22.305 -21.81*** 
Price of Maize (kg)         0 -0.06 -0.004 -0.05 
Price of Anti-malarial pill         0.026 3.08** 0.683 3.02**  
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Missing price         0.023 0.59 0.477 0.46 
Dist. to the nearest clinic         0.001 6.67*** 0.017 6.55*** 
Male Agric. Wage         -0.006 -1.72 -0.185 -2.04*   
Ratio of female Wage         -0.108 -7.00*** -2.813 -6.88*** 
Ratio of child Wage         -0.01 -0.6 -0.268 -0.63 
constant 13.542 475.13*** 184.241 240.13*** 13.693 225.85*** 188.265 115.16*** 13.449 207.84*** 181.836 104.01*** 
Observation no. 1.20E+04  1.20E+04  3547  3547  8113  8113  
R-squared 0.501  0.503  0.526  0.529  0.417  0.416  
adjusted R-squared 0.5  0.502  0.523  0.526  0.415  0.413  
F 597.377  595.003  221.805  222.453  226.231  225.104  
ll -7.70E+03  -4.60E+04  -2.00E+03  -1.40E+04  -5.40E+03  -3.20E+04  
F-test of instruments F(  5, 11634) =  732.68 F(  5, 11634) =  724.21  F(  5,  3522) =  350.05 F(  5,  3522) =  350.79 F(  5,  8081) =  369.93 F(  5,  8081) =  361.17 
P-value             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000 
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AȂ13c: Children Ȃ First-stage regression of endogenous expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 & 1989/99 (Pooled: Illness) 
Pooled Full    Urban    Rural    
 Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Log of land per capita -0.027 -7.51*** -0.676 -8.02***         
Log of land per capita sq. 0.002 8.70*** 0.057 8.98***         
Missing land per capita 0.054 3.44*** 0.981 2.66**         
Log of durable goods  
per capita -0.078 -23.91*** -2.444 -31.32*** -0.085 -16.77*** -2.658 -21.71*** -0.074 -16.70*** -2.205 -20.52*** 
Log of durable goods  
per capita sq 0.013 43.77*** 0.392 50.68*** 0.014 31.86*** 0.404 36.82*** 0.013 28.44*** 0.361 31.89*** 
Formal employment (Head)     0.012 0.56 0.368 0.65 0.139 4.14*** 2.91 3.48*** 
Self-employment (Head)     0.019 0.9 0.5 0.9 0.12 3.76*** 2.558 3.22**  
Mother's Primary 0.007 0.61 0.29 1.01 0.044 2.40* 1.083 2.27* -0.009 -0.66 -0.101 -0.29 
Mother's Middle 0.044 4.55*** 1.093 4.51*** 0.052 3.39*** 1.299 3.36*** 0.05 4.02*** 1.208 3.87*** 
Mother's Sec & above 0.119 6.08*** 2.86 5.64*** 0.145 5.89*** 3.538 5.63*** 0.107 3.08** 2.511 2.73**  
Father's Primary 0.067 4.67*** 1.46 3.98*** 0.048 1.89 0.826 1.24 0.063 3.67*** 1.365 3.15**  
Father's Middle 0.082 8.46*** 1.775 7.39*** 0.099 5.89*** 2.115 5.09*** 0.071 5.90*** 1.59 5.38*** 
Father's Sec & above 0.141 10.88*** 3.395 10.29*** 0.155 7.67*** 3.63 7.07*** 0.119 6.47*** 2.925 6.26*** 
Age (years) -0.006 -2.03* -0.149 -1.93 -0.008 -1.65 -0.196 -1.58 -0.006 -1.42 -0.128 -1.33 
Age squared (years) 0.001 2.65** 0.013 2.66** 0.001 2.08* 0.016 2.03* 0.001 2.06* 0.013 2.10*   
Rural -0.134 -15.13*** -3.305 -14.94***         
Female 0.017 2.27* 0.419 2.30* 0.015 1.29 0.416 1.41 0.018 1.94 0.43 1.89 
Non-Akan -0.038 -4.17*** -0.977 -4.39*** -0.023 -1.68 -0.503 -1.47 -0.07 -5.85*** -1.819 -6.23*** 
Western Region -0.155 -10.13*** -3.869 -10.06*** -0.167 -7.65*** -4.127 -7.48*** -0.149 -4.70*** -3.856 -4.81*** 
Central Region -0.411 -24.22*** -10.071 -23.90*** -0.544 -21.54*** -13.381 -21.90*** -0.432 -13.38*** -10.513 -12.93*** 
Eastern Region -0.286 -18.50*** -7.257 -18.59*** -0.319 -15.80*** -8.2 -16.22*** -0.336 -10.88*** -8.43 -10.79*** 
Volta Region -0.381 -24.70*** -9.059 -23.38*** -0.429 -18.15*** -10.813 -17.88*** -0.423 -13.68*** -10.113 -12.99*** 
Ashanti Region -0.334 -23.48*** -8.003 -22.16*** -0.226 -12.34*** -5.429 -11.57*** -0.452 -14.48*** -11.006 -14.02*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.241 -14.24*** -5.858 -13.78*** -0.165 -6.22*** -3.472 -5.32*** -0.346 -10.93*** -8.641 -10.85*** 
Upper West Region -0.802 -20.75*** -19.841 -22.40*** -0.642 -14.36*** -17.202 -14.75*** -0.958 -19.60*** -23.613 -20.47*** 
Northern Region -0.551 -28.31*** -13.364 -27.63*** -0.536 -19.45*** -12.753 -19.03*** -0.642 -18.79*** -15.844 -18.37*** 
Upper East Region -0.833 -39.10*** -21.037 -40.19*** -0.507 -10.45*** -13.507 -10.89*** -0.961 -28.96*** -23.936 -28.80*** 
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GLSS_1 -2.536 -213.64*** -59.935 -209.32*** -2.589 -135.36*** -62.569 -130.17*** -2.511 -96.28*** -58.388 -93.27*** 
Price of Maize (kg)         -0.002 -0.92 -0.043 -0.75 
Price of Anti-malarial pill         0.049 6.74*** 1.345 7.55*** 
Missing price         0.157 4.98*** 4.385 6.09*** 
Dist. to the nearest clinic         0.001 8.25*** 0.021 8.29*** 
Male Agric. Wage         -0.012 -3.59*** -0.301 -3.46*** 
Ratio of female Wage         -0.062 -4.97*** -1.751 -5.66*** 
Ratio of child Wage         0.079 6.00*** 1.338 4.08*** 
constant 13.432 598.57*** 180.66 323.44*** 13.435 341.21*** 181.368 181.69*** 13.211 207.98*** 175.128 111.82*** 
Observation no. 1.80E+04  1.80E+04  5957  5957  1.20E+04  1.20E+04  
R-squared 0.897  0.892  0.923  0.921  0.883  0.877  
adjusted R-squared 0.896  0.892  0.922  0.92  0.883  0.877  
F 6107.552  6502.396  3277.364  3435.272  2898.203  3096.681  
ll -1.30E+04  -7.10E+04  -3.70E+03  -2.30E+04  -8.90E+03  -4.80E+04  
F-test of instruments F(  5, 18011) =  780.44 F(  5, 18011) =  837.44 F(  4,  5932) =  412.51 F(  4,  5932) =  464.28 F(  4, 12049) =  463.89 F(  4, 12049) =  468.05 
P-value             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000 
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AȂ14a: Adults Ȃ First-stage regression of endogenous expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: Illness) 
GLSS 1 Full    Urban    Rural    
 Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
log of land per capita -0.084 -10.64*** -1.853 -10.69*** -0.073 -5.25*** -1.608 -5.24*** -0.076 -8.30*** -1.666 -8.36*** 
log of land per capita sq. 0.008 11.61*** 0.186 11.56*** 0.006 4.74*** 0.138 4.70*** 0.008 9.53*** 0.176 9.55*** 
Missing land per capita -0.015 -0.57 -0.171 -0.3 -0.025 -0.98 -0.575 -1.01 -0.177 -2.63** -3.285 -2.34*   
formal employment (Head) 0.087 2.55* 1.93 2.59**     0.166 2.64** 3.475 2.59**  
Self-employment (Head) -0.018 -0.55 -0.327 -0.46     0.113 1.97* 2.358 1.94 
log of durable goods  
per capita     -0.162 -15.00*** -3.705 -15.29*** -0.14 -11.98*** -3.107 -12.13*** 
log of durable goods  
per capita sq    0.025 20.12*** 0.57 20.02*** 0.024 13.99*** 0.521 13.91*** 
Primary 0.048 1.67 0.997 1.61 0.048 1.1 0.983 1.02 0.019 0.55 0.36 0.49 
Middle 0.119 5.59*** 2.503 5.41*** 0.091 3.06** 1.917 2.92** 0.056 2.05* 1.15 1.94 
Sec. & above 0.277 8.54*** 6.051 8.33*** 0.164 4.03*** 3.553 3.89*** 0.018 0.4 0.204 0.21 
Age (years) 0.008 3.86*** 0.183 3.95*** 0.01 3.22** 0.23 3.23** 0.004 1.59 0.094 1.66 
Age squared (years) 0 -3.46*** -0.002 -3.56*** 0 -2.74** -0.002 -2.76** 0 -1.48 -0.001 -1.56 
Rural -0.15 -8.02*** -3.191 -7.84***         
Female -0.053 -3.31*** -1.224 -3.50*** -0.047 -2.14* -1.099 -2.23* -0.07 -3.39*** -1.587 -3.59*** 
Non-Akan -0.006 -0.3 -0.188 -0.45 -0.085 -3.49*** -1.846 -3.40*** 0.104 3.72*** 2.185 3.57*** 
Western Region -0.16 -5.13*** -3.693 -5.28*** -0.096 -2.45* -2.222 -2.53* -0.043 -0.68 -1.152 -0.82 
Central Region -0.519 -13.47*** -11.298 -13.46*** -0.474 -8.23*** -10.084 -8.22*** -0.451 -6.82*** -9.845 -6.70*** 
Eastern Region -0.26 -8.61*** -5.8 -8.57*** -0.197 -4.78*** -4.401 -4.72*** -0.189 -3.29** -4.194 -3.25**  
Volta Region -0.642 -18.03*** -13.915 -17.87*** -0.331 -5.76*** -7.226 -5.68*** -0.678 -10.76*** -14.571 -10.46*** 
Ashanti Region -0.463 -16.53*** -10.254 -16.37*** -0.288 -9.39*** -6.468 -9.39*** -0.405 -6.49*** -8.923 -6.41*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.442 -14.44*** -9.875 -14.59*** -0.353 -8.51*** -7.798 -8.63*** -0.307 -5.22*** -6.865 -5.22*** 
Upper West Region -0.739 -7.17*** -15.375 -7.24*** 0 . 0 . -0.707 -5.47*** -14.94 -5.51*** 
Northern Region -0.648 -17.96*** -14.002 -17.91*** -0.551 -11.62*** -11.862 -11.67*** -0.441 -7.08*** -9.49 -6.88*** 
Upper East Region -0.852 -15.15*** -18.186 -15.27*** -0.15 -1.42 -3.465 -1.44 -0.887 -11.90*** -18.87 -11.75*** 
Price of Maize (kg)         0.02 2.79** 0.417 2.66**  
Price of Anti-malarial pill         -0.061 -2.06* -1.247 -1.95 
Missing price         0.014 0.25 0.322 0.27 
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Dist. to the nearest clinic         -0.006 -6.32*** -0.123 -6.20*** 
Male Agric. Wage         -0.03 -2.15* -0.625 -2.08*   
Ratio of female Wage         0.104 4.05*** 2.311 4.15*** 
Ratio of child Wage         0.108 3.39*** 2.25 3.24**  
constant 11.028 167.52*** 122.102 85.04*** 10.941 136.19*** 120.204 67.65*** 10.841 80.10*** 118.137 40.48*** 
Observation no. 6519  6519  2659  2659  3860  3860  
R-squared 0.244  0.241  0.356  0.356  0.252  0.249  
adjusted R-squared 0.242  0.239  0.351  0.351  0.246  0.243  
F 92.837  89.109  86.175  82.1  42.428  40.832  
ll -6.00E+03  -2.60E+04  -2.10E+03  -1.00E+04  -3.40E+03  -1.50E+04  
F-test of instruments F(  5,  6496) =   33.37 F(  5,  6496) =   32.63 F(  5,  2638) =  120.52  F(  5,  2638) =  114.80  F(  7,  3829) =   51.98 F(  7,  3829) =   49.59 
P-value             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000 
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AȂ14b: Adults Ȃ First-stage regression of endogenous expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1998/99 (GLSS 4: Illness) 
GLSS 4 Full    Urban    Rural    
 Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Log of land per capita -0.104 -17.09*** -2.843 -17.09*** -0.079 -5.26*** -2.188 -5.24*** -0.095 -14.41*** -2.602 -14.44*** 
log of land per capita sq. 0.007 16.89*** 0.201 16.78*** 0.005 4.85*** 0.15 4.80*** 0.007 14.76*** 0.191 14.71*** 
Missing land per capita -0.246 -10.92*** -6.569 -10.83*** -0.182 -2.56* -5.255 -2.70** -0.18 -6.86*** -4.756 -6.73*** 
Formal employment (Head)  0.095 3.90*** 2.549 3.74***         
Self-employment (Head) -0.023 -0.99 -0.642 -0.99         
Log of durable goods  
per capita     -0.183 -14.74*** -5.296 -15.42***     
Log of durable goods  
per capita sq    0.02 27.46*** 0.567 28.04***     
Radio         0.003 0.21 0.042 0.09 
Primary 0.042 2.57* 1.079 2.40* 0.042 1.74 1.107 1.63 0.027 1.35 0.67 1.23 
Middle 0.137 9.86*** 3.702 9.73*** 0.077 3.80*** 2.027 3.61*** 0.108 6.34*** 2.899 6.25*** 
Sec. & above 0.375 19.04*** 10.484 18.95*** 0.153 6.45*** 4.282 6.41*** 0.328 11.01*** 9.004 10.81*** 
Age (years) 0.004 2.96** 0.113 3.07** 0 0.14 0.007 0.13 0.004 2.64** 0.121 2.75**  
Age squared (years) 0 -1.75 -0.001 -1.86 0 0.58 0 0.6 0 -1.49 -0.001 -1.6 
Rural -0.263 -20.70*** -7.229 -20.51***       0 .    
Female 0.012 1.09 0.27 0.92 0.014 0.94 0.327 0.8 -0.002 -0.18 -0.123 -0.34 
Non-Akan -0.06 -4.45*** -1.703 -4.55*** -0.022 -1.33 -0.659 -1.39 -0.05 -2.75** -1.396 -2.79**  
Western Region -0.273 -12.56*** -7.784 -12.66*** -0.161 -6.34*** -4.576 -6.29*** -0.354 -7.36*** -9.963 -7.32*** 
Central Region -0.496 -21.27*** -13.95 -21.39*** -0.496 -18.10*** -13.779 -18.08*** -0.429 -8.99*** -12 -8.90*** 
Eastern Region -0.542 -24.59*** -15.054 -24.50*** -0.42 -15.41*** -11.651 -15.46*** -0.574 -12.32*** -15.808 -12.00*** 
Volta Region -0.391 -19.19*** -11.078 -19.36*** -0.368 -13.76*** -10.222 -13.69*** -0.44 -9.85*** -12.339 -9.73*** 
Ashanti Region -0.291 -13.98*** -8.177 -13.90*** -0.127 -5.45*** -3.414 -5.17*** -0.373 -7.93*** -10.421 -7.82*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.301 -12.12*** -8.514 -12.24*** 0.036 1.11 0.949 1.04 -0.441 -9.01*** -12.29 -8.89*** 
Upper West Region -1.051 -32.78*** -28.534 -33.31*** -0.565 -11.27*** -15.802 -11.29*** -1.195 -22.93*** -32.251 -22.40*** 
Northern Region -0.756 -28.35*** -20.711 -28.28*** -0.56 -15.86*** -15.413 -15.99*** -0.855 -17.23*** -23.228 -16.71*** 
Upper East Region -1.072 -39.56*** -28.959 -39.55*** -0.725 -15.09*** -20.184 -15.35*** -1.143 -24.04*** -30.775 -23.15*** 
Price of Maize (kg)         0.005 1.66 0.138 1.67 
Price of Anti-malarial pill         0.032 3.63*** 0.887 3.70*** 
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Missing price         0.032 0.72 0.838 0.71 
Dist. to the nearest clinic         0 2.15* 0.005 1.98*   
Male Agric. Wage         -0.025 -7.03*** -0.712 -7.13*** 
Ratio of female Wage         -0.07 -3.93*** -1.866 -3.85*** 
Ratio of child Wage         -0.126 -6.72*** -3.434 -6.72*** 
constant 14.127 361.48*** 200.121 184.87*** 13.925 188.54*** 194.894 95.46*** 14.053 183.02*** 198.08 93.52*** 
Observation no. 1.40E+04  1.40E+04  4873  4873  8674  8674  
R-squared 0.355  0.351  0.495  0.495  0.277  0.27  
adjusted R-squared 0.354  0.35  0.492  0.492  0.274  0.268  
F 389.219  386.938  264.469  262.214  142.246  142.659  
ll -1.20E+04  -5.70E+04  -3.40E+03  -2.00E+04  -7.60E+03  -3.60E+04  
F-test of instruments F(  5, 13524) =   95.79 F(  5, 13524) =   94.23 F(  5,  4851) =  425.81 F(  5,  4851) =  419.31 F(  4,  8646) =   65.44  F(  4,  8646) =   64.13 
P-value             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000 
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AȂ14c: Adults Ȃ First-stage regression of endogenous expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 & 1998/99 (Pooled: Illness) 
Pooled Full    Urban    Rural    
 Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. Expend pc  Expend pc sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Log of durable goods  
per capita -0.116 -33.86*** -3.455 -40.60*** -0.114 -20.46*** -3.477 -25.22*** -0.09 -19.68*** -2.649 -23.07*** 
Log of durable goods  
per capita sq 0.017 54.00*** 0.478 60.24*** 0.016 36.73*** 0.474 40.70*** 0.014 30.40*** 0.391 33.22*** 
Formal employment (Head) -0.004 -0.24 -0.612 -1.28         
Self-employment (Head) -0.03 -1.72 -1.018 -2.23*         
Log of land per capita     -0.059 -6.58*** -1.268 -6.00***     
log of land per capita sq.     0.004 6.20*** 0.091 5.40***     
Missing land per capita     0.047 2.14* 0.457 0.86     
Room per capita  
(household)         0.656 16.37*** 16.613 16.40*** 
Primary 0.019 1.45 0.399 1.17 0.049 2.27* 1.113 1.97* 0.007 0.45 0.081 0.2 
Middle 0.054 4.96*** 1.236 4.50*** 0.082 4.81*** 2 4.60*** 0.046 3.46*** 1.035 3.12**  
Sec. & above 0.11 7.32*** 2.79 7.13*** 0.167 7.96*** 4.218 7.72*** 0.047 2.18* 1.136 2.03*   
Age (years) 0.003 2.47* 0.064 2.37* 0.004 2.04* 0.077 1.74 0.005 3.84*** 0.128 3.93*** 
Age squared (years) 0 -0.58 0 -0.43 0 -1.08 0 -0.76 0 -3.80*** -0.001 -3.79*** 
Rural -0.134 -14.29*** -3.349 -13.98***   0 .   0 .    
Female -0.022 -2.70** -0.515 -2.47* -0.008 -0.67 -0.173 -0.54 -0.012 -1.14 -0.261 -1.01 
Non-Akan -0.067 -6.78*** -1.593 -6.45*** -0.077 -5.53*** -1.774 -5.02*** -0.114 -8.70*** -2.862 -8.77*** 
Western Region -0.161 -10.11*** -4.171 -10.13*** -0.182 -8.36*** -4.64 -8.17*** -0.135 -4.13*** -3.783 -4.46*** 
Central Region -0.424 -23.29*** -10.589 -23.09*** -0.528 -19.79*** -13.473 -20.51*** -0.383 -11.98*** -9.52 -11.45*** 
Eastern Region -0.324 -20.11*** -8.501 -20.61*** -0.322 -13.77*** -8.664 -14.62*** -0.34 -11.29*** -9.025 -11.43*** 
Volta Region -0.379 -23.93*** -9.317 -22.88*** -0.386 -15.98*** -9.996 -15.83*** -0.387 -12.94*** -9.698 -12.39*** 
Ashanti Region -0.309 -20.82*** -7.528 -19.57*** -0.212 -11.34*** -5.123 -10.43*** -0.358 -11.53*** -8.952 -11.06*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.263 -14.68*** -6.416 -13.91*** -0.164 -6.10*** -3.609 -5.20*** -0.307 -9.71*** -7.84 -9.52*** 
Upper West Region -0.847 -26.00*** -21.463 -27.49*** -0.545 -10.59*** -15.096 -10.63*** -1 -23.88*** -25.327 -24.54*** 
Northern Region -0.631 -31.65*** -15.635 -31.23*** -0.559 -19.45*** -14.009 -19.72*** -0.711 -20.99*** -17.978 -20.58*** 
Upper East Region -0.929 -41.30*** -23.761 -42.06*** -0.517 -9.09*** -14.242 -9.74*** -1.061 -32.75*** -26.978 -32.28*** 
GLSS_1 -2.523 -211.13*** -60.507 -204.51*** -2.486 -122.75*** -61.043 -118.49*** -2.522 -94.63*** -59.304 -90.62*** 
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Price of Maize (kg)         -0.002 -0.73 -0.029 -0.45 
Price of Anti-malarial pill         4.50E-02 6.10*** 1.29E+00 7.16*** 
Missing price         0.127 3.98*** 3.927 5.25*** 
Dist. to the nearest clinic         0 2.52* 0.009 2.74**  
Male Agric. Wage         -0.015 -4.98*** -0.371 -4.62*** 
Ratio of female Wage         -3.20E-02 -2.46* -1.01E+00 -3.08**  
Ratio of child Wage         0.046 3.31*** 0.473 1.36 
constant 13.676 409.41*** 187.322 217.94*** 13.589 292.45*** 186.115 156.46*** 13.233 219.60*** 175.306 115.77*** 
Observation no. 2.00E+04  2.00E+04  7532  7532  1.30E+04  1.30E+04  
R-squared 0.872  0.866  0.897  0.893  0.872  0.865  
adjusted R-squared 0.871  0.866  0.897  0.893  0.872  0.864  
F 6088.52  6479.418  3039.72  3229.959  3027.248  3216.009  
ll -1.70E+04  -8.10E+04  -5.70E+03  -3.00E+04  -9.90E+03  -5.00E+04  
F-test of instruments F(  4, 20043) = 1147.21 F(  4, 20043) = 1225.34 F(  5,  7509) =  456.94  F(  5,  7509) =  476.66 F(  3, 12513) = 1043.30 F(  3, 12513) = 1039.38 
P-value             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000 
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w/ water & 
sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic & water 
and sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned income 
& quad & water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 1             
Full Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.19 1.69 0.204 1.81 0.17 1.48 0.18 1.56 0.171 1.53 0.183 1.63 
Mother's Middle 0.102 1.2 0.12 1.4 0.119 1.35 0.136 1.55 0.101 1.18 0.115 1.34 
Mother's Sec & above 0.306 1.54 0.333 1.67 0.319 1.41 0.322 1.42 0.318 1.57 0.333 1.65 
Father's Primary -0.015 -0.1 -0.024 -0.16 0.076 0.47 0.083 0.51 0 0 -0.009 -0.06 
Father's Middle 0.142 1.68 0.14 1.66 0.239 2.26* 0.256 2.41* 0.117 1.37 0.114 1.34 
Father's Sec & above 0.201 1.6 0.204 1.63 0.312 2.18* 0.331 2.31* 0.171 1.36 0.173 1.37 
Observation no. 6378            
Urban             
Mother's Primary 0.348 1.94 0.323 1.79 0.377 1.96 0.348 1.84 0.332 1.84 0.311 1.72 
Mother's Middle 0.475 3.63*** 0.453 3.44*** 0.499 3.68*** 0.473 3.52*** 0.45 3.41*** 0.433 3.26** 
Mother's Sec & above 0.733 3.20** 0.713 3.10** 0.814 3.24** 0.796 3.15** 0.678 2.90** 0.667 2.85** 
Father's Primary -0.327 -1.12 -0.307 -1.06 -0.289 -0.95 -0.266 -0.87 -0.34 -1.17 -0.32 -1.1 
Father's Middle -0.174 -1.31 -0.155 -1.16 -0.128 -0.66 -0.097 -0.48 -0.192 -1.44 -0.173 -1.28 
Father's Sec & above -0.287 -1.58 -0.275 -1.51 -0.213 -0.93 -0.189 -0.8 -0.314 -1.72 -0.301 -1.65 
Observation no. 2410            
Rural             
Mother's Primary 0.038 0.27 0.063 0.44 0.074 0.44 0.108 0.65 0.027 0.18 0.049 0.34 
Mother's Middle -0.068 -0.59 -0.057 -0.5 -0.01 -0.07 0.001 0 -0.054 -0.47 -0.047 -0.41 
Mother's Sec & above 0.398 0.89 0.438 0.97 0.505 0.93 0.546 1.02 0.399 0.88 0.424 0.94 
Father's Primary 0.126 0.71 0.134 0.75 0.233 1.09 0.23 1.09 0.134 0.75 0.145 0.82 
Father's Middle 0.247 2.25*   0.261 2.38*   0.273 1.96*   0.283 2.06*   0.222 2.01*   0.233 2.11*   
Father's Sec & above 0.503 2.88**  0.539 3.08**  0.595 2.76**  0.63 2.95**  0.464 2.65**  0.499 2.85**  
Observation no. 3968            
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w/ water & 
sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic & water 
and sanitation 
w/ unearned 
income & quadratic 
w/ unearned 
income & quad & 
water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 4             
Full             
Mother's Primary 0.061 0.54 0.083 0.74 0.036 0.44 0.061 0.74 0.033 0.31 0.056 0.52 
Mother's Middle 0.016 0.18 0.04 0.43 -0.045 -0.58 -0.02 -0.26 -0.012 -0.13 0.012 0.14 
Mother's Sec & above -0.031 -0.17 0.003 0.02 -0.039 -0.25 -0.01 -0.06 -0.064 -0.35 -0.029 -0.16 
Father's Primary 0.185 1.25 0.179 1.21 0.031 0.31 0.028 0.28 0.197 1.34 0.192 1.3 
Father's Middle -0.083 -0.8 -0.075 -0.73 -0.183 -2.46* -0.169 -2.27* -0.088 -0.85 -0.08 -0.78 
Father's Sec & above 0.149 0.96 0.168 1.1 -0.026 -0.26 -0.005 -0.05 0.119 0.76 0.137 0.89 
Observation no. 11660            
Urban             
Mother's Primary -0.069 -0.37 -0.085 -0.47 -0.083 -0.53 -0.086 -0.54 -0.104 -0.57 -0.114 -0.64 
Mother's Middle -0.109 -0.71 -0.124 -0.82 -0.173 -1.25 -0.176 -1.27 -0.144 -0.92 -0.153 -1 
Mother's Sec & above 0.019 0.09 -0.002 -0.01 -0.051 -0.25 -0.055 -0.26 -0.02 -0.09 -0.033 -0.16 
Father's Primary -0.13 -0.53 -0.122 -0.5 -0.067 -0.35 -0.061 -0.31 -0.098 -0.41 -0.093 -0.38 
Father's Middle -0.13 -0.86 -0.14 -0.92 -0.185 -1.2 -0.185 -1.2 -0.131 -0.87 -0.138 -0.91 
Father's Sec & above -0.09 -0.46 -0.104 -0.53 -0.022 -0.12 -0.021 -0.12 -0.142 -0.72 -0.15 -0.76 
Observation no. 3547            
Rural             
Mother's Primary 0.111 0.82 0.145 1.06 0.114 1.18 0.144 1.5 0.088 0.68 0.121 0.92 
Mother's Middle 0.072 0.63 0.115 0.99 0.045 0.49 0.085 0.92 0.048 0.42 0.091 0.79 
Mother's Sec & above -0.092 -0.28 -0.03 -0.09 -0.001 -0.01 0.061 0.24 -0.131 -0.39 -0.073 -0.22 
Father's Primary 0.266 1.5 0.256 1.45 0.056 0.49 0.055 0.48 0.264 1.5 0.256 1.46 
Father's Middle -0.099 -0.75 -0.088 -0.68 -0.203 -2.38*   -0.189 -2.23*   -0.112 -0.85 -0.101 -0.78 
Father's Sec & above 0.269 1.26 0.299 1.42 -0.027 -0.22 0.001 0.01 0.251 1.16 0.278 1.3 
Observation no. 8113            
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w/ water & 
sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic & water 
and sanitation 
w/ unearned 
income & quadratic 
w/ unearned 
income & quad & 
water and sanitation 
Pooled             
Full Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.081 1.23 0.1 1.51 0.081 1.23 0.101 1.53 0.059 0.9 0.078 1.18 
Mother's Middle 0.018 0.31 0.039 0.69 0.01 0.17 0.027 0.47 0.001 0.01 0.021 0.37 
Mother's Sec & above 0.085 0.72 0.12 1.01 0.057 0.46 0.079 0.64 0.074 0.63 0.106 0.9 
Father's Primary 0.054 0.67 0.047 0.57 0.038 0.45 0.024 0.29 0.055 0.68 0.048 0.59 
Father's Middle -0.026 -0.47 -0.019 -0.35 -0.046 -0.75 -0.047 -0.76 -0.047 -0.87 -0.04 -0.74 
Father's Sec & above 0.107 1.41 0.119 1.58 0.084 1.02 0.085 1.03 0.092 1.22 0.104 1.38 
GLSS_1 0.587 13.30*** 0.541 11.99*** 0.897 1.66 1.012 1.84 0.573 11.00*** 0.535 10.18*** 
Observation no. 18038            
Urban             
Mother's Primary 0.067 0.58 0.067 0.58 0.063 0.54 0.064 0.55 0.044 0.38 0.044 0.38 
Mother's Middle 0.083 0.89 0.082 0.88 0.076 0.79 0.077 0.8 0.063 0.67 0.063 0.67 
Mother's Sec & above 0.241 1.62 0.24 1.61 0.222 1.36 0.223 1.37 0.21 1.41 0.211 1.41 
Father's Primary -0.099 -0.65 -0.098 -0.64 -0.118 -0.73 -0.117 -0.72 -0.085 -0.56 -0.086 -0.56 
Father's Middle -0.109 -1.11 -0.109 -1.11 -0.132 -1.12 -0.131 -1.1 -0.12 -1.22 -0.12 -1.22 
Father's Sec & above -0.046 -0.38 -0.046 -0.38 -0.063 -0.44 -0.061 -0.43 -0.063 -0.52 -0.063 -0.52 
GLSS_1 0.762 10.05*** 0.762 10.05*** 0.937 1.07 0.915 1.03 0.839 9.00*** 0.84 8.99*** 
Observation no. 5957            
Rural             
Mother's Primary 0.094 1.18 0.125 1.57 0.086 1.06 0.117 1.46 0.075 0.94 0.104 1.31 
Mother's Middle -0.007 -0.1 0.023 0.33 -0.017 -0.24 0.007 0.1 -0.019 -0.26 0.009 0.13 
Mother's Sec & above 0.03 0.14 0.098 0.47 -0.015 -0.07 0.033 0.15 0.024 0.11 0.086 0.41 
Father's Primary 0.105 1.09 0.109 1.14 0.1 0.99 0.101 1 0.096 1 0.102 1.06 
Father's Middle -0.032 -0.49 -0.018 -0.28 -0.035 -0.48 -0.027 -0.36 -0.062 -0.94 -0.048 -0.72 
Father's Sec & above 0.207 2.07*   0.235 2.35*   0.187 1.74 0.204 1.91 0.192 1.92 0.219 2.19*   
GLSS_1 0.053 0.4 -0.04 -0.3 0.081 0.09 0.16 0.18 0.056 0.42 -0.024 -0.18 
Observation no. 12081            
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AȂ18: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Own Education on The Duration of Adult Illness, 1987/88 (GLSS 1) 
Sample: 
personal education 
only w/ water & sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & quadratic 
& water and sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned income & 
quad & water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 1             
Full Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Primary 0.377 3.34*** 0.386 3.42*** 0.368 3.21** 0.384 3.35*** 0.36 3.19** 0.369 3.27** 
Middle 0.098 1.16 0.114 1.34 0.08 0.82 0.108 1.12 0.062 0.73 0.077 0.9 
Sec. & above -0.123 -0.93 -0.095 -0.72 -0.137 -0.95 -0.1 -0.7 -0.182 -1.37 -0.158 -1.19 
Obs. No. 6519            
Urban             
Primary 0.516 2.81** 0.517 2.81** 0.54 2.69** 0.546 2.71** 0.501 2.72** 0.502 2.73** 
Middle 0.061 0.47 0.062 0.48 0.087 0.5 0.096 0.54 0.032 0.24 0.032 0.25 
Sec. & above -0.16 -0.93 -0.158 -0.92 -0.027 -0.12 -0.018 -0.08 -0.221 -1.26 -0.219 -1.26 
Obs no. 2659            
Rural             
Primary 0.273 1.91 0.294 2.06*   0.245 1.69 0.274 1.89 0.26 1.82 0.283 1.98*   
Middle 0.143 1.27 0.163 1.45 0.078 0.66 0.111 0.93 0.107 0.94 0.126 1.11 
Sec. & above -0.05 -0.24 -0.006 -0.03 -0.128 -0.56 -0.062 -0.27 -0.104 -0.49 -0.061 -0.29 
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AȂ19: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Own Education on The Duration of Adult Illness, 1998/99 (GLSS 4) 
Sample: 
personal education 
only w/ water & sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & quadratic 
& water and sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned income & 
quad & water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 4             
Full             
Primary 0.047 0.49 0.059 0.6 0.016 0.17 0.035 0.37 0.036 0.36 0.048 0.49 
Middle -0.037 -0.34 -0.018 -0.16 -0.222 -2.74** -0.2 -2.48* -0.062 -0.59 -0.042 -0.39 
Sec. & above -0.345 -3.08** -0.315 -2.76** -0.934 -3.91*** -0.944 -3.91*** -0.402 -3.45*** -0.37 -3.13** 
Obs no. 13547            
Urban             
Primary 0.095 0.52 0.075 0.42 -0.084 -0.56 -0.091 -0.61 0.085 0.46 0.07 0.38 
Middle -0.03 -0.13 -0.058 -0.25 -0.147 -1.08 -0.159 -1.17 -0.072 -0.34 -0.094 -0.44 
Sec. & above -0.338 -2.10* -0.37 -2.33* -0.396 -2.47* -0.406 -2.54* -0.41 -2.61* -0.434 -2.78** 
Obs no. 4873            
Rural             
Primary 0.029 0.25 0.051 0.43 0.002 0.02 0.027 0.26 0.01 0.08 0.032 0.27 
Middle -0.064 -0.6 -0.019 -0.17 -0.259 -2.79**  -0.205 -2.23*   -0.089 -0.82 -0.043 -0.39 
Sec. & above -0.406 -2.47*   -0.329 -2.00*   -0.689 -3.80*** -0.599 -3.32*** -0.457 -2.66**  -0.384 -2.24*   
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AȂ20: Tobit Results Ȃ The Impact of Own Education on The Duration of Adult Illness, 1987/88 & 1998/99 (Pooled) 
Sample: 
personal education 
only w/ water & sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & quadratic 
& water and sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned income & 
quad & water and 
sanitation 
             
Pooled             
Full Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Primary 0.094 1.44 0.103 1.57 0.096 1.44 0.1 1.51 0.079 1.21 0.088 1.35 
Middle -0.048 -0.91 -0.03 -0.58 -0.037 -0.64 -0.03 -0.52 -0.07 -1.33 -0.053 -1 
Sec. & above -0.24 -3.10** -0.214 -2.76** -0.203 -2.35* -0.195 -2.28* -0.273 -3.52*** -0.248 -3.19** 
GLSS_1 0.85 20.59*** 0.81 19.20*** 0.732 1.2 0.936 1.48 0.891 18.51*** 0.855 17.56*** 
Obs no. 20066            
Urban             
Primary 0.097 0.86 0.096 0.86 0.069 0.61 0.071 0.62 0.085 0.76 0.085 0.76 
Middle -0.07 -0.79 -0.071 -0.8 -0.098 -1.05 -0.096 -1.03 -0.088 -0.99 -0.088 -1 
Sec. & above -0.268 -2.46* -0.27 -2.47* -0.304 -2.46* -0.3 -2.43* -0.305 -2.79** -0.306 -2.79** 
GLSS_1 1.032 15.23*** 1.033 15.23*** 1.599 2.83** 1.579 2.66** 1.109 13.24*** 1.109 13.24*** 
Obs no. 7532            
Rural             
Primary 0.083 1.04 0.103 1.28 0.052 0.63 0.163 1.61 0.066 0.82 0.085 1.06 
Middle -0.064 -0.97 -0.032 -0.49 -0.117 -1.72 -0.027 -0.33 -0.091 -1.38 -0.059 -0.9 
Sec. & above -0.21 -1.79 -0.154 -1.31 -0.242 -2.01*   -0.484 -2.81**  -0.247 -2.10*   -0.193 -1.64 
GLSS_1 0.219 1.86 0.116 0.97 2.51 4.57*** -3.293 -1.67 0.301 2.50*   0.205 1.69 
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w/ water & 
sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic & water 
and sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned 
income & quad & 
water and 
sanitation 
GLSS 1             
Full Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Primary 0.347 3.06** 0.355 3.13** 0.337 2.91** 0.352 3.05** 0.334 2.95** 0.343 3.02** 
Middle 0.051 0.58 0.065 0.74 0.03 0.31 0.057 0.58 0.023 0.26 0.036 0.41 
Sec. & above -0.203 -1.5 -0.18 -1.33 -0.218 -1.48 -0.183 -1.26 -0.248 -1.82 -0.228 -1.67 ǯ 0.538 2.48* 0.541 2.50* 0.545 2.50* 0.544 2.50* 0.519 2.39* 0.52 2.40* ǯ -0.237 -1.38 -0.231 -1.34 -0.25 -1.45 -0.241 -1.4 -0.248 -1.44 -0.244 -1.42 ǯƬe 0.489 1.14 0.498 1.16 0.543 1.22 0.52 1.17 0.456 1.06 0.457 1.07 	ǯ 0.033 0.17 0.039 0.2 0.04 0.21 0.043 0.22 0.012 0.06 0.017 0.09 	ǯ 0.154 1.63 0.162 1.7 0.158 1.64 0.164 1.71 0.14 1.47 0.145 1.53 	ǯƬ 0.25 1.43 0.276 1.58 0.269 1.49 0.285 1.59 0.224 1.27 0.247 1.41 
Observation no. 6519            
Urban             
Primary 0.425 2.30* 0.426 2.31* 0.445 2.23* 0.45 2.24* 0.417 2.26* 0.418 2.27* 
Middle -0.052 -0.39 -0.052 -0.39 -0.037 -0.22 -0.031 -0.18 -0.068 -0.51 -0.068 -0.51 
Sec. & above -0.348 -1.94 -0.348 -1.93 -0.229 -1.03 -0.223 -0.98 -0.382 -2.11* -0.383 -2.11* ǯ 0.985 3.49*** 0.982 3.48*** 1.032 3.58*** 1.031 3.56*** 0.972 3.44*** 0.968 3.42*** ǯ -0.04 -0.19 -0.037 -0.18 -0.055 -0.25 -0.049 -0.23 -0.055 -0.27 -0.052 -0.25 ǯƬ 0.726 1.64 0.732 1.65 0.887 1.92 0.885 1.9 0.689 1.56 0.697 1.57 	ǯ 0.724 2.51* 0.726 2.52* 0.724 2.44* 0.722 2.41* 0.71 2.46* 0.712 2.47* 	ǯ 0.13 1 0.132 1.02 0.169 1.23 0.173 1.26 0.119 0.92 0.122 0.94 	ǯƬ 0.25 1.19 0.254 1.21 0.356 1.61 0.356 1.59 0.223 1.05 0.228 1.08 
Observation no. 2659            
Rural             
Primary 0.266 1.85 0.288 2.00*   0.243 1.66 0.271 1.85 0.257 1.79 0.28 1.95 
Middle 0.143 1.25 0.161 1.41 0.085 0.7 0.115 0.94 0.111 0.97 0.129 1.12 
Sec. & above -0.059 -0.27 -0.016 -0.07 -0.133 -0.58 -0.069 -0.3 -0.106 -0.5 -0.064 -0.3 
  426 
ǯ 0.114 0.34 0.118 0.35 0.044 0.13 0.046 0.14 0.101 0.3 0.103 0.31 ǯ -0.548 -1.79 -0.566 -1.85 -0.504 -1.64 -0.527 -1.72 -0.55 -1.8 -0.572 -1.86 ǯƬ -0.969 -0.61 -1.026 -0.65 -0.98 -0.62 -1.07 -0.68 -1.048 -0.67 -1.127 -0.72 
Father's Primary -0.493 -1.83 -0.484 -1.8 -0.538 -1.98*   -0.531 -1.96 -0.516 -1.91 -0.508 -1.89 
Father's Middle 0.242 1.72 0.252 1.79 0.204 1.43 0.212 1.49 0.218 1.55 0.226 1.61 
Father's Sec & above 0.228 0.74 0.276 0.89 0.183 0.59 0.233 0.75 0.21 0.68 0.262 0.85 
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AȂ22: Tobit Results Ȃ 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w/ water & 
sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & 






income & quad & 
water and 
sanitation 
             
GLSS 4             
Full             
Primary 0.025 0.26 0.035 0.37 0.016 0.17 0.032 0.33 0.016 0.17 0.027 0.28 
Middle -0.063 -0.62 -0.046 -0.44 -0.198 -2.43* -0.178 -2.19* -0.082 -0.83 -0.064 -0.64 
Sec. & above -0.399 -3.34*** -0.373 -3.10** -0.886 -4.11*** -0.889 -4.10*** -0.443 -3.63*** -0.416 -3.39*** 
Mother's Primary -0.187 -1.4 -0.181 -1.36 -0.08 -0.66 -0.079 -0.65 -0.197 -1.51 -0.191 -1.47 
Mother's Middle 0.064 0.38 0.074 0.44 -0.239 -1.95 -0.237 -1.92 0.054 0.32 0.065 0.39 
Mother's Sec & above 0.303 1.33 0.315 1.39 -0.336 -1.17 -0.362 -1.25 0.277 1.21 0.29 1.26 
Father's Primary 0.311 1.86 0.31 1.86 0.181 1.52 0.186 1.55 0.31 1.87 0.309 1.88 
Father's Middle 0.079 0.88 0.09 1.01 -0.018 -0.22 -0.005 -0.06 0.06 0.66 0.072 0.79 
Father's Sec & above 0.055 0.48 0.065 0.56 -0.109 -0.84 -0.105 -0.8 0.031 0.27 0.041 0.36 
Observation no. 13547            
Urban             
Primary 0.119 0.66 0.103 0.58 -0.066 -0.44 -0.072 -0.48 0.116 0.64 0.103 0.57 
Middle -0.019 -0.09 -0.041 -0.19 -0.118 -0.86 -0.128 -0.93 -0.048 -0.24 -0.066 -0.33 
Sec. & above -0.347 -2.10* -0.369 -2.25* -0.374 -2.26* -0.379 -2.30* -0.394 -2.40* -0.412 -2.52* 
Mother's Primary -0.543 -2.23* -0.541 -2.23* -0.261 -1.46 -0.258 -1.45 -0.554 -2.29* -0.551 -2.30* 
Mother's Middle 0.065 0.22 0.057 0.2 -0.064 -0.42 -0.066 -0.43 0.032 0.11 0.026 0.09 
Mother's Sec & above 0.051 0.18 0.044 0.15 0.077 0.32 0.078 0.33 0 0 -0.004 -0.02 
Father's Primary 0.311 1.11 0.299 1.07 0.255 1.41 0.246 1.36 0.3 1.1 0.29 1.07 
Father's Middle -0.102 -0.75 -0.116 -0.85 -0.103 -0.85 -0.111 -0.92 -0.133 -0.96 -0.144 -1.04 
Father's Sec & above 0.113 0.67 0.094 0.56 0.031 0.19 0.02 0.12 0.074 0.45 0.058 0.35 
Observation no. 4873            
Rural             
Primary -0.017 -0.16 0.003 0.03 -0.058 -0.57 -0.033 -0.33 -0.034 -0.31 -0.013 -0.12 
Middle -0.095 -0.9 -0.053 -0.5 -0.258 -2.84**  -0.208 -2.32*   -0.116 -1.08 -0.074 -0.68 
  428 
Sec. & above -0.447 -2.69**  -0.376 -2.26*   -0.505 -3.33*** -0.431 -2.86**  -0.49 -2.87**  -0.423 -2.49*   
Mother's Primary 0.092 0.6 0.11 0.73 0.124 0.82 0.126 0.83 0.075 0.5 0.093 0.63 
Mother's Middle -0.017 -0.1 0.009 0.05 -0.158 -1.04 -0.14 -0.92 -0.013 -0.07 0.016 0.09 
Mother's Sec & above 0.613 1.57 0.647 1.7 0.288 0.83 0.325 0.94 0.573 1.42 0.604 1.53 
Father's Primary 0.349 1.76 0.335 1.72 0.163 1.14 0.158 1.11 0.344 1.78 0.33 1.74 
Father's Middle 0.174 1.56 0.194 1.75 0.066 0.67 0.096 0.98 0.161 1.42 0.181 1.61 
Father's Sec & above -0.11 -0.65 -0.11 -0.65 -0.087 -0.54 -0.069 -0.43 -0.122 -0.72 -0.123 -0.73 
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w/ water & 
sanitation 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic 
w/ expend. & 
quadratic & water 
and sanitation 
w/ unearned income 
& quadratic 
w/ unearned 
income & quad & 
water and 
sanitation 
Pooled             
Full Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio Coef. t- ratio 
Primary 0.084 1.27 0.091 1.38 0.086 1.29 0.089 1.34 0.071 1.08 0.078 1.19 
Middle -0.054 -1.02 -0.04 -0.75 -0.044 -0.75 -0.039 -0.67 -0.074 -1.37 -0.059 -1.1 
Sec. & above -0.256 -3.19** -0.237 -2.95** -0.22 -2.51* -0.217 -2.48* -0.283 -3.52*** -0.264 -3.28** 
Mother's Primary -0.017 -0.18 -0.015 -0.15 -0.022 -0.22 -0.02 -0.21 -0.031 -0.32 -0.029 -0.29 
Mother's Middle -0.169 -1.91 -0.159 -1.79 -0.158 -1.77 -0.147 -1.65 -0.173 -1.96 -0.163 -1.85 
Mother's Sec & above 0.201 1.2 0.208 1.25 0.226 1.33 0.229 1.35 0.198 1.18 0.204 1.22 
Father's Primary 0.143 1.5 0.146 1.54 0.143 1.5 0.145 1.52 0.136 1.42 0.139 1.46 
Father's Middle 0.052 0.89 0.065 1.11 0.056 0.95 0.066 1.11 0.041 0.7 0.054 0.93 
Father's Sec & above 0.074 0.8 0.089 0.95 0.085 0.91 0.096 1.02 0.056 0.6 0.07 0.75 
GLSS_1 0.855 20.29*** 0.817 19.03*** 0.708 1.16 0.912 1.45 0.893 18.36*** 0.858 17.48*** 
Observation no. 20066            
Urban             
Primary 0.08 0.71 0.08 0.71 0.057 0.5 0.058 0.51 0.072 0.64 0.072 0.63 
Middle -0.072 -0.79 -0.072 -0.8 -0.095 -1.01 -0.094 -0.99 -0.084 -0.93 -0.085 -0.94 
Sec. & above -0.294 -2.57* -0.295 -2.58** -0.32 -2.56* -0.318 -2.53* -0.322 -2.81** -0.322 -2.81** 
Mother's Primary -0.04 -0.28 -0.04 -0.28 -0.052 -0.36 -0.053 -0.37 -0.061 -0.42 -0.061 -0.42 
Mother's Middle -0.078 -0.66 -0.079 -0.66 -0.074 -0.62 -0.073 -0.62 -0.089 -0.75 -0.089 -0.75 
Mother's Sec & above 0.195 0.99 0.195 0.99 0.203 1.02 0.203 1.02 0.187 0.95 0.187 0.95 
Father's Primary 0.346 2.35* 0.345 2.34* 0.332 2.25* 0.333 2.26* 0.344 2.34* 0.344 2.34* 
Father's Middle -0.025 -0.28 -0.026 -0.29 -0.038 -0.43 -0.036 -0.41 -0.035 -0.4 -0.035 -0.4 
Father's Sec & above 0.112 0.89 0.111 0.88 0.1 0.78 0.102 0.8 0.091 0.72 0.091 0.72 
GLSS_1 1.052 15.10*** 1.052 15.10*** 1.6 2.84** 1.583 2.67** 1.124 13.26*** 1.124 13.26*** 
Observation no. 7532            
Rural             
Primary 0.074 0.91 0.091 1.12 0.115 1.18 0.145 1.44 0.058 0.72 0.075 0.93 
  430 
Middle -0.071 -1.05 -0.043 -0.64 -0.075 -0.93 -0.031 -0.37 -0.095 -1.41 -0.067 -1 
Sec. & above -0.219 -1.83 -0.171 -1.43 -0.513 -3.09**  -0.462 -2.77**  -0.249 -2.08*   -0.203 -1.69 
Mother's Primary 0.042 0.31 0.054 0.4 0.119 0.74 0.148 0.9 0.033 0.25 0.046 0.34 
Mother's Middle -0.278 -2.06*   -0.256 -1.9 -0.363 -2.30*   -0.336 -2.10*   -0.281 -2.09*   -0.259 -1.93 
Mother's Sec & above 0.279 0.83 0.321 0.96 -0.069 -0.17 -0.03 -0.07 0.241 0.72 0.277 0.83 
Father's Primary 0.032 0.26 0.033 0.26 0.129 0.85 0.138 0.88 0.019 0.15 0.021 0.17 
Father's Middle 0.138 1.76 0.16 2.03*   0.101 1.1 0.133 1.42 0.125 1.59 0.147 1.87 
Father's Sec & above 0.011 0.08 0.033 0.23 -0.148 -0.86 -0.126 -0.72 -0.008 -0.06 0.013 0.09 
GLSS_1 0.22 1.86 0.119 1 -2.752 -1.48 -3.22 -1.65 0.298 2.47*   0.205 1.69 
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A-24a: The Effects of Parental Education on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of Pre-School Children, 1987/88 (GLSS 
1) 
Pre-School Variant 1: Education Variant 3: Education conditioning on unearned income 
 Illness  Haz  Whz  Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Sample: Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.049 1.35 -0.038 -0.4 0.003 0.05 0.04 1.12 -0.037 -0.38 3.60E-04 0.01 
Mother's Middle 0.026 0.88 0.048 0.59 0.005 0.1 0.021 0.72 0.039 0.48 -0.006 -0.11 
Mother's Sec & above 0.044 0.64 0.493 3.13** 0.299 2.22*  0.039 0.56 0.448 2.77** 0.25 1.87 
Father's Primary 0.071 1.44 -0.064 -0.5 -0.016 -0.17 0.075 1.51 -0.066 -0.52 -0.017 -0.17 
Father's Middle 0.081 2.72** 0.044 0.54 0.009 0.16 0.07 2.32* 0.04 0.48 -0.002 -0.04 
Father's Sec & above 0.15 3.41*** 0.157 1.36 0.09 1.06 0.138 3.11** 0.152 1.32 0.078 0.92 
Observation no. 2168            
Urban sub-sample:             
Mother's Primary -0.002 -0.03 0.199 1.19 0.028 0.22 -0.006 -0.09 0.183 1.08 0.022 0.18 
Mother's Middle 0.112 2.20* 0.535 4.18*** -0.021 -0.23 0.102 1.96 0.494 3.85*** -0.035 -0.38 
Mother's Sec & above 0.13 1.52 0.849 4.21*** 0.249 1.55 0.122 1.39 0.806 3.90*** 0.217 1.35 
Father's Primary -0.131 -1.43 -0.181 -0.68 -0.037 -0.19 -0.134 -1.45 -0.19 -0.73 -0.043 -0.22 
Father's Middle -0.053 -0.96 -0.092 -0.68 0.084 0.93 -0.06 -1.08 -0.116 -0.85 0.072 0.78 
Father's Sec & above -0.05 -0.71 -0.094 -0.53 0.074 0.55 -0.062 -0.87 -0.134 -0.75 0.058 0.42 
Observation no. 757            
Rural sub-sample:             
Mother's Primary 0.06 1.34 -0.159 -1.32 0.019 0.24 0.054 1.21 -0.145 -1.2 0.016 0.2 
Mother's Middle -0.006 -0.16 -0.212 -2.09* -0.009 -0.12 -0.008 -0.22 -0.215 -2.11* -0.016 -0.22 
Mother's Sec & above 0.147 0.77 0.192 0.61 0.829 2.48*  0.123 0.64 0.201 0.63 0.773 2.32*  
Father's Primary 0.133 2.30* -0.102 -0.7 0.019 0.17 0.137 2.39* -0.109 -0.74 0.024 0.21 
Father's Middle 0.118 3.22** 0.109 1.05 -0.036 -0.51 0.107 2.88** 0.129 1.23 -0.049 -0.69 
Father's Sec & above 0.266 4.75*** 0.276 1.77 0.165 1.49 0.257 4.54*** 0.298 1.92 0.157 1.41 
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A-24b: The Effects of Parental Education on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of Pre-School Children, 1987/88 (GLSS 
1), controlling expenditure 
Pre-School Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure per capita 
 Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Sample: Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.049 1.35 -0.057 -0.52 0.02 0.29 
Mother's Middle 0.026 0.87 0.07 0.74 -0.017 -0.31 
Mother's Sec & above 0.029 0.38 0.357 1.02 0.206 1.37 
Father's Primary 0.079 1.46 0.142 0.85 -0.1 -0.91 
Father's Middle 0.09 2.34* 0.288 2.02*  -0.101 -1.26 
Father's Sec & above 0.157 3.17** 0.36 2.16*  -0.02 -0.2 
Observation no. 2168      
Urban sub-sample:       
Mother's Primary -0.012 -0.16 0.037 0.18 -0.13 -0.75 
Mother's Middle 0.113 2.09* 0.476 2.93** 0.007 0.05 
Mother's Sec & above 0.141 1.24 0.717 2.24* 0.441 1.38 
Father's Primary -0.144 -1.43 -0.331 -0.99 -0.268 -0.82 
Father's Middle -0.086 -0.76 -0.528 -1.53 -0.434 -1.33 
Father's Sec & above -0.084 -0.69 -0.587 -1.55 -0.48 -1.36 
Observation no. 757      
Rural sub-sample:       
Mother's Primary 0.068 1.45 -0.186 -1.41 0.103 1.03 
Mother's Middle 9.43E-05 0 -0.173 -1.52 0.048 0.5 
Mother's Sec & above 0.142 0.8 0.468 1.09 0.678 1.53 
Father's Primary 0.133 2.09* 0.001 0 -0.006 -0.04 
Father's Middle 0.116 2.62** 0.208 1.44 -0.094 -0.93 
Father's Sec & above 0.26 4.25*** 0.368 1.99* 0.067 0.44 
Observation no. 1411      
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A-25a: The Effects of Parental Education on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of School-Aged Children, 1987/88 
(GLSS 1) 
School-Aged Variant 1: Education Variant 3: Education conditioning on unearned income 
 Illness  Haz  Whz  Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Sample: Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.077 2.09* -0.079 -0.92 -0.032 -0.34 0.076 2.05* -0.077 -0.9 -0.026 -0.28 
Mother's Middle 0.025 0.87 -0.106 -1.49 -0.064 -0.93 0.028 0.99 -0.126 -1.76 -0.083 -1.21 
Mother's Sec & above 0.119 1.73 0.23 1.65 0.043 0.25 0.127 1.78 0.133 0.94 -0.075 -0.42 
Father's Primary 0.019 0.43 -0.053 -0.47 -0.093 -0.89 0.02 0.47 -0.052 -0.46 -0.093 -0.89 
Father's Middle -0.008 -0.31 -0.125 -1.84 -0.026 -0.39 -0.013 -0.5 -0.123 -1.8 -0.018 -0.27 
Father's Sec & above 0.004 0.1 0.086 0.9 0.016 0.15 -0.002 -0.06 0.095 1.01 0.025 0.25 
Observation no. 2207  2207  1268  2207  2207  1268  
Urban sub-sample:              
Mother's Primary 0.156 2.67** 0.171 1.25 0.009 0.06 0.156 2.66** 0.169 1.24 0.01 0.07 
Mother's Middle 0.043 0.94 0.134 1.21 -0.073 -0.7 0.041 0.9 0.122 1.09 -0.088 -0.83 
Mother's Sec & above 0.246 3.08** 0.443 2.66** -0.002 -0.01 0.238 2.87** 0.376 2.21* -0.111 -0.49 
Father's Primary 0.19 1.92 -0.23 -1.21 -0.224 -1.13 0.187 1.89 -0.249 -1.3 -0.253 -1.29 
Father's Middle 0.013 0.31 -0.029 -0.26 0.011 0.1 0.012 0.28 -0.04 -0.36 0.006 0.05 
Father's Sec & above -0.089 -1.51 0.14 0.97 0.108 0.66 -0.091 -1.53 0.128 0.9 0.1 0.61 
Observation no. 866  866  465  866  866  465  
Rural sub-sample:              
Mother's Primary 0.004 0.09 -0.252 -2.27* -0.05 -0.4 0.002 0.05 -0.251 -2.27* -0.042 -0.33 
Mother's Middle 0.038 1.01 -0.288 -3.08** -0.108 -1.17 0.044 1.18 -0.306 -3.28** -0.132 -1.44 
Mother's Sec & above 0.019 0.13 -0.09 -0.26 -0.117 -0.3 0.035 0.23 -0.158 -0.44 -0.189 -0.48 
Father's Primary -0.009 -0.19 -0.014 -0.1 -0.096 -0.78 -0.011 -0.23 0.001 0.01 -0.08 -0.65 
Father's Middle -0.04 -1.28 -0.209 -2.34* -0.03 -0.34 -0.047 -1.48 -0.202 -2.26* -0.017 -0.2 
Father's Sec & above 0.082 1.44 0.045 0.35 -0.002 -0.01 0.068 1.19 0.07 0.54 0.025 0.2 
Observation no. 1341  1341  803  1341  1341  803  
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A-25b: The Effects of Parental Education on Health Status (Illness, Height-for-age Z-scores & Weight-for-height z-scores) of School-Aged Children, 1987/88 
(GLSS 1), controlling expenditure 
School-Aged Variant 2: Education conditioning on expenditure 
 Illness  Haz  Whz  
 Marginal  Marginal  Marginal  
Full Sample: Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio Effects t- ratio 
Mother's Primary 0.079 1.94 0.032 0.31 0.09 0.76 
Mother's Middle 0.024 0.83 -0.118 -1.6 -0.086 -1.1 
Mother's Sec & above 0.099 1.28 0 0 -0.108 -0.52 
Father's Primary 0.021 0.45 -0.142 -1.2 -0.222 -1.76 
Father's Middle -0.008 -0.24 -0.286 -3.03** -0.18 -1.71 
Father's Sec & above 0.001 0.01 -0.137 -1.18 -0.171 -1.29 
Observation no. 2207  2207  1268  
Urban sub-sample:        
Mother's Primary 0.146 2.40* 0.131 0.9 0.061 0.33 
Mother's Middle 0.039 0.84 0.067 0.58 -0.188 -1.33 
Mother's Sec & above 0.27 2.98** 0.214 1.05 -0.211 -0.71 
Father's Primary 0.162 1.53 -0.382 -1.81 -0.768 -2.32*   
Father's Middle -0.027 -0.54 -0.208 -1.45 -0.185 -1.02 
Father's Sec & above -0.128 -2.04* -0.118 -0.67 -0.183 -0.75 
Observation no. 866  866  465  
Rural sub-sample:        
Mother's Primary 0.026 0.46 -0.105 -0.69 0.049 0.35 
Mother's Middle 0.05 1.19 -0.311 -3.00** -0.116 -1.18 
Mother's Sec & above -0.049 -0.39 -0.31 -0.78 -0.351 -0.8 
Father's Primary -0.013 -0.25 -0.108 -0.68 -0.169 -1.25 
Father's Middle -0.066 -1.75 -0.328 -2.79** -0.115 -1.16 
Father's Sec & above 0.041 0.64 -0.132 -0.77 -0.135 -0.91 
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AȂ26a: Pre-school children Ȃ First-stage regression for expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: The Anthropometrics) 
Full Illness Haz Whz 
 Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
log of land per capita -0.047 -3.99*** -0.987 -4.00*** -0.048 -3.98*** -1.01 -3.98***     
log of land per capita sq. 0.005 4.77*** 0.113 4.77*** 0.006 4.82*** 0.116 4.80***     
Missing land per capita -0.042 -1.1 -0.793 -0.98 -0.022 -0.55 -0.344 -0.41     
log of durable goods per capita -0.076 -5.78*** -1.709 -5.92***     -0.073 -5.49*** -1.65 -5.66*** 
log of durable goods per capita sq 0.015 8.58*** 0.34 8.49***     0.015 8.33*** 0.334 8.26*** 
formal employment (Head)     0.146 2.43* 3.076 2.40* 0.097 1.68 2.046 1.66 
Self-employment (Head)     0.145 2.50* 3.126 2.53* 0.131 2.34* 2.814 2.37*   
Mother's Primary -0.053 -1.52 -1.137 -1.55 -0.045 -1.26 -0.967 -1.28 -0.051 -1.48 -1.102 -1.51 
Mother's Middle 0.034 1.22 0.732 1.22 0.068 2.35* 1.448 2.36* 0.029 1.03 0.626 1.04 
Mother's Sec & above 0.159 2.44* 3.6 2.49* 0.334 4.67*** 7.38 4.63*** 0.147 2.23* 3.353 2.30*   
Father's Primary 0.183 3.73*** 3.818 3.65*** 0.172 3.44*** 3.577 3.35*** 0.187 3.83*** 3.898 3.76*** 
Father's Middle 0.205 6.99*** 4.278 6.90*** 0.232 7.66*** 4.853 7.60*** 0.214 7.14*** 4.467 7.07*** 
Father's Sec & above 0.18 4.46*** 3.767 4.41*** 0.246 5.57*** 5.2 5.51*** 0.191 4.58*** 4.024 4.54*** 
6-11months 0.005 0.09 0.079 0.07 0.022 0.4 0.444 0.38 0.001 0.02 0.004 0 
12-23months 0.011 0.25 0.185 0.19 0.03 0.62 0.573 0.57 0.009 0.19 0.139 0.14 
24-35months -0.023 -0.52 -0.568 -0.6 -0.007 -0.15 -0.214 -0.22 -0.028 -0.62 -0.66 -0.69 
36-47months -0.058 -1.27 -1.294 -1.33 -0.034 -0.72 -0.761 -0.76 -0.062 -1.34 -1.372 -1.4 
48-60months -0.078 -1.8 -1.674 -1.83 -0.064 -1.43 -1.368 -1.44 -0.077 -1.75 -1.646 -1.77 
Mother's Height -0.001 -0.38 -0.014 -0.43 0 0.16 0.004 0.13 0 -0.16 -0.006 -0.19 
Rural -0.123 -4.85*** -2.53 -4.68*** -0.173 -6.49*** -3.615 -6.34*** -0.109 -4.41*** -2.245 -4.28*** 
Female -0.013 -0.62 -0.296 -0.64 -0.014 -0.61 -0.301 -0.63 -0.014 -0.62 -0.297 -0.64 
Non-Akan 0.085 3.25** 1.746 3.11** 0.079 2.93** 1.607 2.78** 0.071 2.76** 1.464 2.64**  
Western Region -0.083 -1.9 -1.914 -2.00* -0.125 -2.78** -2.812 -2.85** -0.049 -1.14 -1.197 -1.27 
Central Region -0.363 -7.04*** -7.802 -7.09*** -0.436 -8.11*** -9.364 -8.16*** -0.363 -7.05*** -7.816 -7.12*** 
Eastern Region -0.17 -3.97*** -3.766 -4.02*** -0.221 -5.08*** -4.86 -5.10*** -0.148 -3.53*** -3.338 -3.62*** 
Volta Region -0.575 -11.02*** -12.174 -11.02*** -0.629 -11.71*** -13.346 -11.74*** -0.564 -10.82*** -11.97 -10.86*** 
Ashanti Region -0.339 -8.62*** -7.427 -8.64*** -0.375 -9.27*** -8.18 -9.23*** -0.329 -8.34*** -7.23 -8.38*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.248 -5.51*** -5.432 -5.60*** -0.298 -6.42*** -6.524 -6.51*** -0.216 -4.89*** -4.799 -5.02*** 
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Upper West Region -0.431 -2.39* -8.53 -2.28* -0.447 -2.44* -8.852 -2.33* -0.48 -2.70** -9.512 -2.57*   
Northern Region -0.467 -8.12*** -9.849 -8.08*** -0.471 -7.89*** -9.962 -7.87*** -0.476 -8.30*** -10.073 -8.27*** 
Upper East Region -0.795 -10.67*** -16.637 -10.79*** -0.818 -10.35*** -17.108 -10.45*** -0.802 -10.67*** -16.788 -10.81*** 
constant 10.818 43.54*** 117.765 22.31*** 10.633 41.36*** 113.732 20.85*** 10.645 41.63*** 114.064 21.02*** 
Observation no. 2168  2168  2168  2168  2168  2168  
R-squared 0.308  0.306  0.269  0.266  0.298  0.296  
adjusted R-squared 0.299  0.297  0.259  0.256  0.289  0.287  
F 36.393  35.414  28.322  27.828  37.29  36.235  
ll -1.60E+03  -8.20E+03  -1.60E+03  -8.30E+03  -1.60E+03  
-
8.20E+03  
F-test of instruments F(  5,  2138) =   35.26 F(  5,  2138) =   32.87 F(  5,  2138) =     8.56 F(  5,  2138) =     8.29 F(  4,  2139) =   38.51 F(  4,  2139) =   35.79 
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AȂ26b: Pre-school children Ȃ First-stage regression for expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: The Anthropometrics) 
Urban Illness Haz Whz 
 Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
log of land per capita -0.036 -1.59 -0.78 -1.6     -0.037 -1.62 -0.791 -1.62 
log of land per capita sq. 0.004 1.62 0.079 1.62     0.004 1.64 0.08 1.64 
Missing land per capita -0.042 -1.02 -0.919 -1.02     -0.043 -1.04 -0.932 -1.03 
log of durable goods per capita -0.125 -6.36*** -2.805 -6.35*** -0.126 -6.30*** -2.812 -6.30*** -0.124 -6.32*** -2.781 -6.31*** 
log of durable goods per capita sq 0.02 7.93*** 0.444 7.75*** 0.02 7.82*** 0.444 7.65*** 0.02 7.93*** 0.442 7.74*** 
formal employment (Head) 0.05 0.62 1.084 0.63 0.053 0.67 1.152 0.67     
Self-employment (Head) 0.029 0.35 0.676 0.38 0.03 0.36 0.694 0.39     
Mother's Primary 0.063 1.19 1.338 1.17 0.068 1.29 1.439 1.27 0.061 1.14 1.286 1.12 
Mother's Middle 0.053 1.27 1.224 1.35 0.049 1.17 1.137 1.25 0.052 1.25 1.188 1.33 
Mother's Sec & above 0.107 1.32 2.563 1.42 0.105 1.3 2.504 1.4 0.107 1.33 2.555 1.42 
Father's Primary 0.049 0.6 0.983 0.57 0.042 0.52 0.843 0.49 0.056 0.7 1.133 0.66 
Father's Middle 0.183 4.01*** 3.823 3.93*** 0.181 4.01*** 3.778 3.93*** 0.185 4.09*** 3.858 4.00*** 
Father's Sec & above 0.177 2.95** 3.667 2.84** 0.181 3.07** 3.756 2.95** 0.179 3.01** 3.704 2.90**  
6-11months -0.026 -0.35 -0.58 -0.36 -0.021 -0.28 -0.476 -0.3 -0.027 -0.37 -0.614 -0.39 
12-23months -0.024 -0.33 -0.541 -0.34 -0.015 -0.21 -0.358 -0.23 -0.024 -0.33 -0.545 -0.34 
24-35months -0.069 -1.04 -1.545 -1.06 -0.058 -0.88 -1.304 -0.9 -0.074 -1.11 -1.635 -1.13 
36-47months -0.087 -1.3 -1.924 -1.32 -0.084 -1.25 -1.847 -1.26 -0.088 -1.32 -1.948 -1.33 
48-60months -0.073 -1.12 -1.578 -1.11 -0.062 -0.94 -1.329 -0.93 -0.074 -1.14 -1.596 -1.12 
Mother's Height -0.004 -1.88 -0.088 -1.87 -0.004 -1.92 -0.088 -1.91 -0.004 -1.89 -0.088 -1.88 
Female -0.015 -0.46 -0.334 -0.47 -0.016 -0.5 -0.363 -0.51 -0.015 -0.47 -0.342 -0.48 
Non-Akan 0.008 0.21 0.148 0.17 0.001 0.02 -0.017 -0.02 0.01 0.25 0.178 0.21 
Western Region -0.11 -1.83 -2.443 -1.84 -0.115 -1.94 -2.553 -1.94 -0.11 -1.84 -2.443 -1.84 
Central Region -0.609 -7.30*** -12.872 -7.33*** -0.613 -7.48*** -12.954 -7.53*** -0.612 -7.43*** -12.937 -7.47*** 
Eastern Region -0.21 -3.65*** -4.677 -3.73*** -0.195 -3.70*** -4.361 -3.77*** -0.213 -3.71*** -4.737 -3.79*** 
Volta Region -0.332 -4.17*** -7.151 -4.22*** -0.324 -4.07*** -6.977 -4.11*** -0.339 -4.28*** -7.302 -4.32*** 
Ashanti Region -0.207 -4.17*** -4.592 -4.20*** -0.204 -4.13*** -4.535 -4.14*** -0.208 -4.27*** -4.629 -4.30*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.184 -2.58* -3.998 -2.61** -0.163 -2.51* -3.547 -2.54* -0.19 -2.66** -4.116 -2.68**  
Northern Region -0.612 -7.81*** -12.951 -7.89*** -0.601 -7.91*** -12.713 -7.99*** -0.619 -7.84*** -13.106 -7.92*** 
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Upper East Region -0.316 -2.42* -6.769 -2.40* -0.284 -2.20* -6.065 -2.19* -0.318 -2.45* -6.813 -2.44*   
constant 11.472 32.05*** 131.708 16.84*** 11.452 32.58*** 131.26 17.09*** 11.506 33.77*** 132.479 17.72*** 
Observation no. 757  757  757  757  757  757  
R-squared 0.374  0.372  0.371  0.368  0.374  0.371  
adjusted R-squared 0.349  0.347  0.349  0.346  0.351  0.348  
F 15.178  15.039  16.823  16.69  16.211  16.054  
ll -434.456  -2.80E+03  -436.443  -2.80E+03  -434.791  -2.80E+03  
F-test of instruments F(  7,   727) =   12.50 F(  7,   727) =   11.62 F(  4,   730) =   20.59 F(  4,   730) =   19.09 F(  5,   729) =   17.26 F(  5,   729) =   15.99 
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AȂ26c: Pre-school children Ȃ First-stage regression for expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: The Anthropometrics) 
Rural Illness Haz Whz 
 Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
log of land per capita -0.058 -4.12*** -1.217 -4.12*** -0.057 -3.93*** -1.196 -3.92*** -0.056 -4.00*** -1.185 -4.00*** 
log of land per capita sq. 0.006 4.86*** 0.135 4.85*** 0.006 4.69*** 0.135 4.67*** 0.006 4.70*** 0.132 4.68*** 
Missing land per capita -0.029 -0.33 -0.292 -0.16 -0.066 -0.73 -1.043 -0.55 -0.04 -0.44 -0.513 -0.27 
log of durable goods per capita -0.048 -2.70** -1.032 -2.77**     -0.046 -2.60** -0.995 -2.66**  
log of durable goods per capita sq 0.012 4.71*** 0.254 4.70***     0.012 4.62*** 0.251 4.62*** 
formal employment (Head)     0.322 4.03*** 6.777 4.08*** 0.299 3.76*** 6.293 3.80*** 
Self-employment (Head)     0.363 5.02*** 7.718 5.17*** 0.359 5.01*** 7.625 5.15*** 
Mother's Primary -0.079 -1.85 -1.701 -1.9 -0.081 -1.86 -1.747 -1.91 -0.081 -1.91 -1.742 -1.97*   
Mother's Middle 0.034 0.93 0.658 0.86 0.057 1.52 1.125 1.43 0.027 0.73 0.506 0.66 
Mother's Sec & above 0.432 5.37*** 9.071 5.06*** 0.627 6.73*** 13.158 6.29*** 0.438 5.38*** 9.226 5.09*** 
Father's Primary 0.228 4.19*** 4.744 4.09*** 0.213 3.98*** 4.424 3.89*** 0.229 4.25*** 4.766 4.16*** 
Father's Middle 0.195 5.24*** 4.09 5.22*** 0.222 5.71*** 4.65 5.70*** 0.201 5.33*** 4.227 5.32*** 
Father's Sec & above 0.177 3.41*** 3.735 3.44*** 0.243 4.23*** 5.136 4.27*** 0.193 3.50*** 4.115 3.55*** 
6-11months 0.018 0.25 0.381 0.25 0.017 0.23 0.363 0.24 0.024 0.34 0.519 0.34 
12-23months 0.046 0.76 0.895 0.71 0.053 0.87 1.048 0.82 0.038 0.64 0.74 0.59 
24-35months 0.002 0.03 -0.032 -0.03 0.004 0.06 0.008 0.01 -0.003 -0.06 -0.144 -0.12 
36-47months -0.049 -0.8 -1.088 -0.85 -0.045 -0.73 -0.999 -0.77 -0.054 -0.89 -1.187 -0.93 
48-60months -0.063 -1.1 -1.366 -1.14 -0.06 -1.04 -1.298 -1.07 -0.064 -1.12 -1.38 -1.15 
Mother's Height 0.003 1.45 0.069 1.46 0.005 1.99* 0.098 2.00* 0.004 1.66 0.08 1.67 
Female 0.005 0.2 0.114 0.19 0.01 0.36 0.213 0.36 0.011 0.39 0.227 0.39 
Non-Akan 0.123 3.18** 2.554 3.10** 0.131 3.39*** 2.722 3.31*** 0.12 3.12** 2.492 3.05**  
Price of Maize (kg) 0.027 2.89** 0.58 2.87** 0.025 2.57* 0.527 2.56* 0.028 2.95** 0.595 2.94**  
Price of Anti-malarial pill 0.006 0.15 0.142 0.16 -0.004 -0.09 -0.078 -0.09 -0.007 -0.16 -0.138 -0.16 
Missing price 0.135 1.78 2.794 1.75 0.106 1.38 2.213 1.36 0.15 1.99* 3.12 1.96 
Dist. to the nearest clinic -0.005 -3.87*** -0.098 -3.84*** -0.005 -4.27*** -0.107 -4.24*** -0.005 -4.05*** -0.102 -4.02*** 
Male Agric. Wage -0.003 -0.17 -0.033 -0.08 -0.005 -0.28 -0.074 -0.2 -0.005 -0.26 -0.071 -0.18 
Ratio of female Wage 0.117 3.16** 2.527 3.21** 0.105 2.78** 2.286 2.85** 0.115 3.10** 2.489 3.16**  
Ratio of child Wage 0.11 2.50* 2.314 2.47* 0.142 3.19** 2.997 3.17** 0.129 2.94** 2.73 2.92**  
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Western Region -0.115 -1.18 -2.668 -1.24 -0.075 -0.73 -1.796 -0.8 -0.101 -1.02 -2.34 -1.08 
Central Region -0.38 -3.75*** -8.255 -3.72*** -0.392 -3.71*** -8.491 -3.68*** -0.381 -3.72*** -8.285 -3.69*** 
Eastern Region -0.228 -2.39* -4.962 -2.35* -0.19 -1.92 -4.148 -1.9 -0.212 -2.19* -4.606 -2.16*   
Volta Region -0.744 -7.35*** -15.732 -7.13*** -0.731 -6.94*** -15.445 -6.75*** -0.736 -7.16*** -15.543 -6.96*** 
Ashanti Region -0.408 -4.19*** -8.898 -4.15*** -0.392 -3.88*** -8.531 -3.84*** -0.404 -4.08*** -8.801 -4.04*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.313 -3.35*** -6.886 -3.34*** -0.285 -2.90** -6.263 -2.90** -0.308 -3.23** -6.761 -3.22**  
Upper West Region -0.583 -2.75** -11.843 -2.66** -0.514 -2.42* -10.398 -2.34* -0.592 -2.81** -12.046 -2.73**  
Northern Region -0.38 -3.63*** -8.033 -3.52*** -0.288 -2.64** -6.083 -2.56* -0.34 -3.16** -7.179 -3.07**  
Upper East Region -0.941 -8.43*** -19.642 -8.20*** -0.905 -7.84*** -18.852 -7.62*** -0.921 -8.15*** -19.206 -7.92*** 
constant 9.918 25.25*** 98.484 12.04*** 9.387 22.77*** 87.17 10.17*** 9.504 23.54*** 89.645 10.68*** 
Observation no. 1411  1411  1411  1411  1411  1411  
R-squared 0.277  0.274  0.259  0.256  0.285  0.282  
adjusted R-squared 0.259  0.255  0.24  0.237  0.266  0.262  
F 18.331  18.092  18.396  18.111  19.816  19.484  
ll -1.10E+03  -5.40E+03  -1.10E+03  -5.40E+03  -1.00E+03  -5.30E+03  
F-test of instruments  F(  5,  1375) =   21.90 F(  5,  1375) =   21.24 F(  5,  1375) =   12.03  F(  5,  1375) =   12.20 F(  7,  1373) =   20.27 F(  7,  1373) =   20.02 
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AȂ27a: School-aged children Ȃ First-stage regression for expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: The Anthropometrics) 
School-aged Illness Haz Whz 
Full Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
log of land per capita -0.052 -4.84*** -1.113 -4.84***         
log of land per capita sq. 0.006 5.96*** 0.127 5.92***         
Missing land per capita 0.004 0.11 0.164 0.21         
log of durable goods per capita -0.086 -7.57*** -1.993 -8.03*** -0.084 -7.14*** -1.954 -7.52*** -0.103 -6.51*** -2.368 -6.75*** 
log of durable goods per capita sq 0.018 12.15*** 0.397 12.22*** 0.018 11.64*** 0.398 11.59*** 0.02 9.77*** 0.451 9.63*** 
formal employment (Head)     -0.059 -1.07 -1.307 -1.1 -0.055 -0.72 -1.173 -0.72 
Self-employment (Head)     -0.012 -0.22 -0.157 -0.14 -0.002 -0.03 0.091 0.06 
Mother's Primary -0.134 -3.54*** -2.788 -3.53*** -0.135 -3.53*** -2.803 -3.52*** -0.127 -2.57* -2.643 -2.57*   
Mother's Middle -0.022 -0.76 -0.436 -0.72 -0.03 -1.02 -0.597 -0.97 -0.006 -0.14 -0.094 -0.12 
Mother's Sec & above 0.221 3.39*** 5.129 3.49*** 0.231 3.50*** 5.368 3.60*** 0.166 1.88 3.951 1.96 
Father's Primary 0.109 2.40* 2.25 2.36*   0.105 2.31* 2.19 2.28*   0.159 2.55* 3.385 2.56*   
Father's Middle 0.124 4.44*** 2.502 4.23*** 0.136 4.75*** 2.782 4.59*** 0.126 3.20** 2.574 3.11**  
Father's Sec & above 0.182 4.75*** 3.766 4.57*** 0.19 4.82*** 3.963 4.67*** 0.13 2.50* 2.672 2.39*   
Age (years) 0.025 0.81 0.56 0.85 0.026 0.83 0.578 0.86 0.176 1.73 3.714 1.71 
Age squared (years) -0.001 -0.82 -0.027 -0.86 -0.001 -0.83 -0.028 -0.87 -0.011 -1.83 -0.24 -1.81 
Mother's Height 0 -0.07 -0.004 -0.11 0 0.24 0.007 0.22 0 -0.04 -0.007 -0.16 
Rural -0.144 -5.61*** -2.962 -5.44*** -0.126 -4.96*** -2.593 -4.82*** -0.136 -4.06*** -2.803 -3.92*** 
Female 0.026 1.17 0.536 1.16 0.019 0.84 0.381 0.82 -0.042 -1.37 -0.902 -1.39 
Non-Akan 0.147 5.65*** 3.163 5.68*** 0.128 4.97*** 2.759 5.00*** 0.129 3.88*** 2.78 3.89*** 
Western Region 0.014 0.3 0.111 0.11 0.04 0.91 0.684 0.71 0.046 0.79 0.841 0.67 
Central Region -0.383 -6.78*** -8.16 -6.85*** -0.384 -6.79*** -8.17 -6.86*** -0.403 -5.56*** -8.505 -5.57*** 
Eastern Region -0.188 -4.52*** -4.225 -4.68*** -0.19 -4.67*** -4.262 -4.84*** -0.174 -3.17** -3.84 -3.21**  
Volta Region -0.522 -9.43*** -11.119 -9.44*** -0.527 -9.56*** -11.242 -9.59*** -0.48 -6.56*** -10.202 -6.48*** 
Ashanti Region -0.349 -8.98*** -7.616 -8.99*** -0.353 -8.99*** -7.685 -9.00*** -0.319 -6.21*** -6.912 -6.16*** 
Brong Ahafo Region -0.269 -6.17*** -5.943 -6.33*** -0.249 -5.65*** -5.515 -5.83*** -0.224 -3.90*** -4.921 -3.99*** 
Upper West Region -0.762 -3.61*** -14.878 -3.46*** -0.789 -3.76*** -15.414 -3.61*** -0.354 -1.2 -6.417 -1.03 
Northern Region -0.489 -9.34*** -10.462 -9.44*** -0.523 -10.05*** -11.205 -10.16*** -0.51 -7.22*** -10.851 -7.26*** 
Upper East Region -0.855 -10.60*** -18.014 -10.97*** -0.868 -10.37*** -18.329 -10.72*** -0.869 -8.52*** -18.324 -8.83*** 
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constant 10.568 37.56*** 112.301 18.91*** 10.53 36.51*** 111.372 18.30*** 10.08 20.60*** 102.514 9.84*** 
Observation no. 2207  2207  2207  2207  1268  1268  
R-squared 0.365  0.372  0.353  0.359  0.333  0.34  
adjusted R-squared 0.357  0.364  0.345  0.352  0.319  0.327  
F 57.414  54.33  54.803  51.788  30.142  28.239  
ll -1.70E+03  -8.40E+03  -1.70E+03  -8.40E+03  -958.034  -4.80E+03  
F-test of instruments F(  5,  2180) =   70.83 F(  5,  2180) =   65.25 F(  4,  2181) =   71.08 F(  4,  2181) =   65.62 F(  4,  1242) =    40.79  F(  4,  1242) =    37.09 
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AȂ27b: School-aged children Ȃ First-stage regression for expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: The Anthropometrics) 
Urban Illness Haz Whz 
 Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
log of land per capita     -0.055 -3.02** -1.286 -3.13**  -0.076 -3.48*** -1.826 -3.72*** 
log of land per capita sq.     0.006 3.52*** 0.141 3.58*** 0.008 4.10*** 0.194 4.26*** 
Missing land per capita     0.076 1.94 1.619 1.88 -0.012 -0.23 -0.428 -0.37 
log of durable goods per capita -0.127 -7.56*** -2.929 -7.85*** -0.125 -7.67*** -2.908 -8.06*** -0.146 -6.74*** -3.41 -7.12*** 
log of durable goods per capita sq 0.022 10.80*** 0.494 10.89*** 0.021 11.09*** 0.494 11.26*** 0.024 9.36*** 0.554 9.57*** 
log of business assets per capita 0.008 0.25 -0.026 -0.04         
log of business assets per capita sq 0.001 0.42 0.038 0.72         
Missing business assets per capita 0.012 0.11 -0.163 -0.06         
Mother's Primary -0.021 -0.44 -0.525 -0.5 -0.031 -0.63 -0.752 -0.72 -0.062 -0.99 -1.381 -1.03 
Mother's Middle 0.042 1.04 0.938 1.08 0.033 0.83 0.748 0.88 0.056 1.09 1.27 1.14 
Mother's Sec & above 0.23 2.67** 5.235 2.71** 0.191 2.29* 4.451 2.37*   0.079 0.73 1.931 0.79 
Father's Primary 0.118 1.19 2.569 1.19 0.101 1.03 2.161 1.01 0.323 2.32* 7.032 2.30*   
Father's Middle 0.026 0.68 0.443 0.53 0.015 0.38 0.146 0.17 0.007 0.13 0.014 0.01 
Father's Sec & above 0.131 2.20* 2.808 2.16* 0.134 2.29* 2.813 2.20*   0.061 0.79 1.181 0.7 
Age (years) 0.036 0.85 0.775 0.83 0.041 0.96 0.87 0.93 0.119 0.79 2.594 0.79 
Age squared (years) -0.002 -0.72 -0.032 -0.72 -0.002 -0.82 -0.036 -0.8 -0.007 -0.79 -0.16 -0.8 
Mother's Height -0.003 -1.42 -0.064 -1.46 -0.003 -1.69 -0.077 -1.74 -0.005 -1.97* -0.107 -1.97*   
Female -0.017 -0.55 -0.33 -0.49 -0.009 -0.28 -0.144 -0.21 -0.04 -0.87 -0.853 -0.85 
Non-Akan 0.04 1.17 0.954 1.28 0.042 1.19 1.006 1.32 0.013 0.28 0.385 0.39 
Western Region -0.036 -0.64 -0.843 -0.68 -0.043 -0.75 -0.968 -0.76 -0.08 -1.09 -1.775 -1.12 
Central Region -0.55 -6.29*** -11.435 -6.27*** -0.582 -6.64*** -12.157 -6.65*** -0.636 -5.57*** -13.351 -5.58*** 
Eastern Region -0.176 -3.32*** -3.914 -3.40*** -0.199 -3.50*** -4.398 -3.57*** -0.232 -2.98** -5.109 -3.01**  
Volta Region -0.237 -2.65** -5.004 -2.54* -0.249 -2.77** -5.309 -2.68**  -0.225 -1.68 -4.706 -1.58 
Ashanti Region -0.169 -3.54*** -3.736 -3.53*** -0.21 -4.68*** -4.627 -4.67*** -0.194 -3.15** -4.269 -3.11**  
Brong Ahafo Region -0.267 -4.48*** -5.66 -4.43*** -0.306 -5.05*** -6.564 -5.08*** -0.327 -3.94*** -7.035 -3.96*** 
Northern Region -0.603 -7.71*** -12.809 -7.84*** -0.632 -8.08*** -13.437 -8.25*** -0.669 -6.04*** -14.22 -6.06*** 
Upper East Region -0.497 -3.70*** -10.831 -3.86*** -0.553 -4.52*** -12.186 -4.93*** -0.551 -3.95*** -12.357 -4.39*** 
constant 11 27.45*** 122.125 14.04*** 11.124 29.76*** 124.494 15.42*** 11.174 16.45*** 125.446 8.40*** 
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Observation no. 866  866  866  866  465  465  
R-squared 0.45  0.457  0.452  0.46  0.476  0.487  
adjusted R-squared 0.434  0.441  0.437  0.445  0.447  0.459  
F 29.877  28.604  31.236  29.916  19.736  18.8  
ll -520.539  -3.20E+03  -518.546  -3.20E+03  -266.602  -1.70E+03  
F-test of instruments  F(  5,   841) =   44.53 F(  5,   841) =   42.10  F(  5,   841) =   48.35 F(  5,   841) =   45.73 F(  5,   440) =   36.11 F(  5,   440) =   33.86 
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AȂ27c: School-aged children Ȃ First-stage regression for expenditure per capita and its quadratic, 1987/88 (GLSS 1: The Anthropometrics) 
Rural Illness Haz Whz 
 Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. Expend per cap Expend per cap sq. 
 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
Marginal  
Effects t- ratio 
log of land per capita -0.058 -4.58*** -1.179 -4.44***     -0.042 -2.47* -0.828 -2.35*   
log of land per capita sq. 0.007 5.59*** 0.134 5.45***     0.005 3.43*** 0.108 3.31*** 
Missing land per capita -0.163 -1.99* -3.216 -1.92     -0.06 -0.59 -1.06 -0.51 
log of durable goods per capita -0.051 -3.21** -1.093 -3.24** -0.042 -2.58** -0.897 -2.64**  -0.045 -2.04* -0.969 -2.08*   
log of durable goods per capita sq 0.013 5.71*** 0.268 5.65*** 0.012 5.19*** 0.245 5.16*** 0.011 3.33*** 0.227 3.32*** 
formal employment (Head)     0.158 1.5 3.29 1.5     
Self-employment (Head)     0.208 2.13* 4.439 2.18*       
log of business assets per capita        -0.116 -2.63** -2.356 -2.52*   
log of business assets per capita sq        0.011 2.98** 0.234 2.89**  
Missing business assets per capita        -0.178 -1.31 -3.349 -1.16 
Mother's Primary -0.214 -4.01*** -4.362 -3.99*** -0.211 -3.86*** -4.3 -3.84*** -0.154 -2.21* -3.157 -2.20*   
Mother's Middle -0.044 -1.12 -0.94 -1.14 -0.053 -1.3 -1.109 -1.31 -0.015 -0.28 -0.308 -0.29 
Mother's Sec & above 0.358 4.77*** 7.396 4.72*** 0.352 4.24*** 7.304 4.22*** 0.345 3.30** 7.051 3.23**  
Father's Primary 0.128 2.65** 2.581 2.56* 0.119 2.47* 2.417 2.41*   0.125 1.91 2.558 1.87 
Father's Middle 0.181 4.69*** 3.725 4.60*** 0.186 4.60*** 3.839 4.53*** 0.162 3.12** 3.383 3.11**  
Father's Sec & above 0.231 4.55*** 4.737 4.41*** 0.235 4.23*** 4.854 4.13*** 0.214 3.04** 4.456 2.97**  
Age (years) 0.027 0.63 0.577 0.65 0.031 0.71 0.661 0.74 0.114 0.87 2.302 0.84 
Age squared (years) -0.001 -0.7 -0.031 -0.73 -0.002 -0.78 -0.035 -0.8 -0.008 -0.97 -0.156 -0.93 
Mother's Height 0.003 1.64 0.069 1.68 0.004 2.01* 0.085 2.05*   0.006 1.81 0.115 1.79 
Female 0.047 1.64 0.97 1.63 0.042 1.46 0.873 1.45 -0.013 -0.32 -0.268 -0.32 
Non-Akan 0.215 5.20*** 4.577 5.22*** 0.19 4.63*** 4.061 4.65*** 0.241 4.47*** 5.14 4.50*** 
Price of Maize (kg) 0.028 2.78** 0.558 2.64** 0.019 1.9 0.383 1.77 0.019 1.46 0.396 1.42 
Price of Anti-malarial pill -0.067 -1.64 -1.26 -1.48 -0.058 -1.38 -1.055 -1.21 -0.051 -0.93 -0.977 -0.84 
Missing price 0.053 0.72 1.149 0.75 0.066 0.9 1.446 0.95 0.025 0.28 0.476 0.25 
Dist. to the nearest clinic -0.004 -2.92** -0.078 -2.83** -0.003 -2.64** -0.07 -2.56*   -0.004 -2.23* -0.078 -2.21*   
Male Agric. Wage -0.059 -2.58** -1.205 -2.52* -0.063 -2.90** -1.3 -2.84**  -0.034 -1.16 -0.675 -1.12 
Ratio of female Wage 0.189 5.24*** 3.94 5.21*** 0.179 4.86*** 3.752 4.84*** 0.192 4.09*** 4.031 4.10*** 
Ratio of child Wage 0.169 3.94*** 3.631 4.10*** 0.195 4.44*** 4.182 4.62*** 0.164 2.98** 3.497 3.07**  
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Western Region -0.217 -1.99* -4.735 -1.99* -0.187 -1.68 -4.094 -1.69 -0.103 -0.73 -2.209 -0.73 
Central Region -0.623 -5.39*** -13.274 -5.31*** -0.622 -5.22*** -13.214 -5.15*** -0.525 -3.48*** -11.071 -3.43*** 
Eastern Region -0.462 -4.34*** -9.92 -4.27*** -0.459 -4.20*** -9.815 -4.13*** -0.331 -2.38* -7.032 -2.33*   
Volta Region -0.895 -7.67*** -18.852 -7.55*** -0.879 -7.35*** -18.492 -7.24*** -0.741 -5.09*** -15.581 -5.01*** 
Ashanti Region -0.63 -5.86*** -13.498 -5.77*** -0.639 -5.79*** -13.66 -5.71*** -0.464 -3.30** -9.92 -3.28**  
Brong Ahafo Region -0.493 -4.71*** -10.704 -4.69*** -0.484 -4.48*** -10.486 -4.47*** -0.34 -2.50* -7.341 -2.50*   
Upper West Region -0.914 -3.67*** -18.014 -3.51*** -1.138 -4.77*** -22.557 -4.58*** -0.443 -1.31 -8.171 -1.14 
Northern Region -0.561 -5.20*** -12.071 -5.15*** -0.617 -5.64*** -13.198 -5.57*** -0.448 -3.11** -9.507 -3.07**  
Upper East Region -1.029 -7.86*** -21.566 -7.79*** -1.097 -8.21*** -22.946 -8.14*** -0.958 -5.64*** -19.983 -5.59*** 
constant 10.229 24.53*** 104.63 12.09*** 9.95 22.87*** 98.74 10.94*** 9.509 13.44*** 89.806 6.04*** 
Observation no. 1341  1341  1341  1341  803  803  
R-squared 0.288  0.287  0.27  0.269  0.273  0.274  
adjusted R-squared 0.271  0.27  0.252  0.252  0.24  0.241  
F 23.139  23.147  21.551  21.301  12.886  12.8  
ll -1.00E+03  -5.10E+03  -1.00E+03  -5.10E+03  -611.182  -3.10E+03  
F-test of instruments  F(  5,  1308) =   26.23 F(  5,  1308) =   25.31 F(  4,  1309) =   22.81 F(  4,  1309) =   22.17 F(  8,   767) =   10.33 F(  8,   767) =    9.98 
P-value             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000             Prob > F =    0.0000 
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APPENDIX B: 
B-1: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in PCA (Household Wealth) 
GLSS 1   GLSS 4  
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Piped Water 0.31 0.463 0.43 0.495 
Flush Toilet 0.06 0.236   
Electricity 0.27 0.445 0.42 0.493 
Stove 0.09 0.283 0.14 0.352 
Fridge-Freeze 0.07 0.251 0.19 0.392 
Air conditioner 0.01 0.073   
Fans 0.12 0.319 0.25 0.434 
Video equipment 0.01 0.073 0.05 0.218 
Washing Machine 0.00 0.047   
Black & White TV 0.07 0.252   
Colour TV 0.01 0.082   
TV   0.27 0.442 
Electric iron   0.26 0.439 
House   0.34 0.472 
Room Greater than 
1   0.55 0.497 
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B-4: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in PCA (Distance to health facilities and 
personnel) 
GLSS 1   GLSS 4  
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Hospital 25.599 26.855 35.699 83.967 
Doctor 25.790 26.203 30.623 72.528 
Clinic 10.996 12.584 14.210 58.327 
Nurse 13.471 13.676 14.957 54.023 
Pharmacy 23.078 25.929 41.625 78.528 
Pharmacist 24.517 27.802 39.419 78.369 
Fam. Pl. clinic 21.012 24.742 14.140 58.334 
Fam. Pl. worker 21.668 24.566 15.388 54.020 
Com. Health worker 13.853 16.307 14.902 54.430 
Midwife   16.756 60.049 
TBA   7.821 52.615 
Trad. Healer   5.985 49.767 
Medical Asst.   15.784 53.670 
Drug store   13.340 55.371 
Maternity home   23.737 73.964 
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B-7: Summary Statistics of Variables Used in PCA (Price of commodities) 
 GLSS 1  GLSS 4  
 Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Guinea corn 22.02 38.84 2493.98 20455.63 
Millet 23.31 39.52 2649.64 19903.16 
Bread 153.43 100.23 9559.51 18530.32 
Gari 80.75 54.12 5268.58 27373.94 
Garden egg 74.81 52.76 4153.24 8461.89 
Tomatoes 96.93 69.09 9301.00 24994.34 
Sugar 130.97 68.65 8175.73 24809.27 
Cassava 17.35 11.85   
Egg 16.91 10.34   
Tilapia 282.85 254.41   
Palm oil 117.71 82.10   
Groundnut oil 66.67 97.80   
Milk 326.11 162.38   
Soap 38.39 18.54   
Missing price 0.09 0.29   
Maize   2420.26 13632.27 
Plantain   3641.68 8874.82 
Fish   18174.41 55156.33 
Yam   2599.94 4072.68 
Cocoyam   2510.98 6330.63 
Onion   8425.00 10562.35 
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B-10a: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by All Women, 
1987/88. 
Full GLSS 1 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.068 0.014 0.06 0.01 0.046 0.007 
 1.95 0.75 1.69 0.64 1.26 0.54 
Middle/JSS 0.042 0.06 0.017 0.049 0.009 0.042 
 1.61 3.86*** 0.62 3.56*** 0.32 3.37*** 
Sec. & Higher 0.021 0.14 -0.038 0.093 -0.04 0.079 
 0.39 2.33*   -0.77 1.9 -0.82 1.91 
Still in School 0.469 -0.006 0.478 -0.006 0.503 -0.002 
 8.95*** -0.47 8.88*** -0.57 9.22*** -0.14 
Age25-34 -0.098 0.004 -0.1 0.002 -0.118 0.001 
 -4.29*** 0.49 -4.37*** 0.31 -5.06*** 0.1 
Age35-49 -0.176 -0.012 -0.19 -0.014 -0.209 -0.013 
 -7.56*** -1.53 -8.23*** -1.93 -9.12*** -2.25*   
Rural -0.156 -0.014 -0.116 -0.014 -0.038 -0.007 
 -6.96*** -1.92 -4.14*** -1.89 -0.97 -0.75 
Northern Region -0.046 -0.021 -0.061 -0.018 0.009 -0.014 
 -1.38 -1.87 -1.7 -1.63 0.19 -1.25 
Muslim   -0.113 -0.02 -0.085 -0.013 
   -3.74*** -2.55*   -2.61** -1.76 
Traditional   0.033 -0.012 -0.009 -0.013 
   0.97 -1.32 -0.27 -1.82 
Other   -0.182 -0.028 -0.157 -0.022 
   -5.95*** -4.84*** -4.42*** -3.90*** 
Non-Akan   0.052 0.012 0.006 0.007 
   2.27* 1.96 0.26 1.21 
HAS- Basic   0.049 -0.001 0.015 -0.004 
   3.57*** -0.3 1.02 -1.38 
HAS- High   0.004 0.004 0.01 0.004 
   0.38 1.97*   0.81 2.39*   
Ext. Contr. Use     0.645 0.068 
     12.31*** 4.94*** 
Observation 2240  2240  2240  
chi2 266.872  319.588  474.204  








Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
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B-10b: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by Rural 
Women, 1987/88. 
Rural GLSS 1 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.023 0.025 0.014 7.02E-06 0.012 1.96E-05 
 0.58 1.14 0.35 1.08 0.3 1.09 
Middle/JSS 0.027 0.043 0.016 1.29E-05 0.018 3.54E-05 
 0.89 2.46* 0.5 2.37*   0.53 2.30*   
Sec. & Higher -0.022 0.212 -0.046 1.02E-04 -0.046 2.36E-04 
 -0.27 1.87 -0.51 1.32 -0.54 1.4 
Still in School 0.521 0.005 0.549 1.71E-06 0.578 1.64E-05 
 7.71*** 0.32 7.56*** 0.31 7.56*** 0.72 
Age25-34 -0.05 -3.03E-04 -0.049 -4.38E-07 -0.058 -3.95E-08 
 -1.89 -0.04 -1.83 -0.18 -2.17* -0.01 
Age35-49 -0.15 -0.01 -0.155 -3.49E-06 -0.16 -1.23E-05 
 -5.51*** -1.26 -5.69*** -1.52 -6.08*** -1.97*   
Northern Region -0.011 -0.016 -0.029 
-4.62 
E-06 0.016 -1.01E-05 
 -0.34 -1.47 -0.75 -1.33 0.31 -0.84 
Muslim   -0.092 -0.001 -0.081 -0.001 
   -2.58** -4.60*** -2.16* -4.00*** 
Traditional   -0.017 
-8.41 
E-07 -0.048 -7.29E-06 
   -0.5 -0.29 -1.5 -0.99 
Other   -0.201 
-1.96 
E-04 -0.172 -3.05E-04 
   -7.18*** -4.60*** -5.44*** -4.05*** 
Non-Akan   0.04 1.77E-06 -0.008 1.85E-07 
   1.46 0.85 -0.27 0.03 
HAS- Basic   0.052 -5.28E-06 0.028 -1.43E-05 
   1.55 -1.28 0.87 -1.22 
HAS- High   0.043 5.31E-07 0.044 7.41E-07 
   0.72 0.22 0.67 0.08 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.584 6.67E-05 
     9.32*** 4.20*** 
Observation 1405  1405  1405  
chi2 118.293  .  4.00E+04  
r2_p 0.076  0.101  0.166  
ll -914.041  -889.492  -824.6  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
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B-10c: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by Urban 
Women, 1987/88. 
Urban GLSS 1 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.16 -0.019 0.145 -0.002 0.105 -0.003 
 2.62** -0.64 2.24* -0.81 1.55 -1.04 
Middle/JSS 0.071 0.079 0.064 0.008 0.03 0.008 
 1.57 2.93**  1.22 2.46*   0.53 2.23*   
Sec. & Higher 0.051 0.127 0.025 0.009 0.001 0.009 
 0.68 1.72 0.32 1.18 0.02 1.13 
Still in School 0.381 -0.037 0.365 -0.004 0.371 -0.005 
 4.70*** -2.13*   4.22*** -2.67**  4.35*** -2.63**  
Age25-34 -0.181 0.011 -0.198 0.001 -0.241 2.35E-04 
 -4.49*** 0.71 -4.58*** 0.44 -5.30*** 0.13 
Age35-49 -0.215 -0.019 -0.274 -0.003 -0.318 -0.003 
 -5.03*** -1.03 -6.24*** -1.45 -7.20*** -1.61 
Northern Region -0.214 -0.03 -0.188 -0.003 -0.015 -0.001 
 -2.96** -1.18 -2.17* -0.88 -0.14 -0.12 
Muslim   -0.144 -0.003 -0.106 -0.002 
   -2.45* -1.16 -1.69 -0.85 
Traditional   0.2 -0.053 0.161 -0.053 
   2.48* -5.19*** 1.89 -4.95*** 
Other   -0.153 -0.004 -0.118 -0.004 
   -2.00* -2.59**  -1.26 -1.91 
Non-Akan   0.081 0.002 0.036 0.002 
   1.87 1.53 0.81 1.17 
HAS- Basic   0.061 -7.35E-05 0.026 -0.001 
   3.32*** -0.13 1.32 -1.25 
HAS- High   0.003 0.001 0.007 0.001 
   0.19 2.18*   0.53 2.66**  
Ext. Contr. Use     0.788 0.012 
     8.54*** 3.15**  
N 835  835  835  
chi2 101.931  2.40E+04  2.00E+04  
r2_p 0.088  0.121  0.182  
ll -676.188  -651.838  -606.733  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
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B-10d: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by 
Women Aged 15 Ȃ 34, 1987/88.  
Age1534 GLSS 1 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.054 0.028 0.046 0.022 0.037 0.015 
 1.32 0.99 1.11 0.93 0.87 0.72 
Middle/JSS 0.033 0.075 0.008 0.063 -0.001 0.052 
 1.07 3.64*** 0.24 3.45*** -0.02 3.11**  
Sec. & Higher 0.034 0.124 -0.037 0.084 -0.044 0.068 
 0.53 1.82 -0.59 1.5 -0.69 1.42 
Still in School 0.454 -0.008 0.463 -0.009 0.481 -0.004 
 9.60*** -0.54 9.58*** -0.66 9.95*** -0.34 
Age25-34 -0.108 0.006 -0.112 0.004 -0.133 0.003 
 -4.22*** 0.7 -4.32*** 0.54 -4.97*** 0.39 
Rural -0.159 -0.017 -0.119 -0.021 -0.044 -0.008 
 -5.99*** -1.84 -3.53*** -2.04*   -0.92 -0.6 
Northern Region -0.036 -0.026 -0.046 -0.023 0.031 -0.016 
 -0.83 -1.73 -0.98 -1.49 0.5 -0.83 
Muslim   -0.121 -0.021 -0.093 -0.014 
   -3.21** -2.03*   -2.27* -1.24 
Traditional   0.026 -0.02 -0.008 -0.021 
   0.65 -1.73 -0.2 -2.20*   
Other   -0.206 -0.034 -0.186 -0.028 
   -5.42*** -4.55*** -4.31*** -3.53*** 
Non-Akan   0.038 0.013 -0.01 0.007 
   1.37 1.67 -0.33 0.89 
HAS- Basic   0.055 -0.004 0.024 -0.007 
   3.08** -0.94 1.27 -1.71 
HAS- High   0.014 0.005 0.019 0.005 
   0.75 1.89 1.03 2.27*   
Ext. Contr. Use     0.638 0.084 
     9.73*** 4.59*** 
Observation 1651  1651  1651  
chi2 172.57  220.786  336.869  
r2_p 0.085  0.108  0.164  
ll -1.30E+03  -1.20E+03  
-1.20 
E+03  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 









  460 
B-10e: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by Women Aged 
35 Ȃ 49, 1987/88.  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 










Age3549 GLSS 1 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a 












Primary 0.102 -0.015 0.094 -1.90E-05 0.06 
 1.55 -2.84**  1.42 -3.48*** 0.93 
Middle/JSS 0.053 4.97E-04 0.029 4.76E-07 0.033 
 1.15 0.79 0.62 0.51 0.63 
Sec. & Higher -0.021 0.007 -0.031 6.14E-06 0.054 
 -0.25 1.24 -0.39 0.88 0.61 
Age40-49 -0.043 -0.001 -0.047 -1.21E-06 -0.063 
 -1.23 -1.48 -1.39 -1.48 -1.78 
Rural -0.125 -2.29E-04 -0.063 4.27E-09 -0.029 
 -3.29** -0.51 -1.42 0.01 -0.5 
Northern Region -0.059 -4.31E-04 -0.077 -6.09E-07 -0.029 
 -1.37 -0.9 -1.83 -0.69 -0.47 
Muslim   -0.082 -1.29E-04 -0.064 
   -1.99* -3.08**  -1.41 
Traditional   0.057 4.67E-07 -0.008 
   1.05 0.33 -0.16 
Other   -0.106 -8.03E-06 -0.057 
   -2.11* -3.58*** -0.77 
Non-Akan   0.076 5.66E-07 0.05 
   2.32* 0.88 1.48 
HAS- Basic   0.043 2.49E-07 0.001 
   2.40* 0.86 0.03 
HAS- High   -0.172 2.20E-07 -0.025 
   -1.68 1.03 -0.89 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.571 
     7.78*** 
Observation 589  589  589 
chi2 1.20E+04  1.30E+04  98.944 
r2_p 0.07  0.109  0.204 
ll -331.781  -317.804  -248.329 
  461 
B-11a: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by All Women, 
1998/99.  
Full GLSS 4 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.017 0.059 0.015 0.046 0.008 0.031 
 1.63 3.05**  1.45 2.76**  1.07 2.31*   
Middle/JSS 0.03 0.046 0.024 0.033 0.019 0.027 
 2.62** 3.18**  2.18* 2.44*   2.10* 2.06*   
Sec. & Higher 0.048 0.094 0.034 0.075 0.024 0.062 
 2.16* 3.21**  1.59 2.64**  1.36 2.41*   
Still in School -0.04 -0.092 -0.04 -0.089 -0.032 -0.085 
 -6.51*** -7.97*** -6.56*** -8.07*** -7.26*** -8.91*** 
Age25-34 0.037 0.102 0.034 0.1 0.028 0.098 
 3.39*** 5.55*** 3.29** 5.54*** 3.16** 5.75*** 
Age35-49 0.026 0.062 0.025 0.061 0.022 0.061 
 2.80** 4.04*** 2.84** 4.09*** 2.88** 4.29*** 
Rural 0.016 0.011 0.022 0.016 0.011 -0.041 
 1.99* 0.97 2.27* 1.25 1.8 -2.14*   
Northern Region -0.023 0.016 -0.016 0.029 -0.006 0.031 
 -2.41* 0.58 -1.34 1.12 -0.64 1.65 
Muslim   -0.005 0.005 -0.009 -0.002 
   -0.45 0.24 -1.05 -0.16 
Traditional   2.41E-04 -0.07 0.015 -0.059 
   0.01 -6.10*** 0.86 -5.43*** 
Other   0.015 -0.055 0.012 -0.054 
   0.82 -3.78*** 0.83 -4.32*** 
Non-Akan   -0.008 -0.008 -0.001 -0.004 
   -1.12 -0.75 -0.26 -0.41 
HAS- Basic   0.006 0.002 0.006 0.01 
   1.41 0.37 1.84 1.67 
HAS- High   -0.003 2.67E-04 -0.002 -0.005 
   -0.71 0.05 -0.81 -0.96 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.149 0.256 
     8.19*** 10.69*** 
Observation 5863      
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
a.  Results on community variables are reported in table 3.16 in main text. 










  462 
B-11b: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by Rural 
Women, 1998/99.  
Rural GLSS 4 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.005 0.092 0.003 0.073 -0.001 0.053 
 0.41 3.82*** 0.24 3.75*** -0.13 3.28**  
Middle/JSS 0.029 0.036 0.023 0.025 0.017 0.02 
 1.78 1.88 1.43 1.41 1.41 1.16 
Sec. & Higher 0.054 0.051 0.034 0.043 0.026 0.039 
 1.48 1.3 1.04 1.09 0.92 1 
Still in School -0.041 -0.096 -0.041 -0.091 -0.031 -0.084 
 -4.52*** -6.77*** -4.62*** -6.76*** -4.70*** -7.02*** 
Age25-34 0.034 0.106 0.031 0.105 0.023 0.103 
 2.34* 4.23*** 2.25* 4.28*** 2.10* 4.50*** 
Age35-49 0.012 0.058 0.012 0.059 0.011 0.059 
 1.22 2.77**  1.18 2.89**  1.27 3.09**  
Northern Region -0.032 0.008 -0.023 0.021 -0.006 0.029 
 -2.33* 0.25 -1.43 0.74 -0.46 1.37 
Muslim   -0.007 0.011 -0.016 -0.009 
   -0.44 0.42 -1.49 -0.73 
Traditional   -0.002 -0.072 0.011 -0.062 
   -0.12 -5.39*** 0.6 -5.04*** 
Other   0.01 -0.049 0.007 -0.05 
   0.45 -2.66**  0.41 -3.25**  
Non-Akan   -0.007 -0.008 0.001 -0.007 
   -0.54 -0.52 0.08 -0.61 
HAS- Basic   0.007 -0.005 0.005 0.004 
   1.15 -0.53 1.31 0.56 
HAS- High   -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.008 
   -0.88 -0.56 -0.84 -1.34 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.165 0.258 
     7.00*** 8.73*** 
Observation 3657      
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
a.  Results on community variables are reported in table 3.16 in main text. 










  463 
B-11c: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by Urban 
Women, 1998/99.  
Urban GLSS 4 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.051 -0.01 0.049 -0.014 0.036 -0.019 
 2.06* -0.37 2.14* -0.56 2.16* -0.81 
Middle/JSS 0.034 0.047 0.031 0.037 0.024 0.031 
 2.67** 2.16*   2.64** 1.74 2.58* 1.52 
Sec. & Higher 0.051 0.094 0.045 0.067 0.033 0.06 
 1.97 2.35*   1.74 1.83 1.54 1.73 
Still in School -0.032 -0.087 -0.031 -0.087 -0.027 -0.088 
 -4.57*** -4.95*** -4.38*** -5.01*** -4.61*** -5.94*** 
Age25-34 0.044 0.088 0.042 0.086 0.038 0.086 
 2.55* 3.41*** 2.54* 3.34**  2.50* 3.38**  
Age35-49 0.051 0.058 0.051 0.055 0.045 0.057 
 2.32* 2.69**  2.44* 2.59*   2.60* 2.64**  
Northern Region -0.007 0.035 -0.001 0.044 -0.001 0.037 
 -1 1.23 -0.07 1.21 -0.18 1.3 
Muslim   7.71E-05 0.001 0.004 0.008 
   0.01 0.02 0.31 0.31 
Traditional   0.034 -0.033 0.052 -0.023 
   0.57 -0.75 0.72 -0.48 
Other   0.023 -0.066 0.022 -0.063 
   0.8 -3.13**  0.81 -3.14**  
Non-Akan   -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 0.001 
   -1.79 -0.35 -1.05 0.09 
HAS- Basic   0.003 0.011 0.004 0.013 
   0.58 1.08 1.3 1.48 
HAS- High   0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
   0.19 0.14 -0.46 -0.14 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.112 0.242 
     4.80*** 5.81*** 
Obs. 2206      
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
a.  Results on community variables are reported in table 3.16 in main text. 










  464 
B-11d: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by Women Aged 
15 Ȃ 34, 1998/99.  
Age1534 GLSS 4 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary 0.03 0.047 0.027 0.037 0.017 0.022 
 2.38* 2.22*   2.24* 2.04*   1.83 1.47 
Middle/JSS 0.025 0.047 0.022 0.039 0.015 0.03 
 2.22* 2.68**  1.96 2.27*   1.62 1.96 
Sec. & Higher 0.033 0.091 0.025 0.085 0.017 0.071 
 1.34 2.75**  1.1 2.48*   0.89 2.37*   
Still in School -0.04 -0.088 -0.038 -0.085 -0.03 -0.08 
 -6.21*** -7.35*** -6.09*** -7.27*** -4.79*** -7.81*** 
Age25-34 0.03 0.084 0.026 0.082 0.021 0.079 
 3.96*** 6.03*** 3.75*** 5.94*** 3.15** 6.02*** 
Rural 0.021 0.014 0.029 0.02 0.021 -0.024 
 2.56* 1.24 2.88** 1.56 2.82** -1.2 
Northern Region -0.013 0.022 -0.006 0.025 -2.59E-04 0.029 
 -1.1 0.71 -0.4 0.91 -0.02 1.35 
Muslim   0.008 0.031 0.001 0.021 
   0.56 1.29 0.06 1.17 
Traditional   0.007 -0.056 0.023 -0.046 
   0.32 -4.24*** 0.93 -3.46*** 
Other   0.024 -0.048 0.02 -0.049 
   1.01 -2.84**  1 -3.48*** 
Non-Akan   -0.006 -0.009 -0.001 -0.002 
   -0.61 -0.64 -0.21 -0.21 
HAS- Basic   0.005 -0.002 0.005 0.004 
   1.41 -0.29 1.47 0.77 
HAS- High   -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.012 
   -1.75 -1.02 -1.6 -2.10*   
Ext. Contr. Use     0.123 0.234 
     4.36*** 8.15*** 
Observation 3921      
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
a.  Results on community variables are reported in table 3.16 in main text. 











  465 
B-11e: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Contraceptive Use by Women Aged 
35 Ȃ 49, 1998/99.  
Age3549 GLSS 4 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  














Primary -0.017 0.078 -0.017 0.062 -0.015 0.039 
 -1.26 2.45*   -1.37 2.10*   -1.67 1.37 
Middle/JSS 0.038 0.032 0.028 0.018 0.025 0.013 
 1.77 1.17 1.53 0.66 1.69 0.52 
Sec. & Higher 0.063 0.088 0.042 0.055 0.033 0.043 
 1.57 1.56 1.13 1.09 1.1 0.94 
Age40-49 -0.017 -0.117 -0.016 -0.112 -0.017 -0.112 
 -1.49 -5.61*** -1.53 -5.76*** -2.23* -6.21*** 
Rural 0.006 -0.004 0.001 -0.006 -0.019 -0.089 
 0.44 -0.21 0.09 -0.28 -1.31 -1.87 
Northern Region -0.047 0.003 -0.033 0.042 -0.016 0.04 
 -3.79*** 0.1 -2.00* 1.3 -0.97 1.47 
Muslim   -0.036 -0.042 -0.029 -0.045 
   -2.90** -2.08*   -3.19** -2.78**  
Traditional   -0.009 -0.091 0.005 -0.08 
   -0.41 -5.95*** 0.24 -5.73*** 
Other   -0.016 -0.06 -0.012 -0.058 
   -0.91 -2.37*   -0.83 -2.57*   
Non-Akan   -0.014 -0.011 -0.003 -0.011 
   -1.21 -0.57 -0.36 -0.59 
HAS- Basic   0.002 0.005 0.004 0.015 
   0.37 0.39 0.97 1.34 
HAS- High   0.007 0.015 0.005 0.011 
   1.59 1.42 1.27 1.06 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.164 0.305 
     6.55*** 5.70*** 
Observation   1942    
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
a.  Results on community variables are reported in table 3.16 in main text. 











  466 
B-12a: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Ever Use of Contraceptives by All 
Women, 1987/88.  
GLSS 1 Full 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  













Primary 0.01 0.092 0.003 0.085 0.011 0.048 
 0.29 2.77**  0.1 2.60**  0.31 1.72 
Middle/JSS -0.042 0.177 -0.068 0.162 -0.051 0.119 
 -1.66 7.33*** -2.52* 6.40*** -1.71 5.01*** 
Sec. & Higher -0.121 0.314 -0.168 0.254 -0.149 0.22 
 -2.61** 5.09*** -3.94*** 3.88*** -2.99** 3.49*** 
Still in School 0.446 -0.101 0.455 -0.104 0.46 -0.085 
 9.34*** -4.29*** 9.62*** -4.57*** 10.02*** -4.23*** 
Age25-34 -0.126 0.095 -0.128 0.094 -0.134 0.087 
 -5.37*** 4.65*** -5.41*** 4.58*** -5.26*** 4.44*** 
Age35-49 -0.144 0.032 -0.154 0.025 -0.161 0.02 
 -5.82*** 1.33 -6.12*** 1.05 -5.99*** 0.92 
Rural -0.095 -0.071 -0.026 -0.073 0.015 -0.017 
 -4.17*** -4.15*** -0.91 -3.58*** 0.36 -0.68 
Northern Region 0.007 -0.142 0.003 -0.137 0.022 -0.059 
 0.22 -7.49*** 0.08 -6.64*** 0.44 -1.88 
Muslim   -0.044 -0.072 -0.034 -0.044 
   -1.28 -3.38*** -0.92 -2.13*   
Traditional   0.035 -0.039 0.016 -0.051 
   1.04 -1.62 0.45 -2.42*   
Other   -0.121 -0.077 -0.099 -0.029 
   -3.06** -3.21**  -2.13* -1.05 
Non-Akan   0.009 0.03 0.005 0.011 
   0.38 1.86 0.18 0.68 
HAS- Basic   0.077 0.002 0.057 -0.018 
   5.07*** 0.23 3.52*** -2.06*   
HAS- High   0.002 0.017 0.003 0.016 
   0.18 2.39*   0.23 2.54*   
Ext. Contr. Use     0.398 0.407 
     7.93*** 12.50*** 
Observation 2240  2240  2240  
chi2 375.285  425.919  657.131  
r2_p 0.096  0.111  0.191  
ll -2.10E+03  -2.10E+03  -1.90E+03  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 








  467 
B-12b: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Ever Use of Contraceptives 
by Rural Women, 1987/88.  
GLSS 1 Rural 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  













Primary -0.013 0.069 -0.025 0.06 -0.014 0.035 
 -0.32 1.97*   -0.6 1.81 -0.32 1.34 
Middle/JSS -0.03 0.149 -0.048 0.138 -0.014 0.092 
 -0.95 4.98*** -1.47 4.64*** -0.37 3.72*** 
Sec. & Higher -0.176 0.417 -0.241 0.434 -0.226 0.424 
 -2.90** 3.99*** -5.24*** 3.75*** -3.91*** 3.55*** 
Still in School 0.522 -0.071 0.534 -0.072 0.545 -0.051 
 9.21*** -2.96**  9.49*** -3.14**  9.76*** -2.84**  
Age25-34 -0.071 0.068 -0.067 0.063 -0.065 0.059 
 -2.42* 3.14**  -2.23* 2.98**  -2.02* 3.15**  
Age35-49 -0.092 0.001 -0.092 -0.003 -0.091 -0.002 
 -2.94** 0.02 -2.87** -0.14 -2.65** -0.08 
Northern Region 0.02 -0.107 0.033 -0.095 0.02 -0.032 
 0.57 -5.72*** 0.75 -4.60*** 0.34 -1.23 
Muslim   -0.016 -0.085 -0.009 -0.055 
   -0.36 -4.29*** -0.17 -3.27**  
Traditional   -0.001 -0.022 -0.011 -0.028 
   -0.02 -0.99 -0.29 -1.65 
Other   -0.107 -0.062 -0.078 -0.023 
   -2.37* -2.90**  -1.52 -0.98 
Non-Akan   -0.025 0.004 -0.027 -0.002 
   -0.84 0.26 -0.84 -0.13 
HAS- Basic   0.112 -0.045 0.096 -0.063 
   2.89** -1.98*   2.32* -2.90**  
HAS- High   0.319 0.107 0.249 0.071 
   1.6 1.5 1.17 1.32 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.471 0.279 
     7.59*** 9.19*** 
Observation 1405  1405  1405  
chi2 187.584  203.489  375.68  
r2_p 0.076  0.09  0.182  
ll -1.30E+03  -1.20E+03  -1.10E+03  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 








  468 
B-12c: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Ever Use of Contraceptives 
by Urban Women, 1987/88.  
GLSS 1 Urban 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  













Primary 0.049 0.113 0.045 0.117 0.04 0.067 
 0.81 1.76 0.71 1.79 0.63 1.07 
Middle/JSS -0.06 0.212 -0.101 0.196 -0.114 0.159 
 -1.38 5.24*** -2.05* 4.22*** -2.23* 3.25**  
Sec. & Higher -0.117 0.291 -0.165 0.23 -0.169 0.204 
 -1.81 3.92*** -2.59** 2.80**  -2.49* 2.39*   
Still in School 0.336 -0.172 0.332 -0.185 0.326 -0.178 
 4.03*** -3.32*** 3.75*** -3.60*** 3.85*** -3.62*** 
Age25-34 -0.224 0.138 -0.239 0.137 -0.253 0.128 
 -5.91*** 3.46*** -6.20*** 3.38*** -6.27*** 3.08**  
Age35-49 -0.224 0.079 -0.261 0.058 -0.279 0.046 
 -5.72*** 1.62 -6.63*** 1.19 -6.64*** 0.92 
Northern Region -0.103 -0.208 -0.061 -0.204 0.035 -0.082 
 -1.33 -4.43*** -0.68 -3.69*** 0.31 -0.77 
Muslim   -0.075 -0.079 -0.077 -0.048 
   -1.35 -1.65 -1.33 -0.95 
Traditional   0.178 -0.101 0.143 -0.113 
   2.38* -1.84 1.93 -2.15*   
Other   -0.161 -0.09 -0.145 -0.03 
   -2.20* -1.42 -1.67 -0.38 
Non-Akan   0.057 0.066 0.056 0.022 
   1.41 1.91 1.34 0.61 
HAS- Basic   0.074 0.007 0.069 -0.024 
   4.25*** 0.49 3.79*** -1.58 
HAS- High   -0.012 0.021 -0.012 0.023 
   -1.04 2.51*   -1.04 2.64**  
Ext. Contr. Use    0.152 0.596 
     1.75 7.39*** 
Observation 835  835  835  
chi2 134.739  176.807  246.204  
r2_p 0.088  0.121  0.184  
ll -831.913  -801.028  -744.136  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 









  469 
B-12d: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Ever Use of Contraceptives by 
Women Aged 15 Ȃ 34, 1987/88. 
GLSS 1 Age15-34 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  













Primary 0.001 0.113 -0.008 0.107 0.007 0.059 
 0.02 2.77**  -0.19 2.63**  0.16 1.7 
Middle/JSS -0.033 0.183 -0.066 0.174 -0.042 0.118 
 -1.08 6.57*** -2.02* 5.96*** -1.18 4.30*** 
Sec. & Higher -0.113 0.303 -0.178 0.259 -0.155 0.196 
 -1.92 4.13*** -3.37*** 3.33*** -2.52* 2.69**  
Still in School 0.432 -0.111 0.44 -0.116 0.441 -0.095 
 9.32*** -4.35*** 9.55*** -4.59*** 10.05*** -4.36*** 
Age25_34 -0.137 0.1 -0.142 0.101 -0.147 0.092 
 -5.37*** 5.13*** -5.48*** 5.11*** -5.34*** 4.95*** 
Rural -0.11 -0.06 -0.032 -0.073 -0.008 -0.008 
 -4.10*** -2.99**  -0.93 -3.00**  -0.15 -0.26 
Northern Region 0.026 -0.167 0.034 -0.163 0.055 -0.087 
 0.6 -7.55*** 0.71 -6.59*** 0.88 -2.39*   
Muslim   -0.056 -0.068 -0.048 -0.036 
   -1.37 -2.54*   -1.08 -1.33 
Traditional   0.03 -0.038 0.022 -0.05 
   0.75 -1.31 0.52 -1.88 
Other   -0.146 -0.079 -0.133 -0.022 
   -3.15** -2.67**  -2.47* -0.66 
Non-Akan   -0.007 0.017 -0.012 -0.007 
   -0.23 0.84 -0.38 -0.37 
HAS- Basic   0.091 -0.005 0.078 -0.021 
   4.93*** -0.42 3.94*** -1.93 
HAS- High   0.014 0.023 0.013 0.02 
   0.53 1.84 0.52 2.04*   
Ext. Contr. Use     0.322 0.444 
     5.29*** 10.85*** 
N 1651  1651  1651  
chi2 276.821  315.476  493.763  
r2_p 0.099  0.116  0.194  
ll -1.60E+03  -1.50E+03  -1.40E+03  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 









  470 
B-12e: Marginal Effects: Multinomial Logit Regression of Ever Use of Contraceptives by 
Women Aged 35 Ȃ 49, 1987/88. 
GLSS 1 Age35-49 
 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3a  













Primary 0.045 0.015 0.047 0.008 0.028 0.005 
 0.68 0.28 0.69 0.16 0.38 0.14 
Middle/JSS -0.09 0.149 -0.101 0.115 -0.093 0.089 
 -2.03* 3.06**  -2.13* 2.26* -1.78 2.12*   
Sec. & Higher -0.165 0.345 -0.166 0.238 -0.145 0.261 
 -2.72** 2.93**  -2.60** 1.96 -1.8 2.16*   
Age4049 -0.087 0.011 -0.087 0.012 -0.089 0.012 
 -2.23* 0.42 -2.21* 0.47 -2.08* 0.61 
Rural -0.039 -0.101 0.016 -0.074 0.078 -0.04 
 -0.97 -3.10**  0.33 -2.08* 1.24 -1 
Northern Region -0.021 -0.085 -0.053 -0.079 -0.026 -0.008 
 -0.44 -2.66**  -1 -2.33* -0.34 -0.19 
Muslim   -0.02 -0.074 -0.011 -0.04 
   -0.34 -2.40* -0.16 -1.64 
Traditional   0.051 -0.044 -0.001 -0.039 
   0.88 -1.14 -0.02 -1.47 
Other   -0.07 -0.066 -0.012 -0.027 
   -1 -1.56 -0.14 -0.64 
Non-Akan   0.048 0.066 0.052 0.047 
   1.16 2.45* 1.11 2.13*   
HAS- Basic   0.055 0.014 0.019 -0.009 
   2.17* 1.02 0.69 -0.81 
HAS- High   -0.091 0.017 -0.11 0.013 
   -1.91 1.03 -1.74 1.09 
Ext. Contr. Use     0.579 0.235 
     6.75*** 4.92*** 
Observation 589  589  589  
chi2 73.162  96.056  186.886  
r2_p 0.067  0.088  0.2  
ll -520.567  -508.48  -445.956  
Note: HAS represents Household Asset Score 
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B-13a: Summary Statistics Ȃ ǡǯ
(GLSS 1) 














Breastfeed 0.99 0.11 0.99 0.09 0.99 0.11 0.99 0.11 
Months Breastfeed1 14.1 9.03 13.2 7.77 13.5 8.58 15.0 8.74 
Completed Months  
Breastfeeding2 17.3 7.93 15.0 5.98 16.3 7.17 16.7 7.62 
Censored 0.54 0.50 0.40 0.49 0.52 0.50 0.42 0.49 
None 0.55 0.50 0.35 0.48 0.42 0.49 0.68 0.47 
Primary 0.13 0.34 0.12 0.33 0.14 0.35 0.10 0.29 
Middle/JSS 0.30 0.46 0.46 0.50 0.41 0.49 0.19 0.40 
Sec. & above 0.01 0.12 0.07 0.25 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18 
Age15_24 0.29 0.45 0.26 0.44 0.37 0.48   
Age25_34 0.45 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.63 0.48   
Age35-49 0.27 0.44 0.20 0.40     
Rural     0.64 0.48 0.73 0.45 
Female child 0.47 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.46 0.50 
Northern Region 0.20 0.40 0.08 0.27 0.14 0.35 0.21 0.41 
Child's birth82-84 0.21 0.41 0.20 0.40 0.17 0.37 0.32 0.47 
Child's birth85-86 0.40 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.35 0.48 
Child's birth87-88 0.34 0.47 0.33 0.47 0.36 0.48 0.27 0.44 
Missing birth year 0.05 0.22 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.18 0.06 0.24 
Christian 0.59 0.49 0.66 0.47 0.63 0.48 0.56 0.50 
Muslim 0.11 0.31 0.21 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.16 0.36 
Traditional 0.24 0.42 0.08 0.27 0.17 0.38 0.22 0.41 
Other 0.07 0.25 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24 
Non-Akan 0.53 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.62 0.49 
HAS- Basic -0.49 0.30 0.60 1.10 -0.09 0.89 -0.24 0.72 
HAS- High -0.07 0.15 -0.03 1.03 -0.05 0.69 -0.07 0.25 
Water distance 1946 20271 213 454 1587 18976 681 2786.71 
Market distance 8.15 12.09   5.37 10.52 5.57 10.78 
Access to Health 
facilities/personnel 0.01 0.98   -0.01 0.75 0.07 0.93 
Price score of  
foodstuffs -0.01 1.01   0.00 0.82 -0.01 0.82 
Price score of  
cereals 0.03 1.01   0.01 0.81 0.07 0.85 
Log of real Men's  
Agric. Wage 4.24 2.21   2.94 2.70 2.97 2.69 
Ratio of female to  
men's wage 0.45 0.46   0.31 0.44 0.29 0.43 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage 0.47 0.42   0.32 0.41 0.33 0.42 
 937  473  1064  346  
Note: 1. Includes current age of babies who are still breastfeeding; 2. Only babies who have 
completed breastfeeding.
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B-13b: Summary Statistics Ȃ ǡǯ
(GLSS 4) 














Breastfeed 0.99 0.09 0.99 0.09 0.99 0.09 0.99 0.10 
Months Breastfeed1 16.52 9.11 14.82 7.87 15.39 8.72 17.47 8.83 
Completed Months  
Breastfeeding2 20.98 7.34 17.64 6.98 19.66 7.07 20.17 7.91 
Censored 0.51 0.50 0.38 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.37 0.48 
None 0.59 0.49 0.34 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.62 0.49 
Primary 0.15 0.36 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38 0.13 0.34 
Middle/JSS 0.23 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.30 0.46 0.21 0.41 
Sec. & above 0.02 0.14 0.10 0.31 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 
Age15-24 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.39 0.28 0.45   
Age25-34 0.49 0.50 0.53 0.50 0.72 0.45   
Age35-49 0.32 0.47 0.29 0.45     
Rural     0.70 0.46 0.73 0.44 
Female child 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.50 0.50 
Northern Region 0.20 0.40 0.09 0.29 0.16 0.36 0.20 0.40 
Child's birth92-94 0.09 0.28 0.13 0.34 0.08 0.28 0.14 0.34 
Child's birth95-96 0.20 0.40 0.24 0.43 0.22 0.41 0.20 0.40 
Child's birth97-99 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45 0.36 0.48 0.23 0.42 
Missing birth year 0.38 0.49 0.35 0.48 0.34 0.47 0.43 0.50 
Christian 0.73 0.44 0.76 0.43 0.76 0.43 0.70 0.46 
Muslim 0.10 0.31 0.18 0.39 0.12 0.33 0.13 0.34 
Traditional 0.10 0.30 0.01 0.12 0.06 0.24 0.11 0.32 
Other 0.06 0.24 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.22 
Non-Akan 0.52 0.50 0.48 0.50 0.49 0.50 0.54 0.50 
HAS- Basic -0.49 0.63 0.56 1.02 -0.17 0.91 -0.23 0.87 
HAS- High 0.20 0.91 -0.54 0.93 -0.09 0.96 0.16 0.99 
Water distance  998 20056 183 725 329 1179 1735 30406 
Market distance 14.55 43.18   9.97 35.03 11.65 41.20 
Access to Health 
facilities/personnel -0.04 0.53   -0.03 0.46 -0.03 0.41 
Price score of  
cereals 0.01 1.17   0.02 1.08 -0.02 0.73 
Price score of  
foodstuffs -0.01 1.03   0.02 0.95 -0.06 0.65 
Log of real Men's  
Agric. Wage 7.98 1.82   5.66 3.94 5.98 3.79 
Ratio of female to  
men's wage 0.59 0.41   0.42 0.44 0.45 0.44 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage 0.44 0.41   0.30 0.40 0.35 0.41 
 1750  704  1695  759.00  
Note: 1. Includes current age of babies who are still breastfeeding; 2. Only babies who have completed breastfeeding.
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B-14a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1987/88 
Full Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.293 0.264 0.252 0.221 0.236 0.197 
 2.40* 1.86 2.03* 1.57 1.88 1.36 
Middle/JSS 0.482 0.54 0.379 0.418 0.376 0.405 
 5.19*** 4.92*** 3.84*** 3.70*** 3.75*** 3.52*** 
Sec.& above 0.959 1.079 0.644 0.721 0.617 0.699 
 4.71*** 4.46*** 2.91** 2.82**  2.76** 2.68**  
Age25-34 -0.146 -0.152 -0.169 -0.177 -0.196 -0.206 
 -1.5 -1.36 -1.73 -1.6 -1.99* -1.83 
Age35-49 -0.068 -0.069 -0.046 -0.056 -0.087 -0.101 
 -0.61 -0.54 -0.41 -0.44 -0.77 -0.78 
Rural -0.494 -0.599 -0.324 -0.401 -0.263 -0.361 
 -6.05*** -5.74*** -3.28** -3.34*** -2.02* -2.26*   
Female child -0.177 -0.188 -0.165 -0.174 -0.17 -0.172 
 -2.26* -2.07*   -2.08* -1.94 -2.13* -1.89 
Northern Region -0.661 -0.806 -0.502 -0.581 -0.467 -0.532 
 -5.16*** -5.01*** -3.61*** -3.58*** -2.87** -2.84**  
Child's birth85-86 -0.318 -0.414 -0.292 -0.363 -0.305 -0.38 
 -3.74*** -3.86*** -3.40*** -3.45*** -3.53*** -3.52*** 
Child's birth87-88 -0.755 -0.845 -0.73 -0.801 -0.722 -0.798 
 -3.76*** -3.97*** -3.63*** -3.79*** -3.58*** -3.74*** 
Missing birth year 0.255 0.281 0.233 0.264 0.259 0.289 
 1.48 1.37 1.32 1.29 1.44 1.38 
Muslim   -0.174 -0.203 -0.173 -0.208 
   -1.38 -1.42 -1.36 -1.43 
Traditional   -0.101 -0.113 -0.1 -0.114 
   -0.86 -0.84 -0.84 -0.84 
Other   0.228 0.302 0.242 0.321 
   1.43 1.59 1.51 1.66 
Non-Akan   -0.134 -0.166 -0.158 -0.19 
   -1.55 -1.68 -1.75 -1.82 
HAS- Basic   0.237 0.244 0.23 0.241 
   4.45*** 3.94*** 4.24*** 3.80*** 
HAS- High   0.059 0.053 0.061 0.053 
   1.01 0.84 1.04 0.84 
Water distance     -8.52E-06 -9.98E-06 
     -1.14 -1.26 
Market distance    0.002 0 
     0.33 -0.01 
Access to Health facilities/personnel   -0.037 -0.046 
     -0.59 -0.66 
Price score of foodstuffs    0.083 0.105 
     1.31 1.47 
Price score of cereals    -0.009 -0.014 
     -0.16 -0.21 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage   0.013 0.026 
     0.44 0.75 
Ratio of female to men's wage   -0.241 -0.231 
     -1.79 -1.51 
Ratio of child to men's wage   -0.078 -0.127 
     -0.48 -0.69 
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B-14b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 1. 
FullTm Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














2 -1.826 -1.823 -1.826 -1.824 -1.826 -1.823 
 -4.50*** -4.49*** -4.50*** -4.50*** -4.50*** -4.49*** 
3_4 -3.048 -3.044 -3.048 -3.045 -3.047 -3.043 
 -5.85*** -5.84*** -5.85*** -5.84*** -5.84*** -5.84*** 
5 -3.026 -3.023 -3.027 -3.023 -3.026 -3.021 
 -4.19*** -4.18*** -4.19*** -4.18*** -4.19*** -4.18*** 
6 -2.311 -2.306 -2.308 -2.303 -2.307 -2.301 
 -4.43*** -4.42*** -4.43*** -4.42*** -4.42*** -4.41*** 
7 -1.469 -1.462 -1.465 -1.459 -1.463 -1.455 
 -4.03*** -4.00*** -4.02*** -4.00*** -4.01*** -3.99*** 
8 -0.687 -0.675 -0.681 -0.669 -0.678 -0.665 
 -2.51* -2.47*   -2.49* -2.44*   -2.48* -2.43*   
9 -0.878 -0.857 -0.868 -0.849 -0.865 -0.844 
 -2.94** -2.87**  -2.91** -2.84**  -2.90** -2.83**  
10 -0.82 -0.793 -0.802 -0.777 -0.798 -0.77 
 -2.75** -2.65**  -2.68** -2.59**  -2.67** -2.57*   
11 -2.403 -2.373 -2.383 -2.356 -2.379 -2.348 
 -4.03*** -3.98*** -3.99*** -3.95*** -3.99*** -3.93*** 
12 1.149 1.201 1.179 1.227 1.184 1.239 
 6.29*** 6.50*** 6.44*** 6.60*** 6.47*** 6.64*** 
13 -1.085 -1.01 -1.041 -0.973 -1.034 -0.957 
 -2.96** -2.74**  -2.84** -2.63**  -2.82** -2.59**  
14 0.5 0.59 0.548 0.629 0.555 0.646 
 2.30* 2.65**  2.51* 2.80**  2.54* 2.85**  
15 0.262 0.374 0.317 0.415 0.326 0.437 
 1.09 1.51 1.31 1.67 1.35 1.74 
16 -0.113 0.013 -0.052 0.059 -0.041 0.083 
 -0.4 0.05 -0.18 0.2 -0.14 0.28 
17 -1.155 -1.022 -1.094 -0.978 -1.084 -0.953 
 -2.65** -2.31*   -2.51* -2.21*   -2.48* -2.15*   
18 2.494 2.695 2.563 2.734 2.574 2.766 
 14.52*** 13.49*** 14.81*** 13.41*** 14.86*** 13.13*** 
19 0.174 0.438 0.252 0.475 0.265 0.514 
 0.53 1.24 0.77 1.33 0.81 1.42 
20 1.007 1.29 1.085 1.323 1.1 1.365 
 3.98*** 4.45*** 4.27*** 4.50*** 4.33*** 4.51*** 
21 -1.438 -1.141 -1.358 -1.11 -1.343 -1.066 
 -1.99* -1.54 -1.88 -1.5 -1.85 -1.43 
22 -0.31 -0.008 -0.23 0.022 -0.215 0.066 
 -0.71 -0.02 -0.53 0.05 -0.49 0.14 
23 -1.361 -1.056 -1.282 -1.028 -1.267 -0.983 
 -1.88 -1.43 -1.77 -1.39 -1.75 -1.32 
24 3.357 3.779 3.441 3.786 3.459 3.842 
 18.59*** 13.69*** 18.88*** 13.47*** 18.93*** 12.83*** 
25 -0.054 0.494 0.035 0.483 0.054 0.546 
 -0.07 0.64 0.05 0.62 0.07 0.69 
26 0.701 1.265 0.789 1.249 0.813 1.319 
 1.34 2.13*   1.5 2.09*   1.55 2.16*   
27 0.056 0.633 0.141 0.612 0.168 0.686 
 0.08 0.81 0.2 0.78 0.23 0.87 
28 0.586 1.18 0.671 1.154 0.69 1.225 
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 0.98 1.77 1.12 1.72 1.15 1.79 
29 -0.4 0.209 -0.317 0.176 -0.301 0.246 
 -0.4 0.2 -0.31 0.17 -0.3 0.23 
30 2.115 2.771 2.219 2.743 2.243 2.824 
 5.96*** 5.79*** 6.23*** 5.70*** 6.29*** 5.58*** 
31plus 0.251 1.148 0.392 1.097 0.463 1.225 
 0.78 2.18*   1.21 2.06*   1.42 2.17*   
Constant -2.84 -2.742 -2.852 -2.765 -2.8 -2.71 
 -14.52*** -12.73*** -13.55*** -11.98*** -13.19*** -11.53*** 
ln_varg (cons) -1.371  -1.568  -1.462 
  -2.69**   -2.49*    -2.34*   
N_spell  1410  1410  1410 
gammav  0.254  0.209  0.232 
se_gammav  0.13  0.131  0.145 
ll_nofr  -2.10E+03  -2.10E+03  -2.10E+03 
lltest  5.421  3.154  2.965 
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B-15a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1987/88 
Rural Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.206 0.202 0.193 0.182 0.182 0.154 
 1.35 1.28 1.25 1.08 1.16 0.85 
Middle/JSS 0.481 0.489 0.44 0.469 0.443 0.481 
 3.97*** 3.68*** 3.52*** 3.25**  3.44*** 3.21**  
Sec.& above 0.488 0.512 0.348 0.445 0.293 0.492 
 1.4 1.32 0.97 1.01 0.79 1.01 
Age35-49 0.146 0.147 0.14 0.149 0.117 0.13 
 1.35 1.33 1.27 1.26 1.05 1.04 
Female child -0.256 -0.26 -0.263 -0.275 -0.262 -0.277 
 -2.50* -2.44*   -2.55* -2.46*   -2.51* -2.36*   
Northern Region -0.706 -0.722 -0.622 -0.652 -0.528 -0.579 
 -4.85*** -4.05*** -3.75*** -3.47*** -2.58** -2.46*   
Child's birth85-86 -0.26 -0.27 -0.246 -0.277 -0.26 -0.317 
 -2.36* -2.13*   -2.21* -2.06*   -2.32* -2.23*   
Child's birth87-88 -0.924 -0.932 -0.892 -0.917 -0.855 -0.899 
 -3.24** -3.21**  -3.11** -3.12**  -2.96** -3.01**  
Missing birth year 0.09 0.091 0.081 0.088 0.094 0.111 
 0.45 0.45 0.4 0.4 0.46 0.46 
Muslim   -0.13 -0.148 -0.147 -0.186 
   -0.74 -0.77 -0.83 -0.9 
Traditional   -0.07 -0.071 -0.051 -0.059 
   -0.53 -0.5 -0.38 -0.38 
Other   0.108 0.194 0.117 0.26 
   0.53 0.71 0.57 0.94 
Non-Akan   -0.036 -0.058 -0.038 -0.077 
   -0.32 -0.45 -0.32 -0.56 
HAS- Basic   0.187 0.186 0.141 0.127 
   1.1 1.03 0.8 0.65 
HAS- High   -0.974 -0.929 -1.188 -1.146 
   -0.93 -0.83 -1.09 -0.93 
Water distance     -9.24E-06 -1.02E-05 
     -1.21 -1.3 
Market distance    0.001 -0.001 
     0.17 -0.09 
Access to Health facilities/personnel   -0.046 -0.052 
     -0.68 -0.72 
Price score of foodstuffs    0.076 0.091 
     1.12 1.2 
Price score of cereals    -0.027 -0.025 
     -0.42 -0.36 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage   0.035 0.045 
     1.05 1.13 
Ratio of female to men's wage   -0.25 -0.263 
     -1.72 -1.61 
Ratio of child to men's wage   -0.01 -0.04 
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B-15b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 1. 
Rural Tm Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














2 -2.076 -2.075 -2.075 -2.072 -2.073 -2.068 
 -3.93*** -3.93*** -3.92*** -3.92*** -3.92*** -3.91*** 
3_4 -3.435 -3.434 -3.435 -3.432 -3.432 -3.426 
 -4.72*** -4.72*** -4.72*** -4.72*** -4.72*** -4.71*** 
5 -3.414 -3.414 -3.413 -3.41 -3.411 -3.404 
 -3.36*** -3.36*** -3.36*** -3.36*** -3.36*** -3.35*** 
6 -2.707 -2.706 -2.706 -2.702 -2.702 -2.695 
 -3.72*** -3.72*** -3.72*** -3.71*** -3.71*** -3.70*** 
7 -1.992 -1.991 -1.991 -1.986 -1.986 -1.977 
 -3.76*** -3.76*** -3.76*** -3.75*** -3.75*** -3.74*** 
8 -0.95 -0.948 -0.949 -0.942 -0.943 -0.931 
 -2.73** -2.72**  -2.73** -2.71**  -2.71** -2.67**  
9 -2.618 -2.616 -2.616 -2.608 -2.611 -2.596 
 -3.59*** -3.59*** -3.59*** -3.58*** -3.59*** -3.56*** 
10 -1.192 -1.189 -1.189 -1.18 -1.182 -1.164 
 -3.02** -3.01**  -3.01** -2.99**  -2.99** -2.94**  
11 -3.251 -3.249 -3.249 -3.239 -3.239 -3.22 
 -3.20** -3.20**  -3.20** -3.19**  -3.19** -3.17**  
12 0.73 0.734 0.735 0.752 0.745 0.779 
 3.23** 3.23**  3.25** 3.29**  3.29** 3.38*** 
13 -2.388 -2.382 -2.38 -2.357 -2.368 -2.32 
 -3.28** -3.26**  -3.27** -3.23**  -3.25** -3.17**  
14 -0.211 -0.204 -0.203 -0.177 -0.189 -0.136 
 -0.7 -0.67 -0.68 -0.58 -0.63 -0.44 
15 -0.406 -0.397 -0.399 -0.368 -0.382 -0.319 
 -1.23 -1.19 -1.21 -1.09 -1.16 -0.94 
16 -0.698 -0.688 -0.69 -0.655 -0.673 -0.603 
 -1.85 -1.8 -1.83 -1.7 -1.78 -1.55 
17 -1.738 -1.728 -1.729 -1.692 -1.712 -1.639 
 -2.88** -2.84**  -2.86** -2.78**  -2.83** -2.68**  
18 1.983 1.999 2.001 2.06 2.019 2.134 
 9.69*** 8.81*** 9.75*** 8.64*** 9.81*** 8.57*** 
19 -0.399 -0.377 -0.375 -0.293 -0.354 -0.197 
 -0.95 -0.86 -0.89 -0.65 -0.84 -0.43 
20 0.289 0.313 0.315 0.402 0.336 0.503 
 0.87 0.87 0.95 1.07 1.01 1.3 
21 -1.521 -1.496 -1.494 -1.403 -1.474 -1.299 
 -2.08* -2.01*   -2.05* -1.86 -2.02* -1.71 
22 -0.799 -0.774 -0.773 -0.681 -0.753 -0.575 
 -1.5 -1.4 -1.45 -1.21 -1.41 -1 
23 -1.449 -1.422 -1.425 -1.331 -1.403 -1.222 
 -1.98* -1.9 -1.95 -1.76 -1.92 -1.6 
24 3.008 3.048 3.031 3.174 3.055 3.33 
 14.45*** 9.40*** 14.51*** 8.81*** 14.55*** 8.52*** 
25 -0.144 -0.087 -0.118 0.079 -0.099 0.273 
 -0.2 -0.11 -0.16 0.1 -0.13 0.32 
26 0.644 0.703 0.667 0.872 0.695 1.081 
 1.21 1.1 1.25 1.29 1.3 1.53 
27 -0.683 -0.623 -0.664 -0.454 -0.633 -0.237 
 -0.67 -0.58 -0.65 -0.41 -0.62 -0.21 
28 0.561 0.622 0.576 0.791 0.599 1.008 
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 0.92 0.87 0.95 1.06 0.99 1.29 
29plus 0.662 0.742 0.683 0.956 0.744 1.258 
 2.30* 1.31 2.36* 1.53 2.55* 1.88 
Constant -2.983 -2.977 -2.933 -2.912 -3.017 -2.993 
 -14.18*** -13.86*** -11.64*** -10.91*** -10.54*** -9.56*** 
ln_varg (cons) -3.435  -2.184  -1.545 
  -0.56  -1.07  -1.29 
N_spell  937  937  937 
gammav  0.032  0.113  0.213 
se_gammav  0.197  0.23  0.255 
ll_nofr  -1.30E+03  -1.30E+03  -1.30E+03 
lltest  0.028  0.238  0.685 
lltest_p  0.434  0.313  0.204 
       
N 1.30E+04 1.30E+04 1.30E+04 1.30E+04 1.30E+04 1.30E+04 
N_clust       
ll -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 
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B-16a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1987/88 
Urban Model 1  Model 2  
 A B A B 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Primary 0.281 0.281 0.241 0.241 
 1.36 1.36 1.12 1.13 
Middle/JSS 0.407 0.407 0.273 0.273 
 2.72** 2.73**  1.67 1.69 
Sec.& above 1.283 1.283 0.932 0.932 
 4.73*** 4.73*** 3.08** 3.09**  
Age35-49 -0.091 -0.091 -0.033 -0.033 
 -0.57 -0.57 -0.2 -0.2 
Female child 0.036 0.036 0.052 0.052 
 0.28 0.28 0.4 0.41 
Northern Region -0.652 -0.652 -0.503 -0.503 
 -2.25* -2.25*   -1.69 -1.69 
Child's birth85-
86 -0.367 -0.367 -0.332 -0.332 
 -2.71** -2.73**  -2.43* -2.44*   
Child's birth87-
88 -0.543 -0.543 -0.521 -0.521 
 -1.91 -1.91 -1.83 -1.84 
Missing birth 
year 0.924 0.924 1.094 1.094 
 2.54* 2.54*   2.95** 2.96**  
Non-Akan -0.229 -0.229 -0.27 -0.27 
 -1.76 -1.77 -1.92 -1.93 
Muslim   -0.077 -0.077 
   -0.4 -0.4 
Traditional   -0.077 -0.077 
   -0.29 -0.29 
Other   0.274 0.274 
   1.04 1.05 
HAS- Basic   0.231 0.231 
   3.86*** 3.90*** 
HAS- High   0.053 0.053 
   0.9 0.9 
Water distance   -1.09E-04 -1.09E-04 
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B-16b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 1. 
Urban Tm Model 1  Model 2  
 A B A B 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
2 -1.334 -1.334 -1.336 -1.336 
 -2.07* -2.07*   -2.07* -2.09*   
3_4 -2.394 -2.394 -2.397 -2.397 
 -3.13** -3.14**  -3.14** -3.16**  
5 -2.372 -2.372 -2.376 -2.376 
 -2.28* -2.28*   -2.28* -2.29*   
6 -1.647 -1.647 -1.645 -1.645 
 -2.16* -2.15*   -2.15* -2.17*   
7 -0.691 -0.691 -0.687 -0.687 
 -1.3 -1.3 -1.29 -1.31 
8 -0.18 -0.18 -0.169 -0.169 
 -0.39 -0.39 -0.37 -0.38 
9 0.361 0.361 0.377 0.377 
 0.9 0.9 0.94 0.96 
10 -0.179 -0.179 -0.145 -0.145 
 -0.38 -0.38 -0.3 -0.31 
11 -1.391 -1.391 -1.355 -1.355 
 -1.82 -1.82 -1.77 -1.78 
12 1.859 1.859 1.913 1.913 
 5.65*** 5.68*** 5.79*** 6.01*** 
13 0.157 0.157 0.232 0.232 
 0.33 0.33 0.48 0.49 
14 1.5 1.5 1.581 1.581 
 4.18*** 4.20*** 4.39*** 4.53*** 
15 1.274 1.274 1.373 1.373 
 3.28** 3.29*** 3.52*** 3.62*** 
16 0.851 0.851 0.966 0.966 
 1.9 1.91 2.15* 2.19*   
17 -0.192 -0.192 -0.08 -0.08 
 -0.3 -0.3 -0.12 -0.12 
18 3.414 3.414 3.524 3.524 
 10.55*** 10.62*** 10.81*** 11.28*** 
19 1.205 1.205 1.326 1.326 
 2.24* 2.24*   2.45* 2.49*   
20 2.239 2.239 2.36 2.36 
 5.36*** 5.38*** 5.62*** 5.77*** 
21_22 -0.11 -0.11 0.019 0.019 
 -0.14 -0.14 0.02 0.02 
23_24 2.874 2.874 3.013 3.013 
 8.13*** 8.18*** 8.45*** 8.75*** 
25plus 0.042 0.042 0.32 0.32 
 0.07 0.07 0.54 0.55 
Constant -3.61 -3.61 -3.72 -3.72 
 -10.35*** -10.54*** -10.37*** -11.18*** 
ln_varg (cons) -12.552  -12.866 
  -0.03  -0.02 
N_spell  473  473 
gammav  0.000  0.000 
se_gammav  0.001  0.002 
ll_nofr  -830.728  -821.293 
lltest  0.000  0.000 
lltest_p  0.5  0.5 
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N 6264 6264 6264 6264 
N_clust     
ll -830.728 -830.728 -821.293 -821.293 
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B-17a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1987/88 
Age 15-34 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.367 0.361 0.346 0.309 0.329 0.23 
 2.56* 2.05*   2.38* 1.7 2.23* 1.16 
Middle/JSS 0.515 0.617 0.408 0.466 0.392 0.424 
 4.69*** 4.44*** 3.51*** 3.20**  3.30*** 2.70**  
Sec.& above 1.509 1.574 1.181 1.187 1.127 1.089 
 6.16*** 5.44*** 4.44*** 3.76*** 4.20*** 3.24**  
Age25-34 -0.143 -0.162 -0.176 -0.215 -0.204 -0.262 
 -1.46 -1.35 -1.78 -1.73 -2.04* -1.95 
Rural -0.524 -0.702 -0.358 -0.52 -0.241 -0.483 
 -5.47*** -5.30*** -3.11** -3.35*** -1.56 -2.18*   
Female child -0.159 -0.169 -0.158 -0.167 -0.172 -0.18 
 -1.69 -1.48 -1.67 -1.44 -1.79 -1.45 
Northern Region -0.841 -1.106 -0.698 -0.899 -0.691 -0.918 
 -4.99*** -4.82*** -3.82*** -3.80*** -3.29*** -3.25**  
Child's birth85-86 -0.266 -0.403 -0.241 -0.371 -0.246 -0.422 
 -2.54* -2.91**  -2.30* -2.64**  -2.30* -2.75**  
Child's birth87-88 -0.595 -0.724 -0.555 -0.692 -0.544 -0.724 
 -2.67** -2.97**  -2.49* -2.81**  -2.44* -2.84**  
Missing birth year 0.397 0.437 0.454 0.493 0.467 0.524 
 1.74 1.54 1.97* 1.7 2.01* 1.68 
Muslim   -0.263 -0.388 -0.278 -0.459 
   -1.76 -2.02*   -1.85 -2.22*   
Traditional   -0.263 -0.376 -0.252 -0.399 
   -1.8 -2.01*   -1.72 -1.98*   
Other   0.097 0.215 0.096 0.286 
   0.54 0.89 0.53 1.06 
Non-Akan   0.009 -0.023 0.006 -0.029 
   0.09 -0.18 0.06 -0.21 
HAS- Basic   0.207 0.226 0.191 0.226 
   3.47*** 2.94**  3.13** 2.72**  
HAS- High   0.043 0.038 0.048 0.043 
   0.74 0.56 0.83 0.6 
Water distance     -9.35E-06 -1.29E-05 
     -1.03 -1.29 
Market distance    -4.14E-04 -0.006 
     -0.06 -0.65 
Access to Health facilities/personnel   -0.089 -0.17 
     -1.13 -1.69 
Price score of foodstuffs    0.068 0.127 
     0.89 1.28 
Price score of cereals    0.017 0.034 
     0.23 0.36 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage   0.002 0.032 
     0.05 0.64 
Ratio of female to men's wage   -0.173 -0.096 
     -1.06 -0.44 
Ratio of child to men's wage   -0.153 -0.319 
     -0.78 -1.22 
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B-17b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 1. 
Age 15-34 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














2 -1.542 -1.538 -1.543 -1.539 -1.543 -1.535 
 -3.45*** -3.44*** -3.45*** -3.44*** -3.45*** -3.43*** 
3_4 -2.603 -2.595 -2.603 -2.595 -2.603 -2.59 
 -4.89*** -4.87*** -4.89*** -4.87*** -4.89*** -4.86*** 
5 -2.576 -2.568 -2.575 -2.567 -2.575 -2.561 
 -3.53*** -3.52*** -3.53*** -3.51*** -3.53*** -3.51*** 
6 -2.145 -2.136 -2.141 -2.131 -2.14 -2.123 
 -3.54*** -3.52*** -3.53*** -3.52*** -3.53*** -3.50*** 
7 -1.415 -1.402 -1.41 -1.395 -1.408 -1.385 
 -3.16** -3.13**  -3.15** -3.11**  -3.14** -3.09**  
8 -0.766 -0.746 -0.76 -0.737 -0.757 -0.723 
 -2.17* -2.11*   -2.15* -2.08*   -2.14* -2.04*   
9 -0.55 -0.517 -0.541 -0.502 -0.538 -0.483 
 -1.65 -1.55 -1.62 -1.5 -1.61 -1.44 
10 -0.483 -0.436 -0.464 -0.408 -0.46 -0.38 
 -1.45 -1.3 -1.39 -1.22 -1.38 -1.13 
11 -2.322 -2.269 -2.301 -2.239 -2.296 -2.206 
 -3.17** -3.10**  -3.15** -3.06**  -3.14** -3.01**  
12 1.358 1.447 1.392 1.496 1.396 1.548 
 6.13*** 6.40*** 6.26*** 6.54*** 6.28*** 6.68*** 
13 -0.977 -0.85 -0.926 -0.779 -0.922 -0.709 
 -2.17* -1.87 -2.06* -1.71 -2.05* -1.55 
14 0.472 0.617 0.522 0.689 0.526 0.766 
 1.7 2.15*   1.87 2.38*   1.89 2.60**  
15 0.634 0.806 0.688 0.885 0.695 0.977 
 2.30* 2.81**  2.49* 3.03**  2.51* 3.28**  
16 0.323 0.52 0.386 0.611 0.394 0.717 
 1.03 1.59 1.22 1.84 1.25 2.11*   
17 -0.591 -0.379 -0.526 -0.284 -0.519 -0.171 
 -1.31 -0.82 -1.16 -0.61 -1.15 -0.36 
18 2.763 3.08 2.828 3.184 2.836 3.347 
 13.04*** 12.05*** 13.26*** 11.88*** 13.28*** 11.58*** 
19 0.4 0.816 0.471 0.931 0.486 1.141 
 0.99 1.84 1.17 2.06*   1.2 2.41*   
20 1.263 1.709 1.336 1.828 1.351 2.047 
 4.07*** 4.65*** 4.29*** 4.80*** 4.34*** 5.05*** 
21 -0.788 -0.319 -0.712 -0.196 -0.695 0.032 
 -1.08 -0.42 -0.97 -0.25 -0.95 0.04 
22 0.163 0.641 0.24 0.764 0.256 0.995 
 0.33 1.21 0.49 1.41 0.52 1.78 
23 -0.704 -0.219 -0.625 -0.094 -0.609 0.14 
 -0.96 -0.29 -0.85 -0.12 -0.83 0.18 
24 3.668 4.343 3.758 4.482 3.785 4.804 
 16.35*** 11.78*** 16.60*** 11.42*** 16.66*** 10.81*** 
25 0.678 1.557 0.772 1.709 0.806 2.109 
 0.92 1.89 1.05 2.03*   1.1 2.40*   
26 0.025 0.921 0.114 1.068 0.152 1.481 
 0.02 0.85 0.11 0.97 0.15 1.31 
27 0.055 0.96 0.141 1.105 0.18 1.522 
 0.05 0.88 0.14 1 0.18 1.34 
28 0.818 1.749 0.902 1.891 0.939 2.317 
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 1.11 2.10*   1.23 2.22*   1.28 2.59**  
29 0.214 1.169 0.308 1.315 0.341 1.75 
 0.21 1.07 0.3 1.18 0.33 1.53 
30 2.406 3.434 2.524 3.592 2.56 4.058 
 5.62*** 5.61*** 5.87*** 5.64*** 5.94*** 5.76*** 
31plus 0.41 1.833 0.583 2.02 0.678 2.63 
 1.05 2.64**  1.48 2.79**  1.71 3.28**  
Constant -3.141 -2.999 -3.164 -2.975 -3.101 -2.845 
 -13.32*** -11.31*** -12.49*** -10.12*** -12.16*** -9.20*** 
ln_varg (cons) -0.954  -0.885  -0.544 
  -2.14*    -1.96  -1.44 
N_spell  1064  1064  1064 
gammav  0.385  0.413  0.58 
se_gammav  0.172  0.187  0.219 
ll_nofr  -1.50E+03  -1.50E+03  -1.50E+03 
lltest  7.546  6.883  9.11 
lltest_p  0.003  0.004  0.001 
       
N 1.40E+04 1.40E+04 1.40E+04 1.40E+04 1.40E+04 1.40E+04 
N_clust       
ll -1.50E+03 -1.50E+03 -1.50E+03 -1.50E+03 -1.50E+03 -1.50E+03 
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B-18a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1987/88 
Age 35-49 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 A B A A 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Primary 0.037 0.023 0.066 0.163 
 0.15 0.04 0.26 0.62 
Middle/JSS 0.373 0.358 0.526 0.574 
 1.99* 0.78 2.55* 2.73**  
Sec.& above 0.185 0.168 0.197 -0.015 
 0.46 0.24 0.44 -0.03 
Age -0.374 -0.409 -0.194 -0.138 
 -0.98 -22.80*** -0.49 -0.34 
Age sq. 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 
 1.04 14.10*** 0.57 0.42 
Rural -0.359 -0.371 -0.261 -0.225 
 -2.16* -0.44 -1.32 -0.87 
Female child -0.169 n.a -0.132 -0.17 
 -1.15  -0.87 -1.06 
Northern Region -0.401 -0.377 -0.14 -0.142 
 -1.97* -0.68 -0.62 -0.51 
Child's birth85-86 -0.394 -0.393 -0.364 -0.313 
 -2.52* -2.24*   -2.26* -1.91 
Child's birth87-88 -1.378 -1.377 -1.406 -1.4 
 -2.64** -2.49*   -2.67** -2.64**  
Missing birth year 0.111 0.161 0.001 -0.009 
 0.41 0.21 0 -0.03 
Muslim   0.086 0.1 
   0.36 0.41 
Traditional   0.271 0.277 
   1.3 1.29 
Other   0.653 0.701 
   1.8 1.89 
Non-Akan   -0.433 -0.494 
   -2.49* -2.58**  
HAS- Basic   0.288 0.327 
   2.29* 2.57*   
HAS- High   -0.236 -0.377 
   -0.34 -0.51 
Water distance    0 
    0.84 
Market distance   -0.003 
    -0.39 
Access to Health facilities/personnel  0.13 
    1.3 
Price score of foodstuffs   0.078 
    0.67 
Price score of cereals   -0.103 
    -0.87 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage  0.047 
    0.94 
Ratio of female to men's wage  -0.402 
    -1.61 
Ratio of child to men's wage  -0.016 
    -0.05 
 
  486 
B-18b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 1. 
Age 35-49 Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 
 A B A A 
Months Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
2_6 -3.639 -3.639 -3.64 -3.64 
 -4.85*** -2.57*   -4.85*** -4.85*** 
7 -1.587 -1.586 -1.585 -1.584 
 -2.52* -1.83 -2.52* -2.52*   
8 -0.581 -0.581 -0.573 -0.573 
 -1.34 -0.38 -1.32 -1.32 
9 -1.927 -1.93 -1.911 -1.913 
 -2.57* -1.58 -2.55* -2.55*   
10 -1.906 -1.907 -1.887 -1.887 
 -2.54* -0.8 -2.51* -2.51*   
11 -2.584 -2.585 -2.565 -2.562 
 -2.51* -1.41 -2.49* -2.48*   
12 0.672 0.671 0.701 0.708 
 2.07* 0.28 2.15* 2.17*   
13 -1.304 -1.305 -1.267 -1.256 
 -2.07* -0.52 -2.01* -1.99*   
14 0.511 0.507 0.563 0.582 
 1.45 0.2 1.6 1.65 
15 -0.847 -0.851 -0.782 -0.753 
 -1.51 -0.35 -1.39 -1.34 
16 -1.509 -1.512 -1.448 -1.417 
 -2.01* -0.55 -1.92 -1.88 
17_18 1.122 1.121 1.201 1.234 
 3.84*** 0.44 4.07*** 4.18*** 
19 -0.288 -0.285 -0.139 -0.092 
 -0.51 -0.1 -0.25 -0.16 
20 0.481 0.484 0.621 0.669 
 1.1 0.19 1.41 1.52 
21_22 -2.227 -2.224 -2.095 -2.046 
 -2.16* -0.81 -2.03* -1.98*   
23_24 1.778 1.778 1.906 1.953 
 5.95*** 0.68 6.29*** 6.42*** 
25plus 0.227 0.228 0.402 0.413 
 0.58 0.09 1.01 1.03 
Constant 4.703 5.338 0.869 -0.296 
 0.61 5.57*** 0.11 -0.04 
ln_varg (cons) -16.275   
  -0.01   
N_spell  346   
gammav  0   
se_gammav  0   
ll_nofr  -654.159   
lltest  -0.007   
lltest_p  0.5   
     
ll -654.159 -654.163   
chi2 400.299    
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B-19a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1998/99 
Full Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.218 0.323 0.128 0.174 0.124 0.162 
 2.62** 2.92**  1.5 1.56 1.44 1.44 
Middle/JSS 0.374 0.431 0.227 0.213 0.231 0.209 
 5.17*** 4.62*** 2.97**  2.14*   3.00** 2.07*   
Sec.& above 0.92 1.268 0.592 0.853 0.579 0.84 
 6.89*** 7.22*** 4.05*** 4.59*** 3.95*** 4.47*** 
Age25-34 0.178 0.234 0.111 0.151 0.127 0.165 
 2.10*  2.17*   1.29 1.39 1.47 1.51 
Age35-49 0.134 0.212 0.088 0.162 0.091 0.164 
 1.51 1.87 0.97 1.41 1.01 1.41 
Rural -0.452 -0.659 -0.167 -0.281 -0.188 -0.381 
 -7.11*** -7.29*** -2.12*   -2.78**  -1.33 -2.10*   
Female child -0.015 -0.054 -0.006 -0.066 0.015 -0.052 
 -0.27 -0.74 -0.11 -0.9 0.26 -0.71 
Northern Region -0.678 -0.996 -0.416 -0.648 -0.462 -0.708 
 -8.04*** -7.78*** -4.26*** -4.86*** -4.58*** -5.11*** 
Child's birth95-96 -0.194 -0.211 -0.17 -0.233 -0.2 -0.268 
 -2.32*  -1.92 -2.01*   -2.09*   -2.35* -2.37*   
Child's birth97-99 -0.76 -0.795 -0.759 -0.81 -0.771 -0.825 
 -5.10*** -4.69*** -5.08*** -4.75*** -5.15*** -4.81*** 
Missing birth year -0.081 -0.017 -0.088 -0.04 -0.123 -0.088 
 -1.03 -0.16 -1.1 -0.38 -1.54 -0.82 
Muslim   -0.038 -0.035 -0.034 -0.026 
   -0.39 -0.28 -0.35 -0.2 
Traditional   -0.196 -0.305 -0.153 -0.255 
   -1.54 -1.88 -1.19 -1.55 
Other   -0.027 -0.042 -0.017 -0.034 
   -0.19 -0.23 -0.12 -0.18 
Non-Akan   -0.215 -0.292 -0.221 -0.292 
   -3.19**  -3.33*** -3.23** -3.28**  
HAS- Basic   0.251 0.343 0.264 0.373 
   6.20*** 6.64*** 6.22*** 6.76*** 
HAS- High   -0.11 -0.147 -0.115 -0.156 
   -3.22**  -3.36*** -3.27** -3.47*** 
Water distance     2.24E-06 2.61E-06 
     1.79 1.72 
Market distance    0.003 0.004 
     2.58** 2.75**  
Access to Health facilities/personnel   -0.082 -0.075 
     -0.77 -0.61 
Price score of cereals    0.082 0.11 
     3.18** 3.29*** 
Price score of foodstuffs    0 -0.032 
     -0.01 -0.65 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage   0.014 0.025 
     0.76 1.05 
Ratio of female to men's wage   -0.223 -0.245 
     -2.30* -2.01*   
Ratio of child to men's wage   0.028 0.023 
     0.3 0.19 
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B-19b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 4. 
Full Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














2 -1.484 -1.482 -1.484 -1.482 -1.485 -1.483 
 -3.56*** -3.55*** -3.56*** -3.55*** -3.56*** -3.55*** 
3 -0.767 -0.762 -0.768 -0.762 -0.769 -0.764 
 -2.39*  -2.38*   -2.40*   -2.38*   -2.40* -2.38*   
4 -1.083 -1.074 -1.082 -1.071 -1.079 -1.063 
 -2.99** -2.96**  -2.99**  -2.96**  -2.98** -2.93**  
5 -1.98 -1.969 -1.979 -1.966 -1.972 -1.948 
 -3.73*** -3.71*** -3.73*** -3.71*** -3.72*** -3.67*** 
6 -1.399 -1.388 -1.397 -1.383 -1.391 -1.366 
 -3.35*** -3.33*** -3.35*** -3.31*** -3.33*** -3.27**  
7 -3.326 -3.314 -3.324 -3.308 -3.317 -3.291 
 -3.28** -3.26**  -3.27**  -3.26**  -3.27** -3.24**  
8 -0.809 -0.794 -0.805 -0.785 -0.799 -0.768 
 -2.39*  -2.34*   -2.38*   -2.32*   -2.36* -2.27*   
9 -0.621 -0.598 -0.615 -0.584 -0.608 -0.567 
 -1.94 -1.86 -1.92 -1.82 -1.9 -1.77 
10 -1.032 -1.004 -1.026 -0.99 -1.018 -0.969 
 -2.73** -2.66**  -2.72**  -2.62**  -2.70** -2.56*   
11 -1.417 -1.387 -1.412 -1.372 -1.403 -1.351 
 -3.19** -3.11**  -3.17**  -3.08**  -3.15** -3.03**  
12 1.545 1.602 1.551 1.618 1.561 1.642 
 7.67*** 7.92*** 7.70*** 7.99*** 7.74*** 8.08*** 
13 -0.432 -0.348 -0.425 -0.33 -0.414 -0.302 
 -1.35 -1.08 -1.32 -1.02 -1.29 -0.94 
14 0.634 0.729 0.644 0.753 0.654 0.782 
 2.65** 3.03**  2.69**  3.13**  2.73** 3.23**  
15 0.776 0.892 0.789 0.923 0.799 0.952 
 3.30*** 3.76*** 3.35*** 3.88*** 3.39*** 3.99*** 
16 0.393 0.53 0.407 0.563 0.417 0.594 
 1.5 2.01*   1.55 2.13*   1.59 2.23*   
17 -0.372 -0.221 -0.358 -0.189 -0.347 -0.157 
 -1.1 -0.65 -1.06 -0.55 -1.02 -0.46 
18 2.882 3.112 2.909 3.167 2.925 3.208 
 15.26*** 15.80*** 15.39*** 16.06*** 15.47*** 16.13*** 
19 0.397 0.702 0.441 0.782 0.464 0.835 
 1.32 2.27*   1.46 2.53*   1.54 2.68**  
20 1.436 1.764 1.485 1.851 1.508 1.904 
 6.17*** 7.20*** 6.38*** 7.56*** 6.47*** 7.72*** 
21 -0.499 -0.152 -0.449 -0.062 -0.426 -0.008 
 -1.12 -0.34 -1.01 -0.14 -0.96 -0.02 
22 0.695 1.054 0.749 1.148 0.778 1.206 
 2.39*  3.48*** 2.57*   3.79*** 2.67** 3.97*** 
23 -0.127 0.242 -0.074 0.336 -0.045 0.395 
 -0.32 0.6 -0.19 0.83 -0.11 0.97 
24 4.332 4.948 4.402 5.071 4.44 5.15 
 23.17*** 21.19*** 23.49*** 21.98*** 23.65*** 21.96*** 
25 1.07 1.899 1.146 2.035 1.189 2.125 
 2.70** 4.34*** 2.89**  4.69*** 3.00** 4.87*** 
26 2.576 3.448 2.649 3.583 2.692 3.674 
 10.21*** 10.84*** 10.49*** 11.47*** 10.65*** 11.61*** 
27 1.322 2.239 1.396 2.376 1.441 2.469 
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 3.33*** 5.02*** 3.52*** 5.38*** 3.63*** 5.56*** 
28 2.704 3.667 2.773 3.802 2.82 3.899 
 10.36*** 10.86*** 10.62*** 11.49*** 10.78*** 11.64*** 
29 -0.527 0.472 -0.457 0.605 -0.407 0.704 
 -0.52 0.45 -0.45 0.58 -0.4 0.68 
30 3.657 4.742 3.751 4.884 3.803 4.984 
 15.68*** 14.08*** 16.02*** 14.98*** 16.21*** 15.06*** 
31 plus 2.46 3.758 2.533 3.898 2.59 4.004 
 11.13*** 10.50*** 11.45*** 11.32*** 11.66*** 11.45*** 
Constant -4.044 -4.049 -4.037 -4.015 -4.06 -4.044 
 -18.96*** -17.19*** -18.42*** -16.41*** -18.39*** -16.35*** 
ln_varg (cons) -0.882  -0.88  -0.842 
  -3.76***  -4.13***  -4.02*** 
N_spell  2454  2454  2454 
gammav  0.414  0.415  0.431 
se_gammav  0.097  0.088  0.09 
ll_nofr  -3.70E+03  -3.60E+03  -3.60E+03 
lltest  29.745  39.711  41.322 
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B-20a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1998/99 
Rural Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.236 0.272 0.152 0.155 0.147 0.141 
 2.33* 2.27*   1.45 1.24 1.39 1.12 
Middle/JSS 0.423 0.465 0.295 0.29 0.288 0.277 
 4.65*** 4.36*** 3.11** 2.57*   2.99** 2.42*   
Sec.& above 1.598 1.675 1.098 1.193 1.035 1.148 
 6.80*** 6.39*** 4.24*** 4.05*** 3.95*** 3.85*** 
Age25-34 0.171 0.227 0.135 0.199 0.162 0.222 
 1.61 1.86 1.26 1.59 1.51 1.77 
Age35-49 0.195 0.235 0.196 0.241 0.2 0.243 
 1.78 1.87 1.78 1.85 1.8 1.85 
Female child -0.09 -0.112 -0.106 -0.146 -0.082 -0.127 
 -1.28 -1.38 -1.51 -1.75 -1.16 -1.51 
Northern Region -0.724 -0.886 -0.439 -0.57 -0.497 -0.625 
 -7.48*** -6.51*** -3.74*** -3.96*** -4.06*** -4.19*** 
Child's birth95-96 -0.199 -0.212 -0.213 -0.227 -0.266 -0.281 
 -1.89 -1.72 -1.99* -1.78 -2.46* -2.18*   
Child's birth97-99 -0.891 -0.923 -0.885 -0.919 -0.899 -0.935 
 -4.31*** -4.24*** -4.27*** -4.16*** -4.33*** -4.22*** 
Missing birth year 0 0.024 -0.041 -4.19E-04 -0.098 -0.07 
 0 0.21 -0.41 0 -0.97 -0.57 
Muslim   0.005 0.004 0.01 0.011 
   0.04 0.03 0.07 0.07 
Traditional   -0.154 -0.214 -0.094 -0.152 
   -1.11 -1.32 -0.67 -0.93 
Other   0.073 0.068 0.081 0.071 
   0.42 0.34 0.47 0.35 
Non-Akan   -0.27 -0.354 -0.29 -0.36 
   -3.14** -3.39*** -3.30*** -3.43*** 
HAS- Basic   0.291 0.328 0.334 0.388 
   5.06*** 4.87*** 5.31*** 5.21*** 
HAS- High   -0.124 -0.163 -0.136 -0.176 
   -2.98** -3.26**  -3.18** -3.42*** 
Water distance     2.46E-06 2.63E-06 
     1.91 1.81 
Market distance    0.003 0.004 
     2.67** 2.76**  
Access to Health facilities/personnel   -0.09 -0.083 
     -0.81 -0.71 
Price score of cereals    0.082 0.095 
     3.17** 3.04**  
Price score of foodstuffs    0.006 -0.017 
     0.16 -0.38 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage   0.028 0.038 
     1.3 1.5 
Ratio of female to men's wage   -0.258 -0.259 
     -2.55* -2.23*   
Ratio of child to men's wage   0.038 0.028 
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B-20b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 4. 
Rural Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














2 -2.405 -2.405 -2.406 -2.405 -2.406 -2.406 
 -3.26** -3.26**  -3.26** -3.26**  -3.26** -3.26**  
3 -0.998 -0.998 -0.999 -0.998 -1 -0.999 
 -2.43* -2.43*   -2.43* -2.43*   -2.44* -2.43*   
4 -1.269 -1.267 -1.266 -1.262 -1.258 -1.25 
 -2.77** -2.76**  -2.76** -2.75**  -2.74** -2.73**  
5 -2.349 -2.347 -2.345 -2.339 -2.329 -2.313 
 -3.19** -3.18**  -3.18** -3.17**  -3.16** -3.14**  
6 -2.331 -2.329 -2.325 -2.319 -2.309 -2.293 
 -3.16** -3.16**  -3.15** -3.15**  -3.13** -3.11**  
7 -3.007 -3.005 -3 -2.994 -2.984 -2.968 
 -2.94** -2.94**  -2.94** -2.93**  -2.92** -2.91**  
8 -2.984 -2.982 -2.976 -2.97 -2.961 -2.946 
 -2.92** -2.92**  -2.91** -2.91**  -2.90** -2.88**  
9 -1.571 -1.569 -1.559 -1.552 -1.545 -1.528 
 -2.90** -2.89**  -2.88** -2.86**  -2.85** -2.82**  
10 -1.547 -1.543 -1.536 -1.526 -1.517 -1.497 
 -2.85** -2.85**  -2.83** -2.82**  -2.80** -2.76**  
11 -2.223 -2.219 -2.212 -2.2 -2.193 -2.17 
 -3.01** -3.01**  -3.00** -2.98**  -2.97** -2.94**  
12 1.266 1.278 1.276 1.298 1.297 1.332 
 5.17*** 5.22*** 5.21*** 5.29*** 5.29*** 5.40*** 
13 -0.722 -0.702 -0.713 -0.68 -0.69 -0.643 
 -1.76 -1.71 -1.73 -1.65 -1.68 -1.56 
14 0.227 0.25 0.238 0.276 0.261 0.313 
 0.74 0.81 0.78 0.9 0.85 1.01 
15 0.23 0.259 0.243 0.289 0.267 0.327 
 0.74 0.83 0.78 0.93 0.86 1.04 
16 -0.021 0.014 -0.011 0.042 0.013 0.08 
 -0.06 0.04 -0.03 0.12 0.04 0.23 
17 -0.834 -0.797 -0.826 -0.768 -0.8 -0.729 
 -1.82 -1.73 -1.8 -1.67 -1.74 -1.58 
18 2.564 2.628 2.589 2.686 2.622 2.733 
 11.36*** 11.50*** 11.46*** 11.71*** 11.59*** 11.79*** 
19 0.008 0.099 0.051 0.185 0.096 0.245 
 0.02 0.26 0.13 0.48 0.25 0.63 
20 1.232 1.332 1.282 1.43 1.326 1.489 
 4.47*** 4.74*** 4.65*** 5.07*** 4.80*** 5.23*** 
21 -1.466 -1.359 -1.411 -1.252 -1.365 -1.193 
 -1.99* -1.84 -1.91 -1.69 -1.85 -1.61 
22 0.277 0.388 0.335 0.498 0.39 0.564 
 0.75 1.04 0.91 1.33 1.06 1.5 
23 -0.293 -0.178 -0.236 -0.067 -0.18 0 
 -0.64 -0.38 -0.51 -0.14 -0.39 0 
24 4.148 4.374 4.239 4.551 4.31 4.631 
 18.81*** 17.43*** 19.14*** 18.13*** 19.37*** 18.06*** 
25 1.132 1.461 1.238 1.681 1.32 1.768 
 2.74** 3.27**  3.00** 3.78*** 3.19** 3.94*** 
26 2.537 2.887 2.638 3.11 2.719 3.195 
 8.90*** 8.54*** 9.23*** 9.30*** 9.48*** 9.39*** 
27 1.153 1.526 1.256 1.758 1.342 1.845 
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 2.50* 3.05**  2.72** 3.54*** 2.91** 3.69*** 
28 2.681 3.077 2.79 3.316 2.88 3.407 
 9.07*** 8.56*** 9.42*** 9.37*** 9.68*** 9.47*** 
29 -0.386 0.029 -0.283 0.269 -0.189 0.362 
 -0.38 0.03 -0.28 0.26 -0.18 0.35 
30 3.34 3.798 3.448 4.05 3.54 4.139 
 11.92*** 10.36*** 12.27*** 11.33*** 12.54*** 11.37*** 
31 plus 2.356 2.959 2.425 3.231 2.515 3.317 
 9.29*** 7.64*** 9.53*** 8.70*** 9.82*** 8.73*** 
Constant -4.275 -4.318 -3.955 -3.946 -4.083 -4.149 
 -17.08*** -16.39*** -15.44*** -14.42*** -13.75*** -12.74*** 
ln_varg (cons) -1.571  -1.353  -1.358 
  -3.01**   -3.58***  -3.48*** 
N_spell  1750  1750  1750 
gammav  0.208  0.259  0.257 
se_gammav  0.109  0.098  0.1 
ll_nofr  -2.40E+03  -2.40E+03  -2.30E+03 
lltest  4.754  10.75  9.913 
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B-21a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1998/99 
Urban Model 1  Model 2  
 A B A B 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Primary 0.205 0.382 0.106 0.21 
 1.39 1.75 0.7 0.97 
Middle/JSS 0.301 0.329 0.128 0.041 
 2.44* 2.04*   0.96 0.21 
Sec.& above 0.718 1.043 0.415 0.616 
 4.25*** 3.96*** 2.22* 2.38*   
Age35-49 -0.068 -0.039 -0.095 -0.065 
 -0.64 -0.28 -0.87 -0.44 
Female child 0.09 0.086 0.142 0.113 
 0.9 0.66 1.39 0.83 
Northern Region -0.649 -1.016 -0.516 -0.881 
 -3.58*** -3.09**  -2.51* -2.56*   
Child's birth95-96 -0.147 -0.169 -0.095 -0.212 
 -1.07 -0.91 -0.67 -1.05 
Child's birth97-99 -0.503 -0.554 -0.503 -0.65 
 -2.29* -2.11*   -2.28* -2.35*   
Missing birth year -0.164 -0.114 -0.14 -0.121 
 -1.21 -0.62 -1.02 -0.63 
Muslim   -0.138 -0.308 
   -0.9 -1.3 
Traditional   -0.464 -0.503 
   -0.98 -0.81 
Other   -0.236 -0.413 
   -0.84 -1.06 
Non-Akan   -0.096 -0.082 
   -0.84 -0.52 
HAS- Basic   0.23 0.349 
   3.90*** 3.89*** 
HAS- High   -0.078 -0.118 
   -1.2 -1.36 
Water distance   1.18E-04 1.83E-04 
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B-21b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 4. 
Urban Model 1  Model 2  
Time A B A B 
(Months) Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
2 -0.556 -0.552 -0.557 -0.552 
 -1 -0.99 -1 -0.99 
3 -0.346 -0.337 -0.349 -0.34 
 -0.66 -0.64 -0.66 -0.64 
4 -0.726 -0.712 -0.73 -0.715 
 -1.21 -1.18 -1.21 -1.19 
5 -1.398 -1.382 -1.403 -1.385 
 -1.79 -1.77 -1.79 -1.77 
6 -0.456 -0.439 -0.46 -0.441 
 -0.82 -0.79 -0.83 -0.79 
7_8 -0.315 -0.293 -0.318 -0.293 
 -0.7 -0.65 -0.71 -0.65 
9 0.35 0.388 0.351 0.399 
 0.76 0.84 0.76 0.87 
10 -0.304 -0.259 -0.302 -0.244 
 -0.54 -0.46 -0.54 -0.44 
11 -0.501 -0.452 -0.5 -0.437 
 -0.83 -0.75 -0.83 -0.72 
12 2.037 2.119 2.04 2.147 
 5.59*** 5.75*** 5.60*** 5.82*** 
13 0.08 0.197 0.086 0.237 
 0.15 0.37 0.16 0.45 
14 1.286 1.421 1.296 1.472 
 3.17** 3.43*** 3.19** 3.55*** 
15 1.565 1.733 1.579 1.799 
 3.97*** 4.24*** 4.01*** 4.41*** 
16 1.063 1.263 1.082 1.341 
 2.45* 2.79**  2.49* 2.97**  
17 0.361 0.579 0.38 0.661 
 0.68 1.06 0.72 1.21 
18 3.465 3.797 3.5 3.926 
 9.91*** 9.37*** 10.00*** 9.80*** 
19 1.111 1.557 1.166 1.735 
 2.20* 2.71**  2.31* 3.06**  
20 1.811 2.289 1.868 2.476 
 4.16*** 4.37*** 4.28*** 4.81*** 
21 0.726 1.231 0.787 1.431 
 1.2 1.82 1.31 2.14*   
22 1.464 1.99 1.53 2.199 
 3.00** 3.41*** 3.13** 3.84*** 
23 0.134 0.676 0.2 0.888 
 0.17 0.8 0.26 1.05 
24 4.62 5.482 4.693 5.778 
 13.03*** 8.62*** 13.22*** 9.51*** 
25_26 1.531 2.67 1.606 3.027 
 2.54* 2.92**  2.66** 3.46*** 
27 1.621 2.813 1.698 3.179 
 2.07* 2.64**  2.17* 3.10**  
28 2.424 3.654 2.474 4.012 
 4.02*** 3.80*** 4.10*** 4.37*** 
29_30 3.368 4.658 3.442 5.035 
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 8.00*** 5.23*** 8.16*** 6.04*** 
31 plus 2.259 3.792 2.375 4.243 
 4.46*** 3.53*** 4.66*** 4.24*** 
Constant -4.371 -4.469 -4.444 -4.513 
 -11.91*** -11.24*** -11.72*** -10.70*** 
ln_varg (cons) -0.796  -0.625 
  -1.3  -1.36 
N_spell  704  704 
gammav  0.451  0.535 
se_gammav  0.275  0.245 
ll_nofr  -1.30E+03  -1.20E+03 
lltest  3.033  6.829 
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B-22a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1998/99 
Age 15-34 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.303 0.425 0.18 0.246 0.194 0.262 
 2.98** 3.08**  1.71 1.81 1.83 1.91 
Middle/JSS 0.513 0.57 0.359 0.317 0.395 0.355 
 5.64*** 4.85*** 3.72*** 2.57*   4.05*** 2.84**  
Sec.& above 1.274 1.394 0.848 0.846 0.852 0.847 
 7.40*** 6.42*** 4.58*** 3.72*** 4.59*** 3.68*** 
Age25-34 0.179 0.238 0.092 0.135 0.108 0.151 
 2.10* 2.17*   1.06 1.25 1.24 1.38 
Rural -0.513 -0.72 -0.182 -0.272 -0.187 -0.341 
 -6.63*** -6.15*** -1.93 -2.22*   -1.06 -1.49 
Female child -0.075 -0.112 -0.053 -0.112 -0.026 -0.09 
 -1.04 -1.2 -0.73 -1.22 -0.36 -0.96 
Northern Region -0.627 -0.93 -0.392 -0.6 -0.428 -0.663 
 -5.79*** -5.55*** -3.16** -3.58*** -3.39*** -3.79*** 
Child's birth95-96 -0.129 -0.152 -0.09 -0.186 -0.12 -0.232 
 -1.2 -1.08 -0.83 -1.3 -1.1 -1.6 
Child's birth97-99 -0.632 -0.651 -0.596 -0.659 -0.612 -0.686 
 -3.65*** -3.22**  -3.42*** -3.27**  -3.50*** -3.36*** 
Missing birth year -0.006 0.021 0.046 0.033 0.007 -0.032 
 -0.06 0.15 0.43 0.24 0.06 -0.23 
Muslim   -0.135 -0.173 -0.134 -0.162 
   -1.11 -1.12 -1.09 -1.03 
Traditional   -0.147 -0.19 -0.096 -0.116 
   -0.85 -0.88 -0.55 -0.53 
Other   -0.192 -0.261 -0.196 -0.272 
   -1.04 -1.15 -1.05 -1.18 
Non-Akan   -0.13 -0.197 -0.141 -0.205 
   -1.53 -1.84 -1.63 -1.87 
HAS- Basic   0.334 0.418 0.359 0.457 
   6.72*** 6.50*** 6.88*** 6.71*** 
HAS- High   -0.127 -0.181 -0.139 -0.2 
   -2.93** -3.32*** -3.11** -3.53*** 
Water distance     2.08E-05 2.35E-05 
     0.77 0.79 
Market distance    0.004 0.005 
     2.98** 2.90**  
Access to Health facilities/personnel   -0.042 -0.043 
     -0.38 -0.34 
Price score of cereals    0.074 0.1 
     2.48* 2.53*   
Price score of foodstuffs    -3.04E-04 -0.026 
     -0.01 -0.48 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage   0.019 0.029 
     0.79 0.98 
Ratio of female to men's wage   -0.351 -0.42 
     -2.73** -2.64**  
Ratio of child to men's wage   0.111 0.137 
     0.91 0.9 
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B-22b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 4. 
Age 15-34 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














2 -1.464 -1.462 -1.465 -1.462 -1.465 -1.463 
 -2.65** -2.64**  -2.65** -2.64**  -2.65** -2.65**  
3 -1.032 -1.027 -1.033 -1.029 -1.034 -1.03 
 -2.19* -2.18*   -2.19* -2.18*   -2.19* -2.18*   
4 -1.192 -1.184 -1.19 -1.181 -1.188 -1.175 
 -2.36* -2.34*   -2.35* -2.34*   -2.35* -2.32*   
5 -1.685 -1.676 -1.683 -1.672 -1.678 -1.659 
 -2.70** -2.69**  -2.70** -2.68**  -2.69** -2.66**  
6 -1.146 -1.136 -1.143 -1.13 -1.138 -1.117 
 -2.27* -2.25*   -2.26* -2.24*   -2.25* -2.21*   
7 -2.733 -2.721 -2.729 -2.714 -2.723 -2.7 
 -2.66** -2.65**  -2.66** -2.64**  -2.65** -2.63**  
8 -0.494 -0.477 -0.486 -0.464 -0.481 -0.45 
 -1.21 -1.17 -1.19 -1.14 -1.18 -1.1 
9 -0.35 -0.325 -0.337 -0.304 -0.332 -0.291 
 -0.89 -0.82 -0.85 -0.77 -0.84 -0.74 
10 -0.535 -0.503 -0.519 -0.479 -0.512 -0.461 
 -1.26 -1.18 -1.22 -1.12 -1.2 -1.08 
11 -1.201 -1.165 -1.184 -1.139 -1.177 -1.121 
 -2.17* -2.11*   -2.14* -2.06*   -2.13* -2.02*   
12 1.726 1.785 1.746 1.817 1.755 1.84 
 6.52*** 6.71*** 6.59*** 6.82*** 6.62*** 6.88*** 
13 -0.36 -0.276 -0.336 -0.239 -0.325 -0.21 
 -0.85 -0.65 -0.79 -0.56 -0.76 -0.49 
14 0.902 0.998 0.932 1.042 0.941 1.072 
 2.96** 3.25**  3.05** 3.38*** 3.08** 3.47*** 
15 0.855 0.97 0.887 1.017 0.898 1.048 
 2.73** 3.07**  2.84** 3.21**  2.87** 3.30*** 
16 0.575 0.708 0.608 0.755 0.619 0.788 
 1.69 2.06*   1.79 2.20*   1.82 2.29*   
17 0.098 0.245 0.133 0.293 0.145 0.326 
 0.25 0.61 0.34 0.73 0.37 0.81 
18 3.159 3.394 3.211 3.459 3.229 3.504 
 12.65*** 12.92*** 12.84*** 13.16*** 12.91*** 13.19*** 
19 0.91 1.229 0.985 1.314 1.011 1.371 
 2.54* 3.29**  2.75** 3.52*** 2.82** 3.65*** 
20 1.716 2.059 1.8 2.153 1.823 2.209 
 5.68*** 6.37*** 5.94*** 6.69*** 6.02*** 6.79*** 
21 -1.565 -1.205 -1.482 -1.113 -1.457 -1.055 
 -1.52 -1.16 -1.44 -1.08 -1.42 -1.02 
22 1.118 1.489 1.203 1.582 1.236 1.647 
 3.12** 3.93*** 3.35*** 4.19*** 3.44*** 4.33*** 
23 -0.085 0.299 0.002 0.392 0.034 0.457 
 -0.15 0.53 0 0.69 0.06 0.8 
24 4.586 5.206 4.713 5.317 4.763 5.407 
 18.40*** 16.22*** 18.81*** 17.15*** 18.97*** 17.13*** 
25 1.37 2.187 1.514 2.298 1.579 2.403 
 2.70** 3.83*** 2.98** 4.11*** 3.10** 4.27*** 
26 3.215 4.089 3.351 4.188 3.424 4.3 
 10.42*** 9.81*** 10.82*** 10.55*** 11.04*** 10.68*** 
27 1.708 2.641 1.84 2.732 1.921 2.853 
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 3.36*** 4.48*** 3.62*** 4.77*** 3.77*** 4.94*** 
28 2.946 3.914 3.062 3.996 3.15 4.124 
 8.33*** 8.31*** 8.64*** 8.88*** 8.87*** 9.07*** 
29 0.306 1.313 0.423 1.392 0.512 1.523 
 0.3 1.22 0.41 1.3 0.5 1.42 
30 4.04 5.147 4.179 5.221 4.271 5.353 
 13.09*** 10.93*** 13.48*** 11.87*** 13.73*** 12.00*** 
31 plus 2.663 4.09 2.75 4.128 2.852 4.276 
 8.89*** 7.77*** 9.15*** 8.44*** 9.45*** 8.62*** 
Constant -4.373 -4.346 -4.452 -4.381 -4.515 -4.446 
 -15.85*** -14.41*** -15.63*** -14.11*** -15.73*** -14.18*** 
ln_varg (cons) -0.827  -0.929  -0.893 
  -2.53*    -3.02**   -2.96**  
N_spell  1695  1695  1695 
gammav  0.437  0.395  0.409 
se_gammav  0.143  0.121  0.123 
ll_nofr  -2.30E+03  -2.30E+03  -2.30E+03 
lltest  13.106  16.318  16.868 
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B-23a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, 1998/99 
Age 35-49 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.063 0.117 0.066 0.053 0.039 0.014 
 0.42 0.63 0.43 0.27 0.25 0.07 
Middle/JSS 0.156 0.173 0.071 0.029 0.033 -0.033 
 1.24 1.14 0.53 0.17 0.24 -0.19 
Sec.& above 0.506 0.876 0.447 0.837 0.419 0.821 
 2.27* 2.89**  1.79 2.58**  1.67 2.50*   
Age40-49 -0.18 -0.172 -0.16 -0.142 -0.16 -0.14 
 -1.86 -1.46 -1.64 -1.15 -1.63 -1.11 
Rural -0.396 -0.534 -0.161 -0.285 -0.228 -0.381 
 -3.45*** -3.63*** -1.1 -1.59 -0.91 -1.28 
Female child 0.085 0.077 0.059 0.063 0.073 0.075 
 0.9 0.68 0.62 0.52 0.75 0.61 
Northern Region -0.785 -1.027 -0.437 -0.646 -0.483 -0.707 
 -5.79*** -5.21*** -2.68** -2.96**  -2.77** -3.06**  
Child's birth95-96 -0.332 -0.348 -0.3 -0.335 -0.309 -0.344 
 -2.38* -2.05*   -2.13* -1.87 -2.16* -1.88 
Child's birth97-99 -1.125 -1.164 -1.119 -1.171 -1.103 -1.156 
 -3.48*** -3.41*** -3.46*** -3.37*** -3.40*** -3.32*** 
Missing birth year -0.131 -0.087 -0.202 -0.164 -0.22 -0.185 
 -1.08 -0.58 -1.63 -1.02 -1.75 -1.12 
Muslim   0.1 0.167 0.089 0.142 
   0.62 0.78 0.53 0.64 
Traditional   -0.258 -0.389 -0.223 -0.352 
   -1.35 -1.61 -1.13 -1.42 
Other   0.326 0.422 0.345 0.462 
   1.35 1.35 1.39 1.44 
Non-Akan   -0.317 -0.44 -0.311 -0.423 
   -2.73** -2.91**  -2.65** -2.76**  
HAS- Basic   0.145 0.209 0.149 0.217 
   2.01* 2.37*   1.94 2.28*   
HAS- High   -0.089 -0.097 -0.088 -0.104 
   -1.55 -1.35 -1.51 -1.4 
Water distance     1.88E-06 2.23E-06 
     1.45 1.45 
Market distance    0.003 0.003 
     1.07 1.17 
Access to Health facilities/personnel   -0.133 -0.136 
     -0.58 -0.52 
Price score of cereals    0.154 0.157 
     2.86** 2.52*   
Price score of foodstuffs    -0.032 -0.062 
     -0.35 -0.55 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage   0.011 0.014 
     0.35 0.36 
Ratio of female to men's wage   -0.059 -0.02 
     -0.38 -0.11 
Ratio of child to men's wage   -0.102 -0.177 
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B-23b: Baseline Hazard Estimates of the Duration of Breastfeeding, GLSS 4. 
Age 35-49 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














2 -1.513 -1.511 -1.512 -1.509 -1.513 -1.51 
 -2.38* -2.38*   -2.38* -2.37*   -2.38* -2.37*   
3 -0.513 -0.508 -0.511 -0.504 -0.513 -0.505 
 -1.16 -1.15 -1.15 -1.14 -1.16 -1.14 
4 -0.965 -0.956 -0.961 -0.946 -0.946 -0.93 
 -1.85 -1.83 -1.85 -1.82 -1.81 -1.78 
5 -2.554 -2.543 -2.55 -2.531 -2.518 -2.498 
 -2.47* -2.46*   -2.46* -2.44*   -2.43* -2.41*   
6 -1.855 -1.843 -1.85 -1.83 -1.817 -1.797 
 -2.45* -2.44*   -2.45* -2.42*   -2.40* -2.37*   
7_8 -2.124 -2.113 -2.119 -2.1 -2.086 -2.066 
 -3.34*** -3.32*** -3.33*** -3.30*** -3.27** -3.24**  
9 -1.112 -1.097 -1.105 -1.076 -1.073 -1.042 
 -1.96* -1.93 -1.95 -1.9 -1.89 -1.83 
10 -2.483 -2.464 -2.478 -2.446 -2.445 -2.412 
 -2.40* -2.38*   -2.39* -2.36*   -2.36* -2.33*   
11 -1.781 -1.761 -1.777 -1.744 -1.745 -1.71 
 -2.36* -2.33*   -2.35* -2.31*   -2.31* -2.26*   
12 1.252 1.293 1.254 1.313 1.286 1.348 
 4.01*** 4.13*** 4.02*** 4.19*** 4.10*** 4.27*** 
13 -0.551 -0.488 -0.55 -0.465 -0.519 -0.43 
 -1.13 -1 -1.13 -0.95 -1.06 -0.87 
14 0.178 0.249 0.179 0.276 0.21 0.312 
 0.45 0.63 0.45 0.7 0.53 0.78 
15 0.65 0.741 0.654 0.778 0.685 0.815 
 1.82 2.06*   1.83 2.16*   1.91 2.25*   
16 0.118 0.226 0.123 0.271 0.154 0.309 
 0.28 0.54 0.3 0.65 0.37 0.73 
17 -1.455 -1.338 -1.451 -1.293 -1.419 -1.254 
 -1.92 -1.76 -1.92 -1.7 -1.87 -1.65 
18 2.445 2.611 2.46 2.689 2.497 2.736 
 8.43*** 8.66*** 8.48*** 8.87*** 8.54*** 8.94*** 
19 -0.699 -0.488 -0.673 -0.38 -0.627 -0.321 
 -1.1 -0.76 -1.06 -0.59 -0.98 -0.5 
20 1.026 1.249 1.051 1.361 1.098 1.422 
 2.79** 3.26**  2.86** 3.53*** 2.97** 3.67*** 
21 -0.073 0.166 -0.045 0.286 0.003 0.348 
 -0.14 0.31 -0.09 0.53 0 0.65 
22 -0.036 0.212 -0.006 0.335 0.041 0.398 
 -0.07 0.4 -0.01 0.62 0.08 0.74 
23 -0.228 0.026 -0.2 0.15 -0.152 0.214 
 -0.4 0.04 -0.35 0.26 -0.27 0.37 
24 3.998 4.437 4.04 4.642 4.094 4.724 
 14.11*** 12.63*** 14.25*** 12.98*** 14.31*** 12.99*** 
25 0.704 1.307 0.751 1.571 0.806 1.663 
 1.1 1.88 1.18 2.24*   1.26 2.36*   
26 1.278 1.899 1.33 2.173 1.382 2.265 
 2.44* 3.18**  2.54* 3.61*** 2.63** 3.72*** 
27 0.834 1.473 0.89 1.756 0.94 1.846 
 1.31 2.09*   1.39 2.48*   1.47 2.59**  
28 2.435 3.111 2.489 3.402 2.542 3.497 
  501 
 6.27*** 6.23*** 6.41*** 6.73*** 6.52*** 6.81*** 
29_30 2.37 3.09 2.427 3.388 2.48 3.485 
 6.66*** 6.32*** 6.81*** 6.85*** 6.92*** 6.92*** 
31 plus 2.205 3.022 2.301 3.358 2.348 3.449 
 6.71*** 6.02*** 6.98*** 6.65*** 7.05*** 6.69*** 
Constant -3.354 -3.322 -3.349 -3.277 -3.361 -3.286 
 -10.87*** -10.08*** -10.49*** -9.30*** -10.37*** -9.11*** 
ln_varg (cons) -1.239  -0.993  -0.953 
  -2.61**   -2.67**   -2.60**  
N_spell  759  759  759 
gammav  0.29  0.371  0.386 
se_gammav  0.138  0.138  0.141 
ll_nofr  -1.30E+03  -1.30E+03  -1.30E+03 
lltest  4.868  9.015  9.471 
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B-24a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Full Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.091 0.083 0.081 0.074 0.07 0.034 
 1.25 0.94 1.08 0.82 0.93 0.34 
Middle/JSS -0.162 -0.227 -0.161 -0.225 -0.186 -0.298 
 -2.96** -3.19**  -2.65** -2.88**  -3.03** -3.39*** 
Sec. & above -0.745 -0.987 -0.682 -0.922 -0.689 -1.053 
 -6.51*** -5.66*** -5.66*** -5.23*** -5.72*** -5.37*** 
Still in School -0.994 -1.083 -0.966 -1.059 -0.976 -1.125 
 -4.92*** -4.90*** -4.78*** -4.77*** -4.83*** -4.83*** 
Age25-34 -0.096 -0.15 -0.137 -0.202 -0.128 -0.215 
 -1.76 -2.15*   -2.47* -2.80**  -2.30* -2.76**  
Age35-49 -0.193 -0.246 -0.23 -0.303 -0.225 -0.328 
 -3.15** -3.17**  -3.70*** -3.73*** -3.60*** -3.73*** 
Rural 0.333 0.383 0.286 0.334 0.264 0.26 
 6.68*** 6.09*** 5.47*** 5.09*** 3.36*** 2.57*   
Northern Region 0.138 0.146 0.157 0.198 0.288 0.392 
 1.47 1.27 1.56 1.58 2.50* 2.52*   
Father Schooled   -0.02 -0.029 -0.035 -0.052 
   -0.32 -0.39 -0.58 -0.64 
Father Farmer   0.206 0.244 0.198 0.25 
   3.59*** 3.40*** 3.46*** 3.23**  
Muslim   0.078 0.064 0.092 0.078 
   1.01 0.68 1.19 0.78 
Traditional   -0.066 -0.121 -0.04 -0.103 
   -0.98 -1.43 -0.58 -1.09 
Other   0.063 0.103 0.041 0.079 
   0.69 0.89 0.44 0.62 
Non-Akan   -0.17 -0.198 -0.164 -0.18 
   -3.41*** -3.22**  -3.16** -2.65**  
Access to Health  
facilities/personnel    0.036 0.01 
     0.88 0.2 
Primary distance     -0.031 -0.049 
     -2.10* -2.51*   
Middle/JSS distance      -0.011 -0.017 
     -1.84 -2.05*   
Sec. distance     -0.001 0 
     -0.31 0.09 
Log of real men's  
agric. wage     0.023 0.041 
     1.38 1.82 
Ratio of female to  
men's wage     0.038 0.099 
     0.5 0.95 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage     -0.015 -0.031 
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B-24b: Baseline Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Full Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














13 2.6 2.607 2.6 2.607 2.601 2.614 
 10.47*** 10.50*** 10.47*** 10.50*** 10.48*** 10.52*** 
14 3.892 3.91 3.893 3.912 3.895 3.927 
 19.30*** 19.37*** 19.30*** 19.38*** 19.31*** 19.43*** 
15 5.288 5.35 5.292 5.359 5.297 5.406 
 28.39*** 28.34*** 28.41*** 28.38*** 28.44*** 28.35*** 
16 5.624 5.766 5.631 5.785 5.638 5.883 
 30.20*** 29.01*** 30.24*** 29.09*** 30.27*** 28.50*** 
17 5.533 5.761 5.545 5.791 5.554 5.94 
 29.15*** 26.23*** 29.21*** 26.39*** 29.25*** 25.32*** 
18 6.293 6.643 6.311 6.686 6.322 6.904 
 33.51*** 26.32*** 33.60*** 26.61*** 33.65*** 24.75*** 
19 5.804 6.278 5.83 6.335 5.84 6.618 
 28.90*** 20.71*** 29.01*** 21.10*** 29.06*** 19.52*** 
20 6.86 7.498 6.888 7.565 6.898 7.936 
 34.92*** 20.64*** 35.04*** 21.14*** 35.08*** 19.12*** 
21 5.516 6.289 5.542 6.359 5.553 6.803 
 19.96*** 13.63*** 20.04*** 14.00*** 20.08*** 13.12*** 
22 5.989 6.828 6.015 6.9 6.025 7.38 
 22.09*** 14.09*** 22.17*** 14.47*** 22.21*** 13.42*** 
23 5.634 6.522 5.666 6.6 5.675 7.11 
 15.95*** 11.75*** 16.04*** 12.08*** 16.06*** 11.44*** 
24 6.118 7.076 6.158 7.162 6.168 7.712 
 17.83*** 12.26*** 17.93*** 12.62*** 17.96*** 11.81*** 
25plus 5.535 7.028 5.634 7.152 5.643 7.866 
 17.83*** 9.74*** 18.08*** 10.24*** 18.07*** 9.96*** 
constant -6.815 -6.791 -6.807 -6.777 -6.816 -6.793 
 -35.97*** -34.95*** -34.46*** -32.89*** -34.46*** -32.22*** 
ln_varg (cons) -1.33  -1.28  -0.857 
  -2.75**   -2.86**   -2.40*   
N 3.80E+04 3.80E+04 3.80E+04 3.80E+04 3.80E+04 3.80E+04 
ll -4.60E+03 -4.60E+03 -4.50E+03 -4.50E+03 -4.50E+03 -4.50E+03 
chi2 6739.766  6772.622  6787.752  
N_spell  2237  2237  2237 
gammav  0.265  0.278  0.424 
se_gammav  0.128  0.124  0.151 
ll_nofr  -4.60E+03  -4.50E+03  -4.50E+03 
lltest  6.295  6.897  13.353 
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B-25a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Rural Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.148 0.161 0.102 0.095 0.1 0.024 
 1.66 1.3 1.12 0.71 1.08 0.14 
Middle/JSS -0.012 -0.036 -0.062 -0.138 -0.091 -0.271 
 -0.17 -0.38 -0.83 -1.22 -1.2 -1.87 
Sec. & above -0.785 -1.258 -0.799 -1.426 -0.798 -1.874 
 -3.94*** -3.34*** -3.92*** -3.77*** -3.90*** -4.07*** 
Still in School -1.155 -1.394 -1.1 -1.392 -1.11 -1.644 
 -4.21*** -4.17*** -4.00*** -4.13*** -4.03*** -4.19*** 
Age25-34 -0.17 -0.261 -0.207 -0.32 -0.205 -0.346 
 -2.50* -2.60**  -2.99** -3.03**  -2.95** -2.73**  
Age35-49 -0.256 -0.362 -0.285 -0.439 -0.284 -0.501 
 -3.36*** -3.21**  -3.68*** -3.63*** -3.65*** -3.47*** 
Northern Region 0.11 0.128 0.216 0.361 0.303 0.607 
 0.98 0.8 1.8 1.92 2.06* 2.29*   
Father Schooled   -0.038 0.015 -0.067 -0.003 
   -0.47 0.12 -0.83 -0.02 
Father Farmer   0.119 0.149 0.109 0.151 
   1.62 1.36 1.48 1.11 
Muslim   -0.101 -25% -0.085 -0.282 
   -0.98 -1.61 -0.81 -1.5 
Traditional   -0.127 -0.238 -0.125 -0.256 
   -1.68 -2.01*   -1.58 -1.77 
Other   -0.003 0.079 -0.018 0.039 
   -0.03 0.48 -0.16 0.2 
Non-Akan   -0.183 -0.264 -0.201 -0.273 
   -2.91** -2.77**  -2.99** -2.34*   
Access to Health  
facilities/personnel    0.028 -0.071 
     0.68 -0.94 
Primary distance     -0.03 -0.065 
     -2.03* -2.50*   
Middle/JSS distance      -0.008 -0.021 
     -1.19 -1.85 
Sec. distance     0.001 0.005 
     0.54 1.41 
Log of real men's  
Agric. Wage     0.021 0.102 
     1.12 2.40*   
Ratio of female to  
men's wage     -0.004 0.066 
     -0.05 0.45 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage     -0.076 -0.258 
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B-25b: Baseline Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Rural Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














13 2.428 2.441 2.428 2.444 2.429 2.467 
 8.40*** 8.45*** 8.40*** 8.46*** 8.41*** 8.53*** 
14 3.79 3.827 3.79 3.837 3.793 3.898 
 16.68*** 16.76*** 16.68*** 16.81*** 16.69*** 16.89*** 
15 5.188 5.317 5.193 5.36 5.198 5.546 
 24.90*** 23.89*** 24.92*** 24.31*** 24.94*** 22.80*** 
16 5.5 5.798 5.507 5.889 5.514 6.276 
 26.34*** 21.12*** 26.38*** 22.34*** 26.41*** 18.64*** 
17 5.322 5.797 5.334 5.936 5.342 6.514 
 24.73*** 16.40*** 24.78*** 18.01*** 24.82*** 14.41*** 
18 6.182 6.924 6.2 7.136 6.212 8.011 
 29.21*** 14.23*** 29.28*** 16.18*** 29.33*** 12.40*** 
19 5.681 6.707 5.708 6.992 5.723 8.157 
 24.47*** 10.38*** 24.57*** 12.13*** 24.63*** 9.59*** 
20 6.911 8.416 6.936 8.816 6.947 10.533 
 30.51*** 9.13*** 30.60*** 10.79*** 30.63*** 8.33*** 
21 5.111 7.017 5.131 7.496 5.131 9.578 
 11.92*** 5.87*** 11.95*** 7.03*** 11.95*** 6.13*** 
22 6.511 8.714 6.541 9.268 6.539 11.718 
 19.48*** 6.43*** 19.51*** 7.70*** 19.51*** 6.42*** 
23 5.728 8.232 5.737 8.857 5.721 11.657 
 9.29*** 5.02*** 9.31*** 5.99*** 9.28*** 5.39*** 
24 5.934 8.691 5.968 9.378 5.942 12.444 
 7.97*** 4.70*** 7.98*** 5.58*** 7.93*** 5.10*** 
25plus 4.427 8.583 4.548 9.626 4.543 13.78 
 6.01*** 3.00**  6.14*** 3.85*** 6.11*** 4.30*** 
constant -6.368 -6.299 -6.279 -6.145 -6.278 -6.409 
 -30.86*** -29.37*** -28.57*** -25.03*** -26.80*** -21.30*** 
ln_varg (cons) -0.662  -0.451  0.185 
  -1.11  -1.08  0.55 
 2.30E+04 2.30E+04 2.30E+04 2.30E+04 2.30E+04 2.30E+04 
ll -2.80E+03 -2.80E+03 -2.80E+03 -2.80E+03 -2.80E+03 -2.80E+03 
chi2 4471.297  4489.059  4498.216  
N_spell  1403  1403  1403 
gammav  0.516  0.637  1.204 
se_gammav  0.307  0.266  0.41 
ll_nofr  -2.80E+03  -2.80E+03  -2.80E+03 
lltest  3.97  7.612  18.39 
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B-26a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Urban Model 1  Model 2  
 A B A B 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Primary -0.067 -0.261 -0.015 -0.106 
 -0.52 -1.19 -0.12 -0.54 
Middle/JSS -0.416 -0.802 -0.297 -0.505 
 -4.64*** -3.80*** -2.86** -2.86**  
Sec. & above -0.871 -1.609 -0.646 -1.086 
 -6.01*** -4.16*** -3.99*** -3.56*** 
Still in School -0.796 -0.897 -0.786 -0.89 
 -2.66** -2.30*   -2.62** -2.36*   
Age25-34 0.037 -0.056 -0.007 -0.117 
 0.4 -0.37 -0.08 -0.8 
Age35-49 -0.04 -0.183 -0.073 -0.207 
 -0.38 -1.04 -0.69 -1.24 
Northern Region 0.237 0.387 0.099 0.202 
 1.38 1.27 0.52 0.67 
Father Schooled  -0.026 -0.104 
   -0.28 -0.73 
Father Farmer   0.308 0.471 
   3.45*** 3.30*** 
Muslim   0.283 0.392 
   2.29* 2.10*   
Traditional   0.174 0.061 
   1.13 0.27 
Other   0.3 0.397 
   1.75 1.48 
Non-Akan   -0.144 -0.177 
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B-26b: Baseline Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Urban Model 1  Model 2  
Time A B A B 
(Years) Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
13 3.108 3.128 3.108 3.125 
 6.12*** 6.16*** 6.12*** 6.16*** 
14 4.236 4.288 4.239 4.285 
 9.54*** 9.64*** 9.55*** 9.64*** 
15 5.636 5.816 5.645 5.802 
 13.47*** 13.51*** 13.49*** 13.61*** 
16 6.038 6.449 6.053 6.406 
 14.47*** 13.68*** 14.50*** 14.16*** 
17 6.096 6.754 6.128 6.69 
 14.53*** 12.44*** 14.60*** 13.41*** 
18 6.691 7.687 6.732 7.576 
 16.01*** 11.58*** 16.11*** 13.10*** 
19 6.224 7.546 6.271 7.381 
 14.44*** 9.39*** 14.54*** 10.91*** 
20 7.095 8.814 7.152 8.577 
 16.66*** 8.96*** 16.78*** 10.76*** 
21 6.107 8.155 6.176 7.857 
 12.73*** 7.03*** 12.86*** 8.43*** 
22 5.898 8.131 5.97 7.801 
 11.39*** 6.45*** 11.52*** 7.72*** 
23 5.99 8.372 6.07 8.016 
 11.06*** 6.23*** 11.19*** 7.47*** 
24 6.565 9.177 6.648 8.78 
 12.65*** 6.31*** 12.80*** 7.67*** 
25plus 6.173 9.725 6.26 9.22 
 12.58*** 5.54*** 12.73*** 6.74*** 
constant -7.164 -6.906 -7.364 -7.269 
 -17.19*** -15.74*** -17.24*** -16.09*** 
ln_varg (cons)    
_cons  -0.111  -0.319 
  -0.21  -0.67 
N 1.50E+04 1.50E+04 1.50E+04 1.50E+04 
N_clust     
ll -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03 
chi2 2307.704  2331.762  
N_spell  834  834 
gammav  0.895  0.727 
se_gammav  0.466  0.349 
ll_nofr  -1.70E+03  -1.70E+03 
lltest  11.905  12.495 
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B-27a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Age15-34 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary -0.012 -0.014 0.024 0.023 0.016 0.003 
 -0.14 -0.16 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.03 
Middle/JSS -0.189 -0.195 -0.138 -0.157 -0.159 -0.201 
 -2.91** -2.58*   -1.99* -1.97*   -2.26* -2.27*   
Sec. & above -0.751 -0.772 -0.636 -0.707 -0.644 -0.778 
 -5.49*** -4.27*** -4.43*** -3.88*** -4.48*** -3.95*** 
Still in School -0.986 -0.997 -0.966 -1.008 -0.976 -1.058 
 -4.87*** -4.69*** -4.76*** -4.65*** -4.81*** -4.70*** 
Age25-34 -0.104 -0.109 -0.138 -0.166 -0.131 -0.178 
 -1.89 -1.7 -2.48* -2.34*   -2.34* -2.39*   
Rural 0.386 0.392 0.335 0.358 0.338 0.362 
 6.54*** 5.55*** 5.40*** 4.87*** 3.55*** 3.31*** 
Northern Region 0.237 0.24 0.222 0.238 0.365 0.423 
 1.97* 1.93 1.77 1.72 2.47* 2.42*   
Non-Akan -0.108 -0.112 -0.109 -0.123 -0.107 -0.125 
 -1.92 -1.8 -1.87 -1.86 -1.78 -1.76 
Father Schooled   -0.014 -0.012 -0.024 -0.021 
   -0.21 -0.16 -0.35 -0.27 
Father Farmer   0.207 0.233 0.204 0.25 
   3.17** 2.97**  3.13** 3.01**  
Muslim   0.048 0.044 0.055 0.049 
   0.53 0.45 0.6 0.47 
Traditional   -0.003 -0.011 0.035 0.025 
   -0.04 -0.12 0.43 0.26 
Other   0.117 0.144 0.108 0.147 
   1.1 1.16 0.99 1.11 
Access to Health  
facilities/personnel    0.06 0.057 
     1.25 1.04 
Primary distance     -0.017 -0.022 
     -0.98 -1.1 
Middle/JSS distance      -0.012 -0.015 
     -1.55 -1.67 
Sec. distance     -0.001 -0.001 
     -0.55 -0.45 
Log of real men's  
Agric. Wage     0.01 0.018 
     0.52 0.76 
Ratio of female to  
men's wage     0.034 0.031 
     0.38 0.29 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage     0.034 0.039 
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B-27b: Baseline Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Age15-34 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














13 2.675 2.676 2.675 2.678 2.676 2.681 
 9.24*** 9.24*** 9.24*** 9.24*** 9.24*** 9.25*** 
14 3.958 3.96 3.958 3.966 3.959 3.974 
 16.64*** 16.63*** 16.64*** 16.66*** 16.65*** 16.68*** 
15 5.321 5.327 5.323 5.35 5.326 5.377 
 24.09*** 23.80*** 24.09*** 23.87*** 24.11*** 23.86*** 
16 5.671 5.685 5.674 5.736 5.678 5.795 
 25.67*** 24.10*** 25.69*** 24.20*** 25.71*** 23.93*** 
17 5.656 5.679 5.659 5.76 5.666 5.853 
 25.18*** 21.67*** 25.20*** 21.83*** 25.23*** 21.33*** 
18 6.357 6.393 6.362 6.516 6.369 6.656 
 28.48*** 20.94*** 28.50*** 21.17*** 28.53*** 20.34*** 
19 5.911 5.961 5.922 6.131 5.928 6.313 
 24.75*** 16.13*** 24.79*** 16.48*** 24.81*** 15.83*** 
20 6.882 6.947 6.896 7.171 6.901 7.406 
 29.27*** 15.76*** 29.32*** 16.18*** 29.33*** 15.40*** 
21 5.629 5.707 5.647 5.975 5.654 6.257 
 17.05*** 10.23*** 17.10*** 10.72*** 17.12*** 10.44*** 
22 5.832 5.916 5.839 6.192 5.843 6.492 
 16.55*** 9.98*** 16.57*** 10.36*** 16.59*** 10.07*** 
23 5.702 5.788 5.712 6.075 5.72 6.389 
 13.05*** 8.80*** 13.07*** 9.15*** 13.08*** 8.98*** 
24 6.655 6.747 6.653 7.044 6.671 7.391 
 17.12*** 10.30*** 17.12*** 10.56*** 17.14*** 10.18*** 
25plus 5.877 5.985 5.86 6.326 5.877 6.736 
 10.71*** 7.21*** 10.68*** 7.41*** 10.71*** 7.29*** 
constant -6.829 -6.826 -6.941 -6.948 -6.946 -6.961 
 -30.15*** -29.96*** -29.83*** -29.39*** -29.84*** -29.03*** 
ln_varg (cons)      
_cons  -3.638  -2.208  -1.598 
  -0.64  -1.6  -1.91 
N 2.80E+04 2.80E+04 2.80E+04 2.80E+04 2.80E+04 2.80E+04 
N_clust       
ll -3.20E+03 -3.20E+03 -3.20E+03 -3.20E+03 -3.20E+03 -3.20E+03 
chi2 4884.885  4898.969  4906.466  
N_spell  1650  1650  1650 
gammav  0.026  0.11  0.202 
se_gammav  0.15  0.151  0.17 
ll_nofr  -3.20E+03  -3.20E+03  -3.20E+03 
lltest  0.032  0.587  1.722 












  510 
B-28a: Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Age35-49 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














Primary 0.408 0.382 0.294 0.26 0.269 0.145 
 2.69** 1.88 1.88 1.24 1.71 0.57 
Middle/JSS -0.266 -0.38 -0.312 -0.468 -0.354 -0.624 
 -2.23* -2.30*   -2.32* -2.47*   -2.60** -2.69**  
Sec. & above -0.834 -1.472 -0.868 -1.555 -0.889 -1.976 
 -3.91*** -3.46*** -3.83*** -3.41*** -3.87*** -3.42*** 
Age40-49 -0.09 -0.08 -0.088 -0.079 -0.098 -0.11 
 -1.01 -0.65 -0.98 -0.63 -1.09 -0.74 
Rural 0.184 0.234 0.181 0.221 0.163 -0.054 
 1.92 1.78 1.8 1.58 1.14 -0.21 
Northern Region 0.066 0.077 0.067 0.194 0.197 0.439 
 0.43 0.35 0.39 0.76 1.02 1.28 
Father Schooled   -0.016 -0.094 -0.029 -0.145 
   -0.12 -0.5 -0.21 -0.65 
Father Farmer   0.174 0.136 0.164 0.139 
   1.43 0.8 1.32 0.69 
Muslim   0.161 0.083 0.195 0.123 
   1.11 0.41 1.33 0.52 
Traditional   -0.177 -0.409 -0.196 -0.469 
   -1.43 -2.07*   -1.5 -2.01*   
Other   -0.076 -0.146 -0.143 -0.32 
   -0.43 -0.57 -0.8 -1.04 
Non-Akan   -0.315 -0.377 -0.328 -0.32 
   -3.26** -2.74**  -3.14** -1.89 
Access to Health  
facilities/personnel    -0.012 -0.135 
     -0.15 -1.08 
Primary distance     -0.066 -0.143 
     -2.47* -2.81**  
Middle/JSS distance      -0.016 -0.018 
     -1.44 -1.06 
Sec. distance     0.003 0.006 
     0.71 1.03 
Log of real men's  
agric. Wage     0.046 0.087 
     1.6 1.61 
Ratio of female to  
men's wage     0.085 0.465 
     0.56 1.64 
Ratio of child to  
men's wage     -0.215 -0.254 
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B-28b: Baseline Hazard Model Estimates of the Age at Cohabitation, 1987/88 
Age35-49 Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  














13 2.389 2.4 2.39 2.404 2.392 2.425 
 4.92*** 4.94*** 4.92*** 4.95*** 4.92*** 4.99*** 
14 3.711 3.741 3.714 3.748 3.72 3.804 
 9.72*** 9.79*** 9.73*** 9.81*** 9.75*** 9.89*** 
15 5.207 5.316 5.215 5.334 5.231 5.493 
 15.03*** 15.11*** 15.05*** 15.12*** 15.09*** 14.82*** 
16 5.511 5.768 5.528 5.805 5.553 6.112 
 15.91*** 15.44*** 15.96*** 15.42*** 16.02*** 14.05*** 
17 5.226 5.627 5.259 5.687 5.286 6.115 
 14.67*** 13.52*** 14.76*** 13.53*** 14.83*** 11.74*** 
18 6.174 6.789 6.223 6.872 6.259 7.484 
 17.77*** 14.19*** 17.90*** 14.22*** 17.99*** 11.43*** 
19 5.605 6.445 5.661 6.534 5.708 7.323 
 15.09*** 11.12*** 15.23*** 11.21*** 15.34*** 9.00*** 
20 6.839 8.022 6.914 8.114 6.968 9.168 
 19.02*** 11.11*** 19.18*** 11.28*** 19.30*** 8.60*** 
21 5.299 6.764 5.392 6.856 5.444 8.109 
 10.48*** 7.35*** 10.64*** 7.52*** 10.73*** 6.19*** 
22 6.186 7.809 6.285 7.9 6.33 9.283 
 13.87*** 8.07*** 14.05*** 8.28*** 14.14*** 6.51*** 
23 5.494 7.276 5.602 7.368 5.638 8.868 
 9.09*** 6.49*** 9.24*** 6.67*** 9.30*** 5.52*** 
24 4.949 6.841 5.073 6.94 5.102 8.513 
 6.32*** 5.37*** 6.46*** 5.53*** 6.50*** 4.85*** 
25plus 5.334 8.15 5.495 8.272 5.521 10.172 
 12.03*** 5.96*** 12.25*** 6.22*** 12.24*** 5.28*** 
constant -6.712 -6.724 -6.64 -6.516 -6.655 -6.616 
 -19.29*** -18.68*** -17.94*** -16.22*** -17.83*** -15.44*** 
ln_varg (cons) -0.667  -0.659  -0.083 
  -1.25  -1.27  -0.18 
N 1.00E+04 1.00E+04 1.00E+04 1.00E+04 1.00E+04 1.00E+04 
N_clust       
ll -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03 
chi2 1878.84  1898.957  1912.183  
N_spell  587  587  587 
gammav  0.513  0.517  0.921 
se_gammav  0.273  0.268  0.416 
ll_nofr  -1.30E+03  -1.30E+03  -1.30E+03 
lltest  7.77  7.425  14.759 
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B-29a: Summary Statistics Ȃ Woman has at least one Child and Number of Births, 1987/88  
 Full  Rural  Urban  Age15-34  Age35-49  
GLSS 1           
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child 0.798 0.402 0.823 0.382 0.757 0.429 0.732 0.443 0.983 0.130 
Number of live births 3.136 2.806 3.401 2.927 2.695 2.526 2.061 1.916 6.164 2.693 
Age15-24 0.362 0.481 0.366 0.482 0.356 0.479 0.491 0.500   
Age25-34 0.376 0.484 0.365 0.482 0.393 0.489 0.509 0.500   
Age35-49 0.262 0.440 0.269 0.444 0.251 0.434     
Age40-49         0.595 0.491 
Trad. Cont (M1) -0.723 0.829 -1.037 0.689 -0.198 0.805 -0.475 0.784 -1.443 0.540 
Mod. Cont (M1) -3.022 1.239 -3.502 1.154 -2.311 1.051 -2.728 1.201 -7.081 9.901 
Trad. Cont (M2) -0.743 0.946 -1.076 0.833 -0.205 0.950 -0.484 0.907 -1.538 0.891 
Mod. Cont (M2) -3.129 1.438 -11.661 17.901 -4.669 8.719 -2.825 1.395 -13.644 15.983 
Trad. Cont (M3) -0.788 1.247 -1.150 1.125 -0.204 1.271 -0.500 1.182 -1.734 1.324 
Mod. Cont (M3) -3.334 1.807 -10.670 15.122 -4.544 8.250 -2.967 1.707 -32.596 30.318 
Age at Cohab (M1) 18.696 10.839 18.962 10.993 18.833 11.033 18.442 10.894 20.034 11.244 
Age at Cohab (M2) 16.763 12.253 18.853 10.974 18.423 10.647 18.601 10.783 19.426 10.817 
Age at Cohab (M3) 18.170 10.772 17.896 10.771   18.784 11.000 19.313 10.615 
Observations 2237  1403  834  1650  587  
Note: Predicted values of the proximates are used. Sample weights are applied in the calculations for GLSS 4. 
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B-29a contd: Summary Statistics Ȃ Woman has at least one Child and Number of Births, 1998/99 
 Full  Rural  Urban  Age15-34  Age35-49  
GLSS 4           
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Child 0.709 0.454 0.753 0.432 0.636 0.481 0.573 0.495 0.981 0.135 
Number of live births 2.835 2.766 3.231 2.895 2.179 2.398 1.584 1.853 5.360 2.573 
Age15-24 0.356 0.479 0.333 0.471 0.395 0.489 0.533 0.499   
Age25-34 0.313 0.464 0.322 0.467 0.298 0.457 0.467 0.499   
Age35-49 0.331 0.471 0.346 0.476 0.307 0.461     
Age40-49         0.596 0.491 
Trad. Cont (M1) -3.090 0.990 -2.922 0.837 -3.546 1.406 -3.251 1.108 -2.920 0.877 
Mod. Cont (M1) -2.185 0.831 -2.165 0.826 -2.269 0.907 -2.322 0.967 -2.029 0.627 
Trad. Cont (M2) -3.114 1.005 -2.946 0.849 -3.590 1.426 -3.302 1.134 -3.015 1.039 
Mod. Cont (M2) -2.230 0.891 -2.228 0.911 -2.297 0.947 -2.363 1.013 -2.108 0.778 
Trad. Cont (M3) -3.451 1.317 -3.382 1.276 -3.763 1.603 -3.634 1.493 -3.452 1.449 
Mod. Cont (M3) -2.352 1.048 -2.392 1.085 -2.339 1.042 -2.503 1.169 -2.233 0.996 
Observations 5863  3657  2206  3921  1942  
Note: Predicted values of the proximates are used. Sample weights are applied in the calculations for GLSS 4. 
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B-29b: Summary Statistics Ȃ Number of Births conditional on at Least One Birth, 1987/88  
 Full  Rural  Urban  Age15-34  Age35-49  
GLSS 1           
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of live births 3.824 2.529 4.002 2.626 3.480 2.277 2.854 1.676 6.826 2.341 
Age15-24   0.287 0.453 0.264 0.441 0.370 0.483   
Age25-34 0.476 0.500 0.446 0.497 0.535 0.499 0.630 0.483   
Age35-49 0.245 0.430 0.267 0.443 0.201 0.401     
Age40-49         0.536 0.499 
Trad. Cont (M1) -0.887 0.592 -1.154 0.390 -0.379 0.603 -0.690 0.491 -1.498 0.512 
Mod. Cont (M1) -3.148 1.168 -3.601 1.019 -2.344 1.065 -2.888 1.137 -7.236 10.069 
Trad. Cont (M2) -0.925 0.711 -1.192 0.576 -0.426 0.766 -0.717 0.625 -1.561 0.704 
Mod. Cont (M2) -3.263 1.344 -11.525 17.697 -4.919 8.984 -2.992 1.302 -13.912 15.909 
Trad. Cont (M3) -0.981 1.031 -1.258 0.918 -0.460 1.104 -0.752 0.928 -1.730 1.196 
Mod. Cont (M3) -3.481 1.696 -10.552 14.958 -4.816 8.494 -3.155 1.599 -33.622 29.611 
Age at Cohab (M1) 18.573 10.971 19.098 11.036 18.863 11.143 18.477 10.865 20.696 11.749 
Age at Cohab (M2) 16.874 12.360 18.932 11.347 18.564 10.652 18.640 10.824 19.081 10.868 
Age at Cohab (M3) 18.043 10.887 17.983 11.047 n.a  18.892 11.136 18.852 10.665 
Breastfeeding (M1) 18.097 12.852 18.772 12.754 18.712 12.372 17.230 9.440 19.333 9.976 
Breastfeeding (M2) 18.174 12.806 19.535 10.198 15.518 8.442 18.455 12.693 n.converge  
Breastfeeding (M3) 18.496 13.070 19.632 10.027 n.a  18.000 12.270 n.converge  
Observations 1409  936  473  1064  345  
Note: Predicted values of the proximates are used. Sample weights are applied in the calculations for GLSS 4. 
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B-29b contd: Summary Statistics Ȃ Number of Births conditional on at Least One Birth, 1998/99 
 Full  Rural  Urban  Age15-34  Age35-49  
GLSS 4           
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of live births 3.942 2.410 4.185 2.500 3.337 2.052 2.946 1.679 6.166 2.307 
Age15-24 0.189 0.391 0.193 0.395 0.178 0.383 0.273 0.446   
Age25-34 0.502 0.500 0.489 0.500 0.534 0.499 0.727 0.446   
Age35-49 0.309 0.462 0.318 0.466 0.288 0.453     
Age40-49         0.421 0.494 
Trad. Cont (M1) -2.747 0.648 -2.689 0.625 -2.981 0.872 -2.682 0.666 -2.948 0.911 
Mod. Cont (M1) -1.852 0.494 -1.862 0.525 -1.870 0.511 -1.807 0.563 -1.887 0.635 
Trad. Cont (M2) -2.773 0.665 -2.711 0.629 -3.032 0.935 -2.729 0.698 -3.039 1.036 
Mod. Cont (M2) -1.910 0.630 -1.927 0.679 -1.916 0.629 -1.851 0.663 -1.993 0.819 
Trad. Cont (M3) -3.125 1.129 -3.145 1.185 -3.158 1.133 -3.081 1.308 -3.492 1.468 
Mod. Cont (M3) -2.012 0.828 -2.062 0.886 -1.934 0.710 -1.962 0.870 -2.102 1.032 
Breastfeeding (M1) 19.051 13.212 20.029 12.897 15.979 8.224 18.193 9.654 18.466 9.660 
Breastfeeding (M2) 19.041 13.214 19.532 13.241 18.693 12.079 17.880 9.864 18.174 9.914 
Breastfeeding (M3) 19.298 12.893 19.341 13.060 n.a  18.193 9.654 18.070 9.389 
Observations 2447  1746  701  1690  757  
Note: Predicted values of the proximates are used. Sample weights are applied in the calculations for GLSS 4. 
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B-30a: Marginal Effects after Probit: Woman has a Child, 1987/88 &1998/99 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Full Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 0.173 0.18 0.201 0.174 0.181 0.201 0.206 0.258 0.293 
 10.98*** 11.39*** 12.81*** 11.03*** 11.43*** 12.86*** 12.11*** 16.54*** 18.87*** 
Age35-49 0.193 0.204 0.224 0.194 0.205 0.225 0.394 0.417 0.435 
 13.57*** 14.76*** 16.74*** 13.55*** 14.81*** 16.80*** 25.16*** 25.54*** 28.17*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.152 -0.133 -0.079 -0.152 -0.132 -0.078 -0.038 0.037 0.009 
 -8.95*** -8.82*** -7.12*** -8.93*** -8.77*** -7.08*** -1.67 2.42*   0.63 
Modern  
Contraceptives  0.02 0.026 0.015 0.019 0.026 0.015 0.223 0.088 0.071 
 1.93 2.77**  2.01*   1.87 2.73**  1.94 7.45*** 4.83*** 3.74*** 
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.001 -5.82E-05 -0.001       
 -1.09 -0.1 -1.73       
Observation 2237 2237 2237 2240 2240 2240 5863 5863 5863 
ll -753.784 -759.751 -778.094 -755.458 -760.837 -780.574    
chi2 552.462 498.17 476.299 557.221 499.389 476.232    
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B-30b: Marginal Effects after Probit: Woman has a Child, 1987/88 &1998/99 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Rural Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 0.143 0.154 0.167 0.146 0.155 0.167 0.165 0.21 0.251 
 7.63*** 8.08*** 8.40*** 7.74*** 8.12*** 8.44*** 8.95*** 12.14*** 13.30*** 
Age35-49 0.16 0.179 0.204 0.163 0.18 0.205 0.313 0.342 0.363 
 9.46*** 11.04*** 12.54*** 9.67*** 11.07*** 12.59*** 17.18*** 17.50*** 17.88*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.176 -0.106 -0.05 -0.174 -0.105 -0.05 -0.036 0.006 0.004 
 -5.53*** -6.81*** -6.21*** -5.41*** -6.80*** -6.19*** -1.68 0.34 0.32 
Modern  
Contraceptives  0.026 0.002 0.002 0.026 0.002 0.002 0.193 0.106 0.061 
 2.31*   4.61*** 2.94**  2.26*   4.56*** 2.91**  7.30*** 6.40*** 4.55*** 
Age at  
Cohabitation 0.001 4.31E-04 -5.04E-05       
 1.59 0.59 -0.07       
Observation 1403 1403 1403 1405 1405 1405 3657 3657 3657 
ll -422.627 -431.472 -447.575 -424.926 -432.619 -448.598    
chi2 271.224 288.892 254.992 269.371 290.705 255.643    














  518 
B-30c: Marginal Effects after Probit: Woman has a Child, 1987/88 &1998/99 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Urban Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 0.163 0.202 0.255 0.162 0.204 0.254 0.307 0.333 0.352 
 4.22*** 6.11*** 8.72*** 4.22*** 6.20*** 8.74*** 10.78*** 12.91*** 14.46*** 
Age35-49 0.177 0.212 0.263 0.176 0.214 0.263 0.507 0.516 0.528 
 4.56*** 7.37*** 10.71*** 4.56*** 7.46*** 10.74*** 19.38*** 20.10*** 22.15*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.209 -0.153 -0.076 -0.209 -0.151 -0.076 0.062 0.071 0.062 
 -6.22*** -6.87*** -5.66*** -6.24*** -6.87*** -5.69*** 2.15*   3.15**  2.66**  
Modern  
Contraceptives  -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.006 -0.004 -0.002 0.075 0.031 0.017 
 -0.37 -2.40*   -1.29 -0.37 -2.36*   -1.29 1.73 0.96 0.53 
Age at  
Cohabitation -2.58E-04 0.002 0.001       
 -0.2 1.43 1.01       
Observation 834 834 834 835 835 835 2206 2206 2206 
ll -316.203 -316.41 -327.481 -316.244 -317.592 -328.057    
chi2 232.298 210.483 198.537 232.3 210.788 199.342    
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B-30d: Marginal Effects after Probit: Woman has a Child, 1987/88 &1998/99 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Age1534 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 0.27 0.288 0.32 0.272 0.289 0.321 0.361 0.412 0.491 
 10.90*** 12.09*** 14.18*** 10.98*** 12.16*** 14.26*** 12.17*** 17.09*** 23.02*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.236 -0.198 -0.128 -0.234 -0.197 -0.128 0.103 0.132 0.03 
 -9.28*** -8.94*** -7.65*** -9.25*** -8.92*** -7.64*** 2.34*   4.89*** 1.73 
Modern  
Contraceptives  0.036 0.041 0.03 0.036 0.04 0.03 0.14 0.068 0.091 
 2.52*   3.14**  2.62**  2.46*   3.10**  2.61**  2.52*   2.26*   4.17*** 
Age at  
Cohabitation 1.99E-04 6.40E-05 -1.57E-05       
 0.19 0.06 -0.02       
Observation 1650 1650 1650 1651 1651 1651 3921 3921 3921 
ll -704.461 -709.104 -727.283 -705.566 -710.148 -728.239    
chi2 395.506 365.34 342.066 396.596 366.153 342.776    
















  520 
B-30e: Marginal Effects after Probit: Woman has a Child, 1987/88 &1998/99 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age40-49 2.63E-04 0.02 0.016 2.07E-04 0.02 0.016 -0.018 -0.006 -0.006 
 0.11 1.7 1.44 0.09 1.7 1.48 -1.49 -0.71 -0.83 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.002 0.002 -1.92E-04 -0.002 0.001 -3.14E-04 -0.003 -0.002 0.001 
 -0.46 0.4 -0.08 -0.45 0.33 -0.11 -0.72 -0.71 0.27 
Modern  
Contraceptives  -0.001 -2.89E-04 -2.85E-04 -0.001 -2.71E-04 -2.86E-04 -0.009 0.003 0.001 
 -0.88 -0.95 -1.78 -0.84 -0.87 -1.73 -0.85 0.52 0.15 
Age at  
Cohabitation 5.79E-05 2.60E-04 3.14E-04       
 0.47 0.57 0.88       
Observation 587 587 587 589 589 589 1942 1942 1942 
ll -44.04 -48.289 -46.921 -44.454 -48.516 -47.258    
chi2 10.829 5.681 8.421 10.605 3.635 6.448    
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B-31a: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Full Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 2 1.957 2.084 2 1.959 2.086 2.569 2.665 2.549 
 22.65*** 22.36*** 24.33*** 22.78*** 22.45*** 24.38*** 29.96*** 30.98*** 30.52*** 
Age35-49 4.569 4.585 4.841 4.554 4.58 4.839 5.057 5.123 5.042 
 34.39*** 35.34*** 37.35*** 34.34*** 35.31*** 37.39*** 55.35*** 58.52*** 57.79*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.248 -0.327 -0.143 -0.259 -0.327 -0.143 -0.147 -0.083 -0.096 
 -3.89*** -5.29*** -2.51*   -4.08*** -5.29*** -2.50*   -1.45 -1.23 -2.31*   
Modern  
Contraceptives  -0.263 -0.154 -0.115 -0.261 -0.154 -0.119 0.064 -0.065 0.027 
 -5.33*** -3.51*** -2.94**  -5.29*** -3.51*** -3.05**  0.5 -0.79 0.52 
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.012 -0.004 -0.011       
 -3.22**  -1.38 -3.05**        
Constant 0.428 0.547 0.793 0.215 0.474 0.573 0.059 -0.077 0.126 
 2.96**  4.28*** 5.96*** 1.69 4.01*** 5.08*** 0.49 -0.56 0.78 
Observation 2237 2237 2237 2240 2240 2240 5863 5863 5863 
 -4.60E+03 -4.60E+03 -4.60E+03 -4.60E+03 -4.60E+03 -4.60E+03    
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B-31b: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Rural Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 2.156 2.172 2.344 2.158 2.176 2.325 2.552 2.74 2.609 
 20.36*** 20.81*** 22.42*** 20.48*** 20.87*** 22.29*** 21.47*** 23.68*** 24.39*** 
Age35-49 5.109 5.179 5.549 5.114 5.189 5.524 5.2 5.344 5.285 
 32.93*** 31.42*** 34.41*** 33.29*** 31.53*** 34.30*** 46.48*** 50.52*** 52.39*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.388 -0.383 -0.088 -0.386 -0.382 -0.095 -0.412 -0.319 -0.14 
 -6.14*** -7.89*** -1.71 -6.14*** -7.88*** -1.85 -4.24*** -3.89*** -3.65*** 
Modern  
Contraceptives  -0.044 0.007 0.001 -0.046 0.007 0.001 0.399 0.199 0.14 
 -0.74 2.03*   0.22 -0.78 2.01*   0.29 3.72*** 2.49*   2.97**  
Age at  
Cohabitation -4.81E-04 0.003 -0.012       
 -0.11 0.64 -2.66**        
Constant 0.691 0.822 1.181 0.674 0.875 0.968 0.274 0.013 0.449 
 3.90*** 7.83*** 11.80*** 4.44*** 16.31*** 16.41*** 1.6 0.07 2.68**  
Observation 1403 1403 1403 1405 1405 1405 3657 3657 3657 
ll -2.90E+03 -2.90E+03 -2.90E+03 -2.90E+03 -2.90E+03 -2.90E+03    
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B-31c: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Urban Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 1.74 1.373 1.633 1.73 1.383 1.639 2.335 2.378 2.248 
 11.06*** 9.71*** 12.65*** 11.01*** 9.84*** 12.75*** 25.11*** 24.65*** 22.22*** 
Age35-49 3.609 3.503 3.86 3.59 3.503 3.854 4.538 4.567 4.441 
 15.19*** 16.09*** 18.49*** 15.15*** 16.14*** 18.50*** 31.21*** 32.01*** 31.32*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -0.245 -0.624 -0.35 -0.249 -0.618 -0.347 -0.119 -0.095 -0.051 
 -2.61**  -7.96*** -6.13*** -2.66**  -7.90*** -6.08*** -1.61 -1.56 -0.88 
Modern  
Contraceptives  -0.452 -0.036 -0.033 -0.45 -0.036 -0.033 -0.04 -0.103 -0.078 
 -6.24*** -4.81*** -4.13*** -6.22*** -4.84*** -4.16*** -0.39 -1.2 -0.88 
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.005 0.005 0.003       
 -0.97 0.86 0.53       
Constant 0.111 0.88 0.807 0.021 0.97 0.862 -0.398 -0.486 -0.202 
 0.53 6.51*** 6.06*** 0.11 11.43*** 10.58*** -2.51*  -3.09**  -1.41 
Observation 834 834 834 835 835 835 2206 2206 2206 
ll -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03 -1.70E+03    
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B-31d: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Age1534 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 1.979 1.983 2.057 1.981 1.984 2.065 2.314 2.311 2.342 
 23.24*** 23.24*** 24.49*** 23.30*** 23.28*** 24.47*** 28.34*** 25.64*** 27.89*** 
Traditional  
 
Contraceptives  -0.329 -0.329 -0.191 -0.328 -0.328 -0.191 0.336 0.19 -0.027 
 -6.22*** -6.22*** -3.74*** -6.20*** -6.20*** -3.76*** 2.86**  2.96**  -0.91 
Modern  
Contraceptives  -0.107 -0.041 -0.062 -0.108 -0.043 -0.06 -0.259 -0.109 0.089 
 -2.48*   -1.05 -1.72 -2.51*   -1.11 -1.67 -1.75 -1.25 1.88 
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.001 -0.004 0.004       
 -0.33 -1.13 1.06       
Constant 0.627 0.851 0.663 0.602 0.771 0.736 1.004 0.881 0.618 
 4.89*** 6.73*** 5.08*** 5.28*** 7.23*** 7.01*** 9.42*** 6.62*** 4.34*** 
Observation 1650 1650 1650 1651 1651 1651 3921 3921 3921 
ll -3.00E+03 -3.00E+03 -3.00E+03 -3.00E+03 -3.00E+03 -3.00E+03    
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B-31e: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Age3549 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age40-49 1.396 1.771 1.87 1.371 1.735 1.827 -1.247 0.41 0.92 
 6.33*** 8.28*** 9.02*** 6.26*** 8.05*** 8.82*** -4.64*** 2.38*   5.90*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives  -1.069 -0.307 0.02 -1.094 -0.311 0.023 -0.382 -0.331 -0.267 
 -5.18*** -2.22*   0.26 -5.33*** -2.17*   0.31 -4.97*** -4.39*** -4.24*** 
Modern  
Contraceptives  -0.03 -0.021 -0.012 -0.03 -0.021 -0.012 -1.963 -0.513 -0.069 
 -2.71**  -3.03**  -3.06**  -2.75**  -3.09**  -3.22**  -7.98*** -3.80*** -0.66 
Age at  
Cohabitation 0.008 -0.02 -0.02       
 0.86 -2.13*   -2.09*         
Constant 3.424 4.753 5.095 3.555 4.364 4.715 1.041 3.081 3.805 
 9.19*** 16.09*** 18.96*** 11.14*** 19.68*** 23.82*** 3.63*** 15.23*** 18.56*** 
Observation 587 587 587 589 589 589 1942 1942 1942 
ll -1.40E+03 -1.40E+03 -1.40E+03 -1.40E+03 -1.40E+03 -1.40E+03    
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B-32a: Regression Results for Number of Live Births Conditional on One, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Full Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 1.811 1.755 1.752 1.797 1.758 1.742 3.312 2.592 2.108 
 17.42*** 18.50*** 19.75*** 17.41*** 18.64*** 19.75*** 19.55*** 20.04*** 18.94*** 
Age35-49 4.867 4.824 4.903 4.848 4.819 4.891 5.354 4.931 4.648 
 27.32*** 29.75*** 33.20*** 27.32*** 29.68*** 33.05*** 39.90*** 43.20*** 40.03*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives 0.099 -0.011 -0.041 0.074 -0.01 -0.048 0.059 -0.265 -0.143 
 0.62 -0.09 -0.47 0.46 -0.08 -0.55 0.44 -2.92**  -3.13**  
Modern  
Contraceptives -0.275 -0.204 -0.1 -0.265 -0.203 -0.101 -1.485 -0.501 -0.148 
 -3.96*** -3.50*** -2.05*   -3.83*** -3.47*** -2.07*   -6.82*** -4.72*** -1.98*   
Breastfeeding  
Duration -0.004 9.76E-05 -0.001 -0.005 0 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 0.002 
 -1.25 0.03 -0.43 -1.38 0.02 -0.43 -0.73 -0.27 0.48 
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.011 -0.007 -0.011       
 -2.76**  -1.81 -2.43*         
Constant 1.278 1.242 1.617 1.103 1.138 1.428 -1.95 -0.589 0.662 
 7.32*** 7.85*** 10.09*** 6.82*** 7.53*** 10.18*** -5.55*** -1.87 2.54*   
Observation 1409 1409 1409 1409 1409 1409 2447 2447 2447 
ll -2.70E+03 -2.70E+03 -2.70E+03 -2.70E+03 -2.70E+03 -2.70E+03    
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B-32b: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born Conditional on One Birth, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Rural Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 1.872 1.798 1.917 1.876 1.798 1.896 2.68 2.391 2.05 
 15.18*** 15.72*** 18.05*** 15.15*** 15.74*** 17.86*** 14.76*** 16.36*** 16.09*** 
Age35-49 5.133 4.88 5.24 5.148 4.88 5.206 5.069 4.902 4.769 
 17.90*** 19.84*** 30.01*** 17.83*** 19.90*** 29.74*** 34.91*** 35.48*** 34.25*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives -0.017 -0.398 -0.048 0.004 -0.398 -0.061 -0.316 -0.382 -0.165 
 -0.06 -2.03*   -0.6 0.01 -2.03*   -0.77 -2.67**  -3.53*** -4.53*** 
Modern  
Contraceptives -0.08 0.008 0.002 -0.083 0.008 0.002 -0.487 -0.175 -4.54E-05 
 -1.07 1.56 0.43 -1.12 1.56 0.55 -3.28**  -1.59 0 
Breastfeeding  
Duration 0.002 0.001 0.007 0.003 0.001 0.007 0.001 0.001 -0.006 
 0.57 0.21 1.12 0.62 0.21 1.18 0.28 0.32 -1.51 
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.006 3.22E-04 -0.011       
 -1.13 0.07 -2.28*         
Constant 1.556 1.49 1.779 1.447 1.497 1.577 -0.572 0.011 1.242 
 6.47*** 7.47*** 9.80*** 6.59*** 8.46*** 10.21*** -1.25 0.03 4.81*** 
Observation 936 936 936 936 936 936 1746 1746 1746 
ll -1.80E+03 -1.80E+03 -1.80E+03 -1.80E+03 -1.80E+03 -1.80E+03    
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B-32c: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born Conditional on One Birth, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Urban Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 1.761 1.256 1.378 1.77 1.236 1.356 2.963 2.923 2.333 
 7.90*** 8.21*** 10.03*** 8.08*** 8.23*** 10.00*** 15.94*** 14.65*** 12.93*** 
Age35-49 4.368 4.007 4.21 4.362 3.974 4.201 4.997 4.992 4.451 
 12.37*** 13.28*** 15.68*** 12.45*** 13.06*** 15.48*** 26.91*** 28.94*** 25.24*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives 0.326 -0.436 -0.259 0.333 -0.465 -0.268 -0.435 -0.435 -0.204 
 1.31 -3.43*** -3.44*** 1.35 -3.64*** -3.55*** -4.21*** -4.87*** -2.32*   
Modern  
Contraceptives -0.513 -0.036 -0.034 -0.518 -0.036 -0.033 -0.861 -0.712 -0.468 
 -4.93*** -4.25*** -4.01*** -5.05*** -4.19*** -3.90*** -5.16*** -5.37*** -3.49*** 
Breastfeeding  
Duration -0.009 0.014 -0.002 -0.009 0.014 -0.001 0.008 -0.007 -0.007 
 -1.62 1.68 -0.33 -1.62 1.7 -0.2 1.02 -1.26 -1.26 
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.004 -0.01 -0.013       
 -0.64 -1.39 -1.72       
Constant 0.826 1.616 1.888 0.741 1.431 1.647 -2.734 -2.216 -0.619 
 2.72**  7.78*** 10.20*** 2.72**  9.12*** 12.57*** -6.12*** -5.13*** -1.53 
Observation 473 473 473 473 473 473 701 701 701 
ll -888.948 -890.415 -888.254 -885.53 -888.188 -889.977    
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B-32d: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born Conditional on One Birth, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Age1534 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age25-34 1.759 1.781 1.754 1.759 1.779 1.76 3.008 2.393 2.023 
 17.54*** 19.54*** 20.36*** 17.55*** 19.51*** 20.31*** 16.35*** 16.23*** 16.68*** 
Traditional 
Contraceptives -0.015 0.008 -0.033 -0.015 0.006 -0.033 0.407 -0.055 -0.068 
 -0.1 0.07 -0.41 -0.1 0.06 -0.41 2.27*   -0.68 -2.81**  
Modern  
Contraceptives -0.164 -0.14 -0.112 -0.164 -0.141 -0.109 -1.499 -0.508 -0.137 
 -2.72**  -2.87**  -2.58*   -2.72**  -2.89**  -2.53*   -5.26*** -3.79*** -1.55 
Breastfeeding  
Duration 0.001 -0.011 -0.009 0.001 -0.011 -0.009 0.001 0.004 0.003 
 0.12 -3.39*** -2.50*   0.12 -3.38*** -2.49*   0.37 0.89 0.68 
Age at  
Cohabitation -1.39E-04 -0.003 0.003       
 -0.03 -0.8 0.81       
Constant 1.255 1.591 1.475 1.253 1.527 1.537 -0.884 0.034 0.94 
 7.43*** 9.84*** 9.70*** 8.22*** 11.40*** 12.23*** -2.19*   0.1 3.48*** 
Observation 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1064 1690 1690 1690 
ll -1.90E+03 -1.90E+03 -1.90E+03 -1.90E+03 -1.90E+03 -1.90E+03    












  530 
B-32e: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born Conditional on One Birth, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Structural Model) 
 GLSS 1      GLSS 4   
Age3549 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Age40-49 1.967 2.002 2.128 1.944 1.994 2.089 -0.831 1.103 1.341 
 8.11*** 8.60*** 9.56*** 8.08*** 8.51*** 9.28*** -1.85 3.73*** 4.97*** 
Traditional  
Contraceptives -0.23 -0.183 0.056 -0.255 -0.172 0.077 -0.134 -0.172 -0.197 
 -0.89 -1.02 0.6 -1 -0.97 0.84 -1.33 -1.94 -2.55*   
Modern  
Contraceptives -0.02 -0.021 -0.009 -0.02 -0.022 -0.01 -2.046 -0.327 -0.063 
 -1.8 -2.87**  -2.16*   -1.82 -3.01**  -2.53*   -5.69*** -1.86 -0.45 
Breastfeeding  
Duration 0.013 0.014 0.015 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.014 0.036 0.027 
 1.14 1.25 1.31 1.26 1.35 1.34 1.58 3.71*** 2.40*   
Age at  
Cohabitation -0.003 -0.02 -0.038       
 -0.31 -1.91 -3.58***       
Constant 5.088 5.279 5.909 4.977 4.885 5.19 1.934 3.822 4.236 
 9.73*** 12.96*** 16.15*** 10.86*** 13.36*** 15.92*** 3.49*** 11.18*** 14.78*** 
Observation 345 345 345 346 345 345 757 757 759 
ll -741.572 -735.131 -733.312 -743.673 -737.014 -739.811    
Note: Predicted values of the proximates are used. Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
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B-33a: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Reduced 
Form Model) 
 GLSS 1   GLSS 4   














Primary -0.239 -0.25 -0.254 -0.427 -0.384 -0.385 
 -1.75 -1.82 -1.84 -5.37*** -4.77*** -4.74*** 
Middle/JSS -0.675 -0.578 -0.558 -0.861 -0.785 -0.782 
 -6.94*** -5.74*** -5.44*** -12.37*** -10.98*** -10.93*** 
Sec.& above -1.378 -1.047 -1.02 -1.597 -1.423 -1.417 
 -8.20*** -5.93*** -5.68*** -19.71*** -16.40*** -16.36*** 
Still in school -0.607 -0.616 -0.59 -0.427 -0.43 -0.426 
 -7.59*** -6.91*** -6.60*** -9.42*** -9.01*** -8.92*** 
Age25-34 2.155 2.166 2.154 2.191 2.221 2.225 
 28.09*** 28.20*** 27.98*** 35.30*** 36.01*** 36.03*** 
Age35-49 4.995 5.036 5.036 4.629 4.631 4.627 
 42.37*** 42.91*** 42.81*** 60.85*** 60.96*** 60.42*** 
Rural 0.514 0.24 0.054 0.475 0.241 0.266 
 6.18*** 2.31*   0.38 8.47*** 3.59*** 2.14*   
Northern Region -0.392 -0.43 -0.484 -0.005 -0.09 -0.084 
 -3.26**  -3.16**  -2.98**  -0.07 -1.06 -0.95 
Muslim  0.396 0.388  0.117 0.124 
  2.82**  2.76**   1.38 1.43 
Traditional  0.049 0.016  0.106 0.096 
  0.41 0.12  0.75 0.67 
Other  -0.188 -0.237  0.119 0.115 
  -1.18 -1.47  0.8 0.77 
Non-Akan  -0.264 -0.249  -0.208 -0.204 
  -3.04**  -2.83**   -3.49*** -3.36*** 
HAS- Basic  -0.277 -0.27  -0.169 -0.169 
  -5.67*** -5.43***  -5.98*** -5.55*** 
HAS- High  0.006 0.002  0.147 0.145 
  0.26 0.09  4.76*** 4.58*** 
Water distance   6.40E-06   1.20E-03 
   3.32***   3.51*** 
Constant 1.124 1.326 1.312 0.866 1.055 1.048 
 11.33*** 11.04*** 10.80*** 12.35*** 12.87*** 12.22*** 
Observation 2240 2240 2240 5863 5863 5863 
ll -4.60E+03 -4.50E+03 -4.50E+03    
Note: Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
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B-33b: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Reduced 
Form Model) 
 GLSS 1   GLSS 4   














Primary -0.08 -0.119 -0.129 -0.355 -0.339 -0.339 
 -0.46 -0.68 -0.72 -3.47*** -3.30** -3.24**  
Middle/JSS -0.366 -0.371 -0.34 -0.859 -0.814 -0.807 
 -2.99**  -2.90**  -2.61**  -10.07*** -9.64*** -9.53*** 
Sec.& above -1.185 -1.001 -0.922 -1.97 -1.781 -1.768 
 -4.36*** -3.31*** -2.92**  -17.10*** -14.32*** -14.36*** 
Still in school -0.919 -0.912 -0.861 -0.625 -0.612 -0.604 
 -10.86*** -10.05*** -9.11*** -10.47*** -9.66*** -9.53*** 
Age25-34 2.267 2.255 2.239 2.408 2.426 2.432 
 22.47*** 22.28*** 22.00*** 27.60*** 27.42*** 27.43*** 
Age35-49 5.484 5.482 5.488 4.99 4.984 4.983 
 37.59*** 37.46*** 37.39*** 51.52*** 51.32*** 50.41*** 
Northern Region -0.386 -0.306 -0.4 -0.032 0.004 0.017 
 -2.81**  -1.81 -1.92 -0.32 0.04 0.15 
Muslim  0.172 0.125  0.08 0.088 
  0.82 0.59  0.69 0.73 
Traditional  -0.046 -0.101  0.032 0.018 
  -0.33 -0.7  0.21 0.12 
Other  -0.175 -0.248  0.126 0.117 
  -0.93 -1.3  0.69 0.63 
Non-Akan  -0.28 -0.255  -0.324 -0.325 
  -2.41*   -2.16*    -4.11*** -3.93*** 
HAS- Basic  -0.315 -0.229  -0.161 -0.162 
  -2.34*   -1.64  -3.80*** -3.30**  
HAS- High  0.039 -0.033  0.137 0.135 
  0.34 -0.3  3.24** 3.13**  
Water distance   6.58E-06   1.31E-06 
   3.54***   2.65**  
Constant 1.357 1.359 1.135 1.17 1.195 1.192 
 13.89*** 9.83*** 5.99*** 17.10*** 13.99*** 6.88*** 
Observation 1405 1405 1405 3657 3657 3657 
ll -2.90E+03 -2.90E+03 -2.90E+03    
Note: Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
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B-33c: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Reduced 
Form Model) 
 GLSS 1   GLSS 4   














Primary -0.569 -0.487 -0.496 -0.474 -0.4 -0.401 
 -2.56*   -2.18*   -2.21*   -3.89*** -3.25** -3.27**  
Middle/JSS -1.138 -0.867 -0.881 -0.817 -0.691 -0.691 
 -7.24*** -5.30*** -5.32*** -6.98*** -5.52*** -5.53*** 
Sec.& above -1.771 -1.312 -1.316 -1.386 -1.188 -1.188 
 -8.35*** -5.91*** -5.91*** -12.25*** -9.12*** -9.14*** 
Still in school -0.373 -0.336 -0.35 -0.36 -0.376 -0.375 
 -2.97**  -2.30*   -2.38*   -6.81*** -6.15*** -6.09*** 
Age25-34 1.972 2.011 2.003 1.831 1.885 1.885 
 17.21*** 17.42*** 17.35*** 23.54*** 25.28*** 25.30*** 
Age35-49 4.135 4.235 4.229 3.997 4.005 4.005 
 21.63*** 22.02*** 22.00*** 38.22*** 38.53*** 38.62*** 
Northern Region -0.209 -0.495 -0.463 0.044 -0.245 -0.223 
 -0.81 -1.84 -1.71 0.57 -2.62** -2.56*   
Muslim  0.578 0.562  0.115 0.13 
  3.01**  2.91**   0.88 0.98 
Traditional  0.426 0.441  0.59 0.579 
  1.59 1.64  1.5 1.47 
Other  -0.302 -0.312  0.01 0.01 
  -1.04 -1.07  0.04 0.04 
Non-Akan  -0.267 -0.266  -0.013 -0.015 
  -2.12*   -2.11*    -0.17 -0.19 
HAS- Basic  -0.223 -0.24  -0.19 -0.193 
  -4.25*** -4.43***  -4.63*** -4.75*** 
HAS- High  -0.003 -0.002  0.154 0.158 
  -0.16 -0.08  3.49*** 3.62*** 
Water distance   -1.51E-04   -3.78E-05 
   -1.11   -1.35 
Constant 1.681 1.673 1.727 1.11 1.206 1.212 
 12.20*** 9.93*** 9.75*** 11.14*** 9.74*** 9.86*** 
Observation 835 835 835 2206 2206 2206 
ll -1.60E+03 -1.60E+03 -1.60E+03    
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B-33d: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Reduced 
Form Model) 
 GLSS 1   GLSS 4   














Primary -0.213 -0.246 -0.258 -0.287 -0.266 -0.264 
 -1.58 -1.83 -1.9 -3.93*** -3.73*** -3.80*** 
Middle/JSS -0.521 -0.499 -0.499 -0.565 -0.532 -0.524 
 -5.49*** -4.97*** -4.91*** -7.68*** -6.96*** -6.81*** 
Sec.& above -1.036 -0.853 -0.843 -1.138 -1.04 -1.035 
 -6.16*** -4.95*** -4.84*** -11.62*** -10.33*** -10.22*** 
Still in school -0.724 -0.721 -0.719 -0.496 -0.488 -0.482 
 -10.39*** -9.61*** -9.40*** -12.18*** -11.84*** -11.79*** 
Age25-34 2.141 2.144 2.13 2.205 2.221 2.225 
 28.06*** 28.05*** 27.89*** 35.67*** 36.03*** 36.48*** 
Rural 0.299 0.061 -0.105 0.319 0.165 -0.099 
 3.88*** 0.67 -0.82 5.38*** 2.20* -0.74 
Northern Region -0.418 -0.36 -0.341 0.027 0.035 0.091 
 -3.40*** -2.72**  -2.23*   0.25 0.33 0.89 
Muslim  0.063 0.046  -0.097 -0.09 
  0.5 0.37  -1.05 -1.01 
Traditional  0.002 -0.043  0.003 -0.009 
  0.02 -0.35  0.02 -0.05 
Other  -0.288 -0.335  0.088 0.08 
  -1.88 -2.18*    0.63 0.57 
Non-Akan  -0.237 -0.226  -0.103 -0.096 
  -2.97**  -2.77**   -1.87 -1.69 
HAS- Basic  -0.208 -0.198  -0.119 -0.091 
  -4.70*** -4.37***  -3.78*** -2.50*   
HAS- High  -0.006 -0.009  0.061 0.039 
  -0.34 -0.53  2.17* 1.29 
Water distance   7.20E-06   -3.13E-06 
   4.33***   -1.98*   
Constant 1.189 1.447 1.443 0.794 0.925 0.875 
 12.11*** 12.31*** 12.13*** 10.84*** 10.53*** 9.67*** 
Observation 1651 1651 1651 3921 3921 3921 
ll -3.00E+03 -3.00E+03 -3.00E+03    
Note: Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
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B-33e: Regression Results for Number of Children Ever Born, 1987/88 &1998/99 (Reduced 
Form Model) 
Age35-49 GLSS 1   GLSS 4   














Primary -0.017 0.059 0.112 -0.468 -0.357 -0.34 
 -0.05 0.16 0.3 -2.41* -1.86 -1.73 
Middle/JSS -0.851 -0.512 -0.467 -1.432 -1.282 -1.245 
 -3.14**  -1.84 -1.67 -11.00*** -9.60*** -9.48*** 
Sec.& above -2.107 -1.477 -1.55 -2.303 -2.049 -2.005 
 -5.43*** -3.46*** -3.62*** -12.85*** -10.64*** -10.29*** 
Age40-49 1.587 1.566 1.563 1.171 1.139 1.153 
 7.84*** 7.82*** 7.80*** 11.68*** 11.51*** 11.19*** 
Rural 1 0.811 0.69 0.841 0.515 0.823 
 4.46*** 2.68**  1.84 7.08*** 3.65*** 3.39*** 
Northern Region -0.342 -0.702 -1.036 -0.06 -0.351 -0.427 
 -1.35 -2.23*   -2.74**  -0.41 -1.98* -2.22*   
Muslim  1.287 1.355  0.465 0.471 
  3.52*** 3.65***  2.39* 2.35*   
Traditional  0.122 0.045  0.18 0.183 
  0.41 0.14  0.76 0.78 
Other  0.076 0.145  0.14 0.095 
  0.19 0.35  0.44 0.29 
Non-Akan  -0.203 -0.205  -0.297 -0.301 
  -0.88 -0.86  -2.36* -2.38*   
HAS- Basic  -0.335 -0.348  -0.203 -0.238 
  -2.78**  -2.84**   -3.03** -3.35*** 
HAS- High  0.019 0.019  0.317 0.327 
  0.15 0.14  4.69*** 4.80*** 
Water distance   -5.81E-05   2.45E-06 
   -1.17   4.74*** 
Constant 4.9 4.889 4.932 4.78 5.026 5.042 
 20.26*** 15.84*** 15.73*** 36.13*** 30.56*** 30.08*** 
Observation 589 589 589 1942 1942 1942 
ll -1.40E+03 -1.30E+03 -1.30E+03    
Note: Sample weights are applied in the estimations of GLSS 4. 
a.  Results on community variables are reported in table 3.45. 
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B-34a: The Impact of Control Variables on Fertility (Reduced Form Model), by All Women, 
Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 (Pooled) 
Pooled Full Rural Urban Age15-34 Age35-49 
 Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio Coef./t-ratio 
Model 2      
Still in school -0.456 -0.652 -0.32 -0.538  
 -12.19*** -13.16*** -6.53*** -16.53***  
Age25-34 2.193 2.385 1.876 2.189  
 53.55*** 43.95*** 30.89*** 53.88***  
Age35-49 4.686 5.044 4.062   
 86.19*** 72.23*** 48.12***   
Age4049     1.256 
     13.91*** 
Rural 0.271   0.169 0.559 
 5.40***   3.78*** 4.46*** 
Northern 
Region -0.171 -0.116 -0.213 -0.078 -0.377 
 -2.38* -1.32 -1.65 -1.13 -2.45* 
Muslim 0.152 0.096 0.197 -0.062 0.6 
 2.13* 0.95 1.87 -0.99 3.51*** 
Traditional 0.021 -0.058 0.42 -0.038 0.077 
 0.25 -0.61 1.99* -0.46 0.43 
Other -0.009 -0.01 -0.108 -0.046 0.078 
 -0.09 -0.08 -0.59 -0.47 0.34 
Non-Akan -0.198 -0.244 -0.115 -0.141 -0.234 
 -4.41*** -3.99*** -1.8 -3.49*** -2.20* 
HAS- Basic -0.203 -0.195 -0.196 -0.152 -0.274 
 -8.73*** -4.94*** -6.50*** -7.36*** -4.71*** 
HAS- High 0.103 0.12 0.073 0.038 0.276 
 4.91*** 3.51*** 2.84** 2.25* 4.99*** 
Constant 1.001 1.118 1.203 0.975 4.748 
 16.32*** 17.09*** 13.16*** 17.12*** 31.73*** 
Observation 8103 5062 3041 5572 2531 
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B-34b: The Impact of Additional Control/Community Variables on Fertility (Reduced Form 
Model), by All Women, Residence & Age Ȃ 1987/88 & 1998/99 (Pooled) 












Water distance  2.57E-06 2.46E-06 -3.18E-05 5.51E-06 1.34E-06 
 1.88 1.75 -0.66 2.76**  1.38 
Market distance 0.001 0.001  0.002 -0.001 
 0.71 0.42  1.57 -0.3 
Primary school distance 0.001 0.001  0.001 0.001 
 0.75 0.65  1.25 0.3 
Middle/JSS school distance -2.06E-04 1.56E-04  -0.001 0.002 
 -0.1 0.07  -0.65 0.48 
Secondary school distance -0.001 -0.001  -0.001 -0.001 
 -1.4 -1.31  -1.51 -0.3 
Access to Health 
facilities/personnel 0.01 0.005  -0.005 0.008 
 0.23 0.12  -0.14 0.08 
Price score of cereals -0.023 -0.019  -1.90E-02 0.046 
 -0.79 -0.65  -0.67 0.66 
Price score of foodstuffs -0.004 -0.003  -0.013 -0.042 
 -0.22 -0.14  -0.67 -0.56 
Log of real Men's Agric. Wage -0.001 0.002  0.026 -0.041 
 -0.09 0.16  2.34*   -1.42 
Ratio of female to men's 
wage 0.113 0.112  0.092 0.105 
 1.64 1.59  1.42 0.69 
Ratio of child to men's wage 0.074 0.064  -0.025 0.274 
 1.07 0.9  -0.38 1.73 
Constant 0.983 1.013 1.209 0.931 4.766 
 15.60*** 8.33*** 13.12*** 16.01*** 30.74*** 
Observation 8103 5062 3041 5572 2531 
Log-likelihood -1.60E+04 -1.00E+04 -5.70E+03 -9.60E+03 -5.70E+03 
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APPENDIX C:  
Unearned Income 











0.00 0.00 6.08 7.70 9.56





















0.00 0.00 0.00 7.76 9.14 9.86 10.82 12.53



























0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.97 9.67 10.40 11.30 12.71






















0.00 0.00 0.00 4.44 5.78 6.68 7.49 8.25 9.12





















0.00 0.00 0.00 4.53 5.93 6.93 7.60 8.48 9.55
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